

Front cover photo: Photo of a ferry boat crossing Lac Léman viewed from Montreux, Switzerland. Against a cloudy sky, the French alps are visible.

Photo by Audrey Patrick, Class of 2024, Johns Hopkins University

THE INTERNATIONALIST

Undergraduate Journal of Foreign Affairs

The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Volume VII

Issue I

Fall 2021



Lisa and her Rake: When COVID first hit I went to live on my parent's farm in Tobaccoville, NC. A forest fire broke out on the back of the property in April and my neighbor, Lisa, came to help fight the flames.

Photo by Scottie Nicholson, Fourth-Year Interdisciplinary Studies in Cultural Studies with a minor in Studio Art

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Special thanks to:

Joshua O'Brien
President of the Carolina International Relations Association

Mikhal Ben-Joseph
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This publication would not be possible without the support of the Carolina International Relations Association and its leadership.

FROM THE EDITOR

This journal is the product of the brilliant, hard-working minds of dozens of students, from the authors to the editors to the photographers. Hundreds of hours of research, writing, editing, and formatting have gone into the composition of this final product. *The Internationalist* has continued to grow and expand this semester, and it would not be possible without the dedication of everyone who has contributed to it, all of whom are deserving of endless recognition and appreciation.

This semester, the contents of this journal span the four corners of the world and engage with multidimensional topics that delve into myriad factors that shape the international system. These pieces deal with topics from nationalism in India to economic instability in Iraq, United Nations peacekeeping operations to the role of Congress in United States foreign policy. Our authors conducted in-depth research on fascinating topics, such as the role of the United States in the 2009 Honduras coup, the rise of ethnopopulism in Europe, the impact of the prison system on Guatemalan democracy, and progressive policy in Mexico. These articles illustrate a depth of understanding, advanced analysis, and compelling arguments, which are a credit to both their authors and the University of North Carolina.

Special thanks to our Executive Editor, Hannah Rubenstein, whose hard work and incredible leadership makes the journal what it is; Jay Ramesh and Stuti Shah, our amazing Managing Editors, who spearheaded the editing process and provided invaluable guidance to our Staff Editors; Mariana Herrera, our irreplaceable Head Design Editor, whose vision and expertise is truly inspiring; and Emma Holmes, our Marketing Director, who runs the Internationalist Blog with astounding capability and grace. Finally, I wish to thank our team of staff editors, who work closely with each article published and whose dedication and attention to detail defines *The Internationalist*.

It has been an honor to work with this incredible team, and I look forward to facilitating the growth of the journal and continuing to publish phenomenal undergraduate research in the spring semester.

Sincerely,



Ash Huggins
Editor-in-Chief

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Nationalist Muslim Opposition to the Partition of India: Madani, Azad, and Khan By Rohan Rajesh	8
No Prosperity, No Peace: The Iraqi Economy and Instability By Mikhal Ben-Joseph	22
Predatory Peacekeeping: The Sexual Violence Issues of the UN By Patrick White	30
Actor and Inhibitor: Congress in the Post-Cold War Foreign Policy, 1989-1997 By Joshua O'Brien	44
Closing the Veins of Latin America By Gabriel Morrison	58
The Rise of Right Wing Populism Throughout Europe: Mechanisms and Outcomes By Ezra Cross	68
Democracy Behind Bars: Guatemalan Prisons By Mackenzie Roche	76
PROGRESA: Progressive Policy Championing Women and Children in Mexico By Alexis Zucker	84

Nationalist Muslim Opposition to the Partition of India: Madani, Azad, and Khan

By Rohan Rajesh

*"Muslim citizens in India have a responsibility to remove the doubts and misgiving entertained by a large section of the people about their loyalty founded largely on their past association with the demand for Pakistan and the unfortunate activities of some of them."
- Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel in a letter to Jawaharlal Nehru, March 1950*

In advocating for the Partition of India, the All-India Muslim League sought to protect the Muslims of British India by giving them their own homeland. Instead, hundreds of millions of Muslims remain divided among three countries, including a significant minority population in a Hindu-majority India. While India's leaders envisioned the country as a secular, democratic republic in which all citizens would be equal under the law, Muslims faced economic and political marginalization since independence.¹ Much of the marginalization stems from enduring suspicion, particularly among Hindu Nationalists, about Indian Muslims' roles in dividing Mother India.² However, the above quote came not just from a leader of the nominally secular Indian National Congress (INC), but from independent India's first Home Minister, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel. Two years before writing

that letter, Patel himself ordered an investigation in 1948 within India's bureaucracy to ascertain the loyalty of Muslim employees.³ To this day, Muslims are often treated as suspect citizens in India. Their loyalty is questioned on everything from sports, "Is it true that every Indian Muslim secretly cheers for the Pakistan cricket team?" to matters of identity, "Tell us what is more important to you, being an Indian, or being a Muslim?"⁴

The history of the Pakistan movement and the battle for Muslim hearts and minds is complicated. Jinnah, the leader of the Muslim League and Pakistan's chief campaigner, prevaricated on the definition of Pakistan to appeal to diverse constituencies.⁵ Was Pakistan a separate country or a collection of autonomous states within India? A territorial Pakistan could never include the United Provinces and Delhi, but it was in this region that

support for the League was strongest, particularly among the middle class and the educated.⁶ Further, the prevailing, simplistic narrative of Hindu-Muslim enmity, leading to the natural creation of Pakistan as a state for Indian Muslims, belies the significant complexity of the debate that took place within the Indian Muslim community on their relation to their ancestral land and the global ummah. The same is true of post-9/11 discourse on Muslims in general.

Despite Jinnah's effective rhetoric, several Muslim leaders, representing key constituencies among India's Muslim population, stridently opposed Partition and supported a united, secular India. Some of the most prominent of these leaders include Hussain Ahmad Madani, Maulana Azad, and Abdul Ghaffar Khan. Madani was a Deobandi cleric most famous for his treatise, "Composite Nationalism and Is-

lam.”⁷ His treatise contains compelling arguments for a united India that were grounded in the Quran and shared by many clerics at the time. The fact that a devout Muslim used Quranic literature to oppose the creation of a Muslim state is striking. Maulana Azad was the youngest ever president of the INC. Khan was the leader of the Khudai Khidmatgars, an organization of Pashtuns who worked with the INC to nonviolently oppose British rule. Contradicting the conceptions of history among Pakistani and Hindu nationalists, these leaders show that Muslim support for dividing India was far from universal among key Muslim constituencies.

To give a more nuanced history of the Pakistan movement and Partition, I will analyze the ideas of each of the leaders in separate sections. For Madani, I use an English translation of “Composite Nationalism and Islam.”⁸ For Azad, I analyze an important speech given by him in his 1940 presidential address, while drawing on the insightful history given by Syeda Hameed.⁹ Finally, for Khan, I study a paper written by Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah.¹⁰

Maulana Madani – A Deobandi Cleric’s Opposition to the Partition of India

Maulana Hussein Ahmad Madani (1879-1957) was the principal of the Darul Uloom Deoband, the Islamic university where the influential Deoband movement developed in the 19th century.¹¹ He

was also one of the most important Muslim critics of Partition because he used the teachings of the Quran, of which he was a renowned expert, to deliver an effective argument against the idea of religion as a means of nationhood. His seminal “Composite Nationalism and Islam” was even a rejoinder to a poem published by Allama Iqbal, the famous Urdu poet and the “ideological father of Pakistan.”¹² More on Iqbal and his philosophy below.

“The non-Arab world still does not know the secrets of the faith.

Thus from Deoband Hussain Ahmad proves

somewhat strange singing out high on the pulpit

That millat is based on land.

What does he know of the stance of the Arab

Messenger, on whom be peace?

Bring yourself closer to Mustafa, for his alone is faith

complete.”

If you cannot approach him

You’re just an Abu Lahab!

Essentially, Iqbal mocked Madani as someone who did not know Arabic and was an Abu Lahab, an uncle of Mohammed who opposed Islam.¹³ This poem was blatantly slanderous given that Madani was an eminent expert of Quranic Arabic and a respected religious leader. It also stemmed from a misreading of a speech given by Madani.¹⁴ Thus, Madani felt compelled to respond, which he did

when he published “Composite Nationalism and Islam” in 1938, which I will break down shortly.

The main ideological difference between these two titans of modern Islamic philosophy was the conception of nationhood. Iqbal felt that modern European-style nationalism, drawn on ethnolinguistic lines, was responsible for war and imperialism. He deplored the division of Turks and Arabs along ethnic lines following the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, when both groups should have realized their common bonds as Muslims.¹⁵ Iqbal felt that a united Muslim ummah in which Islam is a modern, rationalist, ethical, philosophical conception would help end these conflicts and promote a creative spirit for the betterment of the world, just as the caliphates of old were vital to the dissemination of classical knowledge to the West.¹⁶

Madani, on the other hand, saw the hand of imperialism in the division of India along religious lines and considered Iqbal’s ideas a dangerous extension of that. He noted the irony of the British exploiting nationalism to break up the Ottoman Empire while condemning it when Indians protested British rule.¹⁷ To Madani, it was vital that Muslims and non-Muslims alike work together to fight the common foe of British imperialism.

“Composite Nationalism and Islam” is divided into three sections. In the first section, Madani eluci-

dates the precise meaning of a qaum (country) as used in the Arabic of the Prophet Muhammad. Through a thorough reading of dictionaries and the Quran, Madani concludes that qaums have always included Muslims and non-Muslims who belong to the same territory or ethnicity.¹⁸ He also states that the Quran sanctions the cooperation of Muslims and non-Muslims towards the betterment of the qaum and that prophets can have relationships with non-Muslims, including polytheists.¹⁹

In the second section, Madani attacks the hypocrisy of European imperialism. He points out that when Indian handicrafts and commerce dominated Europe, “the philosophy of ‘safe and secure trade’ was propagated by Europeans and every newspaper, journal, and intellectual’s lecture sang paeans of its virtues as if it was a source of eternal bliss for mankind.”²⁰ But, “when the Indian economy and commerce were weakened by this policy and ‘made in England’ goods began to dominate the market, the philosophy of ‘free trade’ was preached to us . . . as a result, the handicraft industry of India was completely destroyed.”²¹ More specifically with regards to nationalism, he goes on to say, “When the Muslims were dominant, the West harangued the philosophy that the European map could not be changed and that the victorious nation could not annex the territory of the vanquished country. How-

ever, when the Muslim power [i.e., the Ottoman and Mughal Empires and Caliphates] was weakened . . . A new philosophy was propounded that the victors could not be denied access to their booty.”²²

This was a stunning indictment of imperial rule and, by extension, a powerful argument for Indian nationalism. Essentially, Madani is arguing that Europeans broke Muslim empires by dividing religious communities when Muslims should have used the power of nationalism and worked with their non-Muslim brethren to end British rule on the subcontinent. He later points out that the Prophet Muhammad famously allied with the Jews of Medina to vanquish their common enemy.²³ As Madani writes, “To think and argue that Islam is not a flexible religion is something that I cannot really understand . . . Islam can have a covenant with non-Muslims . . . Muslims can also live and interact with non-Muslims. They can share in their happiness and sorrows. They can drink water from the same tap and eat in the same plate.”²⁴ That the conservative cleric argued for union with non-Muslims while Anglophile Muslims argued for separation and Muslim unity seems confusing until you realize that it is the cleric who knows the Quran in and out and finds in it the fundamental message of universal solidarity.

Madani concludes by praising the Indian National Congress and its commitment to the protection of

minorities and their cultures.²⁵ As Madani writes, besides nationalism, “there is no other way to protect our religion and culture from the British onslaught.”²⁶ He points to a verse in the Quran which exhorts Muslims to fight for each other as long as they have not signed a treaty with another group. Thus, in Madani’s view, there is no contradiction between being a member of the ummah and being an Indian.²⁷ He accuses Iqbal of serving British goals by arguing against composite nationalism and preventing Muslims from joining non-Muslims in ending British imperialism.²⁸

“Composite Nationalism and Islam” is a powerful rejoinder to the Pakistan ideology. While the League advocated for a separate state for Muslims, a respected Islamic scholar argued that the entire enterprise was, at best, misguided and, at worst, blasphemous. While the Deobandis are typically associated with ultra-conservative strains of Islam,²⁹ Madani presented a very liberal, secular ideal for post-independence India. Meanwhile, the highly Westernized and “Savile Row-suit-wearing, sausage-eating, whisky-swilling” Jinnah articulated a vision for a separate Islamic state on the premise that, “There is nothing in life which links [Hindus and Muslims] together. Our names, our clothes, our foods – they are all different.”³⁰ This contrast is very striking and truly belies the idea of Pakistan being founded as a “pure”

Islamic state by devout Muslims.

When Madani wrote “Composite Nationalism and Islam,” he was confident that Muslims would be fairly represented in a united India, given the presence of five Muslim-majority provinces and the fact that a third of British India’s population was Muslim. Madani never imagined that post-Partition, all five of those provinces would be lost and the Muslim population reduced to less than ten percent of independent India.³¹ Nonetheless, Madani chose to remain in India to guide the debilitated Muslim population as the head of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind, the Deobandis’ political wing. He called on India’s Muslims to serve the country and commit to a jihad-e-akbar (“great jihad”) of moral character to improve their standing in independent India.³²

Maulana Azad: An Indian and a Muslim

Maulana Abul Kalam Azad (1888-1958) was born in Mecca, quite fittingly for an important Muslim leader, to a Bengali Muslim scholar and his Arab wife. Azad received a traditional Islamic education in Calcutta, where he studied the Quran and Islamic jurisprudence extensively, but he was influenced by the ideas of the Islamic educationist Sir Syed Ahmed Khan (1817-1898) and, without his father’s knowledge, learned English to gain a well-rounded education.³³

In Calcutta, Azad, then a teenager, published and wrote in an

Urdu newspaper, the Al-Hilal, “The Crescent”, wherein he espoused anti-British and anti-imperial views, giving Azad significant clout in the Muslim community.³⁴ It was also in Calcutta that Azad joined the INC.³⁵ In the 1920s, he became particularly involved in the Khilafat Movement, a movement by British Indian Muslims to preserve the Ottoman Caliphate.³⁶ Although the movement was ultimately unsuccessful because Turkey’s secular President Atatürk promptly disbanded the caliphate upon achieving Turkish independence, it was noteworthy for being an early example of Hindu-Muslim political cooperation.³⁷ It was during the Khilafat Movement that Azad and Gandhi became close friends, and Azad became a key member of the INC.³⁸ As a prominent Muslim theologian and Indian nationalist, he also served as an ambassador for Hindu-Muslim unity. With the Muslim League gaining ground in the court of Muslim opinion, often due to missteps on the part of the INC as Azad was quick to point out, the leaders of the INC decided to make Azad the President of the INC in 1940.³⁹ Given his role as the most prominent Muslim in the INC, it is important to analyze his motivations for supporting the Indian National Congress and a united, independent India.

Much like Madani, Azad believed that being Muslim and being Indian were not mutually exclusive. Rather, Azad believed that Indian

Muslims should work with Hindus on matters of national concern while maintaining ties with Muslims elsewhere.⁴⁰ Azad believed in Muslim advocacy if one’s Muslim identity was at risk of being submerged in Hinduism, such as in the matter of the Hindi-Urdu debate. Unlike the League, however, Azad retained confidence that Muslims had a strong enough position in the subcontinent that they did not need to rely on British support or autonomy for protection.⁴¹ He also recognized that the strength of Muslims, in general, derives from the fact that they “occupy every inch of the road between Khyber and Constantinople.”⁴²

Fundamentally, Azad was a Muslim leader and declared he would not hesitate to split the INC if it became inimical to Muslim interests.⁴³ According to an unpublished article written by Azad in 1938, he originally supported working with the League to fight for independence and giving them a seat at the table in the formation of provincial governments after the 1937 elections saw the League perform dismally. However, Azad blamed the League, particularly Jinnah, for not compromising with the INC, thereby preventing cooperation.⁴⁴ Azad recognized that there were Hindu majoritarian elements within the INC, but he felt that since the overall INC was non-communal, it was in Muslims’ interests to stand with this national force for indepen-

dence and not the British.⁴⁵ As Azad writes, “Even if all the Muslims of India say to the British, ‘Do not leave this country, we will help you,’ he won’t stay... When his own vessel is caught in a whirl, how can he help another’s sinking ship?”⁴⁶

These sentiments were expressed in his 1940 Presidential Address. This was an important speech given that the League had passed the Lahore Resolution some months earlier, declaring support for “Pakistan.” He accused the British, and, implicitly, the League, of using the excuse of India’s religious demography and communal situation to deny it independence. While trying not to downplay the communal situation, Azad said, “to admit its [the problem of communalism] existence, however, does not mean that it should be used as a weapon against India’s national freedom. British imperialism has always exploited it to this end.”⁴⁷ In trying to assuage the concerns of Muslims that they would be underrepresented in a fully democratic India, Azad said,

[The Congress] has always held to two principles . . . (i) Whatever constitution is adopted for India, there must be the fullest guarantee in it for the rights and interests of minorities. (ii) The minorities should judge for themselves what safeguards are necessary for the protection of their rights and interests of mi-

norities. The majority should not decide this.⁴⁸

Azad continues by arguing that Muslims are not a political minority because of their significant population across India, their domination in five provinces, as well as their relative unity compared to Hindus (who were beset by divisions along caste and regional lines). According to Azad, the idea of Muslims as a separate community from Hindus is a part of the British “divide and rule” policy to prevent a unified movement for independence.⁴⁹ Azad then appeals to his fellow Muslims to recognize their common Indianness, stating,

Like Ganga and Jumna, they [Hindus and Muslims] flowed for a while through separate courses, but nature’s immutable law brought them together and joined them in a sangam [confluence, union] . . . Islam has now as great a claim on the soil of India as Hinduism . . . Just as a Hindu can say with pride that he is an Indian and follows Hinduism, so also we can say with equal pride that we are Indians and follow Islam.⁵⁰

Further describing the commonalities between Indian Hindus and Muslims, Azad concludes,

Eleven hundred years of common history have enriched India with our common achievements. Our languages, our poetry, our literature, our culture, our art, our dress, our

manners and customs, the innumerable happenings of our daily life, everything bears the stamp of our joint endeavors . . . Whether we like it or not, we have now become an Indian nation, united and indivisible. No fantasy or artificial scheming to separate and divide can break this unity.⁵¹

Essentially, Azad is pointing out that through the course of history, Indian Muslims became Indians and enriched India culturally. In the above quote, he refers to the idea of Pakistan as a “fantasy” that would fail to break the unity of India’s peoples. However, Azad’s vision for a united, independent India began to unravel in 1942. Azad’s goal was *purna swaraj* or *mukammal azad* (complete independence, in Hindi and Urdu, respectively) by whatever means necessary. He was willing to eschew nonviolence (“a matter of policy, not creed”) and support the British war effort if it meant freedom for India.⁵² However, recognizing that the British intended to maintain control over India even after the war, Azad and his fellow Congress members refused to support the British war effort in the Second World War. While they opposed fascism, they also viewed British imperialism as equally unacceptable. Without guarantees of independence after the war, they would not support the British.⁵³

To convince Indian leaders to support the war effort, the British

government sent the Cripps Mission, led by cabinet minister Sir Stafford Cripps, to negotiate. One of the proposals was to allow the provinces to secede upon independence. Azad vehemently opposed this proposal.⁵⁴ Additionally, the Congress leaders were not convinced that the British were committed to Indian independence. These led to the INC's rejection of the proposals.⁵⁵ Cripps responded that allowing a majority government in India was "irresponsible" given the communal situation.⁵⁶ Given that such claims flew in the face of Azad's political beliefs, Azad responded by explaining the INC's stand and the understanding that the various religious groups would hash out the communal issues after independence.⁵⁷ In response, Gandhi decided to launch the Quit India Movement. Azad opposed the measure, fearing that the British would simply arrest them during wartime.⁵⁸ Sardar Patel intervened, and the INC's Working Committee passed the Quit India Resolution in 1942. As Azad predicted, the INC leaders, including Azad, were promptly arrested by the British.⁵⁹

The arrest of the INC's leaders and the resignations of the Congress-led provincial ministries allowed the League to gain grassroots support among Indian Muslims during the war. During the postwar negotiations for Indian independence, Jinnah demanded that the League alone be allowed to appoint

Muslim delegates. Azad pushed back strongly on this suggestion since the Congress was a national party, not a communal one.⁶⁰ When the League overperformed among Muslims in the 1946 elections compared to the 1937 elections, Jinnah had a stronger hand to play with the British.

Azad opposed the idea of Pakistan on ideological and theological grounds. Theologically, Azad opposed the insinuation behind the very name of Pakistan that some areas were pak ("pure" in Urdu and Persian) while others were not since the Prophet said, "God has made the whole world a mosque for me."⁶¹ In what can only be described as one of the most prescient arguments in history, Azad pointed out,

If India is divided into two states, one Hindu and one Muslim, in the Hindu part, Muslims will be scattered in small minorities all over the entire region. They will wake up one day to discover that they have become aliens and foreigners and left to the mercies of an unadulterated Hindu Raj. Their position in Pakistan, too, he writes, will be vulnerable and weak, and whatever little majority they enjoy will be offset by the economic, educational, and political lead enjoyed by the non-Muslims of those areas. Despite all this, however, even if Pakistan were to become overwhelmingly

Muslim, it would still not solve the problem of the Muslims of India.⁶²

He accused both the League and extremist Hindus of inciting communal passions around the issue, since when

[Communal Hindus] read into the formation of the League, a Pan-Islamic conspiracy which they opposed out of fear . . . this became an incentive to the followers of the League who acted upon the simple logic that if Hindus were opposed to something, it must be of benefit to the Muslims. An emotional frenzy was thus created, which made persons immune to reason.⁶³

Azad favored a formula in which the country remained united with political power significantly devolved to the provinces; this became the basis of the Cabinet Mission Plan. The plan was agreed upon, albeit reluctantly, by Jinnah and Azad. Unfortunately, Nehru made an ill-conceived statement which implied that the INC did not, in fact, accept the plan. This led Jinnah to declare that an independent Pakistan was the only solution. Azad convinced the All-India Congress Committee to pass a resolution affirming its commitment to the Cabinet Mission Plan, but Jinnah no longer trusted the INC.⁶⁴ After this, Jinnah declared a Direct-Action Day in Calcutta, leading to bloody sectarian rioting in Bengal, which

spread across the plains of North India. The violence forced a reluctant Congress to accede to Partition.⁶⁵

Azad, ever the oracle, campaigned furiously against Partition, arguing,

Partition would not solve the communal problem, it could only make it a permanent feature of Indian polity. Creating two states based on communal hatred would create a self-fulfilling prophecy. It was Jinnah who had raised the slogan of two nations, and to allow the country to be partitioned would be to accept Jinnah's logic.⁶⁶

Despite his pleas, the die was cast. Partition was agreed upon, and the rest is history. However, as Azad pointed out, "the acceptance of [Partition] was 'only in a resolution of the Working Committee of the Congress and on the register of the Muslim League. The people of India had not accepted Partition. . . the Hindus and Sikhs' were to a man opposed to partition' plus there was a large section of the Muslim community which did not support it either."⁶⁷

Azad stayed behind in India, mindful of the fact that despite Partition, millions of Muslims remained in India as suspect citizens in the eyes of resentful Hindus. He served as India's Education Minister until a few weeks before his death in 1956. His birthday is still celebrated in India as National Education Day.

Till his death, he never believed that religion was a legitimate foundation for nationhood, writing,

It is one of the greatest frauds on the people to suggest that religious affinity can unite areas which are geographically, economically, linguistically and culturally different. It is true that Islam sought to establish a society which transcends racial, linguistic, economic, and political frontiers. History has, however, proved that after the first few decades or at most after the first century, Islam was not able to unite all the Muslim countries on the basis of Islam alone.⁶⁸

I would argue that within the INC leadership, Azad was arguably the most committed to a united, independent India. While dedicated to the same cause as Azad, Nehru was also concerned about economic development, which necessarily required a strong central government. When Jinnah's obduracy meant that a centralized Indian union would not be possible, Nehru reluctantly agreed to Partition the country to preserve that centralized power (Khan 2017, 85).⁶⁹ Meanwhile, Gandhi was so focused on pursuing nonviolent strategies that he even told Azad that he was willing to sacrifice Indian independence on the altar of nonviolence.⁷⁰ Azad was first and foremost committed to Indian independence and the foundation of a secular, united nation. If cen-

tralization and nonviolence got in the way, that did not matter to Azad. Who knows? If Azad had been the true leader of the INC, India might not have been partitioned at all.

Abdul Ghaffar Khan – The “Frontier Gandhi”

Abdul Ghaffar “Bacha” Khan (1890-1988) was simultaneously one of the most important leaders in modern Pashtun history and one of the most important leaders in modern Indian history. Khan was born in a village in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) of British India, today the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan. The NWFP was around ninety-three percent Muslim and fifty-six percent Pashtun.⁷¹ It was also one of the least developed regions in British India: there was little industry, urbanization, or Western education, and it was oft-neglected by its British overlords.⁷² While the British introduced piecemeal reforms in the rest of India to ease the country into self-government, these reforms never applied to the NWFP, which was governed by “special ordinances” from time to time.⁷³ Due to these factors, the Muslim elites who dominated urban Muslim public opinion in Bengal, the United Provinces, and Punjab, many of whom would also be the most forceful advocates for Pakistan, held little sway in the very rural NWFP.⁷⁴

It was in this milieu that a group of educated Pashtuns formed the Anjuman-i-Islah-ul-Afaghana

(the Association for the Advancement of the Afghan Peoples.⁷⁵ The Anjuman promoted the education of Pashtuns, the eradication of social evils in Pashtun society, the advancement of Pashto language and literature, and the fostering of a “real love” for Islam.⁷⁶ The Anjuman believed that British rule was the root cause of the illiteracy and relative backwardness of the Pashtuns and steadily gained a following in the rural areas.⁷⁷ From this upwelling of Pashtun nationalism, two new organizations were formed. One was the Zalmu Jirga, a youth league aimed at the literate but open to everyone regardless of caste and creed. The second was the Khudai Khidmatgars (Divine Servants), aimed at the elderly and the illiterate.⁷⁸ The movements advanced multiple causes to appeal to diverse constituencies: freedom from British economic imperialism for the peasants, political reform and independence for India for the ulema, who largely opposed British influence and cultural imperialism, and the promotion of Pashtun culture for the intelligentsia.⁷⁹

These days Khan is renowned for his work as the leader of the Khidmatgars. While he enforced military-style discipline among members, he was scrupulous in his advocacy of nonviolence.⁸⁰ Khan’s adherence to nonviolence stemmed from his identity as both a reformer and a devout Muslim. The reformer in Khan pursued nonviolence as a means of advocating against the

Pashtun practice of blood feuds. The Muslim in Khan found inspiration in the life of the Prophet Muhammad, who countered oppression with nonviolence. For his use of nonviolence, Khan is popularly known as the “Frontier Gandhi,” and the Khudai Khidmatgars became extremely popular in the NWFP to the extent that the British authorities tried to paint their members as Bolsheviks, a charge strongly denied by the Khidmatgars.

When the INC decided to pursue Indian independence in 1929, the Khudai Khidmatgar rallied behind it. While the Amritsar Massacre of 1919 is solemnly remembered as a turning point in the Indian independence movement, few remember the brutal oppression meted out to the Khidmatgars by the British. In 1930, a peaceful congregation of Khidmatgars and INC members in Peshawar was disrupted by British soldiers, who massacred more than 200 civilians.⁸¹ The Qissa Khwani Bazaar Massacre unified the Khidmatgars and the INC against British rule. It was also the beginning of a close friendship between Khan and other INC leaders, including Gandhi.⁸²

Similar to Madani, Khan saw no Quranic injunctions against Muslims allying with non-Muslims for the betterment of one’s country. Indeed, like Madani, he found justification for such alliances in the alliance between Muhammad and the Jews of Medina.⁸³ Due to the

Khidmatgars’ grassroots appeal, the League barely had a presence in the NWFP. Many Pashtuns viewed the League as guarding the interests of the elite.⁸⁴ For this reason, the INC dominated the 1937 election of the NWFP and gained enough seats to form a ministry in this Muslim-majority province. This was a rather humiliating defeat for the League.

Thus, in the following years, the League worked aggressively to build support in the NWFP through the Pakistan movement and claims of “Islam in danger.” These appeals mostly fell on unreceptive ears. Pashtun leaders feared Punjabi domination if Pakistan were created.⁸⁵ Additionally, the fact that ninety-three percent of the NWFP was Muslim, as opposed to Punjab and Bengal, which had significant non-Muslim populations, blunted the impact of cries of “Islam in danger.”⁸⁶ In the 1946 election, even though the INC faced an electoral drubbing in Muslim constituencies and Muslim-majority provinces, it still managed to maintain power in the NWFP.⁸⁷ The League began campaigning vigorously against the elected government in the NWFP. Khan and many Pashtuns continued to strongly oppose the Partition of India and the creation of Pakistan. His INC colleagues, however, reluctantly agreed to the demand for Pakistan and called for a referendum to be held in the Congress-controlled NWFP. The referendum only included the choice to join either

India or Pakistan. Gandhi, knowing what this would mean for the NWFP, strongly opposed the referendum. When Khan learned of the referendum and the plan to Partition India, he famously lamented, "We [Pashtuns] have stood by you and had undergone great sacrifices for attaining freedom, but you have thrown us to the wolves."⁸⁸ Khan viewed the entire proposal as betraying Pashtun interests. The fact that the referendum had no option for an independent Pashtunistan irked Khan:

We shall not agree to hold a referendum because we had decisively won the elections on the issue of Hindustan versus Pakistan and proclaimed the [Pashtun] view on it to the world. Now, as India has disowned us, why should we have a referendum on Hindustan and Pakistan? Let it be on [Pashtunistan] or Pakistan.⁸⁹

As shown above, the Khidmatgars wanted an independent Pashtun state, to be combined with Pashtun-majority Afghanistan. Their conception of this state included Islam-inspired democracy and human rights. They refused to cooperate with the League on the matter and viewed the entire referendum as a farce. The Khidmatgars' boycotting of the referendum consequently meant that the province would "vote" to join Pakistan.⁹⁰ When Pakistan became independent on August 14, 1947, the Khidmatgars

refused to join the flag-hoisting ceremony.⁹¹ Jinnah used this as an excuse to dismiss the Congress ministry, a significant blow to democracy and Pashtun autonomy in the minds of the Khidmatgars (Shah 2000, 814).⁹² This would not be the last conflict between the Khidmatgars and the central government. Khan continued to advocate for Pashtun rights and autonomy, leading the government to jail him several times. These calls for autonomy and the Khidmatgars prior opposition to Partition and thus Pakistan led to the movement being labeled as secessionist and was banned in 1955, effectively destroying the movement and its memory in Pakistan's public conscience.

While Khan is often praised as an Indian nationalist, his ultimate goal was the advancement of the Pashtuns. Like Madani and Azad, Khan believed that Islam allowed him to ally with other non-Muslims to eradicate imperialism from the subcontinent. It was only when Partition became an inevitability that Khan advocated for an independent Pashtunistan. His consistent opposition to Pakistan was a significant blow to the idea that Islam could unite the otherwise disparate ethnic groups under one nation, which is why the Pakistani government suppressed the movement and eliminated it from the public conscience. That said, utterances of the Khidmatgar spirit can be seen in the modern-day Pashtun Taha-

fuz Movement (PTM). Since 2018, Pashtuns have been nonviolently protesting the Pakistani military's human rights abuses in the Pashtun areas and, like the Khidmatgars, have also been met with repression.⁹³ Despite attempts to efface their memory, the Khidmatgars' nonviolent and reformist ethos lives on in Pashtunistan.

Conclusion

Notwithstanding the simplistic narrative of the Two-Nation Theory that Hindus and Muslims are two separate peoples, Madani, Azad, and Khan's anti-Partition advocacy undermines claims of transnational Muslim unity and solidarity among Indian Muslims and with the global ummah. These leaders demonstrate that the Pakistan movement was not truly religious. Nobody can deny the spirituality and Quranic expertise of these three leaders, who nonetheless opposed the creation of a state for Muslims. Indeed, they frequently found Quranic justification for their nationalism and opposition to Partition. They also dismissed leaders who called for Muslim autonomy as entrapped by "the magicians (read politicians) of Britain."⁹⁴ These leaders were rooted in their Indianness, but this did not conflict with their pride in being Muslim. As they saw it, the two were not mutually exclusive. Outside the Muslim community, Hindu nationalists such as Savarkar have claimed for decades that Muslims cannot be trusted because they do not view India as their holy

lands. However, Madani puts this notion to rest by pointing out that Muslims did view India as sacred, not least because Adam descended from paradise to Sri Lanka.⁹⁵ Much like Hindus, Muslims are bound to an India of pilgrimage sites, saints, and holy men.⁹⁶ In more recent times, claims have been made of an impending 'clash of civilizations,' particularly between the West and the Islamic world. Since 9/11, Muslim minorities have been collectively viewed as a potential fifth column. The anti-Partition advocacy of these Muslim leaders dispels the notion of a united and monolithic Muslim front and of a collective loy-

alty to the ummah that subverts the nation-state.

While I have covered some of the most important Muslim leaders who opposed Partition, future research should compare these leaders' views and motivations to that of others like Khizr Tiwana of the Unionist Party in Punjab. In India, efforts should be made to further highlight the roles of leaders like Madani, Azad, and Khan in school textbooks to prevent people from jumping to an incorrect conclusion of exclusive Muslim culpability for Partition. In conjunction with this, more efforts should also be made to highlight the culpability of Hindu

nationalist elements in alienating Muslim public opinion during this time. While INC members were being jailed for their role in the Quit India Movement, the Hindu Mahasabha entered into a coalition with the League in Sindh and Punjab, even after the League explicitly called for the secession of Muslim-majority provinces, since Hindu nationalists at the time agreed with the League's Two-Nation Theory that Hindus and Muslims are fundamentally different.⁹⁷ Madani, Azad, and Khan show that Muslims did not split India and create Pakistan; communalists did.

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Taken in the desert, Wadi Rum, outside of Aqaba, Jordan. Wadi Rum was also the filming location of popular movies Dune (2021) and Star Wars: Episode VI (1983). The desert has pigments of red and orange. The cliffs make for a beautiful view of the valley.

Photo by Lauren Richards, First-Year Political Science and Peace War and Defense Double Major





(Above) Alhambra Palace - The Alhambra is a palace and fortress located in Granada, Andalusia, Spain. It is largely based on Moorish culture and architectural styles.

Photo by Brooke Chow, Second-Year Public Policy and Business Double Major and Minor in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics

(Left) Photo by Isabelle Kaufman, Fourth-Year History Major and Spanish Minor

No Prosperity, No Peace: The Iraqi Economy and Instability

By Mikhal Ben-Joseph

Saddam Hussein's Iraq witnessed hundreds of thousands of its conscripted soldiers return from the battlefield with weapons in hand and no jobs in sight when the devastating Iran-Iraq war concluded with a stalemate in 1988. The country owed \$130 billion in foreign debt; it had sliced its oil income by nearly 40 percent;¹ it essentially claimed its neighbors were committing acts of economic warfare against it.² The financial disaster further inflamed Iraq's sizable and already-marginalized groups such as the Kurds and Shi'as. To restore relative economic stability and maintain his grip on power, Saddam invaded Kuwait in 1991.

This case study is one of many that perfectly illuminates the intimate relationship between money and stability in Iraqi history. This article will explore two recent periods in Iraq in which poor economic conditions contributed to large-scale responses by the people. After the American invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003, de-Ba'athification, the process of erasing the former regime's policies, and the severe unemployment which followed

provided a large pool of potential recruits for fledgling Jihadist groups and militias, which eventually overran the country. In 2019, tens of thousands of young Iraqis took to the streets to protest skyrocketing unemployment and deep financial corruption in the government. In both situations, the Iraqi people struggled with poverty, unemployment, and a lack of basic services; why did one situation result in unprecedented sectarian violence and the other not? What can these case studies tell us about the relationship between economics and stability for Iraq in the long term?

In Section I, I will explore the economic circumstances of Iraq immediately following the invasion and up until the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) takeover in 2014. Then we will see how ISIS and other groups filled a unique niche by providing jobs to disenfranchised men throughout Iraq. Next, in Section II, we will delve into the economic circumstances that precipitated the October Revolution of 2019. We will then investigate the reforms – or the lack thereof – that occurred as a result. Finally, we will discuss the cur-

rent economic outlook in Iraq, and predict what role money will play in the future stability of Iraq.

Extremism Out of the Rubble

From 1991 to 2003, UN sanctions erased 97 percent of Iraqi exports and 90 percent of its imports. The U.S.-led Coalition bombing campaign destroyed over 95 percent of Iraq's electrical facilities, reduced Baghdad's water supply to a mere 5 percent of its pre Gulf War levels, and shattered transportation and healthcare infrastructure.³ In his book, "Invisible War," Joy Gordon describes this damage and the collapse of the Iraqi economy as immediate and all-encompassing: "exorbitant prices, collapse of private incomes, soaring unemployment, drastically reduced food intakes, large scale depletion of personal assets, high morbidity levels, escalating crime rates and rapidly increasing numbers of destitute people."⁴ In the aftermath of the 2003 invasion, Iraq's dire economic situation was even further exacerbated.

Just a few weeks after the U.S. invaded Iraq and deposed Saddam Hussein, the Coalition Provisional

Authority (CPA) published its first order: “De-Ba’athification of Iraqi Society.”⁵ This single move functionally fired 400,000 seasoned Iraqi military officers, bureaucrats, and political officials and barred their pensions.⁶ The CPA also took harsh action against state owned enterprises (SOE), many of which were overstuffed, corrupt, and antiquated. It more than halved direct subsidies to SOEs, froze SOE accounts, and attempted to privatize these companies en masse.⁷ However, since the factories were poorly maintained and many were physically damaged from the war, the privatization efforts were unsuccessful. As a result, several hundred thousand employees at these SOEs were fired or forced to retire and key industries like cement and steel became non-operational.⁸

The economic devastation lasted throughout the occupation. Ten years after the invasion, unemployment hovered at 15 percent and youth unemployment at 30 percent.⁹ The major obstacles for economic reconstruction during this period were corruption and internal instability. Despite billions of dollars flowing from the US and the UN to “rebuild Iraq” as well as the increase in oil revenues due to the lifting of sanctions, most of the extra money was squandered on projects that scarcely improved civilian life. For instance, immediately following the invasion, looters infiltrated government buildings and banks, caus-

ing billions of dollars in damages.¹⁰ When the government hired contractors to repair damaged institutions, not only were the contractors often corrupt and siphoning off millions of dollars, but they also would leave projects incomplete or non-functional. Moreover, armed militants would frequently intimidate or interrupt the few contractors who were attempting to do their job.¹¹ As a result, the general economic situation in Iraq did not advance as rapidly or successfully as the Americans had predicted.

After the invasion, Iraq was ripe for recruitment by extremist militia groups including Zarqawi’s Iraqi al-Qaeda affiliate and Baghdadi’s successive ISIS. In its research on the drivers of extremism, the Wilson Center posits that poor socioeconomic conditions – especially high youth unemployment – are highly correlated with successful Jihadist recruitment.¹² After the U.S. pulled out in 2011, ISIS was particularly successful in exploiting Iraq’s high unemployment rate. ISIS offered its recruits an attractive package within an otherwise destitute economic ecosystem: a secure monthly stipend, plus bonuses for wives and children—sometimes totaling as much as \$1,200 a month.¹³ Compounding the attractiveness of the offer was that those who were not affiliated with ISIS but lived in ISIS-controlled areas faced constant extortion, blackmail, and theft by the group. Several first-hand accounts

of high-ranking officials from Saddam’s army confirm the theory that money was a driving incentive for their colleagues to join these groups. “When [the Americans] dismantled the army, what did they expect those men to do? They were out in the cold with nothing to do and there was only one way for them to put food on the table... they didn’t de-Ba’athify people’s minds, they just took away their jobs,” said one former general. Shi’a militia groups like Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mehdi Army also benefited from the economic distress, recruiting “young, unemployed men who had seen no benefit from ‘liberation’ and were less secure than prior to the 2003 invasion.”¹⁴ Several Shi’a organizations received extensive Iranian funding and support, using the money and the idea of combating economic and military imperialism to enlist men to its cause.

When faced with few practical employment options, young men turned to the occupation that had consumed Iraqis for a generation: violence. The only difference is that this time, they were being paid by IS, the Mehdi Army, Iran, Saudi Arabia, or some other organization rather than by the Iraqi government. The gravity of the economic situation facilitated the recruitment and growth of militias and extremist groups; the growth of the extremist groups thus fueled the intensification of sectarian violence in Iraq. While it is impossible and imprac-

tical to ignore the ideological, political, and social factors which drive individuals to participate in violent activities, without relative improvements in the economic situation in Iraq, it will be increasingly difficult to draw people away from well-paying jobs in militant careers.

Protesting Poverty

When Iraqi Security Forces “finished” the fight against ISIS in 2017 by recapturing all the land once held by the extremist group, the country was in dire economic straits. Poverty and unemployment rates had remained high throughout the era of ISIS; the areas formerly under ISIS control were particularly devastated due to infrastructural damage sustained during liberation battles. Seventy percent of Iraqis under forty years old were out of work.¹⁵ Twenty percent of Iraqis lived below the poverty line.¹⁶ The government sought to alleviate joblessness by allocating \$3.5 billion for public projects, but this effort barely made a dent: 75,000 government job applicants remained unemployed.¹⁷ Basic municipal services such as water, electricity, and sewage were still lacking throughout the country and improvements were slow and sporadic due to rampant corruption. Additionally, when oil prices dropped in 2014, the oil-dependent state’s revenues declined steeply, further inhibiting the country’s ability to provide jobs for its citizens.¹⁸ Though the violence had calmed down dramatically since the end of

the sectarian civil war and the fall of ISIS, economic prospects for Iraqis were still bleak. What started off as a group of holders of higher degrees demanding jobs in front of the Prime Minister’s Office in Baghdad quickly grew to be a national protest movement after Iraqi police forces quashed the demonstration. Reports of up to one million peaceful protestors set up camp all over the streets of Iraq from Baghdad and Basra to Karbala and Najaf in October and November of 2019.¹⁹ Recent graduates and other young people struggling to find work filled their ranks, demanding an end to poverty and corruption. As the government responded with increasing levels of force, the protestors’ demands also grew: curbing foreign manipulation of their country and ultimately an overthrow of the entire political system.²⁰

It is important to contextualize the Iraqi October Revolution protests in the larger global movement for economic opportunity and fairness occurring in 2019. In Lebanon, a proposed WhatsApp tax ignited massive protests that were fueled by decades of severe income inequality.²¹ In Chile and India, public transportation and onion price increases were the spark for protests in each country, respectively.²² According to Aljazeera²³ and the Washington Post,²⁴ students had been protesting in Iraq since the 2011 Arab Spring, but as of 2019, the movement did not have multiple political parties to

appease or a single leader to follow, so it could organize more organically around a central issue. Despite intermittent internet blackouts initiated by the Iraqi government, economic protests around the world shared many motivations and strategies.

Research confirms that poor economic conditions are correlated with protests and unrest, not just in Iraq but all over the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. According to a 2019 International Monetary Fund (IMF) report, the economic growth rate for MENA is a meager 1 percent—too low to reduce unemployment to the rate that protesters desire.²⁵ The IMF regional director further pointed out that high levels of government debt, trade imbalance, and sectarian divides are common factors among many of the MENA countries which witnessed large-scale protests since 2011.²⁶ This shared characteristic is unsurprising; with no jobs to occupy them and no alternatives, young men and women have plenty of time to take to the streets to protest the dearth of opportunities.

Unlike the post-2003 era where deteriorating economic conditions fueled a growth in sectarian violence, the October Revolution of 2019 was mostly a peaceful protest. The hundreds of deaths which did occur were due to Iraqi police brutality and infiltration by militia groups like the Mehdi Army.²⁷ Despite facing immense state sanc-

tioned violence including tear gas bombs, kidnappings, torture, and assassinations, the protestors themselves have generally not resorted to violence. This starkly different response is because the origin and bulk of the movement are protestors with higher education demanding jobs that match their educational levels—not former government officials and military officers who have been suddenly fired from their post.

The protesters' demands eventually led to an election which replaced Iranian favored Prime Minister Abdel Abdul Mehdi with a more independent and anti corruption-oriented leader, Mustafa al-Kadhimi. However, even Kadhimi has been unsuccessful in defeating the political quota system, overcoming corruption, eliminating foreign influence, and improving the economy.²⁸ The coronavirus pandemic made camp-style protesting unsafe and temporarily inhibited momentum, but the movement remains strong and periodic protests have re-emerged throughout the country in 2021.

Policy Implications for the future:

As the pandemic continues to surge unmitigated in Iraq and as oil

prices remain low, economic prospects for the struggling country continue to look dim. Twelve million Iraqis are at risk of extreme poverty, and this number will only continue to grow as 700,000 Iraqis remain unsuccessful in their attempts to find work in the labor market each year.²⁹ The government is in no better shape than the civilians; with an annual budget deficit of \$4.5 billion and a compounded debt greater than \$80 billion, the financial trajectory of the frail state itself is unstable.³⁰ To make matters worse, Iranian influence is resurging with nearly-constant Shi'a militia rocket attacks on Iraqi Security Force targets and the potential reinstatement of the Joint Cooperative Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iranian nuclear deal.

Given this context, I predict that the protest movement will re-emerge soon and with strength, especially as the pandemic cools down. As recently as February 2021, protesters in southern Iraq flouted lockdown rules and took to the streets, where four were killed and over one hundred wounded.³¹ These protests will continue to be fueled by economic dissatisfaction, yet they will take on an increasingly anti-for-

eign influence character so long as Iran's influence intensifies and as Americans remain in occupation.

The lack of jobs and opportunity in Iraq historically provided fodder for instability and continues to do so. After the American invasion, instability translated to sectarian civil war and mass violence; in the era of the Arab Spring, it translated to a student-led peaceful "revolution." Iraqis have witnessed so much violence, transition, and suffering over the last few decades – from monarchy to military junta, to authoritarian presidency, to fragile democracy, to a terrorist Caliphate – that I find it painful to imagine how these protests may devolve into more violence. As history has shown us, if the Iraqi government continues to offer brutal crackdowns instead of jobs, and if militias can offer more stable paying jobs than the municipality, people will follow the money. In Iraq, the government regularly fails to provide what the people depend on it for and what they believe they deserve. Until this changes, dim hopes of prosperity are unfortunately the indicator of slim prospects for peace.

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This was taken during my Mount Everest expedition in 2019 by my father, when we have successfully climbed the highest peak in the world and completed the 7 summits program (which has only been completed around 450 times). We have climbed it from the Tibetan (North) side.

Photo by Dmitry Tertychnyy, Fourth-Year Economics and Mathematics Double Major and Minor in Geography



(Above) Photo by Isabelle Kaufman, Fourth-Year History Major and Minor in Spanish

(Right) Scott Monument Caption: This gothic spire in Edinburg serves as a memorial to car crash victims in the UK. Taken by me, located in the heart of Edinburg, 10/02/21.

Photo by Hannah Elkins, Fourth-Year English and Comparative Literature and Peace, War, and Defense Double Major



Predatory Peacekeeping: The Sexual Violence Issues of the UN

By Patrick White

Sexual assault and exploitation by military forces has been an issue for almost as long as humanity has been present on Earth. Throughout history there are reports of armies engaging in campaigns of destruction, pillaging, and rape against an enemy people. These horrendous actions may be somewhat accepted as part of the hell that is war, but what about when they become ingrained into operations meant to stop conflict? The United Nations and its peacekeeping force have experienced a string of sexual violations similar to other militaries, with the major difference being that peacekeepers are tasked with protecting people rather than conquering them. The current methods of reporting and prosecuting sexual assault and exploitation within the United Nations lend themselves to severe mismanagement of cases due to the jurisdictional confusion surrounding prosecution of crimes committed by UN peacekeeping forces, the immunity laws and government agreements concerning the handling of allegations against peacekeepers, and the lack of investigative resources during peacekeeping operations.

The United Nations has seen sexual assault and exploitation by peacekeepers occur in numerous peacekeeping operations throughout their history. Some of the missions most rife with sexual assault and exploitation are the peacekeeping missions in Bosnia, Timor-Leste, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Bosnian peacekeeping mission began in 1992 when UN contingents were inserted into former Yugoslavian territory. They were tasked with monitoring the conflict there and providing humanitarian aid to Bosnian civilians and refugees as well as supporting ceasefires and demilitarization in certain areas.¹ The mission also employed the UN International Police Task Force, which utilized a large number of DynaCorps private security contractors due to the United States' lack of a federal police force.² Before long, abuses of power by these peacekeepers and contractors began to occur. There are multiple accounts of contractors and peacekeeping personnel alike visiting brothels "being operated out of Serb-run concentration camps outside of Sarajevo."³ These camps were part of what the United Na-

tions mission aimed to prevent, and yet their own personnel were benefiting from them through the sexual exploitation of their inmates.

Additionally, aid workers were known to withhold valuable supplies such as food, water, and medical supplies from those who they were supposed to supply it to. In several instances these resources would be used as bargaining chips with the local populace to elicit sexual favors for UN personnel. This even extended to children, with peacekeepers asking for their mothers' whereabouts in exchange for candy.⁴ Not only is this a massive ethical violation, it is also illegal under United Nations law. Even more concerning, however, were the testimonies by UN personnel that revealed how Bosnians under Serb control were often raped or coerced to perform sexual acts with international agents. Despite these testimonies, some of the offenders were never charged.⁵ Other investigations showed that peacekeeping personnel were involved in a variety of illegal activities such as drug and human trafficking. Many of those who were trafficked ended up working in brothels that were frequented by IPTF employees or

were sold into sex slavery.⁶ Some of these sex slaves were even kept by DynaCorps men, who would boast about their perceived property to each other.⁷ This phenomenon was not unique to personnel from any one country of origin, with perpetrators coming from “Spain, France, Britain, Mexico, Fiji, Pakistan, Russia, and Argentina.”⁸

Sexual abuses by United Nations personnel were also documented during UN peacekeeping missions to Timor-Leste. Following Timor-Leste’s declaration of independence from Portugal in 1975, the fledgling nation was invaded by neighboring Indonesia and subsequently occupied for the next 24 years.⁹ During this period of time, the nation was wracked with violence as Timorese forces attempted to liberate the nation from Indonesia. Following a UN referendum in 1999 that showed the Timorese people favored independence, Indonesia recognized the nation’s independence. However, the conflict for Timor-Leste did not end after this. Instead, pro-Indonesian militias began their own campaigns of violence against the newly liberated nation and its citizens. The United Nations sent a peacekeeping mission to Timor-Leste in late 1999 in order to help curtail this violence and rebuild the state administration of Timor-Leste from the ground up.¹⁰ At its peak, the operation had 11,000 UN military personnel deployed to the region. The mission

was set to expire in 2006, but was renewed during that year following a collapse of Timorese security due to a reemergence of armed conflict between regional Timorese militias.¹¹ This mission was meant to provide stability and security to the region as well as rebuild Timorese security and police forces.

Sexual abuse was committed wantonly by the peacekeeping contingents sent to keep order in Timor-Leste. One of the most notorious contingents of peacekeepers who committed these acts were deployed from Jordan. These Jordanian troops were responsible for numerous rapes during their deployment, most of which occurred after the troops would offer food or other goods as payment for sexual favors. Peacekeepers were also known to engage in the sexual exploitation of children, as seen at Oecusse when UN troops molested and raped numerous young boys and girls.¹² Additionally, the prostitution of minors during the period of UN deployment rose significantly. A report compiled in 2004 observed that most male prostitutes were under 18 years old.¹³ Female prostitutes were often slightly older than their male counterparts, but over a third reported that they began prostituting themselves at or before the age of 14. Prostitutes were also subject to a litany of abuses such as beatings, rape, forced pregnancy, and unfair or nonexistent compensation for their sex work at

the hands of United Nations peacekeeping personnel.¹⁴

During the mission, sexual harassment was also a widespread issue amongst the UN contingent. Various reports showed that peacekeepers would routinely harass children to bring their mothers and other women to them, presumably to have sex with them. At Oecusse, a group of Japanese peacekeepers had to be confined to their barracks because of their repeated harassment of juveniles at the local orphanage.¹⁵ Other UN personnel would harass Timorese women and girls on the streets, often using their native languages in order to intimidate their victims as well as keep their comments amongst themselves.¹⁶

Another mission in which UN peacekeepers were accused of sexual exploitation was the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo established in 1999. This operation is ongoing and was renamed the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2010.¹⁷ The main goal of the operation was to establish and maintain a ceasefire between Congolese forces and pro-Rwandan rebels during the Second Congo War as well as the disarmament of local militias and rebel splinter groups. The mission initially deployed approximately 5,500 UN military personnel to the DRC in 1999. As of June 30, 2010, over 20,000 UN personnel had been

deployed to the nation.¹⁸

Several United Nations personnel deployed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo were later accused of engaging in sexual assault and sexual violence during their periods of deployment. The use and exploitation of local prostitutes by peacekeepers was rampant during the mission, but even more appalling were the many reports of sexual assault of minors that United Nations forces were implicated in. Reports from survivors of these attacks describe the forced, transactional nature of what occurred: peacekeeping personnel would often offer young girls food such as cookies or money in order to draw them in.¹⁹ Once a child accepted the apparent gift, the peacekeepers would then proceed to rape and violate them before leaving or disposing of their victim.²⁰

These kinds of sexual violations regularly result in local women giving birth to “peace babies”, children who were fathered by United Nations personnel while on deployment. In most situations, these children are abandoned by their fathers when they rotate back home, often before the child is even born. As a result, the children’s mothers are left to raise and support the child completely alone, often without any form of community support. This can be somewhat attributed to the nature of their societies, which often look down upon children who are born out of wedlock.²¹ Additionally, many regions in which these

“peace babies” are conceived hold heavy prejudices against biracial individuals. As a result, an abandoned child of a UN peacekeeper may be ostracized and bullied for their complexion for years.²² It is important to note that not all “peace babies” are necessarily conceived during instances of sexual abuse or exploitation. Some are products of consensual sexual relations between UN peacekeepers and local women. It would be unfair to characterize all “peace babies” as the result of sexual violations by peacekeepers as it would attach undeserved stigmas to those women who did consensually engage in sexual relations with UN personnel as well as to their children.²³ United Nations personnel are not currently required to provide child support or any other resources for their children while on peacekeeping missions. Instead, the United Nations established a Comprehensive Strategy for the support and assistance of children fathered by UN personnel as well as their mothers.²⁴ However, this strategy focuses entirely on children who are conceived as a result of sexual abuse or exploitation by UN personnel. It ignores children who are born following a consensual sexual relationship, opening the possibility for these children to be ignored by the United Nations. Additionally, the policy makes no explicit mentions of long-term financial support for “peace babies” nor their mothers. As a result, individual peacekeepers

who father children while on peacekeeping missions are often deemed to be not responsible for their children and instead leave them to the scant support mechanisms of the United Nations organization.²⁵

As seen in the aforementioned cases, United Nations peacekeeping missions are often permeated with instances of peacekeeping personnel exploiting and abusing the local population for sexual acts and favors. This is an egregious ethical issue, as the United Nations is meant to protect human rights and preach the message of world peace. By allowing peacekeepers to continue to perpetrate these kinds of heinous acts, the United Nations is creating a rift between themselves and the people they are meant to protect and serve. The United Nations has released multiple condemnations and articles pertaining to the reduction of sexual abuse and exploitation overall. The first explicit condemnation came in 2000 with the passage of Resolution 1325, which calls upon UN member states to follow international human rights laws pertaining to the protection of women during and after conflicts.²⁶ Additionally, the resolution called for annual reports by the Secretary-General on how the resolution is being implemented amongst member states and in the UN as a whole.²⁷ However, no concrete action was taken to combat the pattern of sexual violence in peacekeeping missions until 2001, when an independent investigation

by Save the Children and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) found evidence of peacekeepers committing sexual exploitation and abuse in several African missions to the countries of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.²⁸ In response, the UN passed Resolution 57/306, which called for the reporting of sexual exploitation and abuse charges by the Secretary-General and launched an internal investigation into the allegations presented by Save the Children and the UNHCR. When this investigation concluded in 2003, it was found that 8 out of 53 total allegations met the criteria of serious misconduct.²⁹ Later that year, Secretary-General Kofi Annan released a bulletin that explicitly prohibited UN personnel from engaging in acts of sexual abuse and exploitation as well as calling for UN personnel to report offenders to the United Nations organization.³⁰ This bulletin applied to all members of the United Nations, especially mission commanders and administrators. Additionally, the document gave examples of administrative practices and directives that were meant to curtail the overall level of sexual violence perpetrated by peacekeepers by fostering an environment in which sexual abuse and exploitation could be easily reported. One such action was the appointment of one officer on all missions to serve as the main locus for reporting acts of sexual transgressions.³¹ However, the

main drawback of the bulletin was that it was not a legally binding document. As such, the United Nations could do little to punish offenders themselves and instead had to rely on the criminal justice systems of the offender's home nation.

In 2005, another UN-led investigation into African missions led to more measures meant to help solve the UN's sexual abuse problems.³² Headed by Jordanian ambassador to the UN Prince Zeid Hussein, the investigation led to a number of new recommendations on how to combat these issues. Some of these measures included widespread publication of the United Nations' code of conduct, the issuance of the 2003 Bulletin rules in card form to all peacekeeping personnel, and the integration of on-site tribunals in order to try offenders swiftly and allow access to witnesses and local evidence.³³ Some of these recommendations ended up coming to fruition, such as the issuance of "No-Excuse pocket cards" to UN peacekeeping forces detailing the UN's rules concerning sexual relations. Specifically, the cards state that under no circumstance can peacekeepers engage in any form of transactional sex with persons of any age nor any form of sexual relations with persons under the age of 18.³⁴ Hussein also recommended additional measures such as sensitivity training, data-based collection and analysis of allegations, and making offenders be financially responsible for their

victims and abandoned children.³⁵

However, many peacekeepers who commit these crimes continue to go unpunished or are given punishments that are far too lenient for their crimes. This is due to a number of factors. First, problems within a host country may make it difficult to prosecute sexual offenders. Many nations which UN peacekeepers are deployed to are in states of conflict and governmental breakdown.³⁶ As such, the legal and judicial systems of these countries are often under-equipped or inadequately structured to effectively deal with such prosecutions. Furthermore, the judicial and legal systems of host nations are often wracked with corruption and other such legitimacy issues, making it difficult for troop-contributing nations to trust host nations to fairly try their soldiers for their crimes.³⁷ These systemic issues are compounded by the fact that peacekeepers' tours of duty are often restricted to approximately six months.³⁸ This means that by the time a host state's judicial system has gathered all the necessary evidence for prosecution, the offender themselves may already have rotated home. This then leads to problems with extradition, as some crimes that are illegal under UN or host nation law are not illegal in the offender's country of origin.³⁹ One such example of this is prostitution, which is legal in several nations around the world. Another comes in the form of differing ages

of consent amongst nations, which may be lower than the United Nations' standard of eighteen years.⁴⁰ Additionally, some troop-contributing countries have laws in place that prohibit the extradition of nationals to foreign states.⁴¹ This makes it difficult to try foreign offenders in the host state where the crimes have been committed after their repatriation.

The problem of sexual abuse and exploitation amongst United Nations peacekeepers is undoubtedly a systemic one. Firstly, the United Nations relies heavily upon troop donations from less-developed nations. More developed nations are much less likely to send troop contingents to assist in UN peacekeeping missions. Instead, these nations often prefer to send financial or material support in lieu of donating soldiers and other personnel.⁴² This creates an issue amongst the ranks of UN peacekeepers, as soldiers from less-developed nations are often undertrained and under-equipped compared to their counterparts in more developed countries. Additionally, some of the nations who donate troops are under investigation for human rights abuses themselves.⁴³ Employing soldiers who potentially engaged in human rights violations in their home nations to protect the human rights of people in a host nation is a backwards way of thinking, but the United Nations has been known to turn a blind eye to these investi-

gations in order to secure enough manpower for their missions to proceed. Examples of troop contributing countries who are suspected of human rights abuses include Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Jordan, and Bangladesh.⁴⁴ Some troop-contributing countries are also lacking in legislation that protects and advocates for the rights of women and children. As such, peacekeeping contingents sent from these nations are not necessarily well-trained in observing and respecting the rights of women at the level that the United Nations ostensibly insists upon.⁴⁵ By accepting troops from troop-contributing countries that do not protect human rights nor the rights of women, the United Nations is incurring a substantial risk that sexual abuse and exploitation will occur on missions where these troop contingents are deployed.

An even more pressing issue is the functional immunity that these peacekeepers are given when they are deployed on UN missions. This immunity stems from the agreement that exists between the United Nations and troop-contributing countries. Known as a Status of Forces Agreement or SOFA, these contracts allot certain privileges to peacekeepers. Most importantly, SOFAs often provide troops with absolute immunity from local prosecution while they are deployed in a host country, similar to official state diplomats.⁴⁶ As part of this agreement the troop-contributing

country reserves the exclusive right to prosecute members of its own military that are deployed on peacekeeping missions. This right is given to peacekeepers' countries of origin in return for assurances that, should the UN recommend prosecution, the troop-contributing country will initiate criminal proceedings against the offending soldier.⁴⁷ However, the United Nations does not always get these formal assurances. Sometimes, there is no assurance at all. This results in some offenders being repatriated to their home nations for prosecution and never being prosecuted or punished for their crimes. This can be due to a number of factors, such as worries over damaging a nation's reputation or a lack of concrete evidence required for prosecution and conviction in the country of origin's judicial system.⁴⁸ Additionally, states may repress or dismiss accusations against their soldiers in order to avoid international scrutiny or damage to their military's image.

Under Resolution 59/287, the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services is responsible for investigating all allegations of sexual abuse and exploitation that are leveled against United Nations personnel.⁴⁹ If the investigation shows that the claim is substantiated, the OIOS is responsible for suspending military personnel from UN operations and repatriating them back to their home nations to stand trial. This internal investigation office presents

two issues: the inability to punish offenders directly and the potential for the United Nations to bury or dismiss cases that it does not want thrust into the public eye. If the Office of Internal Oversight Services investigation finds the claim of sexual violation to be unfounded, the case is dismissed and is not prosecuted.⁵⁰ This opens the possibility for internal repression of the claim by the OIOS and could possibly allow offenders to escape prosecution. Additionally, the OIOS has no jurisdiction over defendants if the allegations are proven to be credible and instead must turn over the investigation and prosecution to the individual's home nation.⁵¹ Investigating incidents thus becomes difficult as the troop-contributing country may or may not be able to effectively investigate the claim due to distance and the situation of the host state in which the crime was committed. As such, many offenders who are repatriated by the Office of Internal Oversight Services are given lesser sentences or have their cases dismissed due to lack of efficient investigation and sufficient evidence.⁵²

One such example of the United Nations' system of prosecution failing to fairly prosecute a sexual offender can be found in the case of Didier Bourguet, a French mechanic who was serving as a logistics coordinator for the United Nations peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.⁵³ Bourguet, who was 40 years old at

the time, was accused of raping 20 minors during his stint as a UN civilian worker. He was known to use middlemen to solicit sex from girls as young as 14, often offering a morsel of food or spare change as payment once he was done molesting and raping them.⁵⁴ Bourguet was arrested in October 2004 during a sting operation conducted by Congolese police. He was then repatriated to his home nation of France to stand trial for his numerous offenses.⁵⁵ During his investigation, authorities also discovered hundreds of images of child pornography on his computer. Despite these multiple heinous crimes, however, Bourguet was only sentenced to nine years in prison after being convicted of two counts of rape of a minor.⁵⁶ The reasoning of the French courts for such a minor sentence was that there was not sufficient evidence to convict Bourguet of all the charges levied against him. He has since served his time in a French prison and is currently a free man. Bourguet is the only civilian peacekeeper to have ever been jailed for sexual abuse and exploitation, yet even this punishment is lacking in justice when compared to the scope, severity, and context of his numerous crimes.⁵⁷

More recently, a group of French soldiers serving as UN peacekeepers were acquitted of multiple rape allegations in 2015.⁵⁸ The charges stem from incidents that occurred while they were on a tour of duty in the Central African Republic

in 2013. A confidential UN report states that from December 2013 until June 2014, several children were abused by the French contingent.⁵⁹ Six children were interviewed – two witnesses and four victims. The children, who range in age from 9 to 13, alleged that up to 20 French peacekeepers had committed acts of sexual exploitation and abuse during their tour of duty.⁶⁰ One witness described how the soldiers would offer children rations or water when adults were not around in return for oral sex and other favors. Another victim recalled how she was raped by two French soldiers after being dragged into a building in the UN's airport camp.⁶¹ The report even went as far as to identify specific soldiers based on the children's testimony, most notably on details about the men's faces, intimate areas, and tattoos.⁶² When this report was submitted to the UN, however, the organization failed to address it. An independent panel later investigated the UN's handling of the report and found that the report had effectively been ignored by UN officials. Instead, they simply kept passing the report from one office to another.⁶³ The panel specifically named several senior officials within the United Nations bureaucracy, most notably Carmen Lapointe and Leila Zerrougui.⁶⁴ Lapointe was in charge of internal oversight of the UN bureaucracy at the time while Zerrougui was serving as a special representative for children and armed conflict.

Both officials were accused of failing to act on the report in a timely, impartial manner. The United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund was also criticized for doing little to address the allegations and the children's well-being, instead only sending a small group to meet with the children for several hours.⁶⁵ News about the report was eventually leaked to the French government in July 2014 by Anders Kompass, a high-level official in the Geneva UN human rights office.⁶⁶ A full-scale investigation into the matter was launched by French authorities in 2015, focusing on four soldiers who were identified in the initial report. In 2017, a panel of French judges decided to not levy charges against the group.⁶⁷ Their reasoning for this was that there was insufficient evidence to do so, citing that the children's testimonies were inconsistent and that they may have been manipulated by adults who sought financial gain from the French.⁶⁸ The United Nations' system failed to give justice to the victims of these peacekeepers by refusing to address the initial report in a timely manner, which allowed for the soldiers to rotate home before charges could be pressed and fresh evidence gathered. More importantly, however, the system of exclusive prosecution and repatriation for trial once again interfered with the enactment of justice by muddling the evidence collection process and placing judicial authority in the

hands of the home state.

The United Nations has previously tried to address the issue of sexual abuse and exploitation amongst their peacekeepers, but so far these methods have had little effect in ending the pattern of abuse perpetrated on UN missions. One reason for this is that UN peacekeepers are trained soldiers, not aid workers or social workers. Despite this, UN peacekeepers are often responsible for a number of other responsibilities besides security, such as maintaining refugee camps and distributing humanitarian supplies. The access that UN troops have to humanitarian goods such as food and medical supplies allows for them to have readily available, highly-coveted items with which they can leverage the local populace into performing sexual favors. Additionally, their access to vulnerable refugees as camp managers allows for the creation of situations where the peacekeepers' inherit power dynamic can be exerted upon vulnerable individuals, thus offering another opportunity for leverage as well as ample chances to interact with and isolate potential victims for abuse. One possible solution to these dilemmas is increasing the number of trained social and aid workers in UN peacekeeping missions and keeping peacekeepers out of the camp unless supervised by a trained aid or social worker. By increasing the number of social workers on missions, it allows for the United

Nations to have more people on the ground that are concerned with the overall well-being of the people the peacekeepers are meant to protect. Additionally, the presence of trained social workers may allow for an increase in reporting sexual abuse and exploitation. The previous alternative was to direct allegations to other peacekeepers in the contingent for them to then pass on to higher ups. This system creates a conflict of interest, as troops are less likely to report their comrades for violations and may even be complicit in such crimes themselves. By placing independent UN social workers amongst the peacekeepers, this conflict of interest can be somewhat mitigated. Furthermore, barring peacekeepers from entering refugee camps without supervision from a social worker or children's advocate will increase overall accountability and aid in lowering the number of instances in which a vulnerable individual is alone with peacekeeping troops.

Another idea for curtailing sexual violations on UN missions is to bar member states from contributing troops if they are under scrutiny for possible violations of human rights. Many states that violate human rights utilize their armed forces to do so.⁶⁹ Refusing to send peacekeeping troops from these nations would eliminate the backwards logic of sending human rights violators to protect human rights in another country and remove a significant

risk from peacekeeping missions. This refusal to accept troop donations from these countries may also incentivize their governments and militaries to better adhere to international human rights laws, as many less-developed troop-contributing countries rely heavily upon UN funds and compensations to finance and maintain their standing militaries. By removing this financial aid, it may force some nations to begin complying in order to avoid the weakening of their military might.

The most important potential solution, however, comes in the form of establishing a judicial board within the United Nations to try offenders and end the existence of functional immunity laws for UN peacekeeping forces. These immunity laws bolster feelings of impunity amongst possible offenders, as they know that the system is overwhelmingly in their favor if they are ever caught or accused of perpetrating sexual exploitation or abuse. By removing these laws and instead making offenders answer to the UN directly, issues concerning evidence gathering, extradition, jurisdictional authority, and differing legal codes will be largely eliminated. In order for the internal judicial system to work, the suggested UN judicial board should be comprised of 7 or 9 judges: a head justice from a neutral nation who was not involved in the peacekeeping mission, two to three officials each from the host nation and the home nation of

the accused, and two to three officials from other member states. Additionally, the neutral justices would be selected from nations that follow the laws of the UN as well as international humanitarian laws. The prosecution would be composed of attorneys from the defendant's home nation while the prosecution could be composed of either UN attorneys, attorneys from the victim's home state, or a combination of both. This structure will hopefully allow for all parties to voice their concerns and opinions on the matter as well as allow for a third-party viewpoint on the case from the independent justices. The court would operate based on UN law and the guidelines that govern peacekeepers. One of the easiest ways for this to be implemented is to make most, if not all, UN declarations and bulletins legally binding to individuals who are in the service of the United Nations. This logic stems from the fact that while on deployment, peacekeepers are not operating under orders from their home militaries but rather from UN mission officials. If they violate these officials' rules and conditions while on a United Nations mission, it is effectively the same as a soldier disobeying a superior in their own military while on a national operation. As such, they should be subject to the judicial system of their operational organization if they fail to adhere to its laws. In the case of peacekeepers, this would be the United Nations it-

self and not their country of origin. By making peacekeepers answer to a UN judiciary system, it would eliminate the complex web of immunity laws, Status of Forces Agreements, and jurisdictional authority dilemmas that often allow for sexual offenders to escape prosecution or incur lesser sentences for their heinous acts.

Another option for prosecution of sexual offenders within the UN is to defer jurisdiction over such cases to the International Criminal Court. Usually, the ICC is in charge of presiding over cases concerning war crimes, crimes against humanity, and violations of international human rights laws. International human rights law has developed over the past several decades to include prohibitions on rape and sexual assaults against women, especially in contexts of conflict and warfare. The Geneva Conventions make clear that women are to be protected from sexual assaults, rapes, forced prostitution, and other such "indecent assaults."⁷⁰ The Tokyo war crimes tribunal of 1946 saw the conviction of Japanese general Iwane Matsui for violations of command responsibility for allowing rampant rapes and sexual assaults during the infamous Rape of Nanking during World War II.⁷¹ While this conviction did not explicitly classify rape as an international war crime, it was an important step towards the recognition of the severity of such violations. The International Criminal Tribunal for

Rwanda as well as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia gave further weight to the idea of sexual abuse as an international crime, even attempting to define rape in the context of international law – a concept which had never before been introduced.⁷² The proposed definitions focused upon consent and coercion, specifically the threat of force or the presence of an inherently unbalanced power dynamic, such as the one that exists between peacekeepers and those they are meant to protect.⁷³ The Rome Statute of the ICC classifies sexual crimes such as rape, forced prostitution, sexual slavery, and “any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity.”⁷⁴ These acts are labeled as both crimes against humanity and war crimes under Articles 7 and 8 of the Rome Statute as well as violations of the Geneva Conventions.⁷⁵ The sexual abuses by United Nations peacekeepers fall under the definition of sexual crimes laid out in the Rome Statute. As such, they could be labelled crimes against humanity and tried directly by the International Criminal Court.⁷⁶ Sexual exploitations by peacekeepers would be slightly harder to charge than direct sexual abuses. However, framing the charge in the context of broad sexual violence would give an exploitation charge a chance of success. The ICC definition of sexual violence explicitly mentions that a crime constitutes sexual violence if the perpetrator forces an individual

to engage in a sexual act under coercion, by taking advantage of a coercive environment, or by abusing their power over the victim.⁷⁷ This would surely apply to peacekeepers who use their position of power to coerce individuals into sexual relations as well as those who abuse the humanitarian aid resources they are given in order to perform transactional sex with victims. Additionally, peacekeepers on mission are engaging in their work at the behest of an international organization and as such are operating in an international capacity. Thereby, they should be obligated to follow international human rights laws and be tried by an international court if they violate these laws. Scholar Melanie O’Brien also argues that the ICC should introduce a new provision to the Rome Statute in order to clarify the definition of sexual violence and sexual exploitation, which would allow for peacekeepers who commit such crimes to be prosecuted directly by the ICC.⁷⁸ The prosecution of peacekeepers by the ICC for sexual abuse and exploitation would clarify the jurisdictional confusion of peacekeeper prosecution as well as allow for a set of standard laws by which all peacekeepers would be tried by if they committed crimes while on a UN mission, thus mitigating several issues that lead to offenders receiving scant or no punishment for their crimes.

The United Nations is meant to exist as a force for world peace,

unity, and stability. However, its peacekeepers routinely besmirch these ideals by preying upon local populaces in places they are supposed to protect. The decades-long pattern of sexual abuse and exploitation by UN peacekeepers is a complex issue. The UN’s acceptance of troops from nations who abuse human rights as well as those who do not fully support the rights of women and children creates a body of international troops at risk of violating human rights laws pertaining to sexual conduct due to a lack of education and discipline. When acts of sexual abuse and exploitation do occur, the UN system is woefully underprepared to handle such allegations and their investigations. Even when an investigation does yield a report of sexual violations, the UN bureaucracy is rife with complexities that allow allegations and investigations to be easily mismanaged or ignored. Furthermore, the presence of functional immunity laws in Status of Forces Agreements makes prosecuting UN offenders very difficult due to a limited ability to collect timely evidence as well as acknowledge differences between nations’ legal codes and extradition laws. As a result of these systemic problems, UN peacekeepers are able to repeatedly engage in acts of sexual abuse and exploitation with almost full impunity and are rarely prosecuted for their crimes. Even if the case does go to trial, the punishments that are levied are often

unfair in comparison to the scale of the crime. The United Nations must put more effort into combating these patterns of abuse beyond the issuance of symbolic bulletins and guidelines. Whether it be through the International Criminal Court or a new UN judicial body, UN peacekeepers must be held accountable for violations of international humanitarian law by an international

body. Additionally, UN peacekeeping missions must try to increase the resources available to victims of sexual abuse or exploitation as well as take measures to negate the overall rate of instances, such as restricting unsupervised peacekeeper movement and increasing the number of social workers on missions. In short, the United Nations requires an overhaul of its peacekeeping sys-

tems that focus on actively combating and prosecuting sexual abuses and exploitations that occur at the hands of UN peacekeepers. Only by changing its own system will the United Nations be able to reasonably attempt to end the pattern of sexual abuse and exploitation that occurs on UN peacekeeping missions.

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*(Right) Old Hotel and Entrance MeaShearim were both taken in the Mea She'arim neighborhood of Jerusalem, Israel. Mea She'arim is one of the most thickly populated and religiously orthodox (Haredi) neighborhoods in the country of Israel. It also suffers from extreme poverty. An older man stands at the entrance to a neighborhood, where there is a sign explaining that large groups of visitors are unwelcome.
 Photo by Mikhal Ben-Joseph, Third-Year Statistics and Peace War and Defense Double Major*







(Above) The view from my apartment in Antalya, Turkey. My morning Tea ritual during the lockdown in Turkey was made magical by this view. In all the months I lived there I never saw the sky look the same way twice. Photo taken by Scottie Nicholson, Fourth-Year Interdisciplinary Studies in Cultural Studies with a minor in Studio Art

(Upper left) This photo was taken during my Aconcagua expedition in 2015 by my father, when we have successfully climbed the highest peak of Argentina and South America. Photo taken by Dmitry Tertychnyy, Fourth-Year Economics and Mathematics Double Major and Geography Minor

(Lower left) 540 W 55th St, New York at sunset. Taken as Jamie and her family walked around the city for the first time in 10 years. Photo taken by Jamie Collier, Fourth-Year AD/PR and Media Production Double Major

Actor and Inhibitor: Congress in the Post-Cold War Foreign Policy, 1989-1997

By Joshua O'Brien

On November 9, 1989, the Berlin Wall fell. Constructed between East and West Berlin, the wall had been a symbol of the Cold War system that politically divided much of the world into American and Soviet spheres of influence. The fall of the Berlin Wall represented the decline and end of the Cold War as a political system.

The Cold War had organized the foreign policies of both competing superpowers, and international relations more generally. The United States committed itself to a policy of containment against the Soviet Union and fought proxy wars in Korea and Vietnam. The Soviet Union sought to bolster its own security through satellite and client states, with the ideological goal of facilitating the spread of global Marxism. By the mid-1980s, the two powers had oscillated between holding each other at nuclear gunpoint, as was the case in the Cuban Missile Crisis, and détente, as happened through the 1970s. By the end of the 1980s, relations between the two states, headed by American President Reagan and Soviet Chairman Gorbachev,

saw mutual agreements on matters of arms control, and the gradual expansion of glasnost and perestroika. Meanwhile, states in the Soviet orbit gained more autonomy, and the Soviet bloc weakened as states were allowed to move towards independence.¹

With the rapid easing of Cold War tensions, declining communist influence in Eastern Europe, and fall of the Berlin Wall, the United States needed to shift to a new foreign policy outlook, to replace the loss of its major organizing schema and adversary. With domestic political changes during the Cold War, the United States Congress would have a large influence as a foreign policymaker. The post-Cold War foreign policy of the United States, in the years 1989-1997, was restrained and muddled by the increasing role of Congress in determining the direction and goals of foreign policy. In the Gulf War, this manifested in hesitance over the use of force and intervention. In the humanitarian interventions in Bosnia, this manifested in political concerns over peacekeeping and strategic interests in the region.

This paper will first examine the role of the United States Congress in foreign policy in the pertinent years, and how that role developed in the context of the Cold War system. Following, this understanding of the Congressional role in American foreign policy will be applied to two case studies. The first focuses on the Persian Gulf War and its core military components—Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The section will examine how the US Congress responded to the Bush Administration's interventions and the extent to which it approved and mitigated the use of force. The second case study involves American missions in Bosnia during President Clinton's first term. This includes the Dayton Accords and the American peacekeeping mission dispatched to the region under its auspices. Congressional reaction to both the Accords and the mission will be examined, as well as the reasoning for the limitations Congress placed on them. The paper will conclude with a discussion of the similarities in Congressional action on the case studies.

Congress and Foreign Policy

For the majority of American history, foreign policy was primarily the purview of the executive branch. The US Congress had the authority to issue formal declarations of war, approve treaties, confirm appointments, and make budgetary appropriations to the foreign policy bureaucracy. But the executive maintained predominance in foreign affairs.²

The trend of presidential predominance over issues of foreign affairs continued into the first half of the Cold War. The US Congress was largely sympathetic to presidential policy across party lines—Congressional Democrats sided with the Republican President Eisenhower on most matters of foreign affairs during his term.³ Congressional oversight of the Korean War was fairly minimal, and the US Congress did not stop troop deployments in Japan or Germany. In Vietnam, the 88th Congress approved the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. The Resolution was passed after the alleged attack of the USS Maddox by North Vietnamese patrols, and it gave the president wide authority to “repel any armed attack...and to prevent further aggression” including through the use of military force.⁴ The Resolution’s authorization would be valid as long as the president saw necessary.⁵

The following armed conflict in Vietnam, as such, was conducted without a formal declaration of

war, and with minimal Congressional oversight. With the growing unpopularity of the conflict and the perception of a strategic quagmire, Congress sought more authority over the conduct of foreign affairs, principally through the War Powers Resolution of 1973. The Resolution’s third section requires a written report by the president to Congress in the event of an introduction of U.S. Armed Forces in hostilities, imminent hostilities, foreign territory, or in substantially large numbers.⁶ In certain circumstances or by Congressional declaration, the Resolution stipulates that forces should be withdrawn within sixty days absent further Congressional approval. Despite President Nixon’s veto, the Resolution passed into law.

Since 1973, presidents have refused to recognize the legitimacy of the Resolution in name, though they tend to either abide by or avoid key provisions in practice.⁷ On the other side of the legal argument, Congressionals hold that the legislature should have strong authority in matters of foreign policy, citing Constitutional provisions on war and the purse.⁸ The judiciary has not ruled on the War Powers Resolution, though its opinion in *Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer* holds the view that presidential power on foreign affairs is most certain when authorized by Congress, and the US Congress has some authority to limit or legitimize presidential actions.

The War Powers Resolution

would be a principal component of Congressional authority and rationale on foreign policy in the post-Cold War years. It is also the most obvious manifestation of the increase in Congressional involvement on foreign policy issues in the latter half of the Cold War. Such a trend can also be seen in the debates on routine State Department authorizations in the 1980s, and the personal diplomacy of the Speaker of the House and Senator Jesse Helms.⁹ All of these occurrences would set the stage for Congress to continue to take a strong policy role in the post-Cold War period.

Another issue of Congressional authority in international affairs involves the shifting party consensus on foreign policy issues. Prior to the Vietnam War, Congress could largely come to agreement with the president on major issues, even when the two were controlled by different parties. Following the Cold War, disagreement on the issue of foreign affairs amongst political parties became more common. This was especially prevalent through President Reagan’s term, during which the Democrats were in the legislative majority. Congressional representatives and senators often disagreed on a number of foreign policy issues, most visibly the arming of Nicaraguan Contras, the sanctioning of Apartheid South Africa, and the selling of arms to Saudi Arabia.¹⁰ All three cases involved institutional competition similar to

the War Powers Resolution—Congress had the budgetary authority to approve all three items, and halt what it perceived as an overly aggressive foreign policy by the White House.¹¹

By the end of the Cold War, it was clear that Congress had sway on matters of foreign policy, particularly in matters of budgetary significance, political salience, or institutional authority. It was also clear that this trend was not going to be reversed in a post-Cold War setting—Congress would continue to seek debate and oversee foreign affairs, even as its guiding schema shifted. The issue of defense spending is perhaps the best example of this.

Defense spending is an area where Congress has clear and strong authority—Article 1 of the Constitution delegates budgetary allocations solely to the legislature. It was also an area of policy debate at the end of the Cold War. With the end of a Soviet nuclear or conventional threat, American force posture could be downgraded or shifted, especially to free funds for domestic programs.¹² In the mid-1990s, this position was popular in the electorate, and it likely contributed both to the success of Bill Clinton in 1992, and House Republicans in 1994. Still, Congress was more eager to reduce military spending than either the Bush or Clinton administrations. This is perhaps most readily apparent in the latter's foreign policy strategies,

which outlined a two-war doctrine in which the military would be equipped to fight two nearly simultaneous major conflicts.¹³

Other issues appealed to Congressional debate beyond the matter of defense spending. Key senators and congressmen wrote critiques of foreign policy in the post-Cold War years, calling for various strategy corrections or changes to better fit their worldview and policy goals. Perhaps the most prominent of these is the 1994 criticism penned by Senator Richard Lugar of the Foreign Relations Committee. Lugar called for the use of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European allies to secure stability in the Balkans. He also argued that domestic challenges should not be wholly distracting from foreign policy, making an argument for a more cohesive and stronger foreign policy than he saw from the White House.¹⁴ On the other side of the aisle, Senator Sam Nunn of the Senate Armed Services Committee and Congressman Les Aspin of the House Armed Services Committee both criticized President Bush for failing to quickly set post-Cold War standards and goals for foreign policy.

Overall, political scientists and observers have noted that Congressional opposition and authority on matters of foreign policy has stayed consistent since the end of the Cold War, at least through the Clinton years. Qualitative data does find an increase in partisan discord

on foreign policy issues, while/as well as partisan loyalty and alignment with the president were consistent factors in predicting whether an individual supported the president's foreign policy agenda.¹⁵

The case studies that follow will show specific examples of Congressional authority in post-Cold War foreign policy. The Gulf War chapter will expand on the War Powers Resolution and how it governed Congressional opinion through the crisis. In Bosnia, Congressional opinion on heavy entanglement and military deployments for peacekeeping would help to delay American involvement in the conflict and limit the extent of involvement once it occurred. Through both cases, Congressional concern over public opinion, the institutional desire to be involved in force decisions, and budgetary authority would be motivating factors for Congressional policy shaping.

Congress and the Gulf War *Context of the Gulf War*

On August 2, 1990, Iraqi military forces entered and conquered the oil rich country of Kuwait. Saddam Hussein accused Kuwait of misusing oil resources as justification for the invasion. Additionally, many in Iraq had a long-standing sense of Kuwait as a rightful Iraqi possession that had been removed from the country as a result of the Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 1913. Iraqi forces gained quick control of the country, and annexed Kuwait as

Iraq's nineteenth province.¹⁶

The invasion caught much of the world by surprise. American Secretary of State James Baker recalls the invasion occurring concurrently with a visit to Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. The Soviet diplomat expressed surprise and outrage at the actions of their client state, and he seethed over the perceived irrationality of the event and poor warnings from his country's intelligence assets.¹⁷

The rest of the world reacted similarly to Minister Shevardnadze. Globally, the Iraqi invasion was seen as a violation of international law, with Kuwait the victim of a larger state's aggression. With Yemen's non-participation, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed a unanimous resolution condemning the invasion on August 2 and called for Iraq to return to its August 1, 1990 positions.¹⁸ A few days later, the UNSC passed Resolution 661, allowing for sanctions on Iraq. The sanctions were wide-reaching, limiting almost all imports of Iraqi and Kuwaiti goods, and limiting transactions with Iraq to those justified on humanitarian or medical grounds.¹⁹ The Resolution passed with thirteen affirmative votes, and the abstentions of Cuba and Yemen.²⁰

Concurrently, the Bush Administration put together an international coalition for Operation Desert Shield, the operation placing troops and combat equipment

into the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Desert Shield was conceived with the goal of preventing further Iraqi aggression, but it also served as a forward base to launch any future operations.²¹

Over the remainder of 1990, the Bush Administration focused on maintaining the international coalition. Secretary Baker took trips across the world to negotiate military placements and funding. Middle Eastern countries such as Saudi Arabia provided troops and financial backing, with the displaced Kuwaiti royal family also providing financial assurances. European countries such as France and the United Kingdom provided military assets, and the Soviet Union provided political support despite its former client relationship with Iraq.²²

By the end of the year, Bush and Baker were concerned over the longevity of the coalition. This led to a troop surge in November, which was protested by several in Congress, including Senator Sam Nunn.²³ Criticisms often focused on the need to keep sanctions applied to their full effectiveness, a proposition that Bush and Baker felt would exceed the longevity of the Coalition. Many were also concerned over the justification of the war. While international law had clearly been violated, executive branch rationale varied between the moral implications, the legal implications, and the economic implications of the invasion. Secretary Baker, in particular,

overemphasized a focus on jobs and oil, likely harming popular support for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.²⁴

On November 29, 1990, the UNSC adopted Resolution 678. The Resolution was the work of bitter diplomacy on the part of Secretary Baker, with the goal of reasonably allowing the Coalition to remove Iraq from Kuwait should efforts continue to fail. The Resolution allowed for "all necessary means" to be used to allow Iraq's removal from Kuwait, should it not exit the country by January 15, 1991.²⁵ The deadline would give the Coalition significant time to ready military forces and allow for further diplomatic efforts preceding war. The implicit authorization of force was contentious, but the resolution passed with twelve affirmative votes, two negative votes, and one abstention.²⁶

With Resolution 678 providing international legitimacy, American policymakers continued to prepare for the event of war. Secretary Baker made one last effort to diplomatically come to terms with the Iraqi government, meeting with Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz on January 9, 1991.²⁷ The Geneva Peace Conference did not result in a resolution and confirmed that war would be imminent following the lapse of the January 15 deadline.

Operation Desert Storm began on January 17, 1991, two days after the lapse of the deadline. It began with an aerial campaign, involving

the destruction of several Iraqi Scud missile sites, followed by command and communication facilities. The air campaign was extensive, and the Coalition suffered a limited seventy-five aircraft losses, after dropping eighty-five thousand tons of explosives.²⁸

Beginning on February 24, 1991, ground forces moved out of Saudi Arabia and into Kuwait, quickly expunging Iraqi forces and liberating Kuwait. This phase of the war lasted approximately one hundred hours. American forces in the Coalition suffered approximately one hundred and forty six losses through the duration of the conflict.²⁹ Operation Desert Storm formally ended on February 28, 1991.

Congressional Response to Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm

Initially, the Congressional reaction to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was limited. Congress was out of session, and the midterm campaigns for the 1990 election were well underway. As such, many in Congress were not focused on foreign affairs issues in August of 1990.³⁰ While some representatives were eager to ensure that other countries were taking a fair share of the financial commitment to Desert Shield, the administration actively prevented this from becoming a significant political issue. Others were hesitant to endorse diplomatic and economic sanctions, but none significantly protested the policies or

fought against them in Congress.³¹

Congressional opposition to Gulf War policies solidified in November, following the midterm elections and concurrent with the international debate on Resolution 678. Particularly notable were the protestations of Democrats such as Senator Nunn. Others protested the Administration's placing of troops in a potential combat zone without the authorization of Congress.³² Further, the announcement of troop commitments came in November without a formal notification to Capitol Hill before the announcement, leading to sharp criticism. The Bush Administration, as previous administrations had done, maintained that Congressional authorization was not legally necessary.³³

Still, the Administration viewed relations with Congress in high-regard, and both President Bush and Secretary Baker thought it was important to secure good will with Congress and an authorization for the use of military force. Following the adoption of Resolution 678, they sought to secure domestic support for the Gulf Conflict.³⁴ Particularly following the announcement of the troop surge, domestic backing was a significant issue for the administration. In his memoirs, Secretary Baker writes:

"It took two months of intensive damage control, a United Nations resolution, and a final diplomatic effort by the President, culminating in direct talks between me

and the Iraqi Foreign Minister to persuade legislators to support the option of a U.S. military intervention."³⁵

Before Resolution 678 passed, Congress was apathetic to a war in the Gulf. Both legislators and the public felt that a war was not in the national interest. Saudi Arabia, an ally, was not directly threatened, and oil supplies did not seem to be in trouble either. To others, particularly in Congress, memories of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and Vietnam created a fundamental leeringness for war.³⁶

Following the adoption of Resolution 678, Congress largely lost the ability to use a lack of national interest as a primary opposition. Clearly, international law stood behind a potential war, and the United States now had an international obligation to affirm.³⁷ Still, Congressional representatives remained hesitant to endorse a war that might kill or injure constituents. And others still were not convinced of the utility of war. Many wished to apply sanctions and diplomacy further in the hopes they would force Iraq's withdrawal.

It was these domestic concerns that led Secretary Baker to the Geneva Peace Conference. Previous efforts to bring Saddam Hussein into a summit with President Bush on the issue had failed, leading to Secretary Baker meeting with Minister Aziz six days before the deadline set by Resolution 678 as a last

resort. The summit was ill-advised, in the eyes of international relations. It could risk making the Coalition's resolve appear weak and convincing Iraq that there were doubts about the war. Accounts of the war generally endorse the viewpoint that Saddam Hussein felt that the United States did not have a significant appetite for war, citing the quagmire of Vietnam.³⁸ The Geneva Conference surely reinforced his perception. But the conference also satisfied domestic audiences, who would need convincing that the administration was taking diplomacy seriously. Indeed, the desire to appease Congress in the impending vote on the resolution was a major reason for Baker's endorsement of the summit.³⁹

Still, the debate and vote on the authorization was tense. Personalities in the House and Senate were divided over the issue. Members who were veterans of the armed forces used their recounts of their experience to either denounce conflict or show resolve for the necessity of the war, particularly for international law.⁴⁰ Other members noted that Congress should not authorize a war without the firm support of the people. The populace, much like Congress, was split on their view of the conflict.⁴¹

The final vote was 250-183 in the House of Representatives, and 52-47 in the Senate. Democrats were in control of both houses, though the issue did not follow a clean party split. Members from both parties

supported and dissented. 86 of 267 House Democrats were in favor, and 10 Democrats were in favor in the Senate. In the House, 164 Republicans voted with the resolution and 3 against. In the Senate, the split was 42-2. Still, even those that voted for the Resolutions, such as Bob Dole, released statements reflecting on his experience as a World War II veteran, and disdain for war.⁴²

The Resolution's text reflected the earlier antipathies of many in the House and Senate. The Resolution requires that the President submit a determination that:

“The United States has used all appropriate diplomatic and other peaceful means to obtain compliance by Iraq with the United Nations Security Council resolutions...and that those efforts have not been and would not be successful in obtaining such compliance.”⁴³

Clearly, Congress preferred sanctions to warfare, and sought to make clear their preference for sanctions. This came despite the administration's continued insistence that continued reliance on sanctions would risk the disintegration of the international coalition.⁴⁴ Additionally, the authorization makes specific mention of the War Powers Resolution and requires reports to Congress on the use of military force in Iraq every sixty days for the duration of hostilities.⁴⁵

Though the Gulf War was a military success and saw minimal casu-

alties on the Coalition side, Congressional policymaking on Gulf policy still complicated the eventual conduct of the war. Congressional protests required significant attention from the president and secretary of state. American foreign policy was also conducted, in part, to the appeasement of Congress, as seen in Geneva. In the days preceding Desert Storm, this risked American credibility, and it was unclear if President Bush would have let the war proceed without Congressional authorization. This likely restrained American commitment preceding the war. These same trends would be seen during the next administration, as it struggled with foreign policy in the Bosnian Crisis.

Congress and Intervention in Bosnia

The Context of the Bosnian Conflict and the American Response

The Bosnian conflict is complex, involving ethnic tensions in former Yugoslavia. Upon the death of its longtime dictator, Tito, and the subsequent end to the Cold War, the Yugoslavian state broke apart. Croatia seceded, resulting in a war between Muslim-Croats and Serbians over the territory in Bosnia. The conflict was brutal, with global outcry against ethnic cleansing, particularly by Serbian President Milosevic's policies. The conflict became a core foreign policy issue in the NATO countries. The US Congress was instrumental in determining the American response to the con-

flict—its politicking with the executive branch would determine how the country was allowed to address the evolving issue.

Initially, the American response to the conflict was muted. The Bush Administration felt that the Bosnian problem should be handled by Europe—a European solution to a European problem. Secretary Baker disavowed American political or military involvement, infamously stating “we don’t have a dog in this fight.”⁴⁶ Upon his inauguration in 1993, Bill Clinton adopted this policy from his predecessor.

Moving into 1994 and 1995, Clinton was more active in trying to find a solution to the policy problem. Foreign policymakers addressed the problem with European allies frequently and created a program to allow NATO airstrikes over Bosnia, with UN approval.⁴⁷ This policy was a muted response compared to the initial “lift and strike” option the American administration proposed. Lift and strike would repeal the arms embargo on belligerents, allowing America to arm Bosniak fighters. It would also allow for aerial bombardment of the Serbian forces, with the goal of balancing the conflict. European allies and the UN disapproved of this policy, which was in violation of Resolution 787 on trade with Yugoslavia, leading Clinton to scrap it.^{48 49}

Despite Clinton’s shift on lift and strike, his foreign policy on Bosnia remained deeply unpopular with

the American public and Congress into 1995. Clinton’s foreign policy rating was at thirty-nine percent, and the Republican controlled Congress was critical of the muddling going on in Bosnia, especially as the Europeans began to withdraw.⁵⁰ In this context, Congress moved to a vote on a bill lifting the arms embargo. While the initial Senate vote in May was nearly an even-split, many members supported further action than the Clinton administration was ready to take.⁵¹

By the end of summer 1995, Congress passed a bill forcing the President to repeal the arms embargo with a veto-proof majority.⁵² President Clinton opposed the bill for its circumventing of UN policy and the risk of a strategic blunder by allowing a potential arms flow to both sides.⁵³ As such, the president vetoed the bill at the start of summer recess.⁵⁴

Concurrently, the president authorized Richard Holbrooke to act as a special envoy to the region, conducting shuttle diplomacy across Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia. His efforts culminated in the invitation of all involved leaders to a summit in Dayton, Ohio. The location was chosen for its relative isolation, forcing the leaders to come to an agreement. This agreement, the Dayton Accords, was initially successful in bringing about an end to the conflict. However, they created a convoluted political system built on ethnic divisions, which continues to

be a contentious issue.⁵⁵ Regardless, the U.S. Congress was supportive of the Accords, though only upon their popular reception by the public, and limited peacekeeping apparatus.

The Congressional Response to the Bosnian Conflict

Congressional policymaking was crucial to the outcome of American policy in Bosnia. The Congressional resolution to end the arms embargo forced sudden policy changes for the Clinton Administration that resulted in the Dayton Accords. Similarly, the Dayton Accords were negotiated with Congressional limitations in mind, especially as the US legislative and executive branches were already deadlocked over the 1996 budget.

Congress had never found particular satisfaction in President Clinton’s Bosnia policy. Senator Lugar criticized inaction in the Balkans, viewing it as necessary to the broader goals of a post-Cold War world.⁵⁶ Others were critical of the ongoing presence of the UN Protection Forces (UNPROFOR), describing it and the associated arms embargo as ineffective. These criticisms were heightened when hundreds of European UNPROFOR troops were publicly held hostage in Bosnia.⁵⁷ Congressional disapproval grew with the popular discontent over events in the Balkans, culminating in the resolution to overturn the arms embargo.

The Congressional attempt to overturn the arms embargo, in par-

ticular, demonstrated its tenacity and motivations in foreign policy. The resolution was wide-reaching—it sought to overturn an executive branch policy initially imposed in conjunction with a UN Resolution—showing how far Congress sought to legislate foreign policy, breaking from its past focus on budgeting and war declarations. The senatorial speeches in support of the resolution also highlight its motivation. Senator after senator made emotional pleas regarding the reported atrocities in Bosnia. Many read grueling reports from the war zone during their statements, and others reflected on the moral concerns of their constituents.⁵⁸ The upcoming election year and a desire to align against an unpopular presidential policy were also motivating factors for members.

The vote on the resolution was veto-proof—sixty-nine senators had supported it—and the prospects of sustaining a veto would not improve as the conflict continued without a clear end.⁵⁹ President Clinton decided to exploit a Congressional recess, during which his veto could not be acted upon, to make diplomatic progress through the Holbrooke mission. The mission was a clear last attempt to win a sustainable policy and prevent a Congressional veto. In other words, it was inspired as a domestic work-around Congress rather than by international strategic conditions.

By the time Congress returned,

the Holbrooke mission changed enough minds to sustain the veto.⁶⁰ Further, congressional opposition to the shuttle mission largely ceased following the death of some of the mission staff in a car accident in Igman, Bosnia.⁶¹ As such, the United States was able to organize the Dayton summit with limited domestic opposition, and come to the conclusion of the Dayton Accords as a product of Congressional considerations.

The Dayton Accords were conducted in near total radio silence to limit grandstanding by the involved parties. As such, most of Washington was unaware of the situation in Dayton outside of the limited information the White House provided. As such, Congressional input on the specifics of the Accords were minimal.⁶² However, the negotiators were careful to limit American peacekeeping involvement in consideration of Congress. Secretary of State Warren Christopher was fully aware that Congress would not be eager to sustain a heavy troop presence in a potentially volatile region, fearing a quagmire with limited strategic interest.⁶³ Additionally, the situation on Capitol Hill made funding a large operation infeasible. Republicans in Congress were locked in a budget battle with the President on domestic spending issues. This resulted in the first of two major government shutdowns in 1995-96, concurrent with the Dayton summit.⁶⁴ As such, American

commitments on the ground were kept minimal and a heavy emphasis was placed on European allies when necessary.

Despite the silence, the Dayton Accords were widely popular. Secretary Christopher recalled a scene in which he was greeted with applause at a Dayton diner following the conclusion of the Accords.⁶⁵ With such a popular policy and a clear end to the conflict, Congress lined up behind the Dayton Accords and supported its major elements.

Though the executive and legislative branches came to a consensus on the Dayton Accords, their discord on the Bosnian conflict is illustrative of the broader disagreements on foreign policy between the two branches, particularly in the post-Cold War era. In addressing the new global structure, the Clinton administration, in addressing the new global structure, sought a “National Security of Engagement and Enlargement,” as shown through the expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe.⁶⁶ Congress was less concerned with the expansion of NATO, and its foreign policy in the Bosnian conflict reflected the more immediate concerns of constituents on war and humanitarianism. Further with the changes to Congressional powers in foreign policy and their reach to further legislate the country’s diplomacy, it was more empowered to act on this differing rationale. Certainly, this is the larger trend of diplomacy and

Congressional foreign policymaking in the post-Cold War era.

Conclusion

The foreign policy role of Congress has changed significantly since the country's earliest days, and even since the Cold War. While Congress was subservient to the President's leading role through the first half of the Cold War, by the second half of the Cold War the legislature had begun to assert its authority in the foreign policy realm. As a result, the Congress had a large say on post-Cold War foreign policy, confusing or forcing responses to international crises and impacting long-term American strategy.

The Congressional assertion of authority was both statutory and political. It is most visibly marked by the War Powers Resolution, which provided that Congress should be notified of major military dispatchments. It also provided Congress mechanisms to force an end to the use of armed forces, effectively limiting how widely the President could act as Commander-in-Chief. As seen in the case of Desert Storm,

this forced the administration to compromise its diplomatic position to pursue the politically expedient Authorization for the Use of Military Force. This resulted in a loss of American credibility internationally, including with coalition forces, but with the benefit of dulling Congressional animosity to the impending war, even if the vote on the Authorization was slim.

Politically, Congress had a capable hand in foreign policy. Its responses to the moral sentiments of its constituents during the Bosnian conflict proved this. Congress, due to the domestic political pressure, was persuaded to take action and repeal the arms embargo with the goal of providing necessary assistance to the Bosniaks. The repeal was contrary to President Clinton's policy, and forced him to pursue a more aggressive diplomatic strategy before his veto could be overturned. His efforts culminated in the Dayton Accords, themselves subject to the fierce budgetary considerations occurring simultaneously in Washington. Congress effectively created

the window for the Dayton Accords, but also forced the effectiveness of peacekeeping due to its simultaneous domestic considerations.

The effect of Congress on foreign policy in the post-Cold War era are significant, as these two case studies show. During both Desert Storm and the Bosnian Conflict, the president was forced to change policy due to the strong will of Congress. Sometimes this was due to statute, such as the requirement for a force authorization. Other times it was politics, as with the arms embargo and slim vote on Desert Storm. And other times still, it reflected budgetary concerns on the State Department and military. In the future, Congress will likely continue to restrain the foreign policy of the president and exert force as an actor and inhibitor of foreign policy. As the United States continues to explore the post-Cold War world, face crises, and develop a grand strategy, the president and executive branch will have to factor Congress into its diplomatic efforts.

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(Right) Dawn in Cappadocia, Turkey: I lived in Turkey all last semester free-lancing and taking UNC classes online by night. I took this picture at the crack of dawn in Cappadocia, sitting on some traditional Turkish rugs as the famous hot air balloons were rising into the air.

Photo by Scottie Nicholson, Fourth-Year Interdisciplinary Studies in Cultural Studies Major and a Minor in Studio Art





(Above) A man riding his bike underneath a power line covered in birds in Liberia, Costa Rica. A swath of bird droppings parallels the power lines above, and in the background a man can be seen riding his bicycle between. Photo by Alexander Snow, Fourth-Year History Major

(Right) Karl Marx's grave, located in Highgate Cemetery in London, has an entry fee of 10 pounds. Photo by Hannah Elkins, Fourth-Year English and Comparative Literature and Peace, War, and Defense Double Major



Closing the Veins of Latin America

By Gabriel Morrison

At 5:30 in the morning of June 28, 2009, the sitting President of the Republic of Honduras, Manuel Zelaya, was arrested in his Tegucigalpa home by the Honduran armed forces. Still in his pajamas, the soldiers took him to Soto Cano Air Base – jointly operated by the Honduran and U.S. Air Forces – where he was put on a presidential jet and flown to Costa Rica. Before Zelaya’s family knew what had happened, the President of Honduras’s Congress, Roberto Micheletti, was named Provisional President. Within hours the Honduran people took to the street with chants of “¡Queremos a Manuel!” – “we want Manuel!”¹ The following months saw the removal of virtually all of Zelaya’s allies, including the mayor of San Pedro Sula, the country’s second largest city. In response, every Latin American state refused to recognize the new government and labeled the military’s actions as a coup d’état. Intergovernmental organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS) quickly followed suit.² Only the United States’ veto prevented the OAS from expelling Honduras. The coup was the culmination of

an internal power struggle between President Zelaya and the military and its right-wing civilian supporters, sparked by the President’s call for a referendum to rewrite the nation’s constitution. The Honduran military acted without explicit support from the United States, but, despite publicly backing Zelaya’s return, Washington did nothing to change the situation. According to one of Zelaya’s private secretaries, Enrique Reina, “the Honduran military doesn’t do anything without the U.S. approving it.”³ Indeed, the United States was more involved than its public stance would indicate. Despite its public condemnation of the coup, its tacit approval of the outcome, decades of precedent, and the close relationship between U.S. and Honduran armed forces reveal a deeper relationship between the United States and the 2009 coup.

Background

Relations between the United States and Central America, despite endless theorizing and justification through ideas like liberty, civilization, and anti-communism, are indistinguishable from the politics of the Greek city states which inspired the government of the United States.

As the Athenians themselves, creators of democracy, explained as they subjugated the city of Melos: “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”⁴ Though the names have changed, the concept still rings true. As early as the 19th century, plans for a canal across the Central American isthmus and private business interests focused U.S. foreign policy on the region. Military force was the tool of the era; gunships bombarded hostile coastal towns and marines protected strategic positions along trade routes.⁵ Honduras was subjected to northern imperialism as early as 1860, when the independent filibuster army of Tennessee-born William Walker briefly occupied parts of the country. The rationale of the era for invasion was a quest to “uplift and civilize” the supposedly savage natives, but ultimately the continuous interventions served only U.S. interests.⁶ However, blatant aggression soon became detrimental to the United States’ image of an enlightened democracy. Somewhat counterintuitively, as the United States became a global superpower in the 20th century, their imperial operations became more subtle.

The Honduran coup is a new iteration in a decades-long strategy of achieving regional hegemony through covert action and collaboration with local forces. In 1957, Guatemala became the testing ground for this new approach. Amid Cold War paranoia, the specter of a potential future Soviet invasion was used to justify the overthrow of President Jacobo Árbenz by an irregular group of Guatemalan exiles, supported by the CIA.⁷ A crucial development from the previous century in the approach to regime change was that no U.S. ground forces were used. The soldiers that crossed the border from Honduras were Guatemalan, as was Colonel Carlos Enrique Castillo Armas, their commander on the ground.⁸ However, the planes that bombed Guatemala City and their pilots, along with the guns, supplies, training, and (most importantly) leadership were all American. So began the policy of controlling the nations of Latin America with their own people. A small elite would be brought to power and supplied by the United States with the money, weapons, and ideology to maintain their stranglehold on the economy of whichever republic strayed too close to Communism.⁹ The strategy had immense success across the hemisphere. Though many tried, only a handful of countries escaped from the influence of the United States' weapons, money, and propaganda. Honduras was not one of

them. The Central American republic had been ruled by a series of pro-U.S. presidents and military officers since a United States intervention in the 1910's, a line broken by President Zelaya, elected in 2006.¹⁰

The Situation in Honduras

Despite coming to power on a conservative platform, Zelaya aligned himself diplomatically with the few socialist nations in the region, joining the Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra America (ALBA) along with Venezuela, Nicaragua, Cuba, and Bolivia. He also passed several economic reforms including a massive minimum wage increase.¹¹ This drew consternation from Honduran business leaders, right-wing politicians and military officers, and crucially, the United States.¹² According to Colonel Andrew Papp, military attaché to the U.S. embassy in Tegucigalpa at the time, Washington "didn't really like the guy."¹³ These local groups unified behind the Honduran armed forces, with the tacit approval of the United States, to remove President Zelaya from power permanently. While the 2009 Honduran constitutional crisis was not a U.S.-backed coup d'état in the traditional sense, neither was it an entirely homegrown conflict. Right-wing elements of the Honduran government and armed forces took their own initiative, but used training, intelligence, and material support provided by the United States.¹⁴ Meanwhile, Washington worked

behind the scenes to prevent the return of President Zelaya, legitimize the interim government, and block multilateral action against the perpetrators.

Justification

Though Zelaya's leftward swing alienated the Honduran elite and threatened the ties between Honduras and the United States, open political conflict was sparked by a dispute over the country's constitution. In the prior weeks, Zelaya had called for a referendum on rewriting the document, which Honduran courts and congress ruled unconstitutional, accusing the President of trying to remove his term limits. Undeterred, Zelaya led a group of supporters to an Air Force base in the capital where they seized the ballots for the referendum.¹⁵ When the commander of the armed forces, General Romeo Vásquez, refused a request to have the army organize the vote, the President fired him, though he was immediately reinstated by the Honduran Supreme Court. Critics of Zelaya claimed that his attempts to edit the constitution was a power grab akin to authoritarian socialists such as Hugo Chavez, a view corroborated by his alignment with the dictatorships of Cuba and Venezuela. These accusations, unsurprisingly, found sympathetic ears in Washington, as Honduras had long been used as a staging ground for U.S.-backed anti-communist operations. Florida Representative Connie Mack IV even went so far as

to call the referendum requested by Zelaya “the real coup and the only coup,” while praising Micheletti as a “hero.”¹⁶

In the immediate aftermath of the coup, the Honduran Supreme Court defended the military’s actions on the basis that Zelaya had “acted against the Constitution’s provisions,” and therefore his removal was a defense of the law.¹⁷ However, Zelaya’s proposed changes to the constitution would only have taken effect after the next election – meaning they would not have allowed him to run again.¹⁸ The court’s explanation was not accepted by many Hondurans, who expressed their discontent with months of mass demonstrations. When Zelaya attempted to re-enter the country by plane, thousands of citizens gathered peacefully at Toncontin International Airport to receive him.¹⁹ The military opened fire on the crowd with live ammunition, killing several protestors and arresting thousands more in the ensuing chaos. The armed suppression of pro-Zelaya demonstrations reinforced the appearance of a military coup, undermining the attempts to make the conflict appear as a legal, constitutional, and democratic process. Even U.S. President Barack Obama stated publicly that Zelaya remained the “constitutional leader” of the republic.²⁰ A later report by the Law Library of the U.S. Congress found that while Zelaya’s proposal was not in accordance with the con-

stitution, the more egregious violation was on the part of the military in their response.²¹

U.S. Involvement

Though the Obama administration publicly supported Zelaya’s claim to the presidency, behind the scenes the United States cooperated clandestinely with the plotters. When Zelaya was flown out of the country, his plane took off from Soto Cano Airbase. Soto Cano hosts the headquarters for the United States Air Force (U.S.A.F.) Joint Task Force Bravo alongside the Honduran Air Force Academy and was Washington’s staging ground for covert operations across Latin America throughout the Cold War. It would have been virtually impossible for this to have happened without both knowledge and consent from the United States, since U.S.A.F. personnel co-operate the control tower and other airport facilities.²² Military cooperation between the United States and Honduras is not just professional – the two nations’ military personnel are so close that they attend the same parties.²³ At one such event the night before the coup, Colonel Kenneth Rodriguez, the United States military group commander for Honduras, met with the leader of the Honduran armed forces, General Vásquez. The official record of the meeting showed that the coming events were not discussed, but Col. Rodriguez advised Gen. Vásquez to “remain within the bounds of the constitution.”²⁴ When President

Obama condemned the coup, Col. Rodriguez reported that the Honduran military was “confused by the U.S.’s reaction and feel somewhat abandoned by us,” implying that the plotters expected the United States to support their efforts.²⁵ Like many Latin American militaries through history, they saw part of their role as protecting their country from communism and maintaining good relations with the anti-communist United States. Their decision to replace Zelaya with a more traditionally pro-U.S. President flows naturally from that position. Shortly after the coup, Colonel Herbeth Inestroza of the Honduran army took an interview with the Miami Herald, where he admitted that the army’s actions were unconstitutional. Inestroza also stated that a relationship with a left-wing leader like Zelaya would have been “impossible” due to the military’s training – training it received from the United States.²⁶

The connections between the U.S. and local Honduran military is representative of Washington’s general Latin American strategy. As part of an effort to create effective militaries in the region – that is, militaries that can effectively suppress potential anti-capitalist movements – the United States hosts several universities and training camps for foreign soldiers. Hundreds of Honduran officers have attended the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies in Washington, D.C., and General Vásquez himself com-

pleted courses at the School of the Americas in Fort Benning, Georgia during the height of the Cold War.²⁷ Many of the school's alumni went on to actively participate in brutally repressive regimes across Latin America, all backed to some degree by the United States. Dictators such as Chile's Augusto Pinochet and Roberto D'Aubuisson in El Salvador received millions in economic and military aid from the United States to suppress socialist insurgencies and protect their countries' traditional power structures. The explanation for supporting blatantly undemocratic governments was simple – in the Cold War mentality, every potential socialist government in the region was a theoretical national security threat through which the Soviet Union could launch an attack.²⁸ Though the United States could not directly intervene in every country, it developed the strategy of indirect control to prevent the spread of Communism and supposedly protect democracy. In reality, democratic liberties and human rights fell by the wayside. The rhetoric, too, was only a cover for the protection of United States business interests. Socialist reforms proposed by Presidents such as Arbenz in Guatemala and Salvador Allende in Chile threatened the profits of U.S.-owned banana companies and copper mines respectively.²⁹ ³⁰ The allusions to democracy and freedom were nothing but lip service – the military governments were almost

universally more repressive and authoritarian than the socialists they ousted.

Therefore, economic interests should be acknowledged as the primary factor shaping the attitude of the United States towards its southern neighbors. In the eyes of policy makers, free market capitalism was (and remains) the ideal system because it protected the property and profits of United States' companies. Any reforms or movements which menaced the ability of those corporations to extract maximum profit from the natural and human resources of the Latin American republics were, by definition, a threat to United States interests. There exists a natural alliance between the United States and the local elite in Honduras, who also benefit from the exploitation of the Honduran people and land.³¹ Unfortunately for the people of Latin America, the economic status quo keeps them in extreme poverty. Honduras is one of the most unequal countries in the world, and roughly "60% of Hondurans" live below the national poverty line.³² The reforms Zelaya instituted prior to the coup were immensely popular among the nation's poor, especially the minimum wage increase. However, they also cut into the revenue of the U.S.-backed elite – the corporations, latifundia owners, and landholders who dominate the country's politics and economy.³³

In the broader context of the

history of U.S.-Latin American relations, it is unsurprising that Zelaya found no allies in the United States. Washington's attitude toward any particular leader in the region is essentially inverse to how much their decisions benefit the poor – not because the poor are the enemy, but because any action which redistributes power and wealth downward within Latin America necessarily cuts into the northward flow. The Honduran coup was, in other words, completely characteristic of U.S.-Latin American relations. The only difference from the perspective of Washington was the degree to which U.S. operatives were directly involved. Honduran forces acted to protect United States interests almost entirely independently, using weapons largely provided by the United States, and operating with tactics learned at United States military schools.

The Response

A major change from the past, however, was the response from Latin America. The condemnation of the removal of a democratically elected leader was swift and near universal. President Óscar Arias of Costa Rica and Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez backed Zelaya within twenty four hours of the coup, followed over the next few days by virtually every head of state in the region. President Arias played a lead role in the ensuing mediation efforts.³⁴ ³⁵ Later the same day, the members of ALBA met in Nicaragua to discuss poten-

tial countermeasures against the illegitimate government.³⁶ On June 29th, President Chávez suspended petroleum shipments to Honduras, and all three of the state's neighbors blocked all trade.³⁷ Soon after, the member states of OAS voted unanimously to suspend Honduras from the organization, blocked only by a veto from the United States. The OAS supported the return of Zelaya to his country and position, though the U.S. State Department criticized the President's attempts to re-enter, accusing him of inciting violent actions.³⁸ While in the past United States intervention had been met with criticism from scholars and activists, the 2009 coup was widely denounced by a Pan-American audience, including national governments, non-governmental groups like the Federation of Latin American Journalists, and inter-governmental organizations such as ALBA and the OAS.³⁹ Honduras marked a turning point in relations between the Northern Colossus and the southern Latin republics. Instead of facing isolated and disorganized nations, U.S. interests were now opposed by a unified political block which showed itself capable of coordinating rhetoric and punitive diplomatic measures against rogue states. Though ultimately the coup triumphed and Zelaya was prevented from retaking the presidency, the reaction proved that a united Latin America was able and willing to push back against Washington.

Conclusion

The question of constitutionality dominates the discourse surrounding the removal of Zelaya – whether the referendum was constitutional or not, or if the military was justified in breaking the law because it had the blessing of the Honduran Supreme Court. This argument distracts from the real conflict, of which this incident was merely one battle. Businessmen both North and South of the Rio Grande cannot tolerate a President who increases operating costs by, for example, raising the minimum wage. Zelaya was not removed because of a constitutional dispute, but because he threatened the status quo supported by the political and economic elite. Though his actions were clearly unconstitutional, if the military and their civilian allies cared about their Constitution, they would not have violated it themselves to remove their opponent.

The episode that took place in Honduras in 2009 is impossible to understand isolated from the broader trend of history. For the past five centuries, Latin American relations with other states have been defined by exploitation on a continental scale.⁴⁰ The banks of the United States are the current beneficiaries of the wealth plundered from South and Central America, following in the footsteps of a long line of imperialist powers. Though the financial and political structure of exploitation has changed, it still operates on

many of the same principles; one of which is the prerogative to destroy any local resistance to the extraction of wealth and resources. Washington removes leaders that threaten their business interests, just as the Spanish Crown crushed the slave rebellion of Tupac Amaru to protect the precious gold mine at Potosí.⁴¹

The United States, unlike the Spanish Empire, does not employ colonial governors. Instead, it allies itself with local elites. Those elites maintain an economic system which generates wealth for the United States. In exchange, they receive a tiny sliver of the profits, but enough to live a life of outlandish luxury. This necessarily impoverishes the vast majority of Latin Americans, Hondurans included. The United States appeared to have perfected its imperial system – Zelaya was eliminated with little more than a wave of the hand, diplomatically speaking. In 2019, the United States used the same method to back the overthrow of Bolivian President Evo Morales and Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro (successor to Chávez), who had jointly supported Zelaya and opposed United States business interests. Both attempts failed. People and their leaders across the continent are beginning to understand how the United States rules them and how to oppose it. They will not allow the removal of the next Zelaya.


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*(Right) Taken in CuencAventura, Villalba de la Sierra, Spain. This photo depicts "descenso de cañones", also known as canyoning, where individuals navigate canyons by swimming, climbing, and jumping.
Photo by Brooke Chow, Second-Year Public Policy and Business Major and Minor in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics*







*(Above) : Lost shoes were collected and hung on a string at a Brixton co-op gymnasium in London.
Photo by Hannah Elkins, Fourth-Year English and Comparative Literature and Peace, War, and Defense Double Major*

(Left) This photo was taken at sunrise on Mt. Masada in Southern Israel. Masada is the ancient site of a legendary story of rebellion, sacrifice, and pride for the Jewish people. A year after Roman troops first laid siege to the fort in 73 CE, nearly 1,000 extremist Sicarii Jews living in fort the committed mass suicide as the enemies made their way up the mountain.

Photo by Mikhal Ben-Joseph, Third-Year Statistics and Peace War and Defense Double Major

The Rise of Right Wing Populism Throughout Europe: Mechanisms and Outcomes

By Ezra Cross

Many countries in Europe established welfare states during and after World War II that never truly left. Europe is unique in that many of its countries have such deeply entrenched systems of welfare that the traditional debate between the fiscally conservative right and the democratic-socialist left on the issue is absent. Today, instead of trying to tear down or block welfare for citizens many right-wing parties attempt to erect gates around government assistance. Thus, right-wing parties can frame the issue in terms of protecting the 'deserving natives' of their countries while excluding 'parasitic aliens.'

How have populist radical right-wing parties achieved such a tremendous resurgence in recent years? Through the use of inflammatory rhetoric, strong welfare chauvinism, and the politics of fear, populist radical right parties have created a new framework for success. Throughout Europe, far-right parties are seizing power, some in countries that haven't seen a substantial far-right political movement

since pre-WWII. From Marine le Pen in France and her rebranded National Front to Austria's Freedom Party (FPÖ) to President Áder in Hungary, the radical right is on the rise with substantial working-class support.

In this paper, I argue that the narrowing of the gap between right-wing and left-wing economic policy has a windfall for radical right-wing parties. Because there is no longer an argument over whether there should be a welfare state, right-wing parties can shift the conversation towards who is deserving of government assistance. Right-wing parties can then use xenophobia and fears of immigrants wreaking havoc on the economy to garner popular support. Right-wing parties are particularly well-suited for targeting working-class voters, who are more likely to rely upon government assistance and work in more insecure jobs. Thus, right-wing parties utilize welfare chauvinism to gain popular support and establish a national identity while also utilizing the politics of fear to suppress any critical

thinking vis-à-vis their own economic policies.

From the literature, I reference what experts have written on the characteristics of the radical right in Europe. I focus primarily on the radical right under Marine le Pen in France, the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) in Austria, and the Danish People's Party (DF) in Denmark. In doing this, I reference statistical analyses of the movement of party ideologies and voting patterns over the last two decades. I also refer to experts on political psychology to examine why and how people make political decisions.

The rest of this paper is divided into three parts. In the first part, I examine how right-wing and left-wing parties in Europe converge and diverge in their economic policies. In the second part, I briefly examine the mechanisms and rhetoric employed by right-wing leaders in France, Austria, and Denmark. In the third part, I use political psychology to demonstrate why working-class voters respond to the tactics used by right-wing politicians.

The New Right

Many scholars have extensively researched how to properly define the rise of radical right parties in Europe. However, most scholars agree that these parties represent a resurgence of right-wing populism. Populism is defined most simply as a narrative that pits “the people” against “the elites”. Different brands of populism can be distinguished by how they defined these two actors. Left-wing populists typically define “the people” as the general proletariat and “the elites” as the literal economic elites. Under left-wing populism, the definition of these groups is more sterile than under right-wing populism; left-wing populists are less likely to imbibe nationalism, xenophobia, or other divisive ideologies in their definitions. Right-wing populists, however, often define “the people” through nationalist term.¹

Although populist radical right parties and left-wing parties diverge in their economic aims, the gap between the two is closing. While in the United States issues like universal healthcare and welfare are split along party lines, in Europe the division is not so vast. Radical right populist parties have shifted towards emphasizing the need for a welfare state, but only for the deserving, who they deem to be the natives of their respective countries. This “welfare chauvinism” has proved beneficial to populist radical right parties, offering blocs that previously would have voted left-wing. Thus,

the traditional dichotomy between conservative, right-wing economics and welfare-oriented left-wing politics is no longer applicable to radical right populists. Instead, populist radical right parties have created a synergy between nationalism and the welfare state that enables them to garner previously unexpected levels of support.

The “Polish Plumber” and Other Bedtime Stories

Following the Second World War, right-wing parties were hesitant in adopting policies of imperial ethnonationalism. Instead, these parties turned to ethnopluralism to bolster the credibility of their arguments while avoiding criticisms of imperialism. The “ethnopluralist” narrative is a more palatable form of nationalism; rather than try to force cultural homogeneity upon the world, ethnopluralist states emphasize the importance of separation to ensure the protection of unique cultures. The philosophy was first championed by the *nouvelle droite* (“New Right”), a neo-conservative movement that started in France in the 60s and 70s. Among the *nouvelle droite* was Jean-Marie Le Pen’s National Front, today the National Rally under Marine Le Pen echoes some of his ideas. Today, many right-wing parties have adopted ethnopluralist policies to spread the narrative of encroaching immigrants bent on corrupting a national identity.²

Right-wing populists cast themselves as the protectors of a

national identity and the people therein. Thus, radical right parties may support a strong welfare state or advocate for protectionist economic policies. In this way, radical right-wing parties are markedly different from their conservative counterparts. Social sciences researcher Tamir Bar-On, writing in “The Radical Right and Nationalism” in *The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right*, finds that far-right parties can be defined through their “(1) nativism, or the defense of the privileges of a homogeneous native population against immigrants; (2) authoritarianism, or the belief in strong leadership and a strong state, and³ a pronounced populism” (3). Political scientist Rooduijin characterizes this form of nationalism as one that emphasizes the antagonistic relationship between the Good nation and Evil outsiders, which, combined with authoritarianism and populism creates the “success formula of the PRR [populist radical right] family.”⁴ Thus, the populist stage is set: the radical right leaders must defend the country and its people against evil.

Populist radical right parties have enjoyed increasing amounts of political capital in nearly every European country. Perhaps the most impressive feature of the radical right is the full extent of their rebranding and normalization. Groups that were previously considered “fringe” have gained popular traction. Marine Le Pen’s National

Rally (RN), originally the National Front, has a long history in France of nationalism and anti-Semitism. The National Front rose to prominence among the rampant nationalism of the interwar period but lost almost all popular support after World War II due to connections to the Vichy government. In 2021, le Pen has consistently polled slightly above Macron in a tight presidential race. The resurgence of the RN can be credited to le Pen's rebranding strategy; le Pen recognized that the RN's history of anti-Semitism was holding the party back and thus rebranded the party through information campaigns and cutting ties with toxic members of the party's old guard, including her outspokenly anti-Semitic father with great success.⁵ In Austria, the FPÖ has been on the rise since the 1980s. Previously considered an untenably far-right party, the FPÖ has gained popular support in large part due to the shift in their strategy in 2005. After the FPÖ suffered critical losses in 2005, the FPÖ changed tactics and moved towards a campaign based on Islamophobia and welfare chauvinism to a tremendous increase in electoral support. The Danish People's Party (DF) has adopted a similar policy, promising to increase welfare for older people while running a xenophobic, Islamophobic platform. The DF received around 21 percent of the vote share in 2015, nearly doubling their vote share from four years previous.⁶

The rhetoric of populist radical

right parties has been credited with the erosion of democracy and political discourse. Radical right-wing parties argue on emotional appeals driven by fear and an "us versus them" mentality. Nationalist leaders stoke fears of replacement and cultural change. Generally, populist radical right parties have two principal features: the combination of fear politics with welfare chauvinism.

Radical right populist parties have utilized the politics of fear to gain increased support and stoke nationalist fervor, generally focusing on two domains: First, the cultural or ethnic identity of a nation, and secondly, the economic burden of immigrants through welfare chauvinism. The cultural or ethnic identity represents a collective threat, while the economic dimension represents an individual one. Many radical right parties focus on Islamophobia to scapegoat vulnerable minority groups. Throughout Europe, the politics surrounding Charlie Hebdo cartoons have inflamed both anti-Islam sentiment and terrorist attacks. Le Pen has capitalized on the increase of Muslim immigrants, using campaign strategies that contrast feminism and LGBTQ rights with women wearing niqabs and "radical Islam," promising in a campaign speech to deport "hundreds of thousands of illegals."⁷ In 2007, the DF stated that "Denmark belongs to the Danes", claiming that "a multiethnic Denmark would mean the breaking down of our stable homog-

enous society."⁸ The message is clear; the barbarians are at the gate and to let them in would invite a complete breakdown of society.

Populist radical right parties tie the economic burden of immigrants directly to individual effects. Ironically, immigrants are both hardworking in their attempts to undercut native workers and slothful in their acceptance of the welfare supposedly lavished upon them. The myth of the "Polish plumber"—a stereotype of cheap immigrant labor—is near-ubiquitous in European countries among the radical right, representing the threat of immigration taking away lower-class jobs. The policy of welfare chauvinism is also directly tied to anti-immigrant sentiments. One supporter of the FPÖ said in an interview for the Brookings Institute, "we have so many poor people here in Austria... but the refugees, we are showering with money."⁹ Thus, populist radical right parties stoke outrage with a narrative that pits greedy, spoiled immigrants against hardworking natives who have already paid their way into the system.

As populist radical right parties turn to welfare chauvinism, they gain popular support among blue-collar workers who previously relied on leftist economic policy. Following the 2008 financial crisis, Le Pen shifted the economic policy of her party left by adopting welfare chauvinism after the uncertainty of the 2008 financial crisis. What fol-

lowed was what Ivaldi characterized as a combination of “exclusionism, authoritarianism, and statist redistributive economic policies.”¹⁰ The FPÖ has created a policy of strict welfare chauvinism. Ennser-Jedenastik writes that nativism “has thus become a (if not the) central feature of the party’s social policy platform.”¹¹ In Denmark, proponents of welfare chauvinism have linked welfare entitlement to “cultural and religious criteria.”¹² Across Europe, populist radical right parties are adopting similar policies. Welfare chauvinism serves as an incentive to tempt blue-collar workers away from left-wing parties: the carrot to the nationalist stick.

This effect can be clearly seen in Figure 1. On the x-axis, immigration policy is graphed, with parties favoring restrictive immigration policies as x increases. On the y-axis, redistribution policy is graphed with parties favoring a restrictive policy on redistribution. The FN/RN in France saw a marked decrease in their redistribution score, indicating that the party adopted more leftist economic policies. Note that the decrease in the redistribution policy score correlates with an increase in received vote share. Over the same period of time, the RN saw a marked increase in their anti-immigration policy. The FPÖ and the DF both saw more sporadic shifts, but in total from 2006-2019 the FPÖ’s immigration policy remained approximately 9.8 while their re-




Figure 1 : Immigration and Redistribution Policy By Year. For each party, immigration policy is graphed on the x-axis and redistribution policy is graphed on the y-axis. The size of the data points is scaled according to the vote share they received. Note that the French National Front (FN) was renamed the National Rally (RN) in 2018. For redistribution policy, a value of 10 indicates that the party strongly opposes redistribution and a value of 0 indicates they are strongly in favor of redistribution. For immigration policy, a value of 10 indicates they strongly favor a liberal policy on immigration while a value of 0 indicates they strongly favor a restrictive policy on immigration. Data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey.²⁰

distribution policy increased. From 2006 to 2019, in total the DF saw a decrease in their immigration policy and an increase in their redistribution policy, but both movements were very incremental. This is likely because both the DF and the FPÖ were more established as right wing populist parties than the RN in 2005.

It is important to note that although Islamophobia is the cornerstone of many right-wing populist platforms, it has not merely been substituted in for anti-Semitism. Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia are not interchangeable and often occur concurrently. As Ruth Wodak, a linguist who studies the language used in conflict and discourse, writes, this comparison is problematic both

because it ignores the different narratives in anti-Semitism and Islamophobia and because it presupposes that anti-Semitism was defeated after World War II.¹³ Anti-Semitic scandals still pervade the RN, and research shows that supporters of the RN are nearly twice as likely as the general population to hold anti-Semitic attitudes. A shocking 36% of RN sympathizers believe in a racial hierarchy.¹⁴ However, populist radical right-wing parties have recognized the need for normalization and have shifted their rhetoric.

Why Are Radical Right Parties So Successful?

The rise of anti-immigrant sentiment and the salience of immigration issues is of the leading causes in the resurgence of radical right

parties. Rydgren states that “anti-immigration sentiments are the single most important reason why voters support the radical right.”¹⁵ Although generally discrimination and racism are frowned upon in modern society, studies show that these norms are only successful in reducing discrimination when the perceived threat of immigration is low. These threats can be either individual (representing threats to individual outcomes and interests) or collective (representing threats to a society, nationality, or ethnic group).¹⁶ Radical right-wing parties utilize inflammatory rhetoric to increase perceived threats. When people believe that the distribution of resources is a zero-sum game, they are more likely to hold anti-immigration attitudes.¹⁷ Radical right-wing parties turn everything into a zero-sum game with their “us versus them” rhetoric. If we let the immigrants have our welfare, then there will be less welfare for us. If we let the immigrants have our welfare, then there will be less welfare for the native French/Austrians/Danes. If we let the immigrants come in with their strange culture and religion, then we risk losing ours altogether.

Through this narrative, the radical right is particularly effective in targeting working-class voters. Welfare chauvinism is effective because it targets groups that previously depended on left-wing

economic policies. Supporters of a welfare chauvinist state are often “young blue-collar, low income, and less educated voters.”¹⁸ However, the shift to welfare chauvinism may actively increase anti-immigrant sentiment in addition to reducing the leftist vote. In researching the impact of the welfare state on populist radical right voting preferences, Ennser-Jedenastik and Köppl-Turyana found that while a strong welfare state might decrease economic insecurity, it also increases immigration salience and sways moderates towards populist radical right parties.¹⁹

Given the populist politics of far-right-wing parties, it is unsurprising that lower-class, less educated voters are overrepresented in the vote share for right-wing parties. Often, lack of proper education is blamed for lower-class support of right-wing political parties. However, we would be remiss to chalk up lower-class right-wing political behavior to a simple lack of education; such a philosophy is reductive. Because immigrants often have—or are perceived to have—low-status jobs, lower class people are more likely to realize the influx of immigrants in their employment sector. After all, the European symbol for the job-snatching immigrant is the “Polish plumber” and not the “Polish lawyer” or the “Polish professor”. Thus, working class voters are more

likely to have a higher perceived threat of immigrants. Similarly, working-class people are more likely to depend on a welfare state and feel the risks of losing government assistance more keenly.

If different forms of populism are delineated by how they define which “people” to protect, then radical right populist parties are characterized not by their definition of a select group of people, but by their lack of one. Populist radical right parties have the ability to keep the base they appeal to malleable. Ader in Hungary might be able to gain support by spouting anti-LGBTQ and anti-Semitic arguments, but le Pen in France recognized the need to reform the anti-Semitic reputation of the RN to gain normalcy. At the same time, as populist radical right parties reject Islam, they can claim to support women and LGBTQ people, thus building a broader coalition. Across Europe, populist radical right parties have recognized the need to shift their economic policies left to gain support from blue-collar workers. The benefit of the populist radical right is clear; they are able to include just enough of the electorate to sway a majority while at the same time designating scapegoats to encourage fear.

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*(Above) Sun setting over Nazareth, Israel: July 13th 7:27 pm. I took this image from my hotel room in Nazareth while on a short trip studying the geopolitical situation in the region.
Photo by Scottie Nicholson, Fourth-Year Interdisciplinary Studies in Cultural Studies Major and Minor in Studio Art*

*(Left) London's classic red phone booths are no longer in use but still serve as an iconic symbol of the city.
Photo by Hannah Elkins, Fourth-Year English and Comparative Literature and Peace, War, and Defense Double Major*

Democracy Behind Bars: Guatemalan Prisons

By Mackenzie Roche

As the world tries its best to survive the COVID-19 pandemic, high-risk communities are at the forefront of discussion. While many communities most at-risk, such as the elderly, are met with sympathy and concern, one certain at-risk group of people is dismissed because of their social status: prisoners. Although they live in communal spaces that are often crowded, and lack access to personal protective gear, which is necessary to avoid spreading the virus, carceral-centered societies have little concern for the health of prisoners specifically. During the pandemic, instead of caring about the personal health of the prisoners, many governments have treated prisons as a threat to general public health. This apathy and depersonalization extends to almost every issue incarcerated people face, and the easiest place to determine where democracy begins to crumble is to consider how a government treats its most vulnerable populations. This evidence of a devolving representative government is seen notably in Guatemala. The prison system in Guatemala is a hindrance to the country's democracy, which can be

addressed through prison complex reforms, judicial reforms, and social reforms.

In order to fully address the state of Guatemala's prisons, it is important to first look at what fuels public support for prisons. Guatemala has one of the highest rates of violence and crime in Central America. Although crime statistics are trending slightly downward, Guatemala still documented 3,578 homicides in 2019. The United States government reported that "Guatemala's alarmingly high murder rate appears driven by narco-trafficking activity, gang-related violence, a heavily armed population, and a police/judicial system unable to hold criminals accountable."¹ While this seems to explain Guatemala's high crime rates, it ignores the history of the United States' involvement in the Guatemalan Civil War. The effects of this 36-year long conflict are still felt throughout the Central American nation; the length of violence has had a long-lasting destabilizing influence on the nation which contributed to the current crime rates, and human rights abuses have gone unpunished. Marginalized communities are especially at

risk of an increase in crime. Indigenous communities still face some of the worst violence. Guatemala is also extremely dangerous for women, with Deutsche Welle reporting that "there have been 161 femicides and more than 20,000 complaints of violence against women, including almost 3,000 rapes" in May 2021 alone.² Along with civilian crime, Guatemala has consistently struggled with issues of corruption, which is rarely punished. Crime itself has far-reaching impacts on democracy with prisons seen as a solution, one that rarely fully works. Guatemalan prisons are overcrowded, despite the fact that most murders remain unsolved, and law enforcement rarely prosecutes sexual and domestic violence. Violence continues to plague Guatemala, and instead of offering some relief, prisons simply continue to perpetuate it.

FAs of February 2021, the prison population of Guatemala was 25,298, amounting to about 139 inmates per 100,000 citizens. While on a global scale this is not particularly disproportionate, it is a strain on the country's infrastructure. As of October of 2019, the official capacity for the 21 prisons in Guatemala is

approximately 6,800 inmates, which means the prison system is currently 372% over capacity, an exponential jump from 140% capacity in 2018.³ This overcrowding threatens the personal safety of incarcerated people. As of 2016, an inmate was twelve times more likely to die in prison than a resident of the nation's capital, Guatemala City. Part of this can be attributed to a self-governing approach which has spread in the understaffed and under-resourced prisons. Often, gangs will take over prisons and act as the de facto authority, illegally controlling access to visitations and legal counsel. Not only do these gangs inflict violence, many prison guards are easily bought off and corrupted, and also will enact violence on prisoners.

Healthcare is also a major problem. Prison Insider finds that while "each prison has an infirmary," "some are administered by a qualified medical person, and others by an inmate with medical experience. In the prisons most affected by overpopulation, inmates occupy the spaces designated for patients" (Guatemala Profile). This has only been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. Pitts and Inkpen found that "within its [Guatemala's] 21 prisons with roughly 15 outpatient physicians serving just over 26,000 persons in custody."⁴ Fifteen physicians cannot reasonably be expected to manage public health for 26,000 inmates normally, much less in a pandemic. COVID-19 threatened

not only prisoners's physical health, but also their mental and emotional health. In order to limit spreading between incarcerated and non-incarcerated populations, "on March 15, only 2 days after Guatemala confirmed its first positive case, the President suspended all family face-to-face visits with prisoners ... A day later, all visits from court authorities to prison were also suspended."⁵ Lack of access to court authorities is especially concerning for the 12,496 incarcerated people who have yet to see trial and be judged, which makes up 49.6% of the incarcerated population.⁶

All of these issues are compounded for women within the prison system. Making up 9.6% of the prison population, there are only two facilities for only women and 13 mixed population prisons. In one prison, 82 women have to share only one toilet. Women face invasive and often abusive body searches, and the conditions these women live under are also perpetuated to their young children. Prison Insider reports that "children can stay with their mother until age four. In July 2016, 86 children (43 girls and 43 boys) were residing in Guatemalan prisons" and there are no budgeted funds to care for or feed these children.⁷ For minors in prison because of their own doings, they are deprived of education and spend "an average of 23 hours a day locked in their cells."⁸ At every turn, the quality of life for incarcerated people is disregarded

and thrown to the wayside and the threat of violence is pervasive. The Guatemalan justice system does not serve victims, as many assailants never face charges, and it does not rehabilitate those who are incarcerated; it simply serves to perpetuate cycles of violence. These cycles include tangible acts of violence as well as systemic violence that erodes Guatemalan democracy.

One of the clearest infringements to democracy that imprisoned people face is disenfranchisement while incarcerated. Brandon Rottinghaus summarizes possible arguments for the disenfranchisement of voters, stating how "the disposition of laws excluding prisoners from voting grew out of the exclusion of those individuals thought to be 'immoral' or threatening to the democratic order of society" but often those deemed to be immoral were poor or members of lower social classes.⁹ Rottinghaus further explains that "prisons are built to rehabilitate citizens, and removal of civil rights during or after prison terms does not further that goal."¹⁰ The isolation and disenfranchisement inmates face means they have no say in how they are treated or represented in government. When a group is unable to democratically participate, the conditions they live under rarely improve within the confines of a system. Prisoners have to rely on advocates on the outside to be heard in the voting booth, which is hardly a proper democracy. Disen-

franchisement of prisons also typically pretends that the prison system is fully removed and separate from civil society, which notably in Guatemala is not the case. Research by Anthony Fontes and Kevin O'Neill found that there is distinct codependency between prisoners and non-prisoners. They concluded that "these interdependencies come into stark relief with a focus on the labour that female visitors provide for incarcerated men... but also an overcrowded and underfunded prison system."¹¹ Female visitors often are smugglers for contraband into the prison, as they bring in items such as cell phones or drugs and rely on these illicit commodities to survive financially. Outside of this source of income, female visitors are instrumental in propping up the failing prison system by providing care and support for incarcerated people and supplementing the lackluster prison healthcare system. The children who live in prisons rely on church groups and local non-government organizations, primarily run by women, for basic necessities such as food and clothes. Not only is life inside and outside of prison inextricably linked, life outside the prison walls economically relies on the prison system falling into disrepair. There is no access for vocalizing reform from inside the prison, and the prison has no external incentive to reform or improve the conditions of incarcerated people. Almost half of the incarcerated people also have

not been convicted of a crime; they simply lost their right to vote while possibly being innocent. The combination of bleak conditions, societal entanglement, and disenfranchisement create the society of Guatemala which is tied to crumbling democratic ideals.

While there are few domestic incentives to reform the prison system, international pressure has incited some government action. Guatemala has adopted the Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and created a domestic task force called the National Office for the Prevention of Torture (OPCAT) to specifically address gang-related torture and violence seen in prisons. Although it has been in place for over a decade, the adoption of the mechanism was superficial, and there have been few substantive changes in line with the United Nations (UN) protocols regulating OPCAT. At the start of 2020, Guatemala announced the New Prison Management Model (NMGP), an initiative intending to curb prison overpopulation. This new reform "includes the construction of a maximum security prison, the creation of 'rehabilitation farms' and the implementation of the electronic shackle in order to reduce overcrowding."¹² Rather than addressing systemic problems at hand, this plan aims to expand the prison system, playing catch up with overpopulation rather than addressing the causes of the exponential growth.

The electronic shackle, also known as ankle monitors, seems like a step in the right direction, but many prison advocates in the United States see electronic shackles as just expanding the prison system to the home. Due to its relative newness, it is hard to make any claim about the success of the NMGP legislation, but there are other solutions Guatemala could look towards. These solutions fall into three main categories: reforms to the prison complex itself and its infrastructure, reforms to the judicial system, and social reforms to address crime and violence at its root.

Looking at possible reforms to the prison complex and infrastructure, it is important to not give too much power to the carceral state. The top priority should be the safety and genuine rehabilitation of incarcerated people. Two main prongs of reforms are addressing corruption within prison officials, specifically prison guards and prison finance reform. Guatemalan prisons are run by two parallel organizations: the General Direction of the Penitentiary System (DGSP) and the Civil National Police (PNC). This dual structure is a direct result of overcrowding as the PNC primarily runs police stations that hold inmates. International organizations have monitored Guatemala, and in its 2016 report, "the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) pointed out that State officials are responsible for the acts of corruption

and violence. For example, some of them accept bribes from the inmates who want to bring in weapons and drugs.¹³ Guatemala has attempted to cut down on this corruption by branding it as extortion by prisoners for illicit goods. While this provides a systemic answer and a way to make public progress, it does not address the fact that prison guards are underpaid and stretched thin. In one correctional facility, the ratio of prisoners to guards at any time is 61 to 1 if no prisoners have to leave the facility for appointments or court.¹⁴ Guards need further training and more coworkers in order to maintain the safety of themselves and the incarcerated populations. There also needs to be more female guards for women-only prisons, as sexual assault and harassment are commonly perpetrated by male guards against female inmates. It is vital that the danger of the job is recognized by the central authorities, and that the guards receive adequate pay so they do not turn to bribes from prisoners.

This increased pay should be a part of the financial reforms of Guatemalan prisons. With the recent election of President Alejandro Giammattei, a former director of the prison system, there has been a recent push to increase prison funding. While the increased funds could be helpful, they have been historically severely misallocated or not used at all. The UN Commission for Human Rights found that

“the authorities of the penitentiary system did not execute the budget allocation of 300,700,000 Quetzals that in 2013 as well as 2014, specifically for construction, equipment, & application of detention centers, in both years the execution of this proposition was 0%.”¹⁵ Not only should funding be increased, but an audit system also needs to be put in place to ensure proper use of these funds. As the infrastructure of the prison complex gets addressed, the failures of the judicial system still need to be reformed.

The judicial system is still marked by the impunity granted to human rights violators during the Guatemalan Civil War, but there is a mounting positive trajectory towards a better system. Wendy Johara Maldonado Urbina calls this positive momentum the Justice Spring of Guatemala, which started “in 2009, a phase was initiated which marked a before and after in the history of the judicial system in Guatemala. The appointment of the judges of the Supreme Court of Justice who served for a five-year term from 2009 to 2014 was fundamental for this change.”¹⁶ This movement towards a truly impartial justice system was assisted by the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), a partnership between the United Nations and Guatemala which has been instrumental in addressing corruption in the nation. While impartiality and reducing impunity are important

for addressing violence, the judicial system’s capacity to take cases to trial needs to be expanded to reduce the percent of pre-trial detainees. Around 50% of prisoners are only in prison because they are awaiting their trial date. Speeding up the process will not only reduce overcrowding but will also assist in avoiding unnecessary disenfranchisement. Judicial expansion includes hiring more public defenders, prosecutors, and judges as the Washington Office on Latin America found that the Public Prosecutor’s Office only had “offices in 20 percent of the country’s municipalities and the ratio of prosecutors to citizens is low. On average, there were 6 judges for every 100,000 people in the country, well below the national global average of 17. The ratio of public defenders was equally low.”¹⁷ The judicial system is overloaded, which leaves citizens without proper access to sufficient representation.

Another way to address the large pre-trial population is to implement bail alternatives. Bail systems disproportionately keep poor people incarcerated and criminalize poverty, a systemic failure rarely a personal failure. Cash bail is a common practice in many judicial systems but it has increasingly been criticized. Guatemala’s suggested use of electronic shackles could be used as a bail alternative but this still invalidates the presumption of innocence all pre-trial citizens are guaranteed and is rather expensive for the state.

As some states in the United States start to address the harms of cash bail, there have been tangible examples and results that can be pointed to. Muhammad Sadar addresses the shortcomings of these experiments and suggests that they could go “one step further by releasing misdemeanor defendants on personal recognizance... The efforts of community bail funds across America have shown that a vast majority of defendants will return to court if adequately notified, exemplifying that pretrial restrictions are unnecessary punitive measures.”¹⁸ Not only would this reduce overcrowding, it would also free up the funds it requires to house the pre-trial detainees, allowing for a better allocation of the prison budget. Moves to eliminate or reduce cash bail would also lighten the load on prison guards, a necessary change as mentioned in the previous paragraph.

Prison reform and judicial reform are solutions that address the

consequences but not the central problem at hand: what puts people in prison. Addressing the root of crime will give the community the necessary support so they no longer have to rely on illegitimate means of survival. Much of the crime committed in Guatemala is tied to gangs and drug trafficking, a necessary source of income for many impoverished citizens. While there are a myriad of suggestions on how to address this, a key one is economic development. Reducing unemployment is one way to give citizens legitimate options and contributes to economic development. Expanding infrastructure and living situations all promote shifts to the formal sector, and these projects also create government-funded jobs within the communities that need them the most. Expanding women’s rights and family programs also reduce crime. When women are allowed to plan their family, it is easier to make sure each child has proper resources

and support. Children mimic what they see, so if family programs are expanded within at-risk communities, children can get raised in environments sheltered from violence and hopefully start to end the cycle.

Prisoners are one of the least sympathized- with populations in a country. Many see them as undisputedly guilty and a danger to society, their time in prison often marking a person’s life for good. This specific population should not be ignored for the indifference they elicit, but instead should be seen as the canary in the coal mine of a failing democracy. Indifference leads to cut corners and poor treatment, and the clearest way to see how a government feels about its citizens is to see how it treats those with few advocates. As democracy crumbles inside prison walls, it loses stability on the outside, and that should never be a point of indifference.

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The Aqueduct of Segovia is one of the most recognized and best-preserved Roman aqueducts. It stretches nearly half a mile and still carries water to this day.

Photo by Brooke Chow, Second-Year Public Policy and Business Major and Minor in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics



(Above) This was taken during my Denali expedition in 2017 by my father, when we have successfully climbed the highest peak of the U.S and North America.

Photo by Dmitry Tertychnyy, Fourth-Year Economics and Mathematics Double Major and Minor in Geography

(Right) Photo by Isabelle Kaufman, Fourth-Year History Major and Spanish Minor



PROGRESA: Progressive Policy Championing Women and Children in Mexico

By Alexis Zucker

What started off as a secret project to alleviate poverty and inequality in the 1990s grew into one of the most successful and widely acclaimed policy programs globally. The Mexican program Programa de Educación, Salud, y Alimentación (PROGRESA) made monumental progress by taking a multifaceted approach to capitalize on the unrealized human capital in the poorest and most marginalized rural areas. While I evaluate the program in limited scope, focusing on education, I conclude from the myriad of academic literature and research that this multifaceted and targeted program is incredibly effective as a whole.

In this essay, I will lay out the issues PROGRESA aimed to address, present a brief history of the program, and provide evidence of the effectiveness of PROGRESA using an approach as multidimensional as the program itself. This will include education, a positive gender bias, and contributing variables to help families escape the poverty trap

while raising future earning power to improve the Mexican economy. I will also address the alternatives, limitations, and suggestions of future improvements to the program and related research.

Following the 1994 Mexican economic crisis, Mexico and its “two-tier economy,” as Presidente Ernesto Zedillo put it, was in disarray.¹ The peso had crashed, public spending dropped, and poverty levels rose from 13.54% to 19.13% between 1994 and 1998.² The poor and the marginalized were again hit hardest, while the other tier managed to stay afloat, widening income distribution inequality.³ The worsening poverty incentivized Presidente Zedillo to advocate for a long-term solution and tackle the roots of poverty and inequality in Mexico.

Education is internationally regarded as being essential to breaking generational cycles of poverty, dependence, gender violence, and discrimination. The Mexican government (1998) was apt to recognize its contribution to promoting development and combat poverty and

inequality. A more educated population means a more skilled and productive labor force, higher-paying and better quality jobs, which invites more foreign investment (an essential component of development for countries like Mexico) that leads to stability and macroeconomic prosperity. Building on this argument, the Mexican government looked to develop this prosperity by helping the poorest. Their findings indicated that the conditions of poverty were significant inhibitors to students attending school, and as poverty worsened, so did the educational desertion and rejection rates among students.⁴

In Mexico, the poor and the marginalized are a large sector of the population, especially in rural regions.⁵ The 2008 Human Development Report indicated such groups are more likely to be “poor, malnourished, and deprived”—all contributing factors to poverty.⁶ Poverty’s problems are exacerbated for women and girls who are distinctly endangered to the poverty trap and abuse in patriarchal societies. This

is most often evidenced by daughters being taken out of school early, leaving them with little knowledge and skills, thus trapping them in a cycle of economic dependence. As parents may view young girls as a burden to the family, they are often married off with the expectation to reproduce in a manner that does not consider how detrimental it can be to their health and the survival of their babies.⁷ In addition to early pregnancy as a health hazard for these women, various types of literature support the conclusion that such economic dependence is also a significant contributing factor to intimate partner violence.⁸ Clearly, educating and investing in girls and women is particularly important and simultaneously difficult.

Other notable challenges keeping students from reaping educational benefits in Mexico include limited and poorly spent resources, population growth, and linguistic diversity. Before PROGRESA, Mexico's education spending as a percentage of GDP was particularly low. In 1995-97, educational spending was only 2-3% of GDP, making it far below the regional average.⁹ Thus, resources devoted to education were limited and used inefficiently. While paying educators fair wages is important, the majority of Mexico's spending in primary and secondary schools goes to teacher salaries at the expense of teaching materials.¹⁰ These capital expenditures are crucial to the quality of teaching and

the motivation of teachers.¹¹ Technological tools are also critical for teaching students valuable skills to be applied in jobs, especially in regions where students may have limited resources in the home.¹² Another difficulty was the rapid growth of the secondary school-aged population.¹³ The issue is simple: without adapting to this increase, teachers and materials may become overextended trying to serve the kids. Finally, the variety of languages spoken in Mexico (62, to be exact, each with its own variations) poses an issue of communication in schools. It also creates another barrier for the 9% of the population that is indigenous, a large sector of which overlap with the poorest and most marginalized people in Mexico (a recurrent trend in Latin America).¹⁴

All of these factors pile onto each other, suffocating the poorest and most marginalized people. In the middle-income country of Mexico, factors such as malnutrition, lack of healthcare, and economic exclusion from schools (including cultural exclusion for girls) add up to a poverty trap for nearly 5 million Mexicans.¹⁵ Unfortunately, in many cases, the cause of the poverty problem is poverty itself.

Dealing with the many factors that contribute to poverty to break this chain requires a multifaceted approach, which is exactly what El PROGRESA aimed to do. The recommended paths of poverty alleviation according to the 2000s OECD

report were investment in human capital, creation of employment opportunities, and development of infrastructure. PROGRESA was designed to tackle and increase the demand for services that may improve human capital, including education, nutrition, and health-care. In the meanwhile, other programs were established to improve the "supply" side, providing quality schools, medical centers, and public services.¹⁶

The conditionality and targeting processes were rooted in the desire to help the most marginalized groups, who were historically unable to benefit from Mexico's public spending programs due to geographic isolation or extreme poverty.¹⁷ For many in this group, the poverty trap is inescapable and is transmitted across generations.¹⁸ Thus, PROGRESA's targeted governmental help in the form of educational grants, subsidized health-care, and nutritional supplements, all grounded in conditional cash transfers, aimed to provide an escape. There were additional schemes aimed at promoting gender equality, an acknowledgement of the rampant sexism in these areas.¹⁹

The targeting process was based on familial surveys in eligible communities and cross-referenced with an index of marginality.²⁰ The survey, known as ENCASEH (Survey of Socioeconomic Characteristics of the Households) calculates the family's opportunity cost of sending

their children to school with the understanding that this cost increases with age and by gender.²¹ While the survey's original aim was to limit the transfer of poverty by these means, this socioeconomic targeting of current familial poverty establishes inequality as a principal goal.²²

The main components of PROGRESA (education, healthcare, and nutrition) are incentivized for beneficiaries by conditionalities for the cash transfer. Education policies revolve around grants for families who send their children to primary and secondary schools. The grants increase in quantity for each additional year of schooling achieved, and female students are paid 15% more than male students to address the higher female dropout rate in Mexico.²³ These grants, ranging from \$10 to \$35 U.S. dollars a month, utilize the price effect because they decrease the opportunity cost of keeping a child, especially a girl, in school.²⁴ Similar opportunity cost calculations are made for child labor benefits, resulting in grants for secondary students enrolled in PROGRESA that comprise approximately two-thirds of the money they might receive for full-time employment.²⁵ PROGRESA's educational goals revolve around getting students enrolled in school, and keeping them in school as long as possible. To receive the grants, students must attend at least 85% of school days. To account for the high percentage of students failing

the exams needed to advance to the next level, program rules dictate students may repeat a grade, but no more than once.²⁶ The conditional educational component is arguably the most important aspect of the program, providing families with an incentive to send their children to school (especially their girls) and break the cycle of generational poverty and inequality.

The positive gender bias PROGRESA applied in raising girls' educational grants is also apparent in the novel practice of delegating monetary responsibilities from the CCT to PROGRESA mothers. The goal was to maximize the impact on the wellbeing of the child, which was later proven successful in a study by Latapí and González de la Rocha.²⁷ Building this bias into all components of the program (education, monetary control, healthcare, nutrition, and monthly education seminars) gave women the support of "powerful actors" like the state and high ranking community members to tackle gender inequality.²⁸

This ingenious and pro-female program was created by three men, Dr. Ernesto Zedillo (president of Mexico 1994-2000), Dr. Santiago Levy, and Dr. José Gómez de León. Levy first came up with the idea of a Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) program, and though initial reactions from the Mexican cabinet were doubtful, in 1996 he ran the secret pilot program anyway. Levy's program, "Basic Food Basket

Program for the Wellbeing of the Family," provided healthcare-related conditional grants to 31,000 households in a poor rural town named Campeche.²⁹ The initial results came out in favor of the female-dominated conditional programs and cash transfers, proving it more efficient and effective than previous subsidies.³⁰ As such, the evaluations pointed towards expanding an improved version of the pilot to include education, a process that would unfold over a decade.³¹ The program was rapidly scaled up from 30,000 to 300,000 beneficiaries at the launch, and by 2000, PROGRESA had reached 2.5 million families.³² In unprecedented fashion, when Vicente Fox of the PAN was elected, he chose to not only keep, but also expand PROGRESA. PROGRESA came to include 2 million more families in urban areas, with only slight adjustments to the base components of the program.³³ By 2006, PROGRESA/Oportunidades (renamed for political reasons) was covering 20% of Mexicans living in extreme poverty.³⁴

PROGRESA/Oportunidades was upscaled to this extent due to the broad consensus that it worked. Painting with a broad brush, there is evidence of successful targeting, progress in poverty reduction, and effective usage of money via positive gender bias.³⁵ Honing into the targeting goals, there is also ample evidence of success in regards to education, health, and nutrition. Even

the secondary components proved successful, as the program improved the situation of women dealing with domestic abuse, and the anti-corruption safeguards held strong.³⁶ However, as this paper focuses predominantly on lack of education as a policy issue, the greatest emphasis will be placed on this topic.

PROGRESA's impacts on education were simply astounding. The UN (2) (2011) noted a 7.5% increase in secondary school enrollment for boys and an 11% increase for girls (p. 1). The increase in enrollment for primary students was not as significant, as primary education was a universal goal and was nearly being met at the time.³⁷ In addition to these significant increases for beneficiaries, a 2009 study by Bobnis and Finan also discovered a roughly 5.6% increase in enrollment of children who were ineligible for the program through what they called a "peer effect."³⁸ Bonis and Finan explain the social interaction between children eligible and ineligible for PROGRESA doubled the effects of the educational grants for secondary school-aged students, generating an unexpected positive externality.³⁹ Along with these increases in enrollment and attendance, performance in school also appears to be positively impacted on a variety of fronts. PROGRESA reduced repetition of grades and dropout rates, decreased missed days of schooling due to health and nutrition conditionalities, and overall, moved

students further along in the educational process.⁴⁰ Undoubtedly, the studies of PROGRESA provide compelling evidence for the success of the program's potential educational impact.

It is safe to say the majority of these positive findings can be attributed to PROGRESA. As the program was created to address an "unfixable" problem, there are few factors that could have otherwise effectively and simultaneously addressed the marginalization, extreme poverty, sexism, cultural oppression, malnutrition, and high opportunity cost of education in these rural areas. That said, there are two smaller factors assisting the improvement of these problems: the developing voice of the poor and the government's supply-side contributions.

A notable trend of poor countries is their tendency to center aid on the middle-class. Yet, with the dual development of globalization leaving behind sectors of the population (making them increasingly frustrated and politically vocal) and creative policies with larger reaches (such as targeted CCTs to rural areas), politicians now have a stronger desire and improved ability to help the poorest escape the poverty trap.⁴¹ PROGRESA was created to address these concerns. However, PROGRESA only addresses the "demand" side issue of increasing access to education (and a whole host of other services). Therefore, Mex-

ico's contributions to the "supply" side of the issue—developing a variety of basic social services of acceptable quality—greatly contributed to the improvement of this problem as well.⁴²

The unique construction of PROGRESA introduces poverty targeting, addresses the multidimensional inhibitors to education, and capitalizes on positive gender bias. Alternative poverty programs have been tried before, but they were not as transparent, rule-oriented, or responsibly allocated, thus stimulating corruption and misuse of funds.⁴³ As previously noted, Mexican educational spending was below average. Thus, for the creative design, responsible implementation, and newfound emphasis on education, PROGRESA has been the best program to date for promoting education and alleviating poverty with a positive gender emphasis. Even compared to recent alternative education policies, PROGRESA and its education subsidies remain the most cost-effective way to increase enrollment, though more could be done. PROGRESA is notably better at achieving a higher mean of completed schooling at a lower annual cost per family than building more schools, creating a bonus for completing 9th grade, or adding a 5,000 annual peso income transfer.⁴⁴ However, the combination of enforcing schooling laws (for example, like compulsory attendance would be the most beneficial for increasing

completed schooling) and a modified subsidy (which redistributes grants from primary towards secondary education) may be useful improvements to the program.⁴⁵

The cost-effectiveness of PROGRESA is a byproduct of its conception during a severe economic recession. Compared to dominant price subsidy schemes at the time, PROGRESA was not only more effective but also less costly, rising from 0.000079% to only 0.005127% of GDP between 1997 to 2010 as it expanded from 300,000 to 5 million families.⁴⁶ Additionally, because of the vast benefit exhibited by PROGRESA research findings, foreign entities like the Inter-American Development Bank offered Mexico billion-dollar renewable loans to continue the program in the early 2000s.⁴⁷

Despite the accomplishments of the program, it is important to acknowledge its limitations. Julio Boltvinik is a Mexican academic, economist, social scientist, and politician, whose 2005 essay “Políticas focalizadas de combate a la pobreza en México, El PROGRESA/Oportunidades,” details the greatest criticisms of the program. Though Boltvinik⁴⁸ also identified issues with targeting creating friction within communities, misuse in restructuring indigenous communities, and failure to reach migrant workers, his complaints regarding education are more pertinent to this essay. One of his primary points is the unnec-

essary educational grants to students in primary school, as primary schooling is nearly universal in Mexico regardless of family income. Additionally, the “supply” side of education lags behind demand, especially when implemented in urban areas.⁴⁹ The quality and quantity of schools were often deemed unacceptable, which complicated findings of school attendance concerning school achievement.⁵⁰ Finally, Boltvinik⁵¹ pointed to the fact that education does not ensure quality jobs and opportunities. The “supply” side must extend beyond education, and into well-paying jobs to foster the economic strength and independence needed for PROGRESA’s beneficiaries to break the cycle of poverty. Boltvinik⁵² points to the rising income poverty, where rising labor levels meet stagnating macroeconomic growth accompanied by greater levels of productivity. This has allowed firms to pay lower wages even to highly educated employees, thus nullifying the benefits of education subsidies as workers are placed in the same jobs they had when they were uneducated.⁵³ The UN⁵⁴ adds, “CCT programmes like Oportunidades can only fully reach their development objectives and eliminate intergenerational poverty if they are coupled with employment generation, asset (such as land) distribution initiatives, and added subsidies/benefits for the extreme poor,” thus emphasizing PROGRESA’s need to be coupled with wider

macroeconomic initiatives for the “supply” side in education and beyond (p. 12).

The “supply-side limitation” is of critical importance because it contributes to both the effectiveness and sustainability of the program. Levy, one of PROGRESA’s creators, admitted that “creating formal-sector jobs is Mexico’s central challenge ... without that ... it is as if Oportunidades were financing an improved labor force for the United States.”⁵⁵ Levy’s statement references Mexico’s dependency on the US for trade and development as well as the brain drain of educated Mexicans migrating to the US for work. It also addresses the necessity for Mexican jobs to retain the benefits that PROGRESA creates: a larger, stronger, and more educated citizenry. Otherwise, the US, with its alluring industries just across the border, will reap these benefits instead.

Other challenges for sustainability and equality include backfiring of the positive gender bias and defunding. Though only allocating money to the mothers has helped decrease domestic violence and improved the allocation of the cash transfer, it places an additional burden on these mothers who may already have full-time responsibilities.⁵⁶ That said, in the majority of cases, a study by Parker and Skoufias (2000) found the leisure time of both men and women in PROGRESA households is not significantly affected by the program.⁵⁷ On the other hand,

there is a disparity in reduced leisure time among boys and girls—female students notably have a smaller reduction in work than any increases in school enrollment, likely an effect of persisting gender roles.⁵⁸ Another structural caveat is that PROGRESA, a CCTP, is only sustainable as long as it remains financed. In recent years, the Mexican government has distanced itself from this program. The 2019 Mexican budget, while expanded for social programs, notably cut PROGRESA's funding by 14%.⁵⁹ It appears that Mexico is falling back into its inefficient poverty alleviation patterns by diffusing aid to its people across multiple programs run by disjointed agencies, a mistake that will hit the poor the hardest.⁶⁰

There is no doubt that PROGRESA is a good program. Its founding principles are poverty alleviation and equality, and it works to-

wards these goals with an effective, multifaceted approach. PROGRESA helps the poorest and the most marginalized by getting aid and education to those who have been previously left behind. It tackles an array of issues successfully, including poverty, gender inequality, inadequate healthcare, and malnutrition, while promoting increased enrollment, attendance, and success in school with a positive externality via the “peer effect.” Additionally, this program has an impressive cost-benefit outcome, with Professors Behrman and Todd estimating “the educational benefits alone exceed the costs by 40 to 110 percent.”⁶¹ This uses estimates on higher earning potential, statistics which further increase when accounting for the benefits from subsidized health and nutrition.

Though PROGRESA is better than its alternatives, modifications to legislation and educational grants

could strengthen the program, as could further research into the wider array of issues Boltvinik addresses.⁶² This includes striving to make PROGRESA sustainable, necessitating further development of the “supply” side (improving schools, health clinics, and the Mexican labor market) to keep the program working. Lastly, Mexico's seeming trend of phasing out PROGRESA should be investigated and addressed. I believe we must investigate how to improve the program rather than get rid of it. However, if this is the choice, after asking “why?” we must ask “where will you go instead?” PROGRESA has proven a valuable, even essential, program for enhancing human capital and development in Mexico. Its large impacts in small communities have potential to greatly benefit the nation, and the program should not be forsaken.

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(Above) *The most protected and admired collection of ancient stones.*

Photo by Hannah Elkins, Fourth-Year English and Comparative Literature and Peace, War, and Defense Double Major



Highlands Scotland: I lived in a castle in Scotland when Covid first hit. I made a friend who insisted on driving all over the country. I snapped this picture while catapulting down the road in his caddy van just past Glen Coe in the highlands.

Photo by Scottie Nicholson, Fourth-Year Interdisciplinary Studies in Cultural Studies Major and Minor in Studio Art