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"Rose of Resilience"

In the Spring of 2018, I studied abroad in Glasgow, Scotland. During my Spring break, I was able to travel around Europe with my friend. One of our destinations was Auschwitz. While I of course knew the history behind the Holocaust, I did not entirely grasp the horrific reality of it. Seeing everything with my own eyes and walking the same paths which so many walked to their death was overwhelming. I took this photo when I was in the women's quarters. My tour group was listening to our tour guide and taking photos of a wall where the women would draw images to entertain the children. As I waited for the crowd to clear, I walked down a small hall where I saw this live rose placed in a patch of sunlight in one of the bunkers. The tour guide mentioned that relatives or visitors will often place flowers throughout the camp to honor and remember their loved ones or to pay their respects. This striking image truly took my breath away. I was already trying to wrap my head around what these poor people endured and seeing a live rose in the light reminded me of their incredible resilience and how they endured the atrocities set before them with courage, strength, and remarkable perseverance. I was truly humbled, moved, and inspired by this extraordinary moment and I am always happy to share this photo and my experience with others.

Photo by Lydia Cooper, Psychology major and Studio Art minor

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The Carolina International Relations Association (CIRA) is UNC's leading international affairs club, engaging undergraduates across the university on global issues of the day. CIRA is devoted to fostering critical thought, discussion, and debate on current international problems, stimulating creative and effective responses to them, and developing the analytical, communicational, and team building skills of its members and the broader university community.

Through our Model United Nations conferences and travel team, Campus Affairs branch, *The Internationalist Undergraduate Journal of Foreign Affairs*, general body meetings, campus-wide events, and social opportunities, there are a variety of ways to get involved!

If you are interested in learning more about what we do, please visit our website at https://uncira.org/. At this link, you can also subscribe to our listserv!

Moreover, if you would like to submit a paper for publication in the Spring 2020 issue of *The Internationalist*, please send your piece to theinternationalistcira@gmail.com. Articles must be at least seven pages long double spaced, and have been written since you began attending college. More information about the requirements can be found at https://uncira.org/the-internationalist/submissions.

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FROM THE EDITOR

It is easy for Americans to ignore events abroad. The United States is surrounded by two very large oceans; is defended by the world's most capable military; boasts one of the largest and most advanced economies; and is the center for global finance, higher education, entertainment, and contemporary pop culture. However, as we progress further into the 21st century, we may soon find that we are not as immune to the trends, occurrences, and calamities transpiring all around us as we once thought. Now, more than ever, must we strive to learn about the world, so that we may better orient ourselves in an increasingly uncertain and unpredictable international system.

The Internationalist was founded in 2015 with the aim of cultivating a greater appreciation for global affairs among the UNC student body through its publication of biannual issues of selected undergraduate-written papers. Thanks to the hard work and dedication of the editorial and design staff, this will be the first time the journal achieves its goal of circulating two publications in a single year. Volume IV Issue I is the first Fall semester issue in the journal's history, while Issue II is scheduled to be released this coming Spring.

This year's executive team implemented several noteworthy reforms to enhance the quality of the journal. These included expanding the size of the editorial staff, introducing greater executive oversight over the editing process, administering mandatory fact-checks for all citations, and holding weekly staff meetings to both more closely monitor the journal's progress, as well as to promote a greater sense of camaraderie among the editors. Fulfilling many of these new responsibilities often proved taxing – especially when striving to balance them with the demands of college life – and I am extremely proud of our editorial, design, and executive teams for rising to the challenge and carrying out these duties with meticulousness, diligence, and integrity.

This issue contains articles ranging from nuclear proliferation in North Korea and South Africa to immunization initiatives in Kenya, and from US economic sanction strategies to recent Vietnamese government efforts to boost electrification rates. Finally, the journal concludes with an article comparing the effectiveness of violent protests in democratization efforts in both Apartheid South Africa and the Jim Crow American South. With authors from Carolina, Wake Forest, and one even as far away as the National University of Singapore, this publication offers fascinating insights into a plethora of global issues from both the past and the present. We hope you enjoy reading them.

Sincerely,

Patrick Clifford
Editor-in-Chief

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Atomic Apartheid: South Africa's Nuclear Arsenal and Strategy

By Goh Swee Yik

Goh Swee Yik is a global history senior and a joint-degree student at both UNC Chapel Hill and the National University of Singapore. This topic stemmed from an interest in nuclear weapons and authoritarian regimes that lean a little too far to the right.

In March of 1993, South African president, Frederik Willem (F.W.) de Klerk, simultaneously announced the existence and dismantlement of a clandestine nuclear weapons program, making South Africa the only country to both create and completely disarm its own nuclear arsenal.[1] With disarmament coinciding with the last days of Apartheid, the program can be seen as a symbol of Pretoria's segregation-era paranoia.[2] In the face of increasing international opposition toward a system of institutionalized racism, South Africa's white leaders sought to defend their regime with nuclear weapons. However, South Africa's unique geopolitical circumstances raise questions regarding the necessity of a nuclear arsenal. Even with only conventional arms, South Africa was southern Africa's predominant military power.[3] Moreover, South Africa's nuclear arsenal, which comprised of six to seven warheads, was paltry compared to the thousands of warheads possessed by the superpowers of the day - the United States and the Soviet Union.[4] Assessing the considerations that drove South Africa's nuclear weapons program, this essay argues that Apartheid South Africa's racial and Cold War concerns resulted in the militarization of what began as a civilian nuclear scientific endeavor. The need to protect the Apartheid regime and the Afrikaner people from the threat of communist-backed black nationalist forces, through securing the assistance of ambivalent Western powers, dictated the unique characteristics of Pretoria's nuclear strategy of catalytic deterrence. This essay begins by discussing South Africa's initial foray into nuclear research, before examining the organizational and geopolitical factors that led to the creation of South Africa's nuclear arsenal. Finally, this paper will conclude by analyzing South Africa's nuclear strategy of catalytic deterrence.

Background: South Africa's Foray into Nuclear S&T

Before examining the country's nuclear weapons program in detail, it is necessary to investigate the origins of nuclear science and technology (S&T) in South Africa. South Africa enjoys an abundance of uranium ore deposits, which a 1979 report estimated to comprise 25 percent of the non-communist world's total reserves.[5] Rapid advances in nuclear technology in the 1940s saw uranium become an increasingly lucrative export for the mineral-rich nation. To facilitate uranium ore extraction, South Africa established the Atomic Energy Board (AEB) in 1949. However, the country's entry into nuclear S&T only began in 1957, when the AEB initiated an extensive research program into nuclear energy. The AEB hoped to not only find an alternative energy source for oil-scarce South Africa, but also to develop technology for uranium enrichment, which would increase its export value. Around the same time, the AEB also received Anglo-American technological aid. While the British provided unclassified information on nuclear reactor production, the assistance provided by the American

"Atoms for Peace" initiative was much more extensive.[6] The initiative began with a 1957 bilateral agreement which was aimed at promoting the peaceful use of nuclear technology in South Africa. For the Americans, it was also intended to shift global attention away from the US' own growing nuclear arsenal. The agreement not only allowed the South African government to request "special nuclear material" (e.g. highly-enriched uranium [HEU]), but it also provided the country with its first nuclear reactor in 1965.[7] Greatly aided by foreign support, the AEB's research efforts led to the establishment of the Uranium Enrichment Corporation in 1970, with the construction of an enrichment plant (otherwise known as "Y-plant") beginning a year later in Valindaba, South Africa.[8]

The Y-plant's construction followed a 1969 inquiry into the use of Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs), and was ostensibly meant to capitalize on HEU's increasing export value. In the words of the South African Defence Minister at the time, the proposed uses of PNEs were for "the preparation of underground oil storage facilities and… the dredging of harbors."[9] As construction of the Y-plant began in 1971, the AEB was permitted to conduct preliminary investigations into the building of South Africa's first nuclear device.[10]

Total Onslaught: South Africa's Response to Decolonization and the Cold War

As South Africa's nuclear program progressed, the economic and scientific imperatives that drove it were drastically altered by the ethnocentrism of the country's white rulers, whose ideology clashed with an emerging postcolonial, multi-ethnic world order. From 1948 to 1994, South Africa was ruled by the National Party, a political party dominated by the white Afrikaner minority.[11] As the descendants of Dutch settlers who fought brutal, and at times, genocidal, wars against both African communities and the British Empire up until the early 1900s, the Afrikaner people in the mid-20th century were characterized by a survivalist "laager" (wagon-fort) mentality, focused on the defense of Afrikaner interests.[12] While this materialized in the establishment of Apartheid, a national policy that oppressed the local black population in favor of the white Afrikaner elite, this mentality was at odds with an African continent in the midst of decolonization.[13]

As Africa's white-dominated former colonies gradually achieved independence and established black majority rule, South Africa was increasingly surrounded by governments hostile toward its oppression of its black African population.[14] This hostility was exacerbated by the country's violent enforcement of white minority rule. In the wake of incidents such as the 1960 Sharpeville massacre, in which 69 black protesters were killed by South African police, the United Nations (UN) adopted a voluntary arms embargo on South Africa in 1963.[15] Concurrently, black nationalist groups, such as the African National Congress (ANC) and the Southwest African People's Organization (SWAPO),

also began taking up arms against Pretoria, often with the aid of neighboring African countries such as Tanzania and Zambia. As the rise of black African nationalism threatened Afrikaner political dominance, the "Die Swart Gewaar" ("Black Peril") came to dominate Pretoria's security concerns.[16]

If the "Black Peril" posed a considerable threat toward Apartheid South Africa, the involvement of the communist bloc only served to worsen the Afrikaners' own perceived vulnerability. While the Soviet Union provided considerable amounts of military aid to the ANC and SWAPO in their struggle against Apartheid, the African states which supported them also embraced leftist ideologies.[17] Consequently, the "Black Peril" threat soon evolved into a concept known as "Total Onslaught," which surmised that the combined forces of communism and black nationalism posed an existential threat to South Africa and the Afrikaner people.[18] This conceptualization was mainly driven by the Afrikaners' own survivalist paranoia, with the Afrikaans media portraying Pretoria's struggle as one "between the forces of order and chaos."[19] Such concerns were certainly aided by the presence of Cold War interests in the region As the Soviet Union sought to gain a foothold in sub-Saharan Africa, the United States cooperated with Pretoria to undermine Soviet influence in newly decolonized countries, such as Angola.[20] Despite America's opposition toward colonialism and white minority rule, this cooperation reinforced the notion that South Africa was a crucial

anti-communist ally on the frontlines of the Cold War.[21]

This mixture of racial and Cold War concerns led to the militarization of South African society, with its Afrikaner elite viewing their country as "a last redoubt of Christianity and Western civilization against a reversal to primitiveness and chaos."[22] Defense spending increased six-fold from 1961 to 1968, and the civilian cabinet position of Secretary of Defence was taken over by a uniformed officer from the South African Defence Force (SADF).[23] South Africa's militarization eventually spread to its civilian nuclear program, altering initial plans to build a peaceful nuclear device.

"All means at our disposal": South Africa's Deteriorating Geopolitical Situation

Before becoming a rogue nuclear state, South Africa actively participated in the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1957, where for twenty years it represented Africa on the Board of Directors.[24] This initial enthusiasm for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons serves to highlight the importance of the aforementioned factors in Pretoria's decision to ultimately militarize its nuclear research and development efforts.

South Africa's changing attitude toward nuclear proliferation became evident in the years leading up to its experiments with peaceful nuclear explosions. When negotiations for what became the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) began in the mid 1960s, the prime minister of South Africa, Hendrik Verwoerd, refused South African participation. With the treaty's negotiations occurring a year after the UN arms embargo on South Africa, Verwoerd stated that South Africa "had a duty to consider

In Reykjanesfólkvangur, Iceland, clouds appear to materialize from the earth. This site is a location of high geothermal activity that can appear extraterrestrial, like much of the island. A dilapidated bridge is visible on the bottom right of the image, indicating the instability of Icelandic landscapes.

Kyle Lambert, Senior Biology major

the military uses of nuclear technology."[25] This stemmed from Pretoria's worries about its worsening geopolitcal isolation and the "Total Onslaught" bogeyman. When Verwoerd's successor, John Vorster, announced South Africa's foray into uranium enrichment in 1970, the proclimation was accompanied by the country's outright rejection of the NPT.[26]

Pretoria's rebuff of the NPT did not mean that the PNE program was simply a military project in disguise. While some AEB researchers, being members of Afrikaner elite, had long argued for a nuclear deterrent against the threat of "Afro-Asiatic" aggression, the PNE program was initially driven by prestige and organizational factors.[27] According to Andre Buys, a former scientist on the AEB explosive team, the program was conceived to retain scientists idled by the cancellation of an earlier nuclear reactor program.[28] Additionally, Pretoria's decision to approve research into PNEs was also driven by a desire to showcase South Africa's scientific capabilities, as well as to demonstrate the inefficacy of the UN's sanctions.

When the first stages of the nuclear program began, South Africa was already gripped by fears of a "Total Onslaught." However, Pretoria's geopolitical position remained stable enough to not necessitate a nuclear deterrent. In the early 1970s, South Africa was still surrounded by friendly white minority governments in countries like Rhodesia, Mozambique, and Angola.[29] This explains the SADF's exclusion from the PNE program until 1974, when the

AEB first requested the use of a military firing range in the Kalahari Desert as a nuclear testing site.[30] Before that, the program was conducted in utmost secrecy, with its existence being known only to Prime Minister Vorster, the AEB, and select members of Armaments Corporation of South Africa (ARMSCOR) - a government-linked arms producer which had been established in the wake of the UN arms embargo.[31]

As the 1970s progressed, however, South Africa's geopolitical situation began to deteriorate, providing the impetus for the militarization of the PNE program. Although South Africa continued to see itself as a vital Cold War belligerent, the assumption that it could rely upon its Western allies for support was compromised in 1975, when South Africa invaded Angola to prevent a takeover by Soviet-backed black nationalists.[32] The invasion was covertly supported by the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), but it failed when the CIA was forced to withdraw its assistance following a Congressional investigation.[33] At the same time, the black nationalist forces were reinforced by thousands of Cuban troops, whose presence also triggered fears of a Soviet bloc invasion of South Africa. Such fears only abated with the end of the Cold War in 1991.[34] In addition to this perceived betrayal by its Western allies, South Africa's perilous security situation was worsened by the establishment of black nationalist governments in neighboring Mozambique and Rhodesia.[35] Pretoria's crackdown

on local black dissidents also bolstered the ranks of anti-Apartheid forces. In 1976, peaceful student protests in the Soweto township against the introduction of Afrikaans as the primary language for use in schools was brutally crushed by security forces. This resulted in thousands of black youths joining uMkhonto we Sizwe - the armed wing of the ANC.[36]

As South Africa's geopolitical situation deteriorated, the impact on its PNE program was evident through the ominous nature of Pretoria's public statements regarding its nuclear program. When questioned about the existence of a South African bomb in February, 1977, Information and Interior Minister, Connie Mulder, declared that "…if it comes to a question of our existence…we will use all means at our disposal."[37]

Any reservations about a fully-fledged South African nuclear weapons program ended after Soviet surveillance satellites detected preparations for a nuclear test in the Kalahari Desert in July of 1977.[38] The subsequent international outcry, coupled with immense Western diplomatic pressure, led to the dismantlement of the Kalahari site; however, not without a massive South African crackdown on black dissidents being carried out at the same time.[39] These factors led the United States to declare the racial policies of its Cold War ally a threat to international security. On October 27, 1977, American president, Jimmy Carter, announced his support for what became UN Resolution 418 - a compulsory arms embargo on South

Africa that included bans on its import of nuclear fuel.[40] Coupled with Pretoria's expulsion from the IAEA's Board of Governors for its continued refusal to accede to the NPT, South Africa's isolation was cemented by the end of 1977, just as the perceived threat of a communist-backed black nationalist "Total Onslaught" worsened.[41]

## "It would be suicide": Formulating a South African Nuclear Strategy

In the face of increasing international isolation and worsening internal security conditions, ensuring the survival and political supremacy of the Afrikaner people in South Africa remained Pretoria's overarching concern. This formed the basis of South Africa's nuclear weapons strategy, which was finalized after the creation of its first nuclear weapon in 1978.[42] Although Pretoria's rhetoric in the 1960s and 1970s raised the possibility of a South African nuclear deterrent, the first instance in which a nuclear military strategy of any kind was considered only emerged in March of 1975 with the Armstrong Memorandum. Named after its author, SADF Chief of Defence Staff, R. F. Armstrong, the memorandum proposed the acquisition of the Israeli Jericho Weapon System, which consisted of missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. Envisioning the threat of a hostile African nation acquiring nuclear weapons from communist China (an assessment evidently influenced by the concept of "Total Onslaught"), Armstrong argued that the missiles would "greatly add to

[Pretoria's] ability to negotiate from a position of strength."[43] Armstrong's recommendations resembled the deterrence strategies used by the Cold War superpowers, where the threat of mutually assured destruction between similarly equipped nuclear states would prevent a nuclear first-strike against South Africa. However, the memorandum's recommendations were ultimately never adopted, and the SADF's leadership, - most of whom were still in the dark about the ongoing nuclear program - decided against developing their own nuclear weapons for budgetary reasons.[44] Additionally, Armstrong's proposed threat of a hostile African nation was overshadowed by fears of a direct confrontation with the communist bloc, following Cuba's intervention in Angola in 1975. While a handful of nuclear missiles might deter a small, hostile African nation, South Africa could never hope to employ a strategy of deterrence against the powerful Soviet Union or one of its well-equipped communist allies.[45]

Efforts to formulate an official nuclear strategy only commenced during the Witvlei committee meeting in 1978, a year following the aborted Kalahari test. Formed by Prime Minister P.W. Botha, who succeeded Vorster that same year, the committee included the prime minister, cabinet members, and leading members of the SADF, AEB, and ARMSCOR.[46] Although the AEB had already built two atomic bombs by 1979, both were cumbersome devices, unable to be used in any situation other than at testing sites.[47] As a result, the

committee recommended the building of air-deliverable bombs to increase the credibility of Pretoria's nuclear deterrent. The first of these bombs was produced by ARMSCOR in 1982, with the capability of being delivered by SADF aircraft.[48]

Despite the Witvlei recommendations of creating a nuclear arsenal with the purpose of deterring other states from attacking South Africa, the committee nonetheless deemed the use of atomic weapons on the battlefield as inconceivable.[49] By 1978, the main threat perceived by Pretoria was the possibility of a Soviet-backed invasion of South Africa, spearheaded by African and Cuban troops stationed in neighboring countries. The credibility of a country's nuclear deterrent depends on its willingness to use its warheads against another state. However, a South African nuclear attack on Soviet-backed troops could trigger a devastating retaliatory response by the Soviet Union.[50] Given that South Africa's meager nuclear arsenal was incapable of striking the Soviet Union, South Africa had no means of credibly deterring a Soviet attack. Consequently, South Africa adopted a "no-use" policy regarding its atomic weapons. This "no-use" policy was seen most evidently in a 1985 review of South Africa's nuclear weapons program, which capped the county's arsenal at seven warheads, and also stated that none of the weapons were intended for offensive uses.[51] Prime Minister Botha also admonished ARMSCOR officials who proposed the construction of more powerful thermonuclear weapons, stat-

The nineteen sloped terraces of the Bahá'í Gardens overlook the busy port of Haifa in northern Israel. This expansive, perfectly manicured greenspace on the slope of Mt. Carmel houses the sacred shrine and tomb of the Prophet-Herald of the Bahá'í faith, the Báb. Baha'ism is a monotheistc religion which embraces such teachings as eradication of prejudice and universal education.

Mikhal Ben-Joseph, First Year Biostatistics and Public Policy double major

An Icelandic ram captured while roaming the hot springs near Reykjavik during the summer of 2016. He posed briefly to show his support of the Carolina Tar Heels.

Isabel Donnolo, Junior Biology major

ing that "these devices will never be used…as it would be suicide."[52]

"The Yanks will come running": Catalytic Deterrence & Conclusion

The battlefield deployment of South Africa's nuclear arsenal would have posed an existential threat to the Afrikaner people in the form of a Soviet nuclear response, so the Witvlei committee instead formulated a three-phased strategy of what observers called "Catalytic Deterrence." Here, Pretoria's nuclear arsenal would have been used to secure the aid of an ambivalent ally,

such as the United States, even if the weapons were never intended to be used. The first phase called for "strategic ambiguity" in peacetime, in which the existence of South Africa's nuclear deterrent would neither be confirmed nor denied.[53] Although the term "peacetime" was relative given the SADF's near constant skirmishes against anti-Apartheid forces, this phase was maintained until President F.W. de Klerk disclosed South Africa's nuclear program in 1993. Given the severe backlash caused by the discovery of its planned nuclear test of 1977, the premature disclosure of Pretoria's nuclear arsenal could have prov-

en fatal to what was left of the country's frayed international ties.[54] In the face of a sizable military threat, however, the second phase would see the covert disclosure of South Africa's nuclear arsenal to leading Western governments, compelling them to aid the beleaguered South African regime. Should this fail, however, the final phase would see either an official statement announcing the existence of a nuclear arsenal, or a nuclear test in the Kalahari Desert.

In the second and third stages, Pretoria sought to leverage on several factors in order to force its Western allies to ignore their disdain for the Apartheid

regime, and instead help ensure its continued existence. Firstly, the introduction of nuclear weapons into southern Africa could encourage other African countries to create their own nuclear deterrents.[55] As a result, the non-proliferation regime established by the NPT that the superpowers sought to maintain would have been severely compromised. Secondly, the presence of a nuclear arsenal in the region could stoke fears of a nuclear war, especially if a desperate South African government on the verge of collapse decided to use its weapons against African or Soviet-backed troops. Lastly, even if Pretoria fell without using its nuclear deterrent, the country's leaders hoped that the Americans would be alarmed at the prospect of South African warheads falling into the hands of an unstable, communist-backed black nationalist government.[56] These factors highlight how South Africa's strategy of "Catalytic Deterrence" was ultimately an elaborate bluff which sought to obtain concessions through a nuclear threat that it had no intention of carrying out.

Apartheid South Africa's initial foray into civilian nuclear research was drastically altered by the racial and Cold War fears which plagued the increasingly isolated and beleaguered ethnocentric state. While Pretoria's nuclear arsenal was intended to ensure the protection of Afrikaner interests, the devastating consequences of its actual use meant that it was only an elaborate feint aimed at generating support from countries, such as the United States, which otherwise would have shunned the pariah state.

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American Economic Sanctions Policy and Effectiveness Against Iran, Cuba, and North Korea

By Nikhil Raj

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Woodrow Wilson once said, "A nation that is boycotted is a nation that is in sight of surrender. Apply this economic, peaceful, silent, deadly remedy and there will be no need for force."[1] The use of military force and violence as a dimension of foreign policy has existed for as long as humankind itself. In the 20th and 21st centuries, however, a new and possibly more potent form of diplomacy has ascended in the form of economic and financial sanctions, utilized mainly by large countries or international organizations, such as the United Nations (UN), in order to apply pressure on a targeted country.

Sanctions are implemented alongside an explicit political agenda within the context of foreign policy. In some instances, such as using the justification of national security concerns, sanctions can even be considered an element of domestic policy. With this in mind, this paper will use a series of case studies to examine how the United States has used economic and financial sanctions as an arm of its foreign policy in recent years. Specifically, this article will compare the ongoing American sanction strategies against Iran, Cuba, and North Korea, consider the US' foreign policy goals at each stage, and reflect on how successful the unilateral and multilateral sanctions have been in the context of attaining those goals.

Background on Sanctions

The United States has been a leading advocate of employing sanctions as an alternative to military force. The US is currently punishing over twenty countries to varying degrees with sanctions on an ever-changing basis.[2] The nature of these sanctions ranges from those targeting a particular industry, such as a country's oil or gas exports, to a full-scale trade embargo that aims to completely isolate a country from the global economy. An example of the latter is the United States' approach to Cuba, where the US has attempted to clamp down on the island's communist regime through completely halting all trade involving American markets and Cuba.

In their book, "Economic Sanctions Reconsidered," Gary Hufbauer et al. note that sanctions can usually be categorized into three main forms. First, sender countries often seek to inflict economic damage through limiting the exports produced by the sanctioned country. Second, sanctions typically include a restriction of imports on select goods and services from the targeted country. Finally, financial sanctions can be imposed through the "freezing or seizing [of] target-country assets within the sender's control."[3]

All this begs the question: What does the United States, or any other state or international organization, seek to gain from imposing unilateral or multilateral sanctions on a target nation? According to the Council on Foreign Relations, governments and international organizations impose economic sanctions to "coerce, deter, pun-

ish, or shame entities that endanger their interests or violate international norms of behavior."[4] This intentionally open-ended definition can lend itself to several justifications, whether they be disapproval of a political structure or leadership, human rights violations, weapons proliferation, or support for terrorism, among others. For example, during Apartheid-era South Africa, the international community, including the United States, United Kingdom (UK), and the European Communities (the predecessor to today's European Union [EU]), imposed sanctions on various South African goods and services, such as steel and iron, as well as barred the importation of the South African rand. This orchestrated strangling of the South African economy in order to weaken the racist Apartheid regime is an example of a coordinated effort to enact political change in a country through economic measures. Normally, unilateral economic sanctions are levied by a politically and economically powerful nation, such as the United States, against a much smaller targeted nation. That nation would then have little choice but to give in to the demands of the larger state or face economic collapse. However, sanctions are typically more effective if they are multilaterally coordinated, and thereby serve to cut off all alternative trading partners of the targeted country, leaving it with no choice but to capitulate.[5]

The World Trade Organization and the international trade community's general framework is based off of what is known as the Heckscher-Ohlin the-

ory. This widely accepted conjecture promulgates the thinking that two nations will account for their respective factors of production, decide on a factor-intensive and abundant good in which to specialize and export, and simultaneously import a less abundant good. The implementation of economic sanctions, which close off open market trading activity and limit free trade, is an intentional attempt to flip the Heckscher-Ohlin theory on its head and pressure a targeted nation into making concessions.[6] In theory, the subsequent isolation of the recipient will lead to the domestic political change desired by the executioner of the sanctions.

One consistent criticism of economic sanctions is that they hurt innocent civilians and individual consumers more than they do targeted governments. A similar charge is often attributed to tariffs, with critics saying that domestic consumers have to bear the brunt of the economic burden due to heightened domestic prices. As a result, a significant shift has taken place in recent years. "Smart sanctions" have replaced the sweeping sanctions of the past which caused widespread political and economic blowback. This term refers to economic penalties that are intended to strike at unsavory governments while mitigating the negative externalities that affect average citizens of the targeted nation. Travel bans and individual asset freezes are two such examples of this concept, as they target individuals and small groups (usually political leaders and their entourages) rather than a country's entire economy.[7]

Iran

Iran currently faces a wide range of economic and financial sanctions imposed upon it by the US and EU. However, it is far from the first time foreign powers have levied punitive measures against the beleaguered Middle Eastern nation. In order to analyze contemporary American economic sanctions on Iran, one must understand the chain of events that preceded the hostile US-Iranian bilateral relationship.

The United Kingdom enacted strict sanctions on Iran in the early 1950s, decades before the Islamic Revolution of 1979, when Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh decided to nationalize the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), which previously had 51 percent ownership by the UK government. As a result, the British government imposed significant sanctions on Iran, including a prohibition of British sugar and steel exports to the country.[8] The American government involved itself in the situation since the nationalization of the AIOC represented a sudden lurch in the direction of socialism, in an era of intensifying US-Soviet rivalry. Widespread paranoia of communist expansion at the beginning of the Cold War led to the CIA-backed overthrow of Mossadegh and the subsequent propping up of the corrupt and aloof monarchy under the Shah. This action spurred anti-Shah sentiment that culminated in the Iranian Revolution of 1979.[9]

The Iranian Revolution led to one of the most contentious periods of US-Iran relations, resulting in the hostage

crisis that lasted over a year and left a stain on Jimmy Carter's foreign policy record. At the beginning of the crisis, President Carter blocked sales of Iranian oil while also signing Executive Order 12170 which froze all Iranian assets held in the United States. The move was notable for the expansiveness of the sanctions, as it was the first time a president had ever employed the sweeping powers offered by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, which effectively allows the president to control commerce under the designation of a national emergency. This served as a warning shot to Iran.[10] The US then tried to rally support from its allies to cut off the Iranian oil trade to further pressure the new theocratic regime into releasing the hostages; albeit, with little success.

As diplomacy and sanctions failed to bring the American hostages back safely, the Carter administration ratcheted up pressure by cutting off food aid, as well as imposing a trade embargo on Iran. Ultimately, the hostages were brought home safely, but not before a calamitous mission named Operation Eagle Claw left eight American servicemen dead.[11] According to then-Treasury officials Richard J. Davis and Robert Carswell, the approximately $12 billion of frozen Iranian assets, most of which were parked in US foreign policy reserves, played a large role in the sudden decision by the Iranians to release the hostages out of fear of further economic suffering and isolation from the international community.[12]

Ever since the hostage crisis, the United States' main foreign policy goals in Iran have revolved around counter-terrorism and preventing the build up of a nuclear weapons program. In 1983, Iranian proxies were incriminated in the Beirut bombings of an American Marine barracks, which killed hundreds of US troops, and landed Iran on the State Sponsor of Terrorism list. The signature usage of sanctions in response to state-sponsored financing of terrorist activity was seen in the 1996 Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), which barred US firms from engaging in trade and investment with Iran.[13]

When it comes to nuclear nonproliferation, the United States has continuously used economic sanctions to try to bring Iran to the negotiation table. Ultimately, America's sanction campaign against Iran led to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which was negotiated in the final years of the Obama administration. Prior to the so-called "Iran Nuclear Deal," the Obama administration was firmly committed to employing a wide range of punitive economic measures to urge Iran to suspend its suspected nuclear weapons program. Like his predecessors, President Obama enacted sanctions when his original diplomatic overtures failed to yield any significant changes.[14]

One such mechanism the administration used was the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA), which one-upped the punishments put forth by the ILSA (now known as the Iran Sanctions Act, or ISA). Importantly, CISADA targeted foreign banks that knowingly facilitated transactions related to Iranian weapons of mass destruction, support for terrorism, activities of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and activities of individuals sanctioned under previous UN Security Council resolutions. Under the new law, foreign financial institutions found to have participated in any such transactions would be barred from accessing their corresponding US bank accounts.[15] The stringent sanctions enforced by the Obama administration dealt a significant blow to the Iranian economy, with US Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew estimating it to be 15 to 20 percent smaller as a result of the sanctions.[16] Additionally, the sanctions "resulted in a two year economic recession in Iran, a decline of the currency (Rial) by 56 percent between January 2012 and January 2014, a period in which inflation reached 40 percent."[17]

The negative economic externalities of America's sanctions were felt in Tehran and throughout the country. According to the Congressional Research Service, Iran experiencd a 50 percent decrease in crude oil exports from 2012 to 2015, and a period of stark economic decline that only ended with the signing of the JCPOA in 2015.[18] In addition to the American sanctions, both the EU and UN enforced sanctions of their own, which involved everything from a block on arms exports to a ban on materials that can be used to increase uranium production.[19] Using these multilateral sanctions as leverage, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, in addition to Germany

I spent time walking the beaches of Gisborne to find old lighthouses and spectacular scenery. However, on my walks I met some Maori people, a group indigenous to New Zealand. They taught me how to find and collect "pupu", a sea snail that they cook. In fact, the tradition of collecting the sea snails is pretty much unwritten about in New Zealand literature; I felt privileged to witness such a quintessential and private tradition.

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and the EU, pressured the Iranians to significantly reduce their stockpile of uranium as part of the promised suspension of their nuclear program.

The multilateral accord prompted the removal of secondary sanctions by the US as well as the sanctions put forth by the UN and EU. Iran enjoyed significant relief as a result, seeing a 7

percent annual economic growth rate, reinstated access to foreign exchange reserves, and key foreign investment which breathed life into a gasping economy.[20] However, President Trump campaigned in 2016 on canceling the "Iran Deal" and bringing back the economic sanctions that were ended as part of the JCPOA agreement. These secondary sanctions, which have been reinstated and expanded during the Trump administration, substantially restrict foreign inflows of capital into Iran. Signatories of the JCPOA were livid at the unilateral American decision to withdraw from the accord. Fearing further diplomatic fallout, the US originally granted six month exemptions with respect to oil trade with Iran to eight countries, including China and India.[21] Recently, however, the Trump administration has ended those exemptions, and has threatened to penalize all major importers of Iranian oil after May of 2019.[22]

The EU and UK have responded to the United States' withdrawal by creating a Special Purpose Vehicle to circumvent the secondary sanctions.[23] The Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) was created in late January by the United Kingdom, France and Germany, each of which were original signatories of the JCPOA.[24] It is important to note, however, that INSTEX wasn't established solely out of bitter sentiment against the US; it was also created to show Iran that the other JCPOA signatories were upholding their end of the deal. According to a New York Times report, "they [the other JCPOA signatories] want to encourage Iran to keep in compliance with the deal primarily because they fear that the rapid pursuit of a nuclear weapon by an unrestrained Tehran could lead to a war between Iran on one side and Israel and the United States on the other."[25]

Despite coming close during the JCPOA negotiations, the United States has not yet achieved its maximalist goal of ending the Iranian nuclear weapons program and its suspected financing of terror groups, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon. While the economic, and in particular, financial sanctions, have played a large role in obstructing Iranian economic growth, the international community has not been sufficiently coordinated enough to impel Tehran to change course. By forgoing multilateralism and embracing a unilateral strategy, the United States under the Trump administration has alienated itself from its allies, making its goals of nuclear de-proliferation and potential regime change in Iran significantly less viable.

Cuba

US foreign policy with regards to Cuba can be summarized in one Spanish term: el bloqueo (the blockade). Since the Kennedy administration, the United States has enforced a comprehensive and unilateral economic embargo against the Caribbean nation. Moreover, diplomatic relations were all but non-existent up until the final years of Barack Obama's presidency. The US' antagonistic attitude toward Cuba was a byproduct of an elevated fear of communist and pro-Soviet behavior under the Fidel Castro regime during the Cold War. In 1959, Castro led a faction of revolutionaries who deposed Fulgencio Batista, the US-backed authoritarian leader, and established a new government that the US originally recognized as legitimate. However, increased trade with the Soviet Union, the nationalization of private property, and the introduction of protectionist taxation on American goods by the Castro government led President Kennedy to introduce an economic embargo on Cuba that continues to this day. In addition to the economic blockade, a travel ban was put in place in the early 1960s that precluded American nationals from visiting the Caribbean island nation.[26]

The United States has also cited human rights abuses as a major reason for the blockade and restriction of economic relations with Cuba. Under Fidel Castro and his successor and brother, Raúl, dissidents have been repeatedly repressed and imprisoned. Additionally, freedom of expression is virtually nonexistent, as media outlets are controlled by the state. According to Human Rights Watch, "Independent journalists who publish information considered critical of the government are subject to harassment, smear campaigns, raids on their homes and offices, confiscation of their working materials, and arbitrary arrests. The journalists are held incommunicado, as are artists and academics who demand greater freedoms."[27]

In addition to its communist government and vast human rights abus-

es, in 1982, Cuba was placed on the State Sponsor of Terrorism list due to its support for a guerrilla organization in Colombia, as well as other leftist revolutionary armed militias in Latin America. According to the Peterson Institute for International Economics, "although the Castro regime was very active in providing arms and training to leftist terrorist organizations during the Cold War, Cuba is no longer active in supporting armed struggles around the world. Cuba, however, remains on the terrorist list because it continues to provide safe haven to individual terrorists and maintains ties to Latin American insurgents."[28] One example of Cuba's ties to terrorist groups as cited by the United States is the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional (FALN), or Armed Forces of National Liberation, a militant group devoted toward Puerto Rican independence from the United States. While the extent of Cuban support for FALN has been disputed, the group was one of the region's most active terrorist organizations in the 1970s and 1980s, claiming over 130 attacks on US soil during this time period.[29]

The Cuban embargo has cost the island nation and its people dearly over the past six decades. According to a UN report, the US trade blockade has cost

This picture was taken in the Old City of Jerusalem during the summer of 2019 and showcases the sprawl of rooftops within the Old City's walls. Jerusalem is an ancient center of multiple religions, as seen with the church in the foreground of the picture, and the Old City is the home of various religious sites, such as the Dome of the Rock, the Western Wall, and the Church of the Holy Sepulcher.

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the country over $130 billion, with the economy growing "just 2.4 percent on average per year over the past decade, official statistics show, much less than the 7 percent annual expansion the government has estimated it needs in order to develop."[30] Additionally, while Cuba is unable to access American markets, it also is prohibited from using US dollars when trading with third party countries, unable to use global financial institutions, and alienated from access to new technologies.[31]

One such instance in which the US has attempted to strengthen its economic blockade was in 1996, with the ratification of the Helms-Burton Act, a sweeping law that "extended sanctions to all non-US companies that did any business with Cuba, and allowed US citizens (including naturalized Cuban exiles) to sue foreign companies for dealing in confiscated US property in Cuba."[32] This aggressive move signaled a willingness to further alienate Cuba from world markets and global business activity. Recently, the Trump administration has taken further steps to enforce certain sections of the Helms-Burton Act.

According to Gary Hufbauer et al., the enactment of the blockade on Cuba came with three main objectives: settle expropriation claims, destabilize the Castro government, and discourage Cuba from "foreign military adventures."[33] However, perhaps with the exception of the latter goal, the US has been largely ineffective in achieving its foreign policy objectives in Cuba.

In recent years, the US has shifted its worldwide sanction policy to the side of "smart sanctions," mostly targeting high ranking government officials through punitive financial measures, such as asset freezes and travel bans. In comparison, the continuous and overarching Cuban embargo seems like a relic, one that is unlikely to be replicated against other nations due to both its lack of clear success in enacting change, as well as the enormously negative impact it has had on the Cuban people.

One negative side effect of the embargo is that it has allowed the Cuban leadership to blame economic troubles and slow growth on American policies. According to a 1992 report by the Government Accounting Office ([GAO] renamed to the Government Accountability Office in 2004), the trade embargo on Cuba only emboldened Castro and "allowed the Castro government to use the external threat posed by the United States to win additional popular support. In addition, as a visible symbol of US hostility, the sanctions made it possible for Castro to justify building a large military and establishing tight political controls on Cuban society."[34] Furthermore, the US has justified its trade embargo over the years by pointing out Cuba's abysmal human rights record, but the trade embargo has done little to change the way the Cuban government stifles freedom of press and expression.

Another purpose of the trade embargo on Cuba has been to decrease domestic support for the communist regime in the hopes of inspiring a democratic movement. That said, the blockade arguably did exactly the opposite,

as the unilateral nature of the sanctions meant that Cuba drew closer to the Soviet Union and counted communist trading partners as some of its closest allies. The GAO report goes on to say that "After the United States began cutting quotas on imports of Cuban sugar in mid-l960, Cuba negotiated a series of new trade agreements with communist nations. In only 2 years, Cuba redirected most of its trade from the United States to these nations."[35] Before 1960, 65 to 75 percent of Cuba's trade was with the United States. In 1961, however, the first full year after American sanctions were put in place, "Cuba was sending 75 percent of its exports to the communist bloc and receiving 86 percent of its imports from these nations. The Soviets also began providing large amounts of technical and monetary aid to the Castro government."[36]

Critics of the blanket ban on trade with Cuba have grown louder in recent decades, maintaining that the embargo has negatively impacted the Cuban people while also failing to complete the foreign policy goals set forth by the US government. The United States' main foreign policy priorities and aims in Cuba are multifold, and it remains a contentious issue over whether the embargo should stay in place, especially given that its retraction would be seen as an American admission of defeat. The closest the US and Cuba have come to a resolution happened during the Obama administration, but the Trump administration has since reversed course.

President Obama said repeatedly on

the campaign trail in 2008 that were he to be elected, his administration would seek to normalize relations with Cuba. During his eight years in office, the US radically shifted its Cuban policy, signaling a much more open diplomatic relationship through a series of restriction rollbacks. For example, shortly after entering the White House, President Obama reformed US policy on remittances and travel, allowing for Cuban-Americans and American tourists to engage with the island for the first time in a generation. While under the new rules Americans could only travel to Cuba under the pretext of religious or educational travel, the move was significant and widely perceived as an olive branch to the Cuban government.[37] Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Cuban government under Raúl Castro welcomed the news with open arms, and reciprocated with a host of measures that included preliminary steps toward liberalizing its state-run economy.[38]

However, the most significant development in US-Cuba relations came toward the end of the Obama administration in 2015, when the US and Cuba formally normalized relations for the first time since before Fidel Castro's ascent to power. Moreover, in the last year of his presidency, President Obama called for an end to the trade embargo in exchange for further political and economic liberalization. Given that the status of the embargo was under the jurisdiction of Congress, there was little likelihood that an end to the embargo would occur when President Obama gave an address during his historic visit

to Havana in 2016.

The current administration has swiftly changed course in its approach to Cuba. On one hand, diplomatic relations between the two nations have stayed intact, despite fierce criticism from Donald Trump on the 2016 campaign trail. However, the Trump administration has once again placed a ban on individual travel to Cuba, while also further castigating Cuban President Miguel Diaz-Canel and the communist government. The Trump administration notably has begun to enforce Title III of the Helms-Burton Act, allowing for Americans to sue Cuban companies for confiscating property.[39] With administration figures such as then-National Security Advisor John Bolton and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo repeatedly linking Cuba with a failing Venezuela under socialist President Nicolás Maduro, US-Cuba relations will likely remain poor for the foreseeable future.

North Korea

Since the end of the Korean War in 1953, North Korea has been a target of US sanctions for a variety of transgressions, ranging from its oppressive communist regime to its burgeoning nuclear weapons program. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, the North Korean regime has been repeatedly punished with sanctions by the international community for "cyberattacks, money laundering, and human rights violations."[40]

The United States' foreign policy goals regarding North Korea are multifaceted, much like Iran and Cuba. A

2006 report by the Congressional Research Service highlighted four main motivations for the unilateral sanctions put forth by the US government. North Korea "is seen as posing a threat to US national security…designated by the Secretary of State as a state sponsor or supporter of international terrorism… is a Marxist-Leninist state, with a Communist government…[and] has been found by the State Department to have engaged in proliferation of weapons of mass destruction."[41]

Economic sanctions have been put in place on North Korea since the mid-20th century, partially due to human rights abuses under Kim il-Sung, Kim Jong-il, and now Kim Jong-un. However, the past three decades of American sanction policy has focused on deterring the growing North Korean nuclear weapons program. In 1985, North Korea was a signatory of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), but withdrew in 2003.[42]

Nuclear proliferation has increasingly become the main foreign policy objective of the hermit kingdom, especially given that its nuclear weapons program represents its main means of defense against potential aggression by the United States or its allies. To inhibit foreign influence over its program, North Korea's leadership has removed the country from global nuclear disarmament treaties, attracting a high level of economic and financial sanctions from the international community as a result.

While the United States has led the way in terms of unilateral econom-

This photograph was taken on assignment for La Liga en Cuba, a non-profit organization that was created to promote soccer in Cuba and support its rapidly growing community. Through a variety of services, La Liga is dedicated to providing a safe and positive environment where Cuban youth can develop important values through competition, while giving Cuban coaches, referees and volunteers the opportunity to develop their skills in a professional setting.

Rodrigo Bustamante, Senior Global Studies major

ic sanctions, the United Nations has also levied sweeping penalties on the North Korean government, further obstructing growth in an already flailing economy. UN sanctions include bans on "the trade of arms and military equipment…the import of certain luxury goods…imports of oil and refined petroleum products…[and] natural gas imports."[43] Moreover, many UN sanctions have specifically targeted North Korean leaders, such as the late dictator, Kim Jong-il. Knowing his affinity for luxury items like Hennessy cognac, Harley Davidson motorcycles, and plasma TVs, special restrictions were put on those products.[44]

The United States has complemented these sanctions with sweeping penalties targeting companies, banks, and individual financiers who have helped North Korea increase its nuclear capabilities. One such example is Banco Delta Asia, a Macau-based bank that hosted several North Korean accounts and engaged in widespread money laundering. The US Treasury Department ordered all American companies to cut ties with the bank, while the Macau government shut down all accounts linked to North Korea.[45]

In addition to the actions undertaken by the Treasury Department, Congress passed the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016, which stipulates that the president must sanction any individual or group that is found to be involved in supporting the country's "WMD program, arms trade,

human rights abuses, or other illicit activities."[46] Furthermore, the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2017 grants the Executive Branch more power to punish individuals within, and allies of, the North Korean regime. The bill also targets foreign persons and companies that employ North Korean forced laborers.[47]

The United States' policy toward North Korea in recent decades has been akin to a pendulum, with periods of diplomatic engagement followed by more combative language and punitive action. In 1993, North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT, and the Clinton administration responded with threats of increased sanctions. Fearing retribution from the world community and multilateral sanctions, North Korea signed an agreement with the US, South Korea, and Japan in 1994 to work toward reducing and eventually ending its nuclear weapons program in exchange for sanctions relief. During the second term of the Clinton administration, the US continued to loosen economic sanctions and endorsed a plan to permit North Korean exports to the United States, while opening up limited market access in North Korea for American companies.[48]

If the Clinton administration's approach to North Korea was one side of the pendulum, his successor, George W. Bush, represented the other. Shortly after taking office in 2001, President Bush included North Korea in his "Axis of Evil" triad while accusing the nation of breaking its portion of the 1994 deal.

In response, Kim Jong-il decided to withdraw from the NPT in 2003 and restart the country's existing nuclear reactor. In 2006, North Korea tested a nuclear weapon and the United States largely refrained from direct negotiation thereafter with the regime until the Trump administration came into office.

President Donald Trump's policy toward North Korea has at times mirrored both the Bush and Clinton administrations, perhaps representing both ends of the pendulum. At the beginning of his presidency, President Trump re-designated North Korea as a State Sponsor of Terror, nearly a decade after it had been taken off the list during negotiations with the Bush administration. The rationale for this decision was based off the state-backed assassination of King Jong-nam, the half-brother of the Supreme Leader, and the death of American student, Otto Warmbier.[49] Moreover, the United States under President Trump led a UN Security Council resolution that imposed additional sanctions on North Korea, in a unanimous decision on August 5, 2017. Three days later, Trump infamously threatened Kim Jong-un with "fire and fury like the world has never seen."[50]

After months of fiery rhetoric and overt threats of military action, President Trump shockingly accepted an offer from his North Korean counterpart to meet for a historic summit in Singapore - the first time in history a sitting American president had ever met with a North Korean leader. While the administration has not since lifted existing sanctions on the regime, Pres-

ident Trump has largely refrained from adding to the list of punishments. For example, citing his budding friendship with Kim, the president tweeted his cancellation of newly inflicted sanctions on March 22, 2019, in a remarkable rebuttal of his own Treasury Department.[51]

Throughout the last three decades, the United States has employed a variety of economic and financial sanctions in order to extract concessions from the North Korean regime in the form of nuclear de-proliferation and human rights guarantees. However, given the continuing repressive nature of Kim Jong-un's government and the ongoing nuclear weapons program, American attempts to achieve their foreign policy goals have largely failed. Perhaps the greatest indicator of this has been seen in the current administration. Blustery language and threats of overt military action, rather than economic sanctions, ended up leading North Korea to the negotiating table, and brought the two nations to the closest point of a deal in over a decade.

While the economic sanctions against North Korea have largely been ineffective in achieving the United States' maximalist political agenda, they have played a significant and adverse effect on the local economy, particularly in recent years. According to a report by the New York Times, many of North Korea's exports have been to its main ally, China, in the form of coal, iron ore, seafood, and textiles. Previous sanctions have been directly linked to the acquisition of technology necessary

for the country's nuclear program. Recently, however, US-led international sanctions have focused on banning the aforementioned North Korean exports entirely. The result has been a significant hit to the collective North Korean economy. In 2018, Chinese imports from North Korea fell 88 percent, in large part due to the ratcheting up of such targeted sanctions. While North Korea has not yet dismantled its nuclear weapons program, Kim requested that the United States remove these more sweeping sanctions when he met with President Trump at the 2019 bilateral summit in Vietnam.[52]

One consequence of America's North Korean sanction policy is seen in the geopolitical relationships that North Korea cultivates today. China and Russia are natural partners, given the history of North Korea's government structure and political ideology. On the other hand, unilateral American sanctions have pushed Kim Jong-un closer to Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, who in turn provide the state with political and economic cover on the world stage and at the UN Security Council. In the aftermath of the failed second summit with President Trump, Kim traveled to Russia to meet President Putin with the hope of receiving aid.[53] Continued overtures from North Korea to Russia are likely to continue, making the American goal of deterring Kim much harder if he has the strong support of an important world leader such as Putin.

North Korea continues to test nuclear weapons despite having promised to denuclearize in a series of vague agreements. Recently, Kim Jong-un has overseen the testing of "large-caliber long-range multiple rocket launchers," to the chagrin of President Trump.[54] With negotiations between the US and North Korea stalling, as well as the burgeoning of ties between Kim Jong-un and Vladimir Putin, it seems that North Korea and its nuclear weapons program will continue to draw the ire of the United States and its allies, regardless of the tenacity of the sanctions imposed. While American sanction policy has certainly caused economic damage to the closed-off nation, it has not brought about the change demanded by American leaders.

Analysis and Conclusion

Reviewing the case studies of American sanction policy toward Iran, Cuba, and North Korea, several important conclusions can be drawn as the United States continues to try and advance its agenda worldwide. The United States has a lot to learn in terms of how to effectively combat rogue governments and national security threats through the use of sanctions. Firstly, from looking at the three case studies, multilateralism with regard to the use of sanctions is absolutely vital in properly attacking the economy of a rogue state. In the case of Iran, the Special Purpose Vehicle created by European countries circumvents the unilateral measures put forth by the United States, hurting the overall effectiveness of the US sanctions in bringing about change from the Iranian government. By forgoing the stipulations put forth by the JCPOA and proceeding unilaterally, the United States under the Trump administration has hampered its own ability to obstruct the Iranian nuclear weapons program.

Multilateral sanctions and coordination with other world powers with regards to sanction policy is also important in terms of geopolitics. Finding themselves alienated by the Western world, Iran, Cuba, and North Korea have increasingly been pushed into the arms of US adversaries, such as Russia and China. These two states wield significant influence and power on the world stage, from their status on the UN Security Council to their capacity to distribute immense volumes of economic and military aid to countries in the developing world.

Secondly, sanctions should be used as a negotiating tactic in bringing about slow but consistent change, rather than as part of a maximalist strategy aimed at inducing significant political transformation, such as regime change. In the case of Iran, the Obama administration utilized sanctions in order to bring the Islamic Republic to the negotiating table. This led to an arrangement that culminated in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Similarly, the Trump administration has utilized sanctions against North Korea in a "stick and carrot" manner, which ultimately resulted in the Supreme Leader propositioning the US president into bilateral summits in Singapore and Vietnam. This "stick and carrot" metaphor is championed by Gary Hufbauer et al. in "Economic Sanctions Reconsidered," who note that "The costs to the target of complying

Seljalandsfoss on the southern side of Iceland is a stunning example of monumental natural architecture. A trail exists underneath the overhang, allowing travelers to circumnavigate the waterfall. Heavy rain and cold temperatures permitted a fortuitously solitary encounter.

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with the sender's demands are, by definition, high, and the costs of defiance related to the sanctions may not be high enough to change the target's behavior. In such cases, a deft manipulation of carrots might lower the costs of compliance enough that the target will be willing to make a deal. When extensive sanctions are in place, promises to lift them obviously become an important carrot…"[55]

While it is uncertain whether the United States and North Korea will ultimately make a lasting peace treaty and sign an agreement that accomplishes

American goals of ending the northeast Asian nation's nuclear weapons program, the fact of the matter is that diplomatic engagement and face-to-face commuication between the two countries is much preferable to the aggressive dialogue and explicit threats that were taking place just two years ago.

Lastly, unilateral economic blockades are largely ineffective. A full trade blockade closes off an entire market for American consumers and businesses, robbing the United States of increased economic access to the county. Moreover, US embargos push targeted states

closer to American adversaries. Gary Hufbauer et al. refer to such adversaries who swoop in with aid as "black knights." According to their research, "Sanctions that do not end quickly are more likely to attract a black knight to assist the target, but such assistance also erodes the chances of success and, given the reluctance of most senders to admit failure and lift sanctions, contributes to episodes that drag on indefinitely."[56]

As previously mentioned, geopolitical awareness is immensely important when enacting sanctions against a rogue state. In Cuba, by completely

imposing a trade blockade, the United States is not giving Cuba any sort of "carrot" that they could work toward and use to strike a compromise. Additionally, trade blockades provide cover to leaders by allowing them to blame the United States for their country's economic woes, as Fidel Castro and his successor have done. In Iran and North Korea, Ayatollah Khameini and Kim Jong-un, too, cite American economic aggression as the cause of their respective countries' economic plight.

The United States has long championed economic and financial sanctions as a means to promote its foreign policy goals and enact lasting political change across the world. However, its various sanctions campaigns have been met with mixed results. When used effectively, economic and financial sanctions can severely damage a country's economic prowess and stunt economic growth, serving as valuable leverage during negotiations. However, as the cases of Iran, Cuba, and North Korea demonstrate, sanctions alone rarely manage to accomplish maximalist American foreign policy objectives.

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A Case Study of the Challenges in Kenya's Immunization Programs

By Rachel Oommen

Rachel (Annie) Oommen is a senior Public Policy and Global Studies major with a French minor from Cary, North Carolina. Annie originally wrote this case study as a final project for a policy internship with the Sabin Vaccine Institute, a non-profit that works to encourage vaccine uptake around the world, during the summer of 2018. She was motivated by the belief that effective immunization strategies can disrupt the structural inequality that presides over much of the world.

In a globalized world of increasing human contact, immunization against infectious diseases is a pressing issue. Thankfully, several industries are joining forces to create and supervise routine immunization programs, build political will among countries' leaders, and establish strategic frameworks to achieve comprehensive health policy goals. Financing, vaccine apprehension and wariness, and deficient health system capacity - the ability of a health system to efficiently operationalize resources, knowledge, and human capital - are significant roadblocks that joint appraisals (JAs) aim to ameliorate. Two prominent players in the global health sphere, *Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance,* and the *Global Health Security Agenda* (GHSA), have each established their own multi-stakeholder evaluations. These evaluations assess a specific country's progress toward a complete and successful implementation of their immunization projects. Gavi, an organization that operates a co-financing method to make vaccines affordable in low-income countries, runs a joint appraisal every year to assess how their grant is performing in a specific country. The GHSA Joint External Evaluation (JEE) evaluates a specific country's progress toward sustainable global health security. While the JA evaluates through a detailed financial lens and the JEE evaluates from a comprehensive capacity point of view, the results from the two reports can be compared and contrasted to conclusively understand the main inhibitors to a successful immunization program.

Kenya is frequently described as a country with a robust and functioning immunization program, soon to be independent of Gavi support. According to the Better Immunization Data Initiative, a PATH-led organization that collects data on immunization policy and uptake, "Kenya's national immunization program was one of the most successful in East Africa in the 1990s."[1] Why then, if the public health community recognizes that Kenya demonstrates the minimum capacity required for transitioning to independent financing, is there still a need to have external evaluations and continued oversight over Kenya's programs? The answer is that Kenya's rate of immunization and expansion of coverage have reached a standstill. The JEE cites that "the performance of routine immunization has stagnated at around 80 percent over the last decade," indicating that while previous efforts to expand coverage have been successful, there is a need to identify and address new issues that have since arisen.[2]

This case study offers a qualitative analysis of Kenya's immunization programs, and a subsequent proposal of policy recommendations to address the identified challenges. The central research question asks that, given the different perspectives and findings of both evaluations, what are the commonly identified challenges to Kenya's immunization programs that both Gavi and the GHSA have pinpointed?

Methodology

The information in this case study was gathered primarily through desk research, in addition to an interview with World Health Organization (WHO) Kenya Epidemiologist, Kibet Sergon. The information that Sergon offered reflects his own insight from his personal academic and professional experience, and not necessarily that of the WHO. The first step of this research was an in depth review of both the JA and JEE, highlighting pertinent information and cross-referencing shared points. The two main challenges that were identified in both evaluations were chosen for further exploration: the inadequate immunization data and health information systems (HIS) currently in place, and the difficulty in reaching marginalized or hard-to-reach populations. It was also necessary to ensure that Kenya's immunization situation was properly contextualized by reviewing additional online sources, such as from WHO, the Sabin Vaccine Institute's Sustainable Immunization Financing Program, and various other literature. Guided by an understanding of the challenges, their causes, and repercussions, a list of questions to prompt the solution writing process followed suit. Lastly, two to three corresponding policy recommendations were produced to address the delineated challenges.

Findings

Both the JA and JEE state that the structure and abilities of the current health information systems in Kenya inhibit the success of the country's immunization programs. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) state that a high quality immunization information system requires three key elements: consistent recording and reporting practices, optimal access to and use of HIS, and rigorous interpretation and use of data for decision making.[3] While Kenya's health information is indeed functioning well, there is still much to be developed before it reaches full sustainability capacity. The JA writes that the lack of a "robust and fully functional health information system" presents challenges, and that there is a need to improve data analysis, data quality, and use of data for decision making.[4] The JEE notes that the use of data for advocacy and decision making needs to be strengthened, as current weaknesses in the system prevent Kenya from reaching full capacity.[5] Between the two evaluations, it is evident that the way data are transferred, verified, examined, and used are all issues in the country's health system that lead to deficient immunization coverage and access.

In discussion with Kibet Sergon, he identified the steps of the data gathering process. After a vaccination is given, it is tallied and then recorded on a permanent record in an immunization register. Once a month, a summary sheet of all the tallies is sent from the health facility to the sub-national level. Then, data specialists key the summary numbers into the District Health Info (DHI) system, where the data is made available to all other levels. Sergon noted that all initial recordings and transfers are not electronic, but rather on paper.[6]

In 2015, the CDC and WHO collaborated on an evaluation called the Immunization Information System Assessment (IISA), to identify the root causes of immunization data quality problems in Kenya. Across the values examined, it was determined that data quality issues stem from problems at the facility level. The IISA found that, in a sample size of 16 health facilities, there was low confidence (around 50 percent) in the facility level target population data. Additionally, there was a 0 percent data concordance between child registers and facility tally sheets.[7] Conversely, concordance was higher, but not excellent (63 percent), between the health facility and sub-country level. To further speak to the poor reliability of the low-level data collection, the IISA also reported that only 50 percent of health facilities' monthly targets for immunizations of children younger than one-year-old were accurate.[8] Potential reasons for these incongruencies are population migration, and clients crossing between ill-defined catchment areas.[9] Other data quality challenges might be due to "redundant data collection tools, lack of transportation, limited supportive supervision, and a lack of airtime/internet access for electronic reporting."[10] Switching perspectives, staff members reported that they need additional training in "record keeping, reporting, analysis, and/or use for action" in order to produce more accurate and consistent information.[11] The IISA points to the individual level as the root

In 2018, I spent my summer working with the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) in The Gambia. As part of my internship, I attended a male clinic at Bundung Maternal and Child Health Hospital, a weekly discussion encouraging men to become more active and engaged partners during their partners' pregnancy. The man pictured was seated outside of the clinic and I was struck by the tender interaction between him and the baby on his lap so I asked to photograph him. Photo location: Serrekunda, The Gambia.

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of several issues regarding accurate immunization data collection.

According to Sergon, the primary systemic challenge to the usefulness of immunization data lies in data analysis, which is only done at higher levels of administration. While data is generated locally, it is analyzed nationally.[12] This incongruence leads to ineffective data usage; the usefulness of data does not reach its full potential when the local level health professionals are not skilled with the appropriate capacity for data collection. This is mostly pertinent in terms of advocacy, since political buy-in and goodwill are the primary causes for which immunization proponents are advocating. It therefore makes sense that the use of data for advocacy would be at the national level. But as the JEE points out, changes in the initial data collection methods and the data analysis routine must be made in order to see an improvement in Kenya's current immunization data infrastructure.

The second challenge for discussion is the difficulty in reaching marginalized populations. In the JEE, it is written that "an increasing number of urban informal settlements, nomadic and border populations, and security challenged areas" are a large reason why the immunization programs in Kenya are not fully sustainable.[13] Nomadic, or informally-settled individuals are unvaccinated largely because of the difficulty they face in vaccine access and delivery. In more rural scenarios, there simply are not enough health care facilities nearby, and reliable transportation to access far away facilities often does

not exist. Aside from rural villagers, the individuals most at risk of exclusion from the health care system and routine immunization are pastoralists and internal migrants. Pastoralists move unpredictably depending on the availability of water and land for their animals. While their constant movement makes it difficult for them to access care and maintain a medical record, when they do briefly settle, it is often in rural regions that are far from immunization-administering health facilities.

Another marginalized group of interest are those residing in urban, informal settlements. According to the Maternal Child Survival Program (MCSP), Kenya is "home to some of the largest urban informal settlements in the world."[14] While pastoralist and nomads follow a lifestyle that makes vaccine access and delivery difficult, the residents of slums owe their deficient health care and preventative treatments to generational and systemic poverty. When poverty is a distal cause of a health issue, there is a complex web of mutually influencing factors at play, making the problems interrelated and the solutions difficult to find. Specifically in Kenya, low immunization coverage persists in these urban, informal settlements because wealth is a driving factor in obtaining immunizations. DTP3 vaccine coverage is 10 percent lower in the poorest wealth quintile than in that of the highest. Additionally, many of these underserved people reside in slums.[15] Research shows that children in these environments are not entirely without immunizations, but 60 percent of

the time, a child with such access will not finish their series, rendering their initial shots ineffective.[16] For Pentavalent, Oral Polio Vaccine, and Measles, the proportion of those vaccinated increases with levels of wealth; 74 percent of the "least poor," 69 percent of "the poor," and only 63 percent of "the poorest" are immunized.[17] There are minimal outreach services to these areas because of a lack of funding, and, according to Sergon, because programs have yet to mobilize services. The few services that do exist currently operate by having health care workers venture to the under-immunized regions, spend a few days vaccinating as many people as possible, and then return to the cities.[18] This leads to inaccurate record keeping, as the data must be transferred from the provider to the jurisdictional health care facility, and will often inconsistently reach the catchment area. Another reason coverage rates are an issue in impoverished areas is the way that they are represented by the data. MCSP found that "aggregated facility-level coverage data masks inequity in immunization coverage in slum areas."[19] Because facilities do not disaggregate the data by slum and non-slum, the records are misconstrued. In addition, a 2015 study in the International Journal for Equity in Health found that 78 percent of the immunization inequality in urban informal settlements in Nairobi rests on the mother's level of education.[20] There are a multitude of reasons why providing effective immunization services to Kenya's marginalized populations, specifically nomads

and those in urban slums, is difficult. However, the prevailing reasons for not receiving vaccines narrow down to the wealth and education of the household - specifically to that of the mother, the individual's migration patterns, and the lack of funding and resources that enable health care workers to traverse geographic and income barriers.[21]

Policy Recommendations

Armed with an understanding of the current immunization structure and its drawbacks, policymakers can now make recommendations to improve the current system in place. Specifically, actors should begin with the goal of reinforcing data accuracy and opening access of data summaries and analysis to health workers of all levels. The first suggestion would be to completely convert all data to an electronic medical records system. The International Training and Education Center for Health (I-TECH) is currently launching a few small-scale, localized projects to implement electronic medical records; however, given the steps of the immunization documentation process, an ideal system would be more standardized, in order to connect every health facility in one place. Therefore, the Kenyan government should dramatically expand this project and look to both KenyaEMR and the Zambian Electronic Immunization Registry (ZEIR) for insight. KenyaEMR, the brainchild of I-TECH, is a program currently being implemented to facilitate electronic HIV/AIDS records that allows for health care professionals at any facility to re-cord an individual's data into one common drive. It utilizes the OpenMRS software, which prides itself on catering to resource-poor environments.[22] Reinforcing the model of KenyaEMR and expanding it from HIV/AIDS to immunization records will allow for a broader scope of data analysis beyond just the players within the national government.

The aim of the KenyaEMR policy is to exchange electronic information effectively and to coexist with other EMR, laboratory, and pharmacy systems. Essentially, the policy was designed to increase cohesion between health systems. The ZEIR is a mobile immunization registry app founded on the OpenSRP software, which was created to be an open source and mobile health platform.[23] By utilizing a mobile app, as done in the ZEIR program, the most preliminary inputs will be electronically done by the provider. This will eliminate the vast array of human error that can occur in the tallying and the monthly summarizing steps of the immunization recording process that is already in place in Kenya. Another benefit of an electronic server that any facility has access to is the ability to interpret data as it fits the needs of different administration levels. Local health care workers will have the capacity to view summaries, interpret patterns, and make changes in their own right, without having to rely on the relaying of information by the national program administrators of the Ministry of Health.[24] Many elements from the two programs can create a Kenya-specific electronic records system that is both mobile and nationwide.

To combat the exclusion of pastoralists and nomads from the current immunization process, developing strategies should work with, not against, their patterns of migration. An ideal policy would utilize nomadic tracking methods to identify the exact settlements, livestock markets, and watering holes that vaccination campaigns can move to. Following the Somali Polio intervention methods, this policy would also include permanent transit vaccination points, where temporary facilities are camped out at common points of transition to and from mapped settlements. Most of the pastoralists participate in larger migratory communities that are organized into a hierarchy of membership.[25] Kenyan pastoralists tend to trust traditional health care providers over modern medical practitioners because the traditional providers are members of the clan and travel alongside the rest of the community. Appealing to the organizational leaders and traditional health providers within each clan, and providing education about immunization will lead to successful engagement with their constituents. Ideally, revised health systems would not only educate clan leaders and caregivers about the benefits of immunization, but would also identify high-traffic locations fit for vaccination campaign stations. This two-pronged approach is more economically viable in the long run than simply financing the construction and upkeep of many new health care facilities.

This photo shows two Palestinian bedouin boys in the Judean desert near Bethlehem. Like their ancestors before them, these boys roam with their livestock across the desert living a nomadic lifestyle. This picture was captured in the summer of 2019.

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Lastly, a new policy should cater to the statistical relationship between low immunization coverage rates and impoverished households with uneducated mothers. This recommendation is composed of three strategies. Firstly, the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Education should partner to incorporate modules about immunizations. These lessons should discuss what they are, how they work, why they are important, and the long term benefits of immunization. The modules should be an addition to currently existing literacy programs. Programmatic actors should partner with the Kenya Adult Learner's Association because the or-

ganization has several active projects where immunization education could easily be incorporated, such as their Adult Education and Resource Centers.[26] The Kenyan government does, indeed, provide free, routine immunization vaccines, but affordability is still a barrier to obtaining vaccines, as lack of transportation, housing, and income-earning opportunities are still prevalent. Therefore, the second strategy would provide a stipend to working mothers so as to overcome these indirect costs. The stipend could be distributed to mothers below a specific income level. In conjunction with the second strategy, the third would offer a

subsidy to incentivize mothers to attain immunization for 100 percent of their household. Birth order has been found to be a determinant of immunization inequality in Kenyan slums, where children are less likely to be immunized the higher within the birth hierarchy they are.[27] This incentive system would operate with the aim of reaching every child within a household. Together, the three strategies would work to educate urban mothers living in informal settlements about the importance of immunizing their children, provide urban mothers with the funds to obtain adequate health care for themselves and their families, and reward them when

they have done so.

Conclusion

Immunization is one of the least expensive methods of achieving global health security and reaching a reasonable quality of living for all people. The challenges that prohibit a community from accessing immunization are solvable, but overcoming the aforementioned challenges requires the political will of governing bodies to catalyze change. Kenya's immunization programs make for a succinct example of international aid organizations, like Gavi, withdrawing their financial support prior to accomplishing a target. State immunization programs remove financial support early because of a premature sense of accomplishment - the involved actors deem progress for progress's sake enough to declare a goal realized. This untimely withdrawal typically leaves a country fledgling as the capacity building is not fulfilled enough for the country to manage its own immunization programs and goals.

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Barriers to Peace:
The US and North Korea

By Kathryn Early

Kathryn Early is a senior at UNC double majoring in Global Studies and Peace, War, and Defense with a minor in Modern Hebrew. She is passionate about using her experience growing up abroad to help others overcome common barriers to successful cross-cultural relationships. This summer, she interned with the US Department of State in Austria, which confirmed her desire to pursue a career in international relations.

The first ever meeting between the leaders of the United States and Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) took place in Singapore on June 12, 2018. Coming away from the meeting, President Trump declared that "our whole relationship with North Korea and the Korean Peninsula is going to be a very much different situation than it has in the past."[1] A very different situation, indeed. Since the Singapore summit, President Trump has continued to reshape US-North Korean relations by becoming the first American president to set foot in North Korea on June 30, 2019. The situation President Trump mentioned in his 2018 statement referred to the multiple failed peace talks the US and North Korea had experienced throughout the Clinton and Bush administrations. But are the current peace talks truly that different from those of the past, and can they actually lead to a genuine ceasing of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula? Today's peace negotiations still face many of the same problems as those in previous years. In-

formation problems surrounding North Korea's nuclear weapons program and American perceptions of North Korea as an irrational actor have continued to create barriers to any successful agreement. Consequently, the prospects for a veritable peace accord in the near future will likely remain elusive.

Background

North Korea is increasingly seen as a threat to American interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Since coming to power in 2011, Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un has substantially increased North Korea's development of nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles. Experts believe that North Korea now possesses a fully functioning arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads to US allies in the Pacific. More concerningly, on November 28, 2017, North Korea tested a ballistic missile with the potential to reach the entire continental US.[2] Furthermore, North Korea has enhanced the survivability of its nuclear program by building a fleet of ballistic

missile submarines. Deploying submarines equipped with nuclear weapons around the globe makes it nearly impossible for another country to eliminate North Korea's stockpile of nuclear weapons with a single strike.[3] These new capabilities aside, North Korea's policy objectives also serve to destabilize the existing international order. In an attempt to circumvent international sanctions and finance its nuclear weapons program, North Korea has organized illicit arms deals with various weapons-smuggling states, such as Syria.[4] Experts fear that North Korea's secret deals could allow nuclear technology to fall into the hands of hostile state or non-state actors. Furthermore, North Korea's reluctance to sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty undermines global non-proliferation norms, and could possibly encourage other states to follow suit in acquiring nuclear weapons.[5] All these factors have caused the US and its allies to impose sanctions on the DPRK and pressure the hermit kingdom into agreeing to a comprehensive denuclearization deal.

While the ostensibly budding friendship between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un raises hopes that both parties may finally reach an agreement, it is not the first time negotiations have seemed promising yet have fallen short.

Since the end of the Cold War, North Korea and the United States have been locked in a series of failed negotiations. During the Clinton administration in 1994, the US and DPRK signed a deal known as the Agreed Framework, whereby North Korea committed to freezing, and eventually dismantling, its nuclear program in exchange for normalized relations with the US, as well as American assistance with constructing several light-water reactor power plants, which lacked the ability to be used for military purposes. The deal fell apart, however, shortly after George W. Bush took office and adopted a more hardline approach toward North Korea. The Bush administration refused to adhere to several of the provisions outlined in the Agreed Framework, prompting North Korea to order international nuclear inspectors out of the country. In case one was inclined to place the blame for the failed outcome squarely upon the United States, it is important to note that the Bush administration strongly suspected North Korea of breaking the 1994 Agreed Framework by covertly running a uranium enrichment program.[6] A similar situation repeated itself several years later when the Six Party Talks, intitiated by the Bush administration and which this time included South Korea, Japan, Russia, and China, stalled after the the DPRK successfully conducted two nuclear tests - first in 2006, and then again in 2009.[7]

Jung H. Pak, a prominent scholar of

The beautiful expanse of the front of the National Museum of Korea contrasts sharply with the skyscrapers of Seoul. The flagship museum of Korean history and art, the National Museum of Korea is one of the most visited museums in the world.

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North Korean foreign relations, has described the relationship between North Korea and the US as a repetitive cycle. In a Public Broadcasting Service report, Pak noted that "North Korea comes to dialogue, then retracts, using the US' 'hostile policy' as an excuse to conduct missile or nuclear tests, then re-enters dialogue to dampen sanctions implementation or reduce tension."[8] This cycle not only prevents the creation of a lasting peace settlement in the region, but also buys time for North Korea to build up its nuclear capacity and therefore improve its bargaining position before re-entering into negotiations with the United States.

Although Pak was referring to the Agreed Framework and Six Party Talks, her statement perfectly captures North Korea's actions this past summer. Hopes that negotiations would resume after Trump and Kim's historic meeting at the demilitarized zone were dashed when North Korea accused the US of acting belligerently by conducting routine military drills with the South Korean armed forces. North Korea then took the opportunity to test eight new missiles before agreeing to return to the negotiating table on September 10, 2019. If there are no serious breakthroughs, the ongoing talks will likely follow the same cyclical pattern as described by Pak.

Irrationality and Information Problems

But why does an endless cycle of failed agreements continue to occur? Part of the problem is information asymmetry, as well as the inability of the US to view North Korea as a rational actor. The North Korean regime maintains a tight grip on all information exiting its borders. In order to protect itself from its enemies, North Korea has incentives to hide its true military capabilities and exaggerate its strengths. Additionally, a strong authoritarian state prevents political, economic, and even social information from being readily available to an international audience. A lack of open records has given North Korea a reputation of being shrouded by mystery, causing international policymakers to dismiss the country as irrational and unpredictable. Difficulty finding information, however, does not mean information is impossible to obtain. It is a serious mistake to assume the US knows nothing about North Korean political aims. For example, since the 1995 food emergency, hundreds of political and humanitarian aid organizations have collected data about the North Korean population's demographics and political mood.[9] From this data, many insights can be drawn about the political pressures facing the regime, and about what actions the government has taken or is likely to take in response. If this data was to be considered by American politicians, then they may be more confident in their ability to predict North Korean actions. Instead of a legitimate lack of information, however, there seems to be an unwillingness to accept this information as politically relevant.

Many policymakers have ignored recent successes by the international aid community in obtaining economic and social data from North Korea, and continue to assert that it is impossible to know the true motives behind North Korea's policy actions.[10] Although humanitarian organizations have shown it is possible to obtain statistics about the illusive country, the mere perception of unreliable information can make it difficult for the US to trust that North Korea would follow an agreement and fully dismantle its nuclear program.

In 2007, the Six Party Talks began to look promising when North Korea agreed to shut down and disable its nuclear facilities in Yongbyon. In return, the US promised to remove North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism, and began allowing for the importation of oil into the country. The deal fell apart, however, when disagreements over how to monitor North Korean compliance led to a bargaining stalemate.[11] Today, it is still in North Korea's interest to withhold information from the international community in order to have more leverage in any potential peace deal, yet without open records, it will be hard for the current US administration to believe any North Korean commitment to denuclearization.

This information problem is exacerbated by the longstanding US perception that North Korea is inherently malicious, and therefore cannot be trusted to act rationally at the negotiating table. American politicians display these attitudes toward North Korea when they use words like "rogue state" or "the most militarized society on earth"

when referencing the DPRK.[12] The Bush administration used similar language to justify a hardline attitude toward North Korea's nuclear ambitions. In his 2002 State of the Union address, President Bush labelled North Korea as one of the three states comprising the "Axis of Evil," implying that the country's regime was fundamentally corrupt, hostile, and posed a threat to international peace. Since North Korea cannot be reasoned with, American politicians rationalized, then the only option available to the United States was to threaten them with the use of force. Force, however, is not always an appropriate response to belligerent actors. The problem with this approach is that it assumes the other party will understand and accept the justification of force. What the Bush administration may have seen as a defensive bargaining position against an irrational actor angered the North Koreans and likely contributed to their decision to renege on the Six Party Talks.[13] Although the threat of force was meant to secure peace, it has only resulted in prolonged conflict and confrontation.

An unwillingness to recognize the rationality of an enemy, like that displayed by President Bush toward North Korea early on in his administration, can lead governments to misinterpret benign actions. This can have far reaching consequences. Take for example this report: "60-65 percent of [North Korean] forces…close to the border, in a high state of readiness, well primed for an attack on the South."[14] At first glance, this report paints a picture of an aggressive North Korea, prepared to invade the South at any moment. Perhaps American politicians could even make the case that preemptive force is justified in such a situation. An astute observer would point out, however, that Pyongyang is only 120 kilometers from the border. One can just as easily say that 60 to 65 percent of North Korea's troops are stationed around its capital.[15] This presents a considerably less threatening view of North Korean actions and narrows the range of proportional US responses. It is hardly acceptable to condemn a country for fortifying its own capital city. When politicians view another actor as inherently evil or irrational, it can lead them to misinterpret the actor's otherwise benign actions, and unintentionally escalate delicate situations.

Relations Under the Trump Administration

Ironically, the US and North Korea seem to have recently switched places with respect to perceptions of irrationality. President Trump's early provocative comments about nuclear war led Kim to denounce the US president as "deranged," and to take a more level-headed and diplomatic approach to negotiations.[16] On the other hand, by accepting North Korea's invitation to negotiate on an equal footing with the US, the Trump administration may have signaled a shift in the American approach toward the DPRK, turning it into one that recognizes the country as rational actor capable of coming to an honest agreement. President Trump has repeatedly referred to Kim as a "friend" and as "someone who has a great and beautiful vision for his country."[17] This is a sharp contrast from previous characterizations of North Korea as a member of an "Axis of Evil," and instead recognizes North Korea as a rational actor that seeks nothing less than what most other countries desire: security and prosperity.

So far, the goal of negotiations has been to dismantle North Korea's nuclear weapons program in exchange for an end to economic sanctions. This arrangement has been proposed by the United States in an attempt to ensure that a devastating war does not break out on the Korean Peninsula. But if avoiding war is America's ultimate goal, then could mutual deterrence actually be the best available option? Some argue that by "securing a high-profile meeting on equal footing with a sitting president of the United States," North Korea has cemented its status as a de facto nuclear power.[18] By agreeing to negotiate with Kim Jong-un, President Trump has subtly recognized the DPRK's nuclear capabilities, and has created a relationship characterized by deterrence rather than regime change.[19]

A relationship built on deterrence may ensure that a genuine crisis between North Korea and the United States will actually be avoided. The principle of mutually assured destruction, for instance, argues that a country will not launch a nuclear first strike if it knows its target has the ability to strike back with a nuclear weapon of its own. On the other hand, if the nuclear capa-

Matsumoto Castle is one of the three oldest castles in Japan. Located in Matsumoto, Gifu Prefecture, Matsumoto Castle was initially constructed in the early 1500s. It has weathered a number of battles and was the seat of Matsumoto Domain under the Tokugawa Shogunate. In modern times, the castle serves as a popular tourist attraction.

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bilities of North Korea were ignored in favor of an approach characterized by regime change and preventative engagement, then a nuclear war may be more likely to occur. If North Korea is not viewed as a de facto nuclear power, then the US might have greater incentives to conduct a first strike against the country. While this may seem like a desirable option to many hawkish policymakers, North Korea's nuclear

and missile technology is simply too far advanced for America to conduct a first strike without experiencing devastating retaliation against either its allies in Asia or against the US homeland itself. This should make the US pause before considering a first strike as a viable option to dealing with the North Korean nuclear program. Although the most recent Trump-Kim summit did not produce a denuclearization deal,

one could argue that it did carve a path for the US and North Korea to have a stable relationship defined by mutual deterrence.

However, there are reasons to be wary of such a relationship. Most notably, accepting North Korea as a de facto nuclear power could set an enticing precedent and roadmap for other states hoping to acquire nuclear weapons, such as Iran. Currently, only five

countries are legally recognized as nuclear weapons states under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: the United States, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, and China. If North Korea could join this exclusive club by ignoring international standards, then what is to stop Iran or other actors hostile to the US from doing the same? Some might argue that a precedent for de facto recognition has already been obtained by other states. India, for instance, was not part of the original five nuclear weapons states, but achieved some level of international acceptance when the US recognized them as a "responsible state with advanced nuclear technology."[20] Although it has never admitted to having nuclear weapons, Israel is believed by many experts to also be in possession

of a nuclear arsenal. Nonetheless, the international community has taken no meaningful action to halt or eliminate Israel's suspected nuclear program.[21] The acceptance of India and Israel as de facto nuclear powers, however, has not made it any easier for North Korea or Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. Perhaps there is room for an international arrangement that accepts North Korea as a de facto nuclear power, without increasing the chance of military confrontation between it and the United States. Or, for that matter, without augmenting the likelihood that other states will seek to flout international norms and acquire nuclear weapons.

Conclusion

A history of failed peace agreements

between the United States and North Korea suggests that the Trump-Kim talks may face a similar difficulty in reaching a deal. Incentives for North Korea to hide the true capabilities of its nuclear and ballistic missile programs weaken its credibility to commit to denuclearization, while American perceptions of North Korea as an irrational actor can lead to a downward spiral of belligerent behavior, caused by a misperception of North Korean intent. The first ever in-person meeting between the leaders of the two countries and a new respect for North Korea as a de facto nuclear power, however, suggest that the barriers to peace are slowly being diminished.

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The Electrification of Vietnam

By Luke Hargraves

Luke Hargraves is a senior double majoring in Public Policy and Music, with a minor in Business Administration. His research centers around successful past policy proposals and actions around the world that can provide lessons for current and future leaders. This project aims to demonstrate the feasibility of providing electricity to developing countries. The paper was originally written for Professor Patricia Sullivan in the Spring 2017 Global Policy Issues course.

Although the fighting had ceased, the troops had left, and the country had been united, Vietnam in 1975 faced a whole new host of problems. The war had decimated the country and left it with a vastly underdeveloped power system. Only 2.5 percent of households had access to electricity and gross domestic product (GDP) per capita was less than $200.[1] Vietnam slowly made progress, with its electrification rate reaching 14 percent by 1994.[2] However, from 1994 onwards, Vietnam experienced unprecedented growth in electrification, with the country reaching an electrification rate of 97.2 percent by 2012.[3] As Vietnam continues to make great strides toward becoming an economic leader in Southeast Asia, the country has also become a model for how developing nations can rapidly boost their electrification rates. Three essential policies, (i) the construction and operation of the 500-kilovolt (kV) line; (ii) the approval of Decision 22; and (iii) the passing of the Electricity Law, provide useful lessons that can be adopted and tailored to other countries' unique contexts. Together, the three policies demonstrate how unwavering political commitment, robust financial support, and a transparent market system can rapidly electrify developing countries.

Problem Description

Expanding access to electricity is often one of the highest priorities of any developing country due to its abundance of positive externalities. In Vietnam, electrification greatly stimulated the national economy and improved household quality of life.[4] Vietnam's electrification project began in 1994 with the involvement of the World Bank, when the country's GDP was valued at $20.736 billion in today's US dollars.[5] By the time the project was close to completion in 2015, Vietnam had a GDP of $193.241 billion.[6] During this same time period, Vietnam increased the number of households connected to electricity from under 50 percent to over 97 percent.[7] As electrification rates increased, so did average household incomes.

A study looking at Vietnamese households between 2000 and 2004 concluded that gaining access to electricity boosted household incomes by 24.7 percent.[8] In addition to spurring economic growth, the quality of life within households improved as well. For example, electricity enables families to cook meals without having to use biomass, which in Vietnam is primarily made of sugarcane bagasse and rice husks.[9] Burning biomass produces dangerous indoor air pollution which can lead to stroke, pneumonia, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and causes 3.8 million deaths per year worldwide.[10] Moreover, biofuels were often collected by women, and electricity relieved them of this time-consuming task.[11] School enrollment also increases from boosted electricity rates because electrical lighting enables students to continue studying after dark.[12] A 2009 study determined that greater access to electricity would increase boys' school enrollment by 11.5 percent in Vietnam, while girls' enrollment would rise by 10.1 percent.[13] While electricity has improved Vietnam's economic status, the quality of life of its citizens, and its education rate, Vietnam's neighbors still have a long way to go.[14] For example, as of 2015, Cambodia and Myanmar had meager electrification

rates of 33 percent and 31 percent, respectively.[15]

Policy Analysis

Vietnam's most basic electricity structure has been present since 1995, when the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MOIT) was created by merging the Ministry of Energy, the Ministry of Light Industry, and the Ministry of Heavy Industry.[16] The MOIT then created a national electricity provider named the Electricity of Vietnam (EVN).[17] A state-owned firm, the EVN is fully dedicated to electricity production, transmission, and distribution, and collaborates with many other member businesses in Vietnam.[18] The EVN cooperated with Vietnamese politicians, businesses, and citizens to implement the three policies that were most crucial to the electrification of Vietnam: the operation and development of the 500-kV line, the passing of Decision 22, and the enactment of the Electricity Law.

Between 1992 and 1994, the Vietnamese government constructed a 500-kilovolt line to connect central and southern Vietnam with the north through linking all of the isolated distribution systems into one standardized and connected power grid.[19] At the time, the presence of several large hydropower plants in the north meant that northern Vietnam produced a surplus of energy.[20] However, the excess energy could not be distributed to other regions, as central and southern Vietnam had a different power system built on US standards.[21] When making

the decision about whether to construct the massive powerline in the first place, the government had the option of selling the north's excess power to China.[22] However, it ultimately decided to dispense the surplus electricity to the rest of the country. Originally constructed at a length of 1,487 kilometers, the 500-kV line allowed extensions to be added on that could reach villages in impoverished areas.[23] As of 2013, the line was 4,887 km long – an additional 3,400 km from its original length of construction.[24] The benefits of the 500-kV were experienced immediately, as it provided 6.2 million additional households with electricity from its completion in 1994 to 1997.[25]

One factor that made the policy so effective was the high population density in Vietnam. In 1995, there were 242 people per square kilometer.[26] This allowed more people to connect to the 500-kV line than would be possible in less densely populated countries. Urban dwellers recieved most of the benefits of electrification. Though only accounting for 20 percent of the population, urban dwellers consumed 86 percent of the country's electricity, with the average urban family consuming 10 times more electricity than their rural counterparts.[27] Thus, the fruits of Vietnam's enormous jump in electricity rates were predominately enjoyed by urban households, rather than rural populations. Yet, the 500-kV marked an important transition in governmental policy. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the government concentrated electrification efforts in agricultural

areas in the north, as electricity was primarily used for irrigation systems and rice cultivation.[28] The percentage of electricity spent on agriculture was 1.6 times higher in 1995 than it was in 2013.[29] Thus, the kV line demonstrated that the government began prioritizing electricity access for all households, rather than only for a select few industries, such as the agricultural sector.

Another major variable in the success of the 500-kV line was the immense demand for electricity among Vietnam's citizenry. A survey of households asked respondents to rank their willingness to pay for services such as electricity, roads, schools, and health care. Electricity ranked as the number one priority.[30] Although many developing countries have populations with a high demand for electrification, Vietnam's population was unique because asking if one's household or commune had electricity became a normal form of greeting for everyday citizens. After the construction of a rural electricity network, it was customary for a multi-day celebration to take place throughout the community.[31] The quantitative evidence to support such widespread demand can be seen by Vietnamese citizens' willingness to pay for electricity. The average income of a rural, five-member household in 1996 was about one million VND ($85 USD) per month. The cost for a new household to connect to a power grid was between one to two million VND, with an additional one million VND for the meter and service drop from the low voltage (LV) line to their house.[32] The strong

Backpacker District in Saigon, Vietnam.

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demand for electrification was also partially the result of an agricultural tax cut in 1990, which incentivized farmers to invest their savings into greater electricity access.[33] A high willingness to pay gave the EVN confidence to expand into rural areas, despite the clear risk of losing money by electrifying less populous regions. By the time the first section of the 500-kV line was completed in 1994, and in combination with the agricultural tax cut, the percentage of households with access to electricity had more than tripled.[34]

The next important policy the Vietnamese government adopted was Decision 22, which was enacted in February, 1999.[35] Decision 22 set forth clear goals for the future, and definitively laid out the responsibilities of the central government, local government, and the citizenry. The stated goal was to provide 80 percent of communes with access to electricity by the end of 2000. This plan was remarkably ambitious because in 1998, only 15.1 percent of communes were connected to power grids. However, by the end of 2000, that figure was 82 percent.[36] Decision 22 also fixed confusing and highly variable electricity pricings. Northern Vietnam was paying almost double the cost per household for electricity than southern Vietnam, because it operated on a costlier Russian-made grid.[37] Consequently, the average northern Vietnamese household paid $392 to access electricity, whereas households paid just $297 on average in the south.[38]

Decision 22 largely shifted costs from customers to the EVN. From 1996 to 2000, the EVN paid 40 percent of all medium voltage electrification costs, with customers contributing 449 billion VND.[39] Between 2001 and 2004, the EVN paid 70 percent of the total costs, with customers paying 314 billion VND, despite total costs rising by an additional 2,339 billion VND.[40] As time went on, the EVN also started to purchase electrical systems which had been built by private companies, local authorities, or other communal entities. In total, the EVN spent 400 billion VND to acquire the new networks. The MOIT also set a price cap at 700 VND per kWh of electricity.[41]

Decision 22 also clarified that Local Distribution Units (LDUs) would be responsible for managing their own systems. LDUs were private companies or cooperatives that bought electricity from the EVN in bulk and then redistributed it to paying customers.[42] The idea behind the policy was to expand electricity access to rural areas, with LDUs taking on part of the risk. The average LDU had only 1,000 households as customers.[43] At first, LDUs were a major failure, as a lack of technical standards and poor-quality electricity resulted in small or negative profit margins.[44] With no performance standards to be held accountable to, and seeking to minimize their costs, the LDUs failed to hire any technicians or electricians to make repairs or fix other problems that would arise with their systems.[45]

Key to resolving technical and organizational issues regarding electrification was Vietnam's partnership with the World Bank.[46] The international organization provided extensive "technical, institutional, and capacity building support to Vietnam's electricity sector" between 1995 and 1999, while also augmenting the country's electricity transmission and distribution systems.[47] In May, 2004, the World Bank financed a $150 million loan to further expand electricity access in rural areas. The loan required local participation, cost sharing between consumers, local, and central governments, and economic viability, all of which had already been set out by Decision 22 several years earlier.[48]

The final major policy that accelerated the electrification of Vietnam was aptly named the Electricity Law, and was enacted in 2004.[49] Under the section "Electricity in Service of Rural and Mountainous Areas, Islands," the law specifically addressed rural populations who were in the greatest need of electricity.[50] The implementation of this provision proved to be a great success in increasing electricity rates in rural areas. The policy encouraged more electricity companies to join not just the redistribution market, but also the generation market, in order to drive prices down through competition. The Electricity Law also broke up EVN's monopoly of Vietnam's energy sector.[51] Clear and transparent regulations for when tariffs would be raised – and with an added adjustment process in place – enabled private companies to cover their costs without allowing them to charge extraordinary amounts.[52] Two years before the Electricity Law was passed, companies outside the EVN ac-

counted for 7 percent of the country's power generation.[53] Four years after the law's enactment, non-EVN companies accounted for almost a third of power generation at 32 percent.[54] For remote and poor regions, the Electricity Law required the government to cover the cost of the service drop, and made further government financial assistance available to investors.[55]

Breaking the EVN's monopoly also minimized technical losses, or losses caused by lack of proper design for not having the appropriate specifications for equipment and materials. Before this policy was enacted, these technical losses could reach up to 50 percent.[56] By 2005, technical losses were down to 11.66 percent, and fell every year until 2009 when they reached a low of under 10 percent.[57] Technical losses specifically for the 500-kV line peaked at 5.13 percent in 2004 - the year the Electricity Law was passed - before declining year after year until reaching 2.69 percent in 2011.[58] This reduction proved especially impressive considering that the electrical intensity of Vietnam's grids, which measures the ratio between GDP and kWhs used, increased by 36 percent between 2004 and 2011.[59] Increasing electrical intensity signals a modernization of production processes and growth of industry.[60] The Electricity Law was able to solve the technical losses problem despite the Vietnamese economy consuming more energy than ever before.

The other highly effective provision in the Electricity Law was the encouragement of renewable resources. Under the same provision, "Electricity in Service of Rural and Mountainous Areas, Islands," the government recognized that it could cut down on electricity generation costs through relying more on hydropower.[61] Renewable resources are still a source of continuing development and improvement in Vietnam today. When the 500-kV line was built in 1995, hydropower accounted for 72.2 percent of the country's total electricity generation.[62] By 2004, when the Electricity Law was passed, hydropower generation had diminished to 38 percent of total electrical output.[63] Although dipping slightly for the next few years as total generation rapidly increased, by 2011 hydropower accounted for 39.4 percent of total output, and by 2013 it had risen to 44 percent.[64] At the same time, total generation had increased 84.54 TWh, or 2.8 times the total amount generated since the law was introduced.[65] Usage of other renewable energy sources apart from hydropower, such as geothermal, solar, tide, wind, biomass, and biofuels, also increased during this period. In 2004, renewable energy excluding hydropower generated next to nothing; one year later, 50 million kWh of it were produced, and two years later, that figure had reached 65 million kWh.[66] While Vietnam has long relied on hydropower and coal, the Electricity Law encouraged the usage of new sources of energy, and has oriented Vietnam toward becoming an electricity leader in clean energy and sustainable power for generations to come.

Conclusion

Vietnam still has a long way to go to catch up with more developed countries in migrating toward sustained renewable energy. Vietnam's CO2 per unit of GDP has risen from 1.00, when the electrification project started in 1995, to 3.39 by 2011.[67] Although Vietnam has shown promise regarding renewable energy, as of 2013, coal and gas still accounted for over 50 percent of the country's total electrical generation.[68]

As Vietnam progresses toward its target of 100 percent electrified households by 2025, it is useful to look back at how a divided and impoverished nation became a global leader in achieving rapid electrification results.[69] Through the 500-kV line, Decision 22, and the Electricity Law, Vietnam was able to take its first steps toward becoming a developed country. The construction of the 500-kV line showcased the nation's strong political willpower, Decision 22 set defined goals and responsibilities, and the Electricity Law created a layered market system.

Vietnam overcame a problem experienced by many developing countries, especially those in Southeast Asia. It demonstrated that strong and sustained public support for action – in this case, for electrification – coupled with a government that listens and responds to the needs of its people, can lead to widespread improvements in a country's economic and social conditions.

This photo was taken in the summer of 2018 as I was returning from a study abroad in Poland. I went to Paris for a few days and snagged this photo after sunset.

Abe Loven, Junior Journalism and Political Science double major

The famous nine arches bridge in Ella, Sri Lanka.

Jennings Dixon, Sophomore English and Political Science double major

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(Non-)Violence and Democracy in South Africa and the American South

By Thomas Elliott

Thomas Elliott is a 2019 UNC graduate in Political Science and Contemporary European Studies. Primarily interested in democratization, authoritarianism, and the political economy of violence, Thomas combines his interests in this comparative study on the role of (non-)violence in achieving democratic outcomes.

How might we look at Martin Luther King Jr. and Chris Hani, two activists assassinated for their efforts to secure democracy and equal rights for their people, in the context of their countries' democratization? One espoused peaceful protest and civil disobedience in the American South, while the other served as a commander of uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK), or "Spear of the Nation," the military wing of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa. Although both liberation movements emanate from different national settings, this study aims to understand how the movements elected to pursue a violent or non-violent approach to their struggle, and what impact those decisions had for each movement's long-term success in democratizing their respective countries.

In this paper, I discuss and compare the American Civil Rights movement and democratization in the American South with the anti-Apartheid struggle and subsequent democratization efforts in South Africa. Generally, political science research suggests non-violence is a more effective means of achieving democratic outcomes. But under what circumstances, however, does violence become more attractive to rights movements as a means to achieve their respective goals? Another frequently overlooked issue in the literature is both the short-term outcomes and the long-term effects of different rights-based democratization strategies on democratic resilience. Although the comparative cases explored in this paper are not entirely generalizable in all contexts, a broader understanding of the decisions made by civil rights movements may be useful in further conceptualizing democratization. I argue against a literature which favors non-violent tactics, and suggest that both cases under study demonstrate the importance of violence or the threat of violence in bringing about successful democratic transitions in nominal de-

mocracies that oppress members of an underprivileged ethnic or racial group. Furthermore, I explore the short-term and long-term outcomes of the decisions made with an overview of the political and electoral advances made by African Americans in Georgia and black South Africans.

This paper is divided into three parts. Part one examines the greater literature on (non-)violence and democratization. Part two sets the stage for both civil rights movements, including the actors involved and the institutional conditions they faced. It also explores the decision-making processes of the movements in deciding whether or not to commit violence in pursuit of their goals. Finally, part three seeks to understand the qualitative benefits achieved by both movements and the potential for, or actually realized, backsliding in each case, and concludes on the need for a model to fill a hole identified in the greater literature concerning (non-)violence and democratization in societ-

ies that are nominally democratic, but which seek to oppress racial and ethnic minority groups within them.

Theoretical Approaches to Violence and Non-Violence

What constitutes violence or non-violence? Political scientists Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan suggest that non-violent approaches to democratization can consist of "boycotts (social, economic, and political), strikes, protests, sit-ins, stay-aways, and other acts of civil disobedience and noncooperation to mobilize publics to oppose or support different policies, to delegitimize adversaries, and to remove or restrict adversaries' sources of power."[1] Violent resistance, however, is characterized as including "bombings, shootings, kidnappings, physical sabotage such as the destruction of infrastructure, and other types of physical harm of people and property."[2] From this definition, it is unclear where rioting fits onto the violence/non-violence spectrum, but for this paper, it is assumed to be a lighter version of "other types of physical harm of people and property," and thus represents a gray area of protest.

In general, the literature agrees that non-violence is the best approach to achieving democratization under authoritarian rule. Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson contend that the notion of violence is necessary for democratization, but only as a threat signaled presumably by peaceful opposition.[3] Actual violence may instead prompt significant pushback from non-democrat-

ic elites that limit democratic outcomes. Indeed, Chenoweth and Stephan's book "Why Civil Resistance Works" argues that 60 percent of non-violent democratization movements succeeded in defeating authoritarian regimes, but less than 30 percent of violent campaigns achieved their goal of defeating a dictator. What prompts this success is that non-violent campaigns tend to attract far greater numbers of the population than violent opposition, since individuals from all corners of society are offered "an opportunity…to participate with varying levels of commitment and risk tolerance."[4] Chenoweth and Stephan's arguments fit rather cleanly with Acemoglu and Robinson's understanding of the threat of violence: the greater the support for a movement, the more dangerous a threat of violence becomes.

Two important considerations, however, are generally left out of the analysis in the works discussed above: the prospects for democratization for marginalized or oppressed groups in a nominally democratic society, and the longer-term quality of democracy for those same groups once their aims have been achieved. Markus Bayer, Felix S. Bethke, and Daniel Lambach conducted a longitudinal analysis exploring democratic outcomes based on the presence or absence of violence in response to Chenoweth and Stephans' work. They found that "sustainable democracy promotion requires support from a broad base of civil society actors," and argued a that there is a "democratic dividend" to non-violent resis-

tance.[5] However, neither the United States' Civil Rights movement nor the South African anti-Apartheid struggle were included in their analysis. Mauricio Celestino and Kristian Gleditsch similarly find that in the moment of transition, a peaceful campaign will be more likely to lead to democratization, while a violent campaign may actually birth another autocracy.[6] However, like Bayer et al., their work does not cover the civil rights movements in the United States or South Africa.

While there appears to be some level of consensus in the literature that non-violence is more effective for achieving democratization, this consensus is misleading because its focus lies on either foreign occupation or domestic dictatorship, not the oppression of particular racial groups within an already democratic society. In these contexts, Charles Tilly's sociological work on the role of violence may be more helpful as, in the end, political realities represent social inequalities across the black/white racial divide in South Africa and the United States. Tilly argues that violence fractures existing trust networks in society that enable continued non-democratic practices, and disrupts entrenched economic and social inequalities.[7] In the next section, I seek to show how violence played this role in the South African and American democratization cases.

(Non-)Violent Decisions: Civil Rights and Political Opportunity Structure

Civil rights movements present significant challenges for the logic of (non-)violence, as articulated by Chenoweth and Stephan. If non-violence is held to be beneficial because it broadens public support for change, what happens when a democratic coalition is inherently limited in scope and size? While there will always be supportive members or allies of the oppressed among the oppressing caste, that support might not be enough to overthrow the oppressive structure. As a result, the process of (non-)violent decision making is fundamentally altered in the context of civil-democratic movements.

A significant turning point in the struggle against Apartheid in South Africa was the African National Congress' decision to arm and train guerillas, first in Tanzania, then Zambia, Mozambique, Angola, and Zimbabwe, to conduct warfare against the region's white minority governments. Known as uMkhonto we Sizwe, this force sought to conduct bombings of government infrastructure and assassinations of individuals deemed sufficiently complicit in the oppression of black Africans. This decision was brought about by the Sharpeville massacre of 1960, when a white police force murdered and wounded 150 black South Africans peacefully protesting against Apartheid's pass laws, which restricted their movement within the country.[8] As the actors involved realized that even the non-violent avenue was fraught with risk of death and imprisonment, the

Dedicated to the goddess Athena, the Parthenon stands watch over the city of Athens. Constructed in 432BC, the temple remains an enduring symbol of democracy and Western civilization.

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political opportunity structure changed in favor of pursuing violent tactics. This was acknowledged by Nelson Mandela during his notorious Rivonia trial in 1963 and 1964 for sabotage after he was captured with several other MK militants. "I do not deny, however, that I planned sabotage," Mandela admitted, and that the plan was "a result of a calm and sober assessment of the political situation that had arisen after many years of tyranny, exploitation, and oppression of [his] people by the whites."[9] Some authors, such as Stephen Zunes, argue that MK violence actually hurt the ANC's struggle for legitimacy in South Africa. According to Zunes, MK's actions "furthered government suppression" and weakened non-violent liberation struggles, as "the government was able to link them in the eyes of the public."[10] Other authors, however, contend that through MK, the ANC "was accorded the mantle of symbolic leadership by the youths spearheading the fighting."[11] Through the use of public violence, the ANC was able to become the leader in the struggle against Apartheid, making itself the nominal benefactor of generalized violent uprisings in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the regime's foundations began to crack.

In South Africa, democracy came about rather quickly after decades of Apartheid. At the end of the Cold War, when any conception of American support in the name of anti-communism for the white regime evaporated, and with the ANC changing tack from revolutionary struggle to a path-

way of electoral success, Mandela and President Frederik Willem de Klerk began negotiating a transition of power. Hermann Giliomee argues that a worsening economy (an interruption in the existing economic order) and increasing township violence (broken trust networks) played a major role in transforming the negotiations in favor of the ANC. Indeed, the Afrikaans National Party (NP) was deemed complicit in many instances of police violence, such as in the Boipatong massacre.[12] In the case of Boipatong, ANC leader, Cyril Ramaphosa, declared that De Klerk played a role in the 1992 attack, which saw 45 of the township's residents murdered by armed thugs.[13] A subsequent visit by De Klerk to deliver sympathies to the massacre's victims also resulted in the police firing on a crowd of ANC-sympathizers.[14] During this period, public support for the NP fell from 25 to 14 percent, while that of the ANC rose from 54 to 60 percent.[15] While the violence discussed above was not necessarily orchestrated by the ANC, the violence did serve to greatly alter the political opportunity structure for ANC leadership. Indeed, the presence of MK in the greater political ecosystem through bombings and targeted assassinations, coupled with the ANC's rise in popularity, meant that the public implicitly condoned the violence that was taking place, in the name of greater democratization and equality. Organized, targeted actions may have promoted disorganized, vigilante violence, making ongoing repression on the part of the white minority increasingly cost-

ly and unappealing.

Many consider the American Civil Rights movement to be a successful example of non-violent rights-based mobilization.[16] The implementation of the Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka Supreme Court case in 1954 brought an end to de jure "separate but equal" legislation that segregated schools, hospitals and other public spaces. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was another major victory for activists in the United States, and had major repercussions for the political reality of the American South as the Republican Party quickly completed its ascendance to power in those states shortly thereafter.

The Civil Rights Act outlawed discrimination based on a number of factors, including race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and prevented segregation in schools, the workforce, and public housing. A year later, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act, spearheaded by northern Democrats. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 took further steps to eliminate any form of discrimination at the polls by prohibiting any law that limits a racial or linguistic minority's access to the ballot box. This was sorely needed in the Jim Crow South, where white-dominated legislatures frequently passed racist laws to limit blacks' ability to vote. Some measures attempted subtlety, such as literacy tests and poll taxes that inherently disfavored blacks. Others, such as the "grandfather clauses," were more openly racist by allowing illiterate or poor whites, whose ancestors had the right to vote before the Civil War,

to claim exemptions from literacy tests and poll taxes.[17] Indeed, in passing the Voting Rights Act, Congress decided that certain states would have to pass a more stringent "pre-approval" process through the federal government, if they elected to change any of their voting laws. These states included South Carolina, Alabama, and Virginia, among several others.[18] August Nimtz argues that what brought about these landmark reforms in the United States was the combination of non-violent practices with the threat of greater violence, as signaled by race riots in the aforementioned states in the early 1960s.[19] Sally Bermanzohn and August Nimtz both agree that another vital aspect of the Civil Rights movement was black self-defense.[20] Bermanzohn quotes Civil Rights leader James Forman: "there was hardly a black house in the South without its shotgun or rifle."[21] On May 11, 1963, following the bombing of the home of Martin Luther King Jr. and a hotel he was believed to be staying at, massive riots occurred in the city of Birmingham. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy reportedly claimed that "The Negroes are mean and tough… and have guns and have been worked up about this…If you have another incident…another bombing, for instance, or fire, or something like that and it attracted a large number of Negroes, then the situation might well get out of hand...this could trigger off a great deal of violence around the country…"[22] Nimtz shows how the Kennedy administration did not take the ending of Jim Crow laws seriously until it was forced to crack down on the Birmingham race riots.[23] Violence played a key role in upending the social realities of members of the white, oppressive classes in South Africa and the United States, altering the social trust networks and upending the economic order by promoting instability and a hostile environment.

Resentment and Backlash: Incomplete Transitions

Despite the lauded successes of the American Civil Rights movement, the view looks rather different today, particularly following the 2018 midterm elections in the United States. This section reviews steps taken across the American South to re-legislate electoral inequality for African Americans. Lenka Bustikova has argued that right wing parties and politicians succeed in places where ethno-liberal groups have made significant advances in promoting the rights of minority groups.[24] While her work focuses on Eastern Europe, might similar mechanisms be at play in the American South? It is well known that following the groundbreaking Civil Rights legislation of the 1960s, political allegiances in the South underwent significant shifts as socially conservative whites shifted their loyalty to the Republican Party.

That same Republican Party has sought to challenge important parts of the Civil Rights legislation, arguing in Shelby County v. Holder (2013) that the pre-clearance mechanism of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court agreed with this analysis, and the federal government's ability to punish electoral discrimination has been significantly limited as a result. "Voters have been disenfranchised," writes Vann Newkirk, "voter-identification laws, which experts suggest will make voting harder especially for poor people, people of color, and elderly people, have advanced in several states, and some voting laws that make it easier to register and cast ballots have been destroyed."[25] Racial gerrymandering in states such as North Carolina and Ohio has significantly impacted elections in those states, and in 2018, voting booths were delivered without power cords to Georgia precincts with significant black populations.[26] In that Georgia election, tens of thousands of black voters possibly had their names struck from the rolls by the office of Georgia's Secretary of State, Brian Kemp, the man running for governor against a black woman, Stacey Abrams.[27] Voter disenfranchisement and discrimination will likely continue to grow in the American South until the appetite returns at the national level to punish Southern states for their discriminatory actions - something which is unlikely under the current presidential administration.

What might be the causal mechanism behind backsliding in the American context when, despite its many issues with corruption and inequality, South African electoral democracy remains more or less intact? In South Africa, black citizens are members of the majority, and political leadership nationally and regionally is overwhelmingly black, unlike in the American

This picture was taken during my trip to Washington, D.C. in the Spring a few years ago. These cherry blossom trees were given by Mayor Yukio Ozaki of Tokyo, Japan, in the early 1900s to Washington, D.C. to celebrate the relationship between Japan and the United States. Now, every year people from around the country will visit D.C. to take part in National Cherry Blossom Festival and witness the blooming of the city's many cherry blossom trees, which usually takes place in late March.

Devina Thiono, graduate student from the class of '23, PhD, Microbiology & Immunology

South. While it is impossible to make a causal claim based on what did not happen, what is missing from the historical record in the American case is a history of organized, militaristic violence. Might a more violent Civil Rights movement have precluded a right-wing backlash, and enshrined electoral freedoms for good?

Conclusion

White South Africans prided themselves on their country's rule of law. While South Africa, indeed, may have possessed a robust legal system, its laws and institutions were racist - privileging a white minority ruling caste at the expense of the black majority. A similar thing can be said of the Jim Crow South. Poll taxes, literacy tests, and grandfather clauses may have been legal, but that did not make them right. Violence was beneficial in the South African case because it helped shift public opinion in favor of the ANC's cause, and younger generations found inspiration from MK's actions and leadership. What is clear is that black South Africans, despite lacking proper citizenship status and facing a much worse legal context than African Americans, did possess one advantage that African Americans did not: numbers. In the late 1980s, blacks made up 74.1 percent of the South African population, and upwards of 80 percent if tallies include those of mixed race.[28] Furthermore, the ANC could foster alliances with neighboring southern African countries, such as Tanzania, Mozambique, and Zambia from which to organize and pursue a military struggle. As discussed above, African American activists were at a numerical and organizational disadvantage, which significantly altered their political opportunity landscape. Nevertheless, the threat of violence remained important in democratization efforts in the United States, particularly through riots and other more destructive protests, as some authors have argued. Based on the two case studies at hand, outright violence and the threat of violence played differing, but important roles in the American and South African cases, differentiated in part by different demographic and organizational realities and the presence of domestic allies.

Ironically, where the literature argues non-violence is beneficial to democratization in authoritarian states, it appears as if more violent approaches have had greater success in democratizing oppressive democracies. This is because citizens who are members of the privileged group place great value on the inherent freedoms to live in safety, to travel where they please, to own property, and perhaps, to believe they live in a democratic society. Violent protests politicize issues in ways peaceful protest never could. It is highly unlikely that the New York Times would have covered the civil rights controversy surrounding the "Silent Sam" confederate monument in Chapel Hill if it had not been "violently" toppled by anti-racist protesters.[29] Nevertheless, it is also clear that advances made by oppressed groups do not always last. While economic power remains in the hands of whites in South Africa, political power will forever lie with black South Africans. Had South Africa's transition itself been more violent, might black South Africans have won greater control over their country's economic resources? Such an outcome is not inconceivable, but the results of extended violence are not necessarily viewed positively. While the American Civil Rights movement and the South African black liberation struggle engaged with violence differently, both's ultimate transitions toward democracy were relatively peaceful. This can be contrasted with a country like Zimbabwe, where violence was carried over into the transition period, and now the country suffers from an oppressive authoritarian regime.

Finally, what do the findings of this paper suggest for the continued liberation struggles in the American South, where the rights of black Americans are continuously undermined by state and local legislation? If greater democratization is to be achieved, perhaps it may be necessary to continually occupy the space that exists between violence and non-violence in the form of riotous, but ultimately peaceful, civil disobedience.

Teachers and students celebrate Diwali with sparklers and handmade rangoli art at Guardian International School, Chengalpattu, Tamil Nadu, India.

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