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
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
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From the Editor

It would be dishonest of me to say that the publication of *The Internationalist* has been anything close to smooth sailing since its establishment in 2015. In the years since that first team of inspired undergraduates published the inaugural issue of this journal, *The Internationalist* has wobbled between leaders and directions. However, despite all the changes and obstacles this journal has faced, there has always been a team there, ready and willing to stay the course.

In the weeks leading up to publication, as myself and my team faced our own hurdles in balancing a publication with the daily workload of college, I was often led to ponder what it is about this journal that has continued to draw so many to its cause. Now that we're at the finish line, I feel confident enough to say that *The Internationalist* has endured, and will continue to endure, because the ideals behind its inception will always resonate with the student body.

The goal of this journal is to be a place where undergraduates and recent graduates hovering on the margins of academia can be published and treated with the respect that their exceptional work deserves. By making this journal entirely student-run, we have underscored the sincerity of this goal: to make academia more accessible and give hard-working students the chance to see their work in print. This ideal, and the passion with which *The Internationalist* staff have pursued it, sets this journal apart and reassures me that student-run journals have a future at this university.

As you read this journal, take a moment to peruse the biographies of our authors. You'll find a diverse group of brilliant writers, from a former paratrooper to a globe-trotting geography major, the group that we have assembled for this issue is truly remarkable and I could not be prouder to be publishing their work. I hope you enjoy the articles, and continue to support student work in all forms. Thank you.

Sincerely,

Jack O'Grady
Editor-in-Chief

Acknowledgements

The first acknowledgment has to go to the staff. We started with a small team and ended with a dedicated group who I feel are more than capable of expanding this journal and taking *The Internationalist* to even greater heights.

Additional thanks have to go out to our Executive and Managing Editors. Nothing could have happened without their tireless efforts. Our team was small, but what we achieved together is truly remarkable.

I would also like to thank our authors for submitting their amazing work and working with us every step of the way to put out the best journal possible. Their work tackled pressing and complex issues; together they have illuminated our past, analysed our present, and helped pave the way toward our future. I sincerely hope they all continue their work and would love to see their work in our pages again. Thanks go out as well to those who submitted and were not selected for publication. Narrowing down our choices was a tough process and I encourage anyone who submitted this year or is considering submitting in the future; we want to give everyone a chance to have their work considered and hopefully published.

I also must thank our parent organization: the Carolina International Relations Association (CIRA). Without CIRA's organizational and financial support, this journal would not be before you today. The work they do on campus is essential to a healthy and active discourse on international relations and we look forward to working with them in the future.

The final thanks must go, of course, to our readers. You are who we work so tirelessly for and we hope you enjoy reading this journal as much as we enjoyed making it happen.

Sincerely,

Jack O'Grady
Editor-in-Chief

An Analysis of the Legal Standing of Chinese Re-Education through Labor Camps:

A Case Study of the Present Targeting of Ethnic Uighurs and Muslims Within the Xinjiang Region

Victoria Friedlander

Victoria Friedlander is a senior Peace, War, and Defense and Philosophy double major with a minor in Religious Studies from Miami, FL. She is deeply passionate about exposing Islamophobic practices and contributing to the dialogue surrounding the real world implications of this type of discrimination. She has taken multiple courses on the rule of law as well as international relations and was fortunate to have the opportunity to combine all her interests into one cohesive paper. This paper is written about a current event that has not been met with urgency or intention to aid by the international community. She hopes that by contributing to the conversation, she can raise awareness for the ongoing human rights violations within Xinjiang.

Overview

For over a year the Chinese government has vigorously denied allegations that administrators and police within the Xinjiang region were forcing the relocation of Chinese Muslims, a majority of which are ethnic Uighur peoples, to re-education camps. That being said, in recent months the government released a statement admitting to the use of re-education through labor (RETL) within the region, but attested that their actions are in the interest of national security. The statement expressed that the use of RETL has a long legal precedence within the state, and that the efforts to relocate people within the region are “vital to a crackdown on religious extremism.”¹ Due to the legal convention of using RETL camps as a mechanism to punish minor criminal offenses, as well as the new anti-Islamic legislation within the region, this targeted action against Muslims has the customary as well as legally authoritative effect of making Islamic practice criminalized within Xinjiang.

The concept of re-education through labor (RETL) has long been used in China to punish minor crimes. The practice was made convention during the Maoist period from 1966 through 1976², when law was no longer taught, nor applied in civil discourse. The end of the Maoist period saw a return to law in the form of “socialist legality,” which adopted an intentional stance on wide-ranging, complete, authoritative, and consistently applied laws³. That being said, this period of socialist legality also saw an

overabundance of new laws being passed at an almost overwhelming rate. Between 1979 and 2000, more than more than 250 laws were voted on, not including the Administrative, Civil, and Criminal Codes of Law⁴. Further, the National People's Congress and its Standing Committee adopted more than 100 decisions, as well as over 800 national and 6000 local administrative regulations⁵. Undeniably, China has become a state of laws, but as many scholars and politicians consider: does this necessarily imply the rule of law?

The protection of fundamental human rights is essential to a state's commitment to the rule of law as well as its commitment to international law norms. The vigorous application of laws seen in the post-Maoist period to some extent has created a structure under which citizens may operate. That being said, the way in which these laws have been instituted do not always comply with popular conceptions of the rule of law, and oftentimes violate the fundamental rights of Chinese citizens. If an individual's lawful actions now can be subject to punishment in the future should the law change, then this inherently undermines the value of operating within a rule of law framework. Further, the punishment the individual may be subjected to if they were to violate the law, in this case the legalized convention of RETL, not only subverts the free will and rights of the individual, violating the standards of the rule of law, but violates international law norms as well⁶. In turn, when looking at the RETL occurring in Xinjiang, the government's commitment is not so much to a rule of law but to a rule by laws, and these laws that are ruling do not demonstrate any commitment to international law standards or fundamental moral values insinuated through a popular conception of the rule of law.

Section I: Re-Education Through Labor

The Current Event

To understand and evaluate the greater legal and societal implications of the use of re-education camps in Xinjiang, the particulars and the historical background of the case study must first be explained.

Xinjiang is the largest region of China, but is officially designated as an autonomous region, similar in nature to Tibet. It hosts a population of nearly 19 million people, including an ethnically Turkic, religiously Muslim population known as the Uighurs. The Uighurs are a minority group within China, but make up around 45-50% of the population within Xinjiang⁷. Throughout time, there has been an increased migration of China's ethnic majority, Han Chinese, to the region. This mass migration has led to ethnic tensions within Xinjiang.

The BBC reported that "many Uighurs complain of discrimination and marginalization by the Chinese authorities and Anti-Han and separatist sentiment has become more prevalent since the 1990s, flaring into violence on occasion."⁸ In the post-9/11 era, China has increasingly portrayed its Uighur separatists as auxiliaries of al-Qaeda, saying they have received training in Afghanistan although little evidence has been produced

in support of these claims⁹. In July 2009, violent clashes between Uighurs and Han Chinese in the region's main city, Urumqi, prompted the Chinese government to send large numbers of troops to patrol the streets¹⁰. Nearly 200 people were killed in the unrest, most of them Han¹¹. The BBC reported that, in 2013, there was a sudden upsurge in violence when the authorities accused separatist "terrorists" of attacks in the city of Kashgar that left 21 dead¹². China has said the East Turkestan Islamic Movement and Uighur terrorists were behind the attacks, but exiled Uighurs and independent specialists on the area have cast doubt on whether such an organisation exists¹³. There was further violence in the summer and in 2014, and exiled Uighur groups accused China of exaggerating the threat in order to justify repression¹⁴. In August 2018, a United Nations human rights panel cited "credible reports" that one million or more Uighurs were being held in what resembles "a massive internment camp that is shrouded in secrecy" in Xinjiang¹⁵. At the time of this report, Chinese officials publicly denied the U.N.'s allegations as unfounded, but a few months later the chairman of the region, Shohrat Zakir, partook in an interview with the government's

news agency, Xinhua News, and publicly acknowledged the existence of these camps.

During the interview, he articulated an image of the camps as “generously equipped vocational schools” where those guilty of minor offences are taught “work skills and legal knowledge” in a government effort to crackdown on religious extremism and terrorism within the region¹⁶.

The individuals being forced to relocate to these camps are majority Muslim, and the qualifications for being sent do not seem to coincide with extremism. New laws have been instituted within the region expressing what types of behavior could lead to detention. Examples of these behaviors include expanding the concept of halal to areas of life outside of diet, refusing to watch state TV and listen to state radio, and preventing children from receiving state education¹⁷. Essentially, the laws have banned the outward practice of Islam and restricted the autonomy of the individual. Women are banned from wearing hijabs or veiling themselves, and men may be detained for having “abnormal beards or unusual names.”¹⁸ One particular account from Abdusalam Muhemet, who was sent to one of the camps within the region, relayed that the police detained him for reciting a verse of the Quran at a funeral¹⁹. In effect, the legal backing of these camps, and the traditional use of RETL camps to punish minor crimes, not only has the customary weight of denouncing Islamic practice, but legally criminalizes devotion to the religion.

RETL in Practice

It has been difficult for scholars and even foreign governments to obtain a clear picture as to what the life within these re-education through labor camps look like. The Chinese government propagates them as legally backed institutions and as a mechanism for re-education. They are often advertised by the state as vocational school or labor training facilities, meant to aid and rehabilitate individuals who commit crimes, so that when they are released they are capable of being functioning members of society²⁰. The Chinese government argues that this should not be looked at as a system of punishment, but rather they exist simply as a tool to reform and re-educate individuals who have strayed from the law and the norms of society through labor and operate under universal, just, and authentic protection of each sanctioned individuals’ human rights²¹. It has been difficult for any foreign entities to either confirm or deny the validity of these statements. The state has done a good job at visually concealing the practices within these camps from the international public.

That being said, testimony throughout the years from individuals who either have been released or have escaped these camps seem to indicate that the image portrayed by the state may not be an accurate representation of the actual practices within the camps. In recent months, reports have been released sharing the testimony of individuals who have escaped the forced labor camps within the Xinjiang region. Once within the camps, those detained spend their days in a high-pressure indoctrination program, “where they are forced to listen to lectures, sing hymns praising the Chinese Communist Party, and write ‘self-criticism’ essays,” according to detainees who have been released.²² Those who could not remember the words to the hymns would be deprived of meals or forced to stand for hours on end.²³

It has been alleged that in good scenarios “conditions are harsh and the workload heavy.”²⁴ In the other scenarios, torture and other forms of maltreatment are used.²⁵ “Sleep and food deprivation, filth, stench, beatings, heat, cold, and toxic odors” are part of daily routine.²⁶ While the Chinese government has often times claimed that technical training for work and education is given to inmates, informants who articulated their accounts to journalist Martin King Whyte unanimously claimed that no such training was provided. In fact, the existing skills of the inmates are exploited, and if an inmate has no special skills of interest they are “encouraged to develop positive attitudes towards unskilled manual labor.”²⁷

While the labor aspect of these RETL camps is heavily emphasized, the education aspect is often times less spoken about. In the testimonies presented by Martin Whyte, there is a general consensus that although the “evening study sessions occupy less time than labor activities, it is unanimously agreed that

these are strongly emphasized and vigorously pushed by authorities.”²⁸ According to Whyte’s informants these sessions varied from large, camp-wide lectures to small group discussions on anything from a disseminated piece of literature to a news story from a local newspaper.²⁹ There is a specific style of small group meeting once a week known as sheng huo chien t’ao hui or “livelihood self-examination meeting” where each individual “reports orally on his overall conduct and thinking during the past week and criticizes himself where his labor, his study, or some other activity has fallen short of the demands of authorities.”³⁰ This style of education through criticism is a common theme throughout all small group meetings. In nightly small group meetings other than the huo chien t’ao hui, self-criticism is supposed to take place, with each inmate comparing his own conduct and attitudes with the examples and standards contained in the study material, criticizing his shortcomings, and pledging to reform.³¹ The other members of the group are expected to provide criticism, directing the self-critic to make a fuller acknowledgement of his failings and his need to reform.³²

As will be expanded upon in the subsequent sections, due to the broad legal structure surrounding RETL, the system lacks any kind of “procedural restraints.”³³ The absence of due process, the indiscriminate standards for selecting detainees, as well as the lack of internal mechanisms within the camps to support the complaints of the individuals all set the stage for abuses of the system to operate undetected or be intentionally disregarded. Practically applied then, re-education through labor has systematically been misused “to incarcerate political and religious dissidents,” as can be seen in the present day within the Xinjiang region.³⁴

Section II: Legal History of the Re-Education Practice

In order to further address the particular actions on behalf of officials within Xinjiang, a broader background on the legality of re-education through labor within China is necessary. The shift in post-Maoist legislative thought led China to become somewhat of a “state of laws.”³⁵ This is evidenced by the 800 national laws and 6000 local laws adopted within the twenty-year period.³⁶ While the number and content of Chinese laws have consistently grown and changed, the use of RETL camps has persisted.

At its foundational platform, the benefit and purpose of RETL camps stem from the Marxist view that labor “can change the existing form and nature of natural things and thus transform them into social wealth as a basic practical activity.”³⁷ Further, Marxist doctrine as well as Chinese social values emphasize that participation in productive labor is advantageous in re-molding consciousness.³⁸ Based on these Marxist principles, forced labor camps are not only thought to be beneficial to the individual but also to society.

The State Council Regarding the Question of Re-Education Through Labor (“1957 Decision”), is the first piece of legislation pertaining to RETL camps.³⁹ The 1957 Decision was approved at the 78th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress in an effort to address as well as reform the ongoing practice and codify it into law.⁴⁰ Under this document, RETL is a punishment sanctioned to only minor offenses, meaning those acts not serious enough to warrant criminal punishment, but that are too serious to be dealt with by only administrative sanctions.⁴¹ The 1957 Decision not only formally legalized re-education camps, but also established agencies at the “level of provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities, directly under the Central Government” who have been allocated local authority to implement and maintain these re-education camps, as well as determine who will be sent in accordance with criteria laid out within the Decision.⁴² Specifically, the 1957 Decision lays out the purposes of RETL as the following: “to reform into self-supporting new persons those persons who are able to work but insist on leading an idle life, violate law and discipline, or do not engage in honest pursuits” and “to further maintain public order, thus facilitating socialist construction.”⁴³ The document further relays four categories of individuals which these sanctions may be applied to:

(1) Those who do not engage in honest pursuits, involve themselves in hooliganism, commit larceny, fraud or other acts for which they are not criminally liable, or violate public security rules and refuse to mend their ways despite repeated admonition;⁴⁴

(2) Counterrevolutionaries and anti-socialist reactionaries who commit minor crimes and are not criminally liable and who have been given sanctions of expulsion by government organs, organizations, enterprises or schools, and as a result have difficulty in making a living;⁴⁵

(3) employees of government organs, organizations, enterprises and schools who are able-bodied, but have refused to work for a long period, violated discipline or jeopardized public order, and have been given sanctions of expulsion, and as a result have difficulty in making a living;⁴⁶

(4) those who refuse to accept the work assigned to them or the arrangement made for their employment or who decline to take part in manual labor and production despite persuasion, keep behaving disruptively on purpose, obstruct public officials from performing their duties and refuse to mend their ways despite repeated admonition.⁴⁷

Various individuals and bodies may apply for the investigation of anyone who falls into one or multiple of these four categories. These bodies include civil affairs and public security departments of the government organ, or an organization, enterprise, school or other units to which the person belongs; or his or her parents or guardians.⁴⁸ The applications must be approved by the various Administrative committees including “the people’s committees of provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the Central Government or by organs authorized by these people’s committees.”⁴⁹

Since the 1957 Decision, two other pieces of legislation have been passed by the National People’s Congress: the 1979 Decision and the 1982 Trial Methods.⁵⁰ Both documents refine some of the open-endedness of the 1957 Decision. The 1979 Decision curtails the indefinite time period of being subject to RETL to three years (but still allowing a one-year extension “whenever necessary”) as well as restricts the imposition of RETL to “those people in large and medium-sized cities who need to be re-educated through labor.”⁵¹ That being said, the 1982 Trial Methods expand the four criteria laid out in the 1952 Decision to include “anyone who joined others to commit a crime such as murder, robbery, rape, and arson,” or who “abetted others to commit a crime.”⁵² The document also expands the 1979 Decision’s restriction of RETL in rural cities and provinces to now apply to the rural populace if an individual commits a crime “in cities, along railways, and in large-scale factories and mines.”⁵³

Although couched in terms of leniency and refinement, the 1979 Decision and the 1982 Trial Methods allow an individual to be detained in a labor camp for up to four years.⁵⁴ This punishment is far more severe than other criminal punishments, which raises concerns as to the true purpose of these camps. According to the 1979 Decision, the rationale behind RETL camps centers around the premise that the system should be applied to minor crimes, meaning those not severe enough to illicit criminal punishment. It then seems counter-intuitive to sanction those individuals who commit minor crimes to a punishment which revokes all the rights of the citizen, whereas someone who commits a bonafide crime may only be subject to fines.⁵⁵ Furthermore, it is crucial to note that the recipient of a RETL sentence “has no right to a hearing, nor right to counsel, and no right to any type of judicial determination in his case.”⁵⁶

Numerous reports regarding the extensive use of the system have led to widespread human rights concerns. RETL is imposed by Administrative Committees. In order to take actions against suspected offenders, these committees have reportedly abused the system by using it as a means to avoid the procedural requirements or supervisory mechanisms presented under the Criminal Procedure Law.⁵⁷ Essen-

tially, as an administrative rather than a criminal sanction, RETL is not subject to any of the limited human rights safeguards contained in the Criminal Law and the Criminal Procedure Law.⁵⁸ As these limited human rights protections are beyond the reach of those punished by RETL, any party that feels the process or acts that occurred in relation to their sanctioning to RETL camps violates their rights, may resort only to protections granted under the Administrative Litigation Law.⁵⁹ This means that the aggrieved party who believes that his or her legitimate rights have been infringed upon by administrative acts (such as being sanctioned to RETL camps) may bring about a lawsuit. That being said, few lawsuits of this nature come around. In 1997, a majority of those interviewed by George Wehrfritz, a journalist writing about the Chinese legal structure and government, identified interference by administrative organs and by the Chinese Communist Party as the greatest difficulty encountered in administrative litigation.⁶⁰ Such interference may occur during the entire course of an administrative case, but it is especially common before the case is accepted.⁶¹ At subsequent stages, judges may be pressured to uphold the administrative act, and aggrieved parties may be pressured to withdraw the case.⁶²

Chinese law does not allow for indefinite detention without trial, so Xinjiang's camps can only be legal if they are voluntary, according to Jeremy Daum, a senior research fellow at the Yale Law School's Paul Tsai China Center. That being said, there is every indication that these camps are not voluntary. Further, while RETL punishment lies outside of the reach of the limited human rights protections allotted to criminal procedural law already, traditionally aggrieved parties may resort to protections granted under the Administrative Litigation Law.⁶³ This statute stipulates that anyone who believes that his or her legitimate rights and interests have been infringed upon by administrative acts such as administrative sanctions may bring a lawsuit.⁶⁴ Should a court find the challenged administrative act illegal, it may revoke (*chexiao*) the act. That being said, most inmates have never been charged with a crime and do not receive legal representation.⁶⁵ Rather, these people are taken to these camps against their will, without any kind of due process.⁶⁶

The nature of the legislation pertaining to RETL places broad and overreaching power in the hands of the government and those subcommittees and agencies representing state interests. Due to this, the rights of citizens are drastically restricted, and the use of RETL as a system for punishing minor crimes has been recklessly applied. In particular, it has been reported that these committees have imposed RETL on offenders against whom they lack sufficient evidence to support a criminal charge, or have been used rather as a means of regulating activity the state finds undesirable, even if this activity is not in fact illegal, as is the case within the Xinjiang region.⁶⁷ The lack of legal recourse against the administrative committees that implement these sanctions raises major concerns as to the legitimacy of these camps.

Section III: The Rule of Law

Defining the Rule of Law

There is a clear distinction between the rule by law and the rule of law. Rule by law simply implies that a state governs in accordance to a set of laws whereas the rule of law has greater philosophical implications. The rule of law, as should be understood in the context of this paper, refers to a wide political ideal or principle. It is robust in a political community when it provides protection and recourse against the arbitrary exercise of power through the instrumentality of the law and through additional institutions instated to complement the legal process.⁶⁸ A state may choose to implement aspects of the rule of law into a society, such as the protection of fundamental human rights, the implications of acknowledging the autonomy of the individual being to feasibly hold them accountable for their actions. In regards to the characteristics of the laws that operate under a rule of law society, at the bare minimum, these laws must be general, consistent, prospective, accessible to and understandable by the public, possible to comply with, and not subject to frequent change.⁶⁹ This conception is known as a formal conception of the rule of law. From this point political philosophers deviate as to whether additional

qualifications should be included in the popular conception of the rule of law—notice that these seven characteristics of law remain silent on the content of the laws, and therefore many argue for additional qualifications that relate to the content of the laws.

Some political philosophers, such as Joseph Raz or Jeremy Waldron, add qualifications that argue in addition to the seven characteristics above, the official implementation of laws must be impartial or unbiased, as well as subject to judicial review.⁷⁰ Additionally, both scholars note the importance of an independent, accessible, fair, and impartial court system to supplement the implementation of the rule of law.⁷¹ These qualifications are known as a procedural understanding of the rule of law because they pertain to how the structure of the law should operate and be executed.

A final conception of the rule of law is referred to as a substantive approach. This is a more contemporary addition to the previously standing formal and procedural conceptions and was greatly propelled by the United Nations and the World Justice Project.⁷² This conception advocates for a legal system which must protect and promote equality before the law with no arbitrary distinctions to protect individual rights and promote democracy.

It is crucial to note that there is no one society that consistently abides by all of these qualities and conceptions of the rule of law. Even a society that is set up with the best intentions will sometimes fall short of these standards, and this does not mean that they are not a rule of law society. Additionally, the more specific (procedural and substantive) the conceptions of the rule of law become, the more they are contested as being inherently narrow and biased towards Westernized thought. Therefore, the rule of law should be looked at as more of an index, a set of norms a state may compare their structure to in order to see what their level of commitment to this political ideal in fact is, but it should not be looked at as the sole indicator for the success of a state.

China and the Rule of Law

Mireille Delmas-Marty presents a compelling account of contemporary China's relation to the rule of law. She begins her assessment by laying out the relation between state, the rule of law, and the fundamental rights of citizens that are necessary to protect. She notes what Etienne Picard points out:

If one considers that the State lays down the law, it is not easy to conceive of fundamental rights as being the foundation of the Rule of Law. Yet it is the fundamental law which subjects the State to the Rule of Law. The only role of the State is to both consolidate and guarantee the Rule of Law⁷³

In other words, consolidation requires the re-founding of the rule of law, which implies both procedural review and recognizing the indivisibility of fundamental rights.⁷⁴ Does China as a whole show a consistent commitment to procedural review and the indivisibility of fundamental rights?

In the 1999 reform of the Constitution, the new first paragraph of Article 5 stated that “The People’s Republic of China exercises the rule of law, building a socialist country governed according to law.”⁷⁵ This provision could provide a legal basis for remedying violations of the Constitution, assuming that constitutional review is reinforced. That being said, there is no political will to do so at present, and the courts have only made timid advances if any advances at all.⁷⁶

In regards to the indivisibility of fundamental rights, it is important to note that this principle is mainly defined in international law and is selectively applied by all states. Delmas-Marty notes that, even “the West gives precedence to civil and political rights and is only now starting to catch up on economic, social and cultural rights.”⁷⁷ That being said, this does not mean that actions of states cannot or should not be analyzed in the context to their commitment to fundamental rights of citizens.

In the case of the Uighurs of Xinjiang, it is evident that the governance of the region is purposefully neglecting the aforementioned characteristics and qualities of the rule of law. There is no protec-

tion and recourse against the arbitrary exercise of power through the instrumentality of the law for the Muslims within the region; in fact the laws are specifically targeting and criminalizing this population. The targeted detainment of the Uighurs operated on a mass scale for many months prior to any legal backing, and once the legal backing was instated, the laws were not general, prospective, consistently applied, nor reasonably clear to the population. If an individual's lawful actions now can be subject to punishment in the future should the law change, then this inherently undermines the value of operating within a rule of law framework.

Chinese law doesn't allow for indefinite detention without trial, so Xinjiang's camps can only be legal if they are voluntary, according to Jeremy Daum, a senior research fellow at the Yale Law School's Paul Tsai China Center. That being said, there is every indication that these camps are not voluntary. There are three things that are blatantly clear when questioning the Chinese commitment to the rule of law in Xinjiang. The first is that the detention of Uighurs began prior to the legalization of aspects that would allow for them to be detained. The second is that the legalization of these aspects that allow for them to be detained such as practicing Islam, having a beard, or having a particular name are targeted and the proper legal protection of the individual against the arbitrary exercise of power by the state is not present. And the third is that the region's claim that this is done in an effort to curb extremism and that the people they are detaining are terrorists is unfounded and inaccurate. Thus, there is no commitment to the rule of law in Xinjiang.

Why This Violates International Law

The United Nations

China was one of the original signatories of the UN Charter in 1945. It holds a permanent place on the UN Security Council and plays an active role on the international stage. This does not necessarily imply that the state abides by the treaties that it propagates and signs on to as will be demonstrated below. Each of the following documents acts as a form of international law which China has agreed to abide by. It is important to note that China is a signatory of more international treaties than the two that will be described. These two documents have been selected for analyzing because they most directly pertain to the actions of the administration within Xinjiang and the Chinese government's failure to regulate and enforce laws that consistently promote human rights.⁷⁸

International Covenant on Civil Political Rights

While there may be legal grounds for re-education through labor camps within the state, the general practice in and of itself violates the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Particularly, re-education through labor violates Article 8—the prohibition of forced or compulsory labor.⁷⁹ While Article 8 Paragraph 3(a) specifically states, “No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour,” the subsequent section, Paragraph 3(b) presents the following qualification:

*Paragraph 3(a) shall not be held to preclude, in countries where imprisonment with hard labour may be imposed as a punishment for a crime, the performance of hard labour in pursuance of a sentence to such punishment by a competent court.*⁸⁰

That being said, this qualification does not justify the actions of the authorities within Xinjiang. Paragraph 3(b) specifically notes that punishment of forced labor may stand if the individual has been sentenced to such punishment by a competent court. The Uighurs within Xinjiang are not being formally sentenced, as they are not tried before they are relocated to the camps. While there is a judicial system within Xinjiang, it is not being used, and there has been no recourse against those who are abusing the system. The informal incarceration of these people and the forced labor and poor conditions placed

upon them do not fall under the qualifications Paragraph 3(b) provides.

Further, this lack of formal judicial proceedings and forced detention violates the subsequent article, Article 9. Article 9 of the ICCPR states the following:

(1) Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law.

(2) Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him.

(3) Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release. It shall not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody, but release may be subject to guarantees to appear for trial, at any other stage of the judicial proceedings, and, should occasion arise, for execution of the judgement.

(4) Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful.

(5) Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation.⁸¹

It is evident that every one of the subsections of Article 9 are being violated in Xinjiang presently. The firsthand accounts mentioned in previous sections indicate that many of the individuals relocated to the RETL camps are there because they have been subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention. An unnamed individual who spoke to the Wall Street Journal conveyed that he was taken to one of the camps and was given no information as to what he had done wrong or how long he would be there for. All of the firsthand accounts attest that there was no legal proceeding, they were not given due process, and they never saw a judge. While theoretically the Chinese state law surrounding RETL provides the opportunity for individuals who are deprived of their liberty by arrest or detention to take proceedings before a court and file a lawsuit, the individuals who have been released or escape from these camps often times will not even provide their identity to the press they are speaking to out of fear of retaliation from the administration within the region. There is no evidence that there have been any cases brought to trial against the law enforcement, camp administration, or state within Xinjiang. Due to the lack of feasible and safe recourse against this arbitrary exercise of power and restriction of liberty, it also necessarily follows that the Uighurs have no enforceable right to compensation.⁸²

While China agreeing to the ICCPR on the world stage seems positive in nature, it is not being enforced fairly within the state as a whole, and is specifically being brutally violated in the region of Xinjiang.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its third session on December 10, 1948. The Preamble to the UDHR relays the following:

The General Assembly, Proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of

*achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.*⁸³

While many facets of the UDHR are not consistently applied or instated to their fullest potential by all of the forty-eight countries that voted in favor of the declaration, there should still be concern when certain articles are systematically ignored and violated by member states. This is the case within Xinjiang in relation to the following two articles.⁸⁴ Article 2 of the UDHR establishes an anti-discrimination law. The article specifically states:

*Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.*⁸⁵

The actions of the Xinjiang administration in fostering this camp system which explicitly targets a particular group of people directly violates this law. The local laws have been oriented to highlight differences in how people should be treated rather than provide equal protection for all individuals. The Uighurs are being detained and their additional rights and freedoms set forth in the UDHR have been curtailed due to their ethnicity, language, religion, and social origin, as well as birth status. In essence, due to the legal convention of using RETL camps as a mechanism to punish minor criminal offenses, as well as the new anti-Islamic legislation within the region, this targeted action against Muslims has the customary, as well as legally authoritative, effect of making Islamic practice criminalized within Xinjiang, inherently violating this Article.

In addition, Article 2 expressly notes that no distinction or lesser quality of these anti-discrimination principles should be made or instated based on the jurisdiction or international status of the territory to which a person belongs. This in turn means that the autonomous region of Xinjiang is still subject to these laws and regulations which they are breaking international law by violating. Most pressing in regards to the autonomy of the individual and the human rights of the individual to not be interfered with or subject to harm is Article 5 of the UDHR on torture. Article 5 states that “no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.”⁸⁶ Accounts from individuals who have been broadly subject to RETL in the past as well as the particular accounts of those who have been detained in camps in Xinjiang oftentimes express circumstances of psychological as well as physical torture.⁸⁷ Victims of these camps share stories of dozens of people being crammed into one room and forced to stand for hours or days as well as share a single toilet. Further allegations speak to food deprivation, claiming that if they sang the improper words to Communist Party songs they would only be fed one meal of cabbage a day, if they were fed at all.⁸⁸ One victim claims he was strapped to a chair for hours, sometimes days, with his hands shackled behind his back and interrogated about his ties to religious groups abroad, which he denied having.⁸⁹ He said the psychological pressure was so great that he tried to commit suicide.⁹⁰ Many individuals who have fled the region attest that they have family members who were detained and never heard from again.⁹¹

There are many facets of the UDHR that are violated through the broad use of RETL as well as the specific circumstances of the discrimination-based forced relocation of Muslim Uighurs within Xinjiang. The aforementioned Articles relay the fundamental value of human rights which is to emphasize an indis-

criminate view and obligation to all human beings, and the current events of the region demonstrate that these rights are being vastly ignored and horrifically violated.

Section IV: Conclusion

For over a year the Chinese government vigorously denied allegations that police within the Xinjiang region were forcing the relocation of Uighur Muslims to re-education camps. Even after acknowledging that a re-education program was in place and operating within the region, the image propagated by state representatives to the UN has been proven to be vastly misleading. Rather than vocational schools necessary to curb extremist views and combat terrorism, the re-education program is a mechanism of the region to eradicate the cultural identity of the Uighur population and remove any devotion to Islam.

By agreeing to the international documents set forth by the UN, China publicizes its commitment to human rights and the rule of law on the international stage, yet domestically abides by strict rules of state sovereignty shrouded in secrecy and gross violations of the rights of individuals. Due to the legal convention of using RETL camps as a mechanism to punish minor criminal offenses, as well as the new anti-Islamic legislation within the region, this targeted action against Muslims has the customary as well as legally authoritative effect of making Islamic practice criminalized within Xinjiang. The further practices of arrest and relocation without due process, as well as the allegations of torture and maltreatment within the camps directly indicate that the Xinjiang region has no intention of abiding by international laws. The allowance of this to occur as well as the attempt to cover up the true nature of the operation by the greater Chinese government, implicates the state as being complicit with the practices within the region.

When looking at the broad practice of RETL as well as the particular instance occurring in Xinjiang, it is evident that the local administration as well as the Chinese states' government's commitment is not so much to a rule of law, but to a rule by laws. As can be seen through the ICCPR and UDHR, these laws that are ruling do not demonstrate any commitment to international law standards or fundamental moral values insinuated through a popular conception of the rule of law. Therefore, through the case study of Xinjiang, it is evident that China does not demonstrate any commitment to international law standards or fundamental moral values that are inherently protected by abiding by the rule of law.

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Buying into Global City Status:

A Case Study of Amazon HQ2's Impact on Washington, D.C

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Abstract

This paper conducts a mixed quantitative and qualitative analysis to forecast Amazon HQ2's impact on Washington, D.C.'s 2030 racial and gender demographics. Results show that HQ2 may reverse D.C.'s gender distribution and increase D.C.'s White demographic. The paper also addresses further racial and gender demographic risks not directly tested in the analysis, and proposes questions for future investigation. The paper aims to study the global phenomenon of city governments courting multinational corporations in hopes of gaining global city status; through a case study of D.C., this paper concludes about local effects of this global phenomenon.

Introduction

A city's social and economic responses to the influx of corporate presence is an important topic for economic geography: the study of human economic activity under varying geospatial conditions. Amazon, Inc. announced on November 13, 2018 that it had chosen Long Island City, New York and Crystal City, Virginia for its new headquarter expansion.¹ Amazon later removed New York from its headquarters expansion plan in February of 2019.² Hundreds of North American cities had entered a yearlong bidding process prior to Amazon's announcement, each believing that Amazon's presence would attract economic growth, technological innovation, and human capital migration from across the world. Crystal City's people and economy are inseparable from those of D.C. Throughout this paper, I refer to D.C., Arlington (encompassing Crystal City), Alexandria, and Bethesda as "the greater D.C. metropolitan area"; whereas "D.C." strictly refers to the District of Columbia. Winning Amazon's new headquarters, hereafter referred to as HQ2, is a huge boost for D.C.'s effort to become a global city.

In the discourse to define a global city, the book *Atlas of Cities* proposes a triangular framework of "commercial intercity relations" where three cities form a powerful global network. For example, New

York, D.C., and London form one such triangular network of commerce and politics.³ Such has been the plight of D.C., whereas popular culture and academia regularly reference New York and London as epitomes of global cities, D.C. rarely makes the top of the list.⁴ When D.C. does receive recognition as a global city, its status often comes with the caveat that its influence is limited to politics.⁵ Amazon building HQ2 in the greater D.C. metropolitan area will likely give a boost to the city's status in commerce, technology, and human capital; but these benefits come with tradeoffs. This paper conducts quantitative and qualitative analyses on HQ2's impact on D.C.'s racial and gender demography as part of a larger phenomenon known as the "prosperity bomb." I will discuss definitions of the term in "The Prosperity Bomb" section.

Global City Status, Technology, and Human Capital

Over the past three decades, the once-exclusive club of global cities has decentralized to include city regions and national capitals.⁶ Jennifer Robinson argues that a city's attempt to achieve and maintain global status is an ongoing process, and D.C. is certainly in the midst of this struggle. Cities such as San Francisco, Hyderabad, and Hong Kong are becoming increasingly more global, and two of their shared ingredients for success are technology and human capital. D.C. can now invest in these two areas to become more global.⁷

The success of cities in the U.S. and abroad demonstrate the importance of technology and human capital. A.T. Kearney's 2018 Global Cities Report currently ranks D.C. as a "Global Elite" city, meaning that D.C. has both the past record and future potential of being a truly global city.⁸ This report examines what defines the world's most influential cities through regional trends over time. Out of five categories ranging across business activity, human capital, information exchange, cultural experience, and political engagement, D.C. ranks first in the world in 2018 only in political engagement. New York, London, Singapore, and other cities that dominate the overall rankings all perform extremely well in business activity, information exchange, and human capital. Business activity and information exchange have merged in the 21st century to become synonymous with technology, which is powered by top business and technology human capital. It is therefore not surprising that cities with the highest concentration of technology and human capital are also the best-recognized global cities. Furthermore, emerging global cities are catching up by investing in technology and human capital. A.T. Kearney currently ranks San Francisco 20th on its Global Cities Index but number one on the Global Cities Outlook index.⁹ San Francisco's strengths in technology and human capital will help it blossom quickly as a global city.

Cities abroad, including Hyderabad and Hong Kong, are following San Francisco's lead. Hyderabad implemented socio-spatial reforms to capture the growth of the information technology economy. The number of engineering colleges in Hyderabad grew from 37 in 1996 to 540 in 2009.¹⁰ As a result, Hyderabad's per capita GDP more than doubled between 2000 and 2014.¹¹ Research shows that the concentration and accumulation of human capital correlates strongly with regional development and economic growth.¹² Hong Kong, on the other hand, has maintained global competitiveness in recent years by becoming Asia's "Mecca" for informational technology. Hong Kong surpassed Japan in 2003 to become the largest venture capital center in Asia.¹³ Other global cities in the Asia-Pacific region—Singapore, Taiwan, Shanghai, and Tokyo—are similarly all integral pieces in the global innovation network.

The aforementioned global cities have attracted talented workforces, international attention, and economic growth. These gleaming incentives justify D.C.'s efforts to rebrand itself from a political city into a global city. To do so, D.C. has worked hard to bring in technology and human capital. Since 2015, governments in the greater D.C. metropolitan area have convinced Advisory Board Co., Yelp, and Marriott International to relocate their headquarters to the greater D.C. metropolitan area.^{14,15,16} Local and state governments have enticed these companies with tax incentives, performance-based grants, world-class infrastructure, and vibrant, urban environments.

While technology and human capital investments can yield economic benefits for a city, they also produce negative consequences.¹⁷ For example, apartments in Seattle (home of Amazon's first headquarters) have become so unaffordable that the city erected 58 cranes in 2017 to keep up with the housing demand.¹⁸ Waves of lower and middle class long-time residents left Seattle as rent and real estate taxes exploded over the past decade. I refer to a city's event-based economic growth followed by negative social and economic aftershocks as the "prosperity bomb," a term coined by Seattle Times journalist Danny Westneat.

The Prosperity Bomb

A city sets off the prosperity bomb when it strives for economic benefits without sufficiently mitigating social and urban risks. Westneat identifies three major outcomes of the Amazon prosperity bomb in Seattle: affordable housing shortage, destruction of small businesses, and gender imbalance.¹⁹ Lack of affordable housing plagues many densely populated cities such as San Francisco, D.C., and Seattle. The mortgage company Freddie Mac found in 2017 that America's number of affordable apartments for very low-income people declined by over 60 percent from 2010 to 2016.²⁰ Online real estate database company Zillow calculated in 2017 that the "median U.S. rent takes 29.1 percent of the typical household income—up from 25.8 percent between 1985 and 2000."²¹ With the rise of companies like Amazon and Microsoft, highly skilled, educated, and well-paid workers dominated the housing market in Seattle; they want to live near the place they work and can afford to pay the skyrocketing rents and taxes. This is problematic. For instance, while 71.1 percent of White households in America currently own their home, only 41.2 percent of African American families participate in home ownership.²²

The influx of wealth and purchasing power into Seattle had made home ownership even more difficult for African American families. Similarly, D.C.'s population grew by 5.2 percent between 2000 and 2010, and the upper-income newcomers displaced long-term low-income residents, especially near the American Shaw/U Street neighborhood.²³ Other urban and social effects of the prosperity bomb in Seattle are harder to quantify but are no less worrisome.

Amazon Prime has shut down countless Seattle small businesses since its inception in 2005.²⁴ Many of these small businesses owners invest their entire savings into their businesses and are not able to pivot quickly to new professions. Additionally, the 2010 U.S. Census showed that Seattle had 19% more single males than females; this gap increased to 30% in 2014.²⁵ Perhaps Richard Florida best captures the core challenges that lay ahead of D.C.'s integration with Amazon. His "urban crisis" theory focuses around the negative externalities of attracting and retaining the "creative class."²⁶ Florida has denounced his original advice for cities to plan and grow around the lifestyles of the highly skilled and well educated.²⁷ Florida's critics, and eventually Florida himself, warn that this approach to city development is a "highly affirmative concept of class and the current mode of capitalist development" and does not have a "positive impact on the success of urban areas in developing sustainable economic structures."²⁸

While many have warned D.C. against building Amazon's HQ2, Virginia Governor Ralph Northam announced on November 13, 2018 that "Amazon, Inc. will invest approximately \$2.5 billion to establish a major new headquarters" that will create "more than 25,000 high-paying jobs over 12 years."²⁹ Amazon promises that these jobs will pay an average salary of \$150,000 to \$200,000 by 2030.³⁰ The press release circumvented the urban and social risks that many residents are concerned about. Current research in sustainable city development focuses on how city planners and policy makers can find the Pareto optimal between attracting human capital and maintaining a balanced growth path.³¹ In contribution to this debate, this paper specifically sheds light on HQ2's potential negative consequences on D.C.'s racial and gender demographics.

Research Methodology

Numbers often look attractive when calculating the benefits of a policy decision, but the reality may not be so. Stephen Fuller and Jeanette Chapman of George Mason University's School of Policy and Government calculate that HQ2 will create over \$25 million for Arlington County and between \$150 and \$235 million for the Commonwealth of Virginia in fiscal revenue by 2030.³² However, job growth and fiscal revenue do not always benefit all parts of the population equally. This analysis focuses on D.C.'s future racial and gender demographics because D.C. is racially divided in education, income, employment, and residence.³³

I hypothesize that HQ2 will increase the racial and gender imbalances in D.C. by 2030. Directly testable dependent variables in this analysis include projected gender and racial demographics in D.C. by the year 2030. I chose the year 2030 because it is the target deadline for HQ2 to be fully constructed and operating.³⁴ Inferable dependent variables include the gender income gap, education disparity by race and gender, employment rates by gender and race, and affordable housing availability. I used a mix of quantitative and qualitative research to extrapolate correlations and trends between D.C.'s demographic changes and Amazon's socioeconomic legacy in the U.S. Quantitative data comes from the U.S. Census Bureau, state and local government reports, and published reports by Amazon. Qualitative data largely comes from reputable news source.

I constructed two models specifically for the purpose of this analysis. The control model projects D.C.'s 2030 demographics according to the city's current gender and racial demographics as well as growth rates. The experimental model takes into account Seattle's demographic shift over the past decade and Amazon's employee demographics; it superimposes these variables on top of D.C.'s natural growth trajectory over a period of 12 years (the time between 2018 and 2030). Isolating HQ2's impact on D.C.'s demographics was challenging due to the recent nature of the event and the complexity of the greater D.C. metropolitan economy. Therefore, the models and projections in this analysis should serve only as frameworks and exploratory insights for future research.

Findings

The analysis yields that HQ2's presence in the greater D.C. metropolitan area could:

1. Reduce total population growth from 2018 to 2030 in D.C. by nine percent.
2. Reverse the gender distribution of D.C. from 47 percent male and 53 percent female to 53 percent male and 47 percent female.
3. Increase the proportion of White residents within D.C.'s total 2030 population by seven percent, from 40 percent to 47 percent.
4. Decrease the proportion of Black residents within D.C.'s total 2030 population by six percent, from 48 percent to 42 percent.
5. Increase the proportion of Asian residents within D.C.'s total 2030 population by one percent, from four percent to five percent.
6. Increase the proportion of Hispanic residents within D.C.'s total 2030 population by one percent, from five percent to six percent.

All models, assumptions, and data sources used in the analysis can be found in the Appendix.

Conclusion and Discussion

The results overall support my hypothesis. I will first discuss the six findings above, then address other racial and gender demographic risks not directly tested by the analysis, and finally propose questions for future investigation.

The increases in White, Asian, and male populations are less surprising than the increase in Hispanic population, the decrease in Black population, and the decrease in overall population growth. Whites and Asians made up 84 percent of Amazon's U.S. managers in 2017 and males represented 74 percent of Amazon's managers globally in 2017.³⁵ Hispanics, however, made up only five percent of Amazon's U.S. managers and 14 percent of Amazon's U.S. employees.³⁶ The one percent projected increases in Hispanic and Asian residents may not be statistically significant enough to signal increasing racial diversity. On the other hand, the larger projected increases in male and White representation amongst D.C. residents may amplify the existing racial and gender income gaps in the city. Male salaries in D.C. are currently an average of 18 percent higher than female salaries despite more women over the age of 25 holding Bachelors and Graduate degrees than their male counterparts.³⁷ Furthermore, Black D.C. residents are four times less likely to hold Bachelor's degrees, five times more likely to be unemployed, and four times more likely to be living in poverty than White residents.³⁸ Finally, a nine percent decline in overall population growth over 12 years is alarming. A map of D.C.'s racial distribution by location of residence (Figure 1) shows that the city centers of D.C., Arlington, and Alexandria are already almost exclusively White and Asian. A core goal of building HQ2 was to attract human capital and make D.C. a more desirable place to live, and the new influx of talent should not displace current residents on such a massive scale, as can be seen in Figure 1.




Figure 1³⁹

While this paper offers exploratory conclusions on HQ2's potential impact on D.C.'s racial and gender demographics, it does not answer questions about HQ2's effects on D.C.'s following metrics: racial income gap, education attainment by race, poverty by race, education attainment by gender, unemployment by gender, and poverty by gender. HQ2's impact on D.C. extends much further than the ethnography of race and gender. While Amazon has not disclosed HQ2's hiring needs, it is reasonable to deduce that Amazon's new headquarters will hire personnel with highly qualified management and technology backgrounds. As cited above, 74 percent of Amazon's global managers are male and 84 percent of

Amazon's U.S. managers are White or Asian. It is important to ask whether paying this segment of the population an average salary of \$150,000 to \$200,000 will further exacerbate the gender and racial income gap. This may induce downstream changes in D.C.'s politics, culture, consumption, entertainment, and housing affordability, just to name a few.

The proposals between the Virginia government, D.C. government, and Amazon also mention investments in K-12 education, funding for computer science degrees at local universities, and injections into infrastructure using fiscal revenues created by new Amazon jobs and Amazon-affiliated jobs.⁴⁰ It is worthwhile to analyze whether all D.C. residents will receive their fair share of benefits from these investments. This paper is limited in scope and does not address the impact of D.C.'s new business policies, which have succeeded in the past three years in attracting Yelp, Advisory Board Co., and Marriott International to relocate their headquarters to the greater D.C. metropolitan area. Changes to income, race, gender, education, and affordable housing are all important economic geography questions for Washington, D.C.'s future sustainable development and its path to a global city.

Finally, the hypotheses and results implicate dozens, if not hundreds, of cities globally that are fighting for global city status. This includes developing cities such as Lagos, Nigeria, smaller prominent cities such as Toronto, Canada, and rapidly-evolving cities such as Berlin, Germany. Neither public-private partnerships nor ethnographic inequality are localized issues. When making future partnership and expansion decisions, community advocates, business leaders, and government officials would be prudent to focus more attention on case studies such as this one to understand the almost-unavoidable negative externalities of such actions rather than relying on promises of tax revenue and return on investment.

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Appendix

Gender Pay Gap in D.C. Metropolitan Area			
Female Average Salary	Male Average Salary		Gender Pay Gap
\$ 52,439.00	\$ 61,919.00		18.08%
Bachelors Women	Bachelors Men		Gender Pay Gap
\$ 58,297.00	\$ 70,796.00		21.44%
Graduate Women	Graduate Men		Gender Pay Gap
\$ 77,655.00	\$ 97,393.00		25.42%
*Gender Pay Gap calculated based on average salary, not median salary			

Appendix 1: DC

D.C. Total Population Growth					
Year	Population	% Change	Derivative	Average Deceleration	Notes
2010	605040		0.56%		
2011	620336		2.53%	351.45%	
2012	635630		2.47%	-2.48%	-6.11% (2012-2020)
2013	650114		2.28%	-7.57%	
2014	660797		1.64%	-27.89%	
2015	672736		1.81%	9.95%	
2016	684336		1.72%	-4.56%	-5.40% (2016-2020)
2017	693972		1.41%	-18.34%	
2018	703608		1.39%	-1.39%	-1.37% (2018-2020)
2019	713244		1.37%	-1.37%	
2020	722880		1.35%	-1.35%	

Appendix 2: DC

Racial Distribution of D.C.					
White	Black	Asian			
40.40%	48.30%	3.60%			

Sources: World Population Review, U.S. Census 2010

Appendix 3: DC

Education Level by Race						
	White	Asian	Black	Hispanic		
Bachelors	90.81%	77.92%	24.84%	42.77%		
Education Level by Gender						
	Male	Female				
Bachelors	22.32%	24.49%	52872	108252	70548	148064
			55380	463011	77516	462989.3684
Graduate	29.11%	35.14%		23.38%		31.98%

*Education data accounts for all obtainable D.C. population over the age of 25

Appendix 4: DC

Poverty by Race, Education, Gender, and Employment					
White	Black	Asian	Hispanic		
7.27%	26.41%	14.85%	16.26%		
<High School	High School	Some College	≥College		
34.77%	24.29%	17.28%	5.46%		
Male Employed	Male Unemployed	Female Employed	Female Unemployed		
5.23%	35.82%	7.26%	47.46%		

Appendix 5: DC

Unemployment by Race, Age, and Education						
White	Black	Asian	Hispanic			
3.10%	16.80%	6.20%	2.30%			
16-19	20-24	25-29	30-34	35-44	45-54	55-59
28.90%	16.10%	7.40%	6.30%	7.50%	8.50%	8.50%
<High School	High School	Some College	≥College			
16.1	17.80%	12.60%	3.20%			

Appendix 6: DC

Seattle Single Male to Single Female Ratio				
Year	Single Males Per 100 Single Females	Ratio Growth Rate	Annualized Growth Rate	
2010	119			
2014	130	9.24%	1.74%	Percent/year
Source: 2010 U.S. Census				

Appendix 7: Seattle

Seattle Total Population Growth					
Year	Population	% Change	Acceleration	Average Acceleration	Notes
2010	610333	0.56%			
2011	622532	2.00%	256.92%		
2012	635974	2.16%	8.03%		
2013	654176	2.86%	32.55%		
2014	669641	2.36%	-17.40%		
2015	685447	2.36%	-0.16%		
2016	707255	3.18%	34.79%		
2017	727745	2.90%	-8.94%	8.15%	(2011-2017)
Sources: World Population Review, U.S. Census 2010					

Appendix 8: Seattle

Overall HQ2 Impact			
	Without HQ2	With HQ2	Net HQ2 Impact
Population Growth	35%	26%	-9%
Male Population (%)	47%	53%	5%
Female Population (%)	53%	47%	-6%
White Population (%)	40%	47%	7%
Black Population (%)	48%	42%	-6%
Asian Population (%)	4%	5%	1%
Hispanic Population (%)	5%	6%	1%

Appendix 9: Overall HQ2 Impact on D.C.

D.C. 2030 Population, Race, and Gender Model (No HQ2)*																						
Year	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030	Percent of Total Population
Base Population	605040	620336	635630	650114	660797	672736	684336	695972	703668	712444	723880	735212	745368	756776	770010	784373	799980	816937	835420	855623	876659	818762
Population Growth Rate	0.56%	2.53%	2.47%	2.28%	1.64%	1.81%	1.72%	1.41%	1.39%	1.37%	1.35%	1.33%	1.31%	1.30%	1.28%	1.26%	1.24%	1.23%	1.21%	1.19%	1.18%	
Male	287031	294287	301543	308414	314882	319146	324649	329220	333792	338563	342934	347504	352071	356635	361194	365749	370298	374840	379375	383902	388421	47%
Female	318009	326049	334087	341700	347315	353590	359687	364752	369816	374881	379946	385009	390069	395125	400176	405223	410262	415295	420320	425353	430381	53%
Gender Gap Growth Rate	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
White to Female Ratio	90.26%	90.26%	90.26%	90.26%	90.26%	90.26%	90.26%	90.26%	90.26%	90.26%	90.26%	90.26%	90.26%	90.26%	90.26%	90.26%	90.26%	90.26%	90.26%	90.26%	90.26%	
White	244436	250616	256795	262646	266962	271785	276472	280655	284238	288151	292044	295933	299824	303711	307594	311472	315346	319215	323077	326932	330780	40%
Black	292234	299622	307009	314005	319165	324031	328634	333083	337438	341707	345893	350003	354038	358000	361921	365749	369524	373266	376984	380687	384384	48%
Asian	21781	22332	22883	23404	23789	24218	24656	24983	25310	25677	26024	26370	26717	27063	27409	27755	28100	28445	28789	29133	29475	4%
Hispanic	27227	27915	28603	29255	29736	30273	30795	31299	31786	32267	32740	33208	33673	34135	34594	35050	35506	35961	36416	36871	37326	5%
Other	19561	19831	20340	20804	21146	21528	21899	22207	22515	22824	23132	23440	23748	24056	24364	24671	24978	25284	25590	25896	26200	3%
Adjusted Population Total	605040	620336	635630	650114	660797	672736	684336	695972	703668	712444	723880	735212	745368	756776	770010	784373	799980	816937	835420	855623	876659	2018-2030 Population Growth
																						2030 Male %
																						2030 Female %

*All data and analyses in this model are based on the population of the District of Columbia and not the greater D.C. metropolitan area
Sources: World Population Review, U.S. Census 2010

Appendix 10: Control Model (No HQ2)

D.C. 2030 Population, Race, and Gender Model (HQ2)**																						
Year	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030	Percent of Total Population
Base Population	605040	620336	635630	650114	660797	672736	684336	695972	703668	712444	723880	735212	745368	756776	770010	784373	799980	816937	835420	855623	876659	
Population Growth Rate	0.56%	2.53%	2.47%	2.28%	1.64%	1.81%	1.72%	1.41%	1.39%	1.37%	1.35%	1.33%	1.31%	1.30%	1.28%	1.26%	1.24%	1.23%	1.21%	1.19%	1.18%	
Male (approximate)	287031	294287	301543	308414	314882	319146	324649	329220	333792	338563	342934	347504	352071	356635	361194	365749	370298	374840	379375	383902	388421	53%
Female (approximate)	318009	326049	334087	341700	347315	353590	359687	364752	369816	374881	379946	385009	390069	395125	400176	405223	410262	415295	420320	425353	430381	47%
Gender Gap Growth Rate	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
White to Female Ratio	90.26%	90.26%	90.26%	90.26%	90.26%	90.26%	90.26%	90.26%	90.26%	90.26%	90.26%	90.26%	90.26%	90.26%	90.26%	90.26%	90.26%	90.26%	90.26%	90.26%	90.26%	
White (approximate)	244436	250616	256795	262646	266962	271785	276472	280655	284238	288151	292044	295933	299824	303711	307594	311472	315346	319215	323077	326932	330780	47%
Black (approximate)	292234	299622	307009	314005	319165	324031	328634	333083	337438	341707	345893	350003	354038	358000	361921	365749	369524	373266	376984	380687	384384	53%
Asian (approximate)	21781	22332	22883	23404	23789	24218	24656	24983	25310	25677	26024	26370	26717	27063	27409	27755	28100	28445	28789	29133	29475	47%
Hispanic (approximate)	27227	27915	28603	29255	29736	30273	30795	31299	31786	32267	32740	33208	33673	34135	34594	35050	35506	35961	36416	36871	37326	47%
Other (approximate)	19561	19831	20340	20804	21146	21528	21899	22207	22515	22824	23132	23440	23748	24056	24364	24671	24978	25284	25590	25896	26200	3%
Adjusted Population Total	605040	620336	635630	650114	660797	672736	684336	695972	703668	712444	723880	735212	745368	756776	770010	784373	799980	816937	835420	855623	876659	2018-2030 Population Growth
																						2030 Male %
																						2030 Female %

**All data and analyses in this model are based on the population of the District of Columbia and not the greater D.C. metropolitan area
Sources: World Population Review, U.S. Census 2010

Appendix 11: Experimental Model (With HQ2)

Assumptions	Definitions
Male %	Percentage of male population out of total D.C. population
Female %	Percentage of female population out of total D.C. population
White %	Percentage of White population out of total D.C. population
Black %	Percentage of Black population out of total D.C. population
Asian %	Percentage of Asian population out of total D.C. population
Hispanic %	Percentage of Hispanic population out of total D.C. population
Other %	Percentage of population that does not racially identify as White, Black, Asian, or Hispanic out of total D.C. population
HQ Gender Ratio Factor	Annualized growth rate of Seattle's single male to female ratio calculated using data from 2010-2014
Baseline Population Growth Rate	Projected growth rate of D.C.'s population for years 2019-2020 (selected as the most conservative growth rate)
D.C. Population Acceleration Rate	Projected acceleration rate of D.C.'s population for years 2018-2020 (selected as the most conservative and up to date growth rate)
HQ Population Acceleration Factor	Acceleration rate of Seattle's population for years 2018-2020 (selected as the most conservative and up to date growth rate)
HQ White %	
HQ Black %	
HQ Asian %	
HQ Hispanic %	
HQ Other %	
Population Shift Period	12 Years

Sources: World Population Review, U.S. Census 2010, Amazon

Appendix 12: Assumptions