

Comparison of Russian - Lithuanian Democratization and Relations

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Though Lithuania is one of the most successful transitions to democracy by a former Soviet Republic, it shares some of the same legacy problems that confronted Russia and the other Republics. At times, Lithuania's democratic process was dominated by the political elite rather than popular will. Like other former Soviet Republics, it lacked experience with civic organizations (political parties, labor, church, community, and social establishments). During its transition, free press and transparent government were often lacking. More importantly, despite Lithuanian attempts at reform, corruption in government and in everyday life have been hard to remove.¹ However, Lithuania is a successful, viable democracy with dynamic political competition. Since independence, it has outpaced Russia and most of the former Soviet Republics economically, entered the EU, and joined NATO. Most remarkable, despite its legacy of corruption and Soviet dominance, tiny Lithuania has lifted itself up and met all of the EU's and NATO's judicial, human rights, and military requirements to be a member in good standing with the European community.

While both Lithuania and Russia wavered in their march toward a liberal society, Lithuania underwent the difficult process of investigating and prosecuting officials, reforming its laws, and striving to eliminate corruption as it moved toward true self-government. Though at times the experience was stressful, Lithuanians stayed the course. In contrast, Russians allowed themselves to slip backwards toward a more authoritarian state, placing trust in a nomenklatura (entrenched bureaucrats) dominated by Siloviki (ex-security service personnel), tolerating the subjugation of dissidence, and wrapping themselves in nationalism and revanchism.^{2,3}

As the first Soviet Republic to call for freedom from Moscow in 1989, Lithuanian society was united against Soviet oppression and communism. It elected an overwhelming majority of pro-independence candidates to the Supreme Council in 1990, and immediately declared a restoration of its sovereignty, which it lost to Russia prior to World War II. Over the next year, there were showdowns and threats, but the Soviet Union eventually recognized Lithuania as a free and independent state in 1991.

Lithuanians had a living memory of self-government and even political parties dating back to Lithuania's period of independence. This imprinted a legacy of democratic institutions upon the country. The public generally grasped how political competition, participation, coalition, and inclusion worked. In contrast, Russia and many other former Soviet Republics lacked such experience. They were more famil-

iar with strongman rule. Both the elites and the general public in Lithuania resented Russian domination and authoritarian rule. This cohesion moderated political competition between political interests throughout the difficult period of institutional reconstruction (1990-1992) which faced not only the normal problems of creating a government, but also a Russian economic blockade and an attempted coup by the Soviet Army in a fledgling independent Lithuania. Once a constitution was in place, political parties, inclusion, and competition followed quickly.⁴ Lithuania also benefited from a diversified industrial base.⁵ Its wealth and industry were less concentrated than Russia's or other former Soviet Republics, minimizing the power of large special interests. Nevertheless, though political competition was and remains strong, public participation has at times been ambivalent and fluctuating, often leaving political elites in a vacuum to decide policy.

Lithuania is pursuing an end to its endemic problems with corruption and nepotism in government, which serve to reduce competition and participation. It improved its concentrated media climate to broaden transparency and, therefore, political competition. Today, the most serious threat to Lithuanian democracy is external. Russia's 'Putinist' policy of revanchism is directed at the Baltic States due to their cooperation with the west (e.g. EU, Euro currency, NATO), strategic location, and energy dependence on Russia. For these reasons, Lithuania's political institutions face serious challenges to insulate themselves and avoid the problems which Levitsky and Way describe as "authoritarian counter-hegemonic powers" that rise to challenge liberal hegemony.⁶

Comparison of the Development of Lithuanian and Russian Political Institutions

In the 1990s, many experts believed free elections would establish a democratic infrastructure.⁷ What turned out to be false for Russia was mostly true for Lithuania. Several differences between these two states proved crucial. Lithuanians had a legacy of successful independence and democracy between World War I and World War II. Lithuanians understood how democratic political competition worked, even though they were also politically suppressed after Russia and Germany divided Eastern Europe in 1940 during World War II. The Lithuanians viewed the threat of partitioning and loss of sovereignty as a great injustice. From a historical point of view, Lithuania is a small country with a distinct culture, history, language, and identity. Korenizatsiya (indigenization into the Russian culture) was never fully accepted in Lithuania. And, as mentioned, Lithuania has no concentrated natural resource or industrial base. This means its business and finance is less susceptible or beholden to outside forces, explaining why it has become more transparent.⁸

Whether to distance themselves from their former rulers or to find a means to protect themselves from Russia in the future, Lithuanians have sought to identify themselves as European. Therefore, they admire the liberal ideals of free markets and self-government so they can be both accepted by Europe as well as achieve greater opportunity and equity. These factors created an environment for democratic transition, propelled by a great desire to never allow Lithuania to be subjugated by the force and weight of their Russian neighbor again. For this reason, the preservation of who and what it means to be Lithuanian is locked into avoiding any dependence upon Russia.

When Perestroika and later Glasnost appeared in the Soviet Union, Lithuanians saw an opening for independence. The Sajudis movement for Lithuanian independence (led by Vytautas Landsbergis) unified the business, intellectual, religious, and political elite with the common people. All favored and turned out for mass demonstrations for independence. In 1991, Gorbachev ordered Soviet troops to occupy government buildings and restore control; the situation resembled Tehran in 1979. Even when confronted with overwhelming power, the Sajudis movement believed their cause was inevitable because it was backed by broad popular resistance.⁹ Gorbachev, like the Shah before him, backed down.

Under the surface, problems of bureaucratic corruption and pay-offs in Lithuania were common and many of these issues remain today. These problems are improving, but unlike the other Baltic States,

they remain culturally embedded. After the 2002 election, the newly elected President was found to be involved in questionable campaign finance and dubious activities with a Russian businessman and, to make matters worse, the investigation exposed criminal elements were involved as well. Impeachment proceeded, was televised, and the legislature and judiciary functioned properly. A conviction and lawful transition of presidential power followed. Ten years later in 2012, a vote buying scandal was discovered leading to a full investigation and nullification of an election.¹⁰ Rooting out these types of corruption led to laws creating government financing of political campaigns. Limits on wasteful, expensive media advertising were put in place to increase political competition and check the influence of money. Nevertheless, petty low-level corruption remains a factor in daily life – from traffic tickets and building inspections to construction approvals and government contracts. Bertelsmann's Sustainable Governance Indicators Report (SGI) confirms this. SGI identifies areas for improvement: transparency of media-ownership, enforcing anti-discrimination rules, citizen participation, and the elimination of corruption in the judiciary, health care, parliament, police and local authorities. After a robust start and high levels of political participation, Lithuania's civic participation remains below average compared to other countries, especially for a democracy. Despite these deficiencies, SGI found Lithuania to be generally a strong democracy operating under the rule of law.¹¹

In contrast, Russia is a vast country with diverse peoples and concentrated natural resource wealth and ownership. Communism dictated past culture, philosophy, sociology, and political thought for 70 years. There were no civic organizations outside the Communist Party prior to 1990 and few have developed since that time. The Russian political system is parliamentary with the Prime Minister appointed by a popularly elected President. Much power is concentrated in the office of the President. Given its history of Communism, people were taught to comply and voluntarily enforce Party norms against one another.¹² Consequently, Russian public ethos differs markedly from Lithuania.

In 1990, Russians did not see themselves as European and may have wanted more freedom, but they were unsure about free markets and remain skeptical of capitalism.¹³ Though invaded in World War II, Russia was not an occupied country and, with the Cold War coming to an end, Russia faced no external threats. Thus, there was no burning fear or resentment to unite the Russian people against a particular enemy or ideology. Russians instead were generally in agreement that the regime under which they lived had failed them. They did not hate Communism or their own countrymen,¹⁴ but they did want reform and the removal of corrupt leaders and nomenklatura who they believed harmed the nation and held it back. Thus, voting in the early Russian elections was not an exercise in independence as it was in Lithuania, but rather an affirmation that Russians wanted accountability from their officials.¹⁵

Yeltsin emerged as the Soviet Union imploded and chaos ensued. He stood for privatization and a hazy concept of democracy.¹⁶ A party apparatchik or functionary himself, Yeltsin's power base was not grass roots or local, but rather handed to him by a removed, political elite – one that expected something in return. He did not fully understand how political competition could strengthen his own position, let alone Russia. He eschewed plans to publicly air past Communist Party mistakes.¹⁷ In contrast, states like Lithuania made a clean break with the past and experienced a greater degree of democratization.¹⁸ The result was that popular support for Yeltsin was mixed. He pursued privatization to make Russians stakeholders and ingratiate himself with them. Shocked by all the changes, the economy contracted severely, tax revenues dropped, the government borrowed and printed money to finance spending, and inflation consumed the people's savings. People soon were forced to sell their shares in the privatized former state companies for cash. Opportunistic nomenklatura and bankers saw an opportunity and bought the shares using loans with favorable terms. Overnight, a power base of industrial empires controlled by the "oligarchs" bloomed. Public cynicism rose and political support weakened.

Since Yeltsin did not build a strong party network with a party platform and political values, he could not muster a power base. Instead, he turned to experts and later, the oligarchs, to manage Russia

from top-down. The experts and oligarchs also lacked or chose to ignore any basic understanding of democracy. Like Yeltsin, they saw government as a kind of spoils system. When this failed and with his popularity waning, Yeltsin began to disrespect institutions vital to a democracy. He employed state power to pressure and then arranged a buy-out of an independent TV station, which was his biggest critic.¹⁹ This and other political maneuverings foreshadowed the top down management of the media and the message that was to come.

To prop things up, the state borrowed more money and this led to a serious flight of capital and devaluation of the ruble. In 1997, Russia defaulted on its debt, causing massive public hardship. In less than a decade, what started out as reform ended up as a failed democracy. Oligarchs and political elite prospered, regional leaders constructed power bases, crime and ethnic terrorism undermined the state, and a civil war in Chechnya broke out. Russia no longer controlled Eastern Europe or the republics while at the same time it was losing control of its internal regions. Jaded by this experience, many longed for law and order and a restoration of Russian greatness. Public disaffection reached a peak.

Unlike Lithuania, Russian democratization was not the product of a unified public and elite. There was no clean break with the past, and no shared purpose or a desire for independence to bring the factions together. There was also no public longing for liberalism or Western values. On the contrary, many Russians remained skeptical of the West or were ambivalent. A decade after the fall of Communism, they again wanted change and reform to end corruption. Yet they were not sure what kind of change. These are the reasons free elections in Russia were not followed by a democratic transition as most experts predicted.²⁰

The elites and intelligentsia in Russia failed to understand the positive and essential role political competition played. This proved pivotal. They did not seek popular support or attempt to build national debate or consensus for their ideas, instead they controlled the political space from the top. When economic policies failed and popular support waned, the experts, followed by the oligarchs, assumed control. Russians, like Lithuanians, lacked experience with civic participation or even non-political social organizations. But unlike Lithuania, Russia had no collective memory of democracy or of participative, civil political competition. Their memories were of Soviet leaders and cults of personality, which is why personality and slogans supplanted policy initiatives. The decision to ignore the development of robust political parties made the process superficial and exploitative. The preservation of power with a spoils system was all that was left to hold power. The entire privatization program, designed to give the people a stake-hold, wound up giving them nothing. Public confidence was shaken by economic catastrophes, corruption, and downsizing in the standard of living.

The dissatisfaction in Russia led the public to call for change, and authoritarianism was familiar to the Russian people. In 2000, the public gravitated to the sounds of order, stability, economic growth, and Russian greatness proposed by a former KGB and Yeltsin anointed fixer named Putin. Calls for patriotism, nationalism, and central authority displaced liberalism which soon became a dog whistle frequently recited in speeches but not practiced. Putin employed state security to curtail and then narrow political competition, opposition, and the free press. By 2004, he had removed regional and oligarchical power, replacing it with a strong central government, a power base of ex-security officials (Siloviki) running the bureaucracy, and pliant oligarchs who, having seen non-cooperative oligarchs jailed, supported Putin in the wings. By 2007, one quarter of all top officials were Siloviki.²¹ Reporting and prosecution of dissidents soon served Putin's purpose to narrow the free political space.

The opposition became props in a deceptive Potemkin democracy where they were targeted for popular disapproval, and then served up as examples to all who might stray outside their lane. The people were told Russia was great because it was not European and not Western, but rather something different and better (reminiscent of the Stalinist Korenizatsia policies).²² In contrast, the West was portrayed as corrupt, capitalism as unfair, liberalism as great deception, and foreign intentions as ignoble.²³

Few today think Russia is transitioning to democracy. Putin is a strongman politician, and his popularity remains well managed and high. Authoritarianism is alive, liberalism is a mirage.²⁴

It is interesting to note that the techniques used to eliminate Russia's political competition began under Yeltsin and even date back to the USSR. As Evans notes, Putin and his circle "mastered techniques that make it possible for the ruling faction to manipulate the mass media, political parties, and public opinion so thoroughly that the outcome of a national election is always a foregone conclusion."²⁵ Andrew Wilson, in his book *Virtual Politics, Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World*, traces the tradition of fake parties, phantom opponents, and 'scarecrow' rivals back to the Czars and what he satirically calls "Absurdistan."²⁶ Absolute power by deceit allowed Putin to freely engage in the restoration of his grand strategy to restore Russian greatness, which included restoring empire and Russian political, military and economic power. In an address to the people in 2005, Putin explained,

*"The collapse of the Soviet Union was the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the century. For the Russian people, it became a real drama. Tens of millions of our citizens and countrymen found themselves outside Russian territory. The epidemic of disintegration also spread to Russia itself."*²⁷ Absent legitimate elections, freedom to question the wisdom of Putin's worldview does not exist and this is what may be most problematic for the former Soviet Republics located in what is now referred to as the "near-abroad."²⁸

Lithuania's Relationship with Russia

After 2005, Russia engaged in intervention, energy curtailment, and hybrid warfare against the more obstreperous former Republics. Russia took territories from Georgia and Ukraine to control resources and strategic location. Russia clearly wants to restore control over the Baltic states to secure and protect the approaches and communications of former Soviet republics, Eastern Europe, and St. Petersburg from real or imagined Western threats. Putin's authoritarian state does this with little internal debate and in the name of restoration and protecting Russian minorities in the near-abroad. (See Fig. 1).²⁹



Figure 1.

Source: Radio Free Europe⁴¹

Even though less than 5% of Lithuanians are ethnically Russian (there are much higher percentages in a few towns), its location and Russia's intentions are the principal threat to Lithuania's liberal democracy. Lithuania borders Russia's militarized exclave, Kaliningrad, and could serve as an important land bridge for Russian access to this isolated eastern province. The Lithuanian port at Laipeda is a vital hub for Belarus (a former republic and also an authoritarian state) both of which the Russia government envies.

In reality, because Lithuania is so small, it has little to no real self-defense against Russia – even though Lithuania spends nearly 2% annually on defense per its NATO target. NATO, and in particular NATO forward deployment, is its only real defense. This boils down to Lithuania doing what is necessary to ensure that NATO, and American forces in particular, have a forward presence to act as a tripwire on Lithuanian territory. In return, Lithuania supports American policies and interests and takes a vigorous and active role in the EU. With energy being so critical to its independence and with Russia demonstrating its willingness to use economic leverage to exert hegemony, resource poor Lithuania built the only Baltic liquid natural gas port facility to import American gas and reduce energy dependence on Russia – a weakness of most Eastern and many Northern European states. After the experience of over 40 years of Soviet dominance, when it comes time for Lithuanians to make choices about trade and commerce, they carefully weigh the implications to their freedom and national identity that such choices carry.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Linus Linkevičius, recently made clear that Lithuania will resist ideas with which it does not agree and defend itself, carefully noting the difference between the Russian people and its powerful elite. Linkevičius noted Lithuania is not looking to provoke, but the hybrid threat posed by Russia's new interventionist policies is the defining stress-test for Europe. He strongly supports sanctions against Russia for its invasion of Ukraine and shares worries over the temptation to use large Russian populations within former Soviet Republics, especially the Baltic States, as a justification for intervention. He wants Europe to wean itself from Russian energy and any other trade dependence, especially since Lithuania trade dependence on Russia is the highest in the EU.³⁰

Lithuania imports \$27 billion annually, 14% of these imports come from Russia, and of that, 80% is energy (oil, natural gas, electricity). Reducing energy dependence removes great risk for Lithuania, which is by far the largest importer of Russian energy among the Baltic states. Lithuanian energy policy is designed to remove its dependence (along with the rest of the Baltic states) upon Russia.³¹ Russia suspended oil deliveries to Lithuania in 2006 for political reasons and natural gas deliveries have been reduced by 60% since 2015. Lithuania is still a large purchaser of Russian electricity, though the amount has declined by 9% since 2013. As for dependence on Russia for exports, 13% of Lithuanian exports across a diverse line of products go to Russia – markets that can be replaced with time, which is underway. Since 2013 and the Ukraine crisis, Russian tourism to Lithuania has been cut in half. While this too has harmed the balance of payments and Lithuanians personally, with time it can be managed.³²

The threat of Russia remains one of the most important factors binding Lithuania's democracy and the desire to live under liberalism to its people. Lithuania is stalwart, it is also pragmatic. They do not seek a confrontation with the Russian regime. They might want a relationship with Russia more like Finland, but realize their location and history exposes them to a greater threat. The EU and NATO memberships lie at the core of Lithuania's economic and security strategy to remain independent.³³

Lithuania's Relationship with Other Former Soviet Bloc States and the West

Lithuania's relationships with other former Soviet Republics is driven by its commitment to independence, liberalism and democracy and its decision to distance itself from Russia. It sees itself as European, therefore, it is much closer to former Republics which are western leaning (see Figure 2.). As the smallest member it has actively participated in the EU and even held the EU Presidency. It led the EU Union for Mediterranean and Eastern Partnership, taking on a regional role to serve as an example of democrat-

ic transition for countries on the southern and eastern periphery of the EU.³⁴ Lithuania is an enthusiastic member of the Three Seas Initiative to align the many countries stretching through Central Europe (between the Baltic, the Black, and Adriatic Seas). Remarkably, it is unafraid to stand up to Russia and ally itself with those who challenge Putin. In late 2018, Lithuania joined Estonia and Poland in calling for more sanctions on Moscow for its on-going Ukrainian intervention and capture of three Ukrainian naval vessels. As part of its overall defense strategy, Lithuania continues to align itself closely to the United States as it relies upon the United States through NATO to counter Russian hegemony.

Former Soviet Periphery



Figure 2.
Source: Stratfor⁴²

Lithuania's Relationship with Baltic States

Lithuania is often grouped with the Baltic States. The most important similarity they share is all faced a narrow window to reintegrate with Europe and escape the orbit of Russia in the early 1990s. At first, they formed a Baltic Union but little was accomplished. While there are similarities between them, these countries are also very different. The populations of Estonia and Latvia are, respectively, 24% and 27% ethnic Russian. The large Russian minority in these two countries present problems for integration, discrimination, and sometimes, dissension. These minorities also present an excuse for Russia to intervene and create avenues for Russian infiltration. The geographies of the three countries are different. Estonia and Latvia have wide land borders with Russia and are closely connected by sea to Sweden and Finland. Estonia sees itself as more of a Nordic country and less a Baltic one.³⁵ In contrast, Lithuania is closer to Belarus and Poland. Though it borders Russia's Kaliningrad exclave, it has no shared border with the Russian mainland. Therefore, Lithuania believes it can pursue a more aggressive policy toward Russia than its Baltic neighbors.

The foreign policies of the Baltic states reflect a strong sense of restitution. Since all three are members of the EU, the Euro currency system, and NATO, their policies are converging.³⁶ Some have suggested they may even join Nordic countries to form an alliance or even a governing entity comprised of the three Baltic States and the Nordic countries.³⁷

Conclusion

Levitsky and Way define formal democratic institutions that often or extensively ignore the parameters of democracy as “competitive authoritarian” states. The parameters they refer to for true democracy are: free and fair elections, universal suffrage, freedom of speech/press/association/expression, and empowered elected officials.³⁸ They further define four key measures of true transition: election integrity, legislative functionality, an independent judiciary, and a free media. The existence of checks and balances on all government branches should be added to this list.

Lithuania has achieved all of these; Russia has achieved few, if any, and the achievements were temporary. Lithuania’s history and perspective helped it avoid competitive authoritarianism and prepared it for liberal democracy; Russia’s experience did not. Russia lacked the collective knowledge that a democracy depends upon for constructive political competition. Derived from an ideologically authoritarian regime, the new Russian democracy could not understand how top down leadership and exclusion could lead to violence (e.g. civil disorder, Chechnya, attempted coup) or how healthy political competition offered opponents the possibility to win power, reducing the possibility of civil conflict, corruption, and illegitimacy.³⁹ Instead, the new Russian democracy came to be built upon corruption as Yeltsin’s inept reforms and lack of interest in grassroots political parties or movements led to a spoils system. The decline of the Russian economy, security, and the loss of international prestige was the price of past mistakes under Communism followed by ineptitude. Combining these created the opening for authoritarian rule. Part of the failure in Russia was due to economic structure, civic apathy and its size, but, both Russia and Lithuania lacked experience with civic participation. To counter this, Lithuania relied upon its past democratic tradition. Russia never had one.

Lithuania, though successful, still faces challenges similar to those which drove Russia off course. An endemic tendency toward petty political corruption and nepotism, something that flourished under the Soviet regime, remains a problem. This can have the effect of restricting political participation. Russia eventually fell into decay, succumbing to repeated crises and civil unrest created by its own misguided leaders.⁴⁰ When faced with adversity, it turned to what it knew, a strong authoritarian figure who could deliver order, stability, patriotism, nationalism, and restoration in exchange for democracy and freedom. At the time, and even to this day, many Russians do not understand what was given up or why it matters. Part of the reason is few Russians were aware of the problems left over from Communism as Yeltsin chose not to make a clean break and disclose the full extent of the problems to the public. Without this understanding, many Russians experienced the pain of Yeltsin’s mismanagement, but never understood the potential benefits of democracy or free markets. This is why they voted for strength and security in 2000. Lithuania experienced some of these same crises (Russian default, 2009 Bubble), but due to its past experience, a strong national unity, inclusion, and vibrant political competition, its institutions held onto legitimacy and were not be undermined from within. Russia had no such protections.

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Focus on Failure:

The Failure of Che Guevara's Foquismo

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Ernesto 'Che' Guevara is as much myth as he is man. The lore of 'El Che' has grown to such epic proportions that it is sometimes difficult to discern between legend and reality. Despite an inability to spread successful revolutionary tactics, Guevara has become a caricature of guerrilla warfare. While revolutions require organic support to sustain themselves, starting a revolution without that support is precisely what Guevara attempted to accomplish. In a secret meeting on December 31, 1966, less than two months after his arrival in South America, Guevara made a fateful decision that would doom his guerrilla cause in Bolivia. Meeting with Bolivian communist leader Mario Monje Molina, Guevara explicitly refused to surrender leadership of his insurgent guerrilla movement to a Bolivian national, dooming his movement to failure before it even began. Many scholars believe that Guevara could not export his brand of guerrilla warfare because of a myriad of factors outside of Guevara's control, but in fact, he failed because he did not understand the power of politics to develop popular support for a revolution.

Guevara's model of guerrilla warfare ignored the concept of setting political and popular conditions for success. According to Guevara's mentor, Alberto Bayo, a people's army of guerrilla columns could fight on their own as long as they fought for legitimate objectives and had the support of the peasants. Guevara did not believe that creating political support was necessary, and instead incorrectly assumed that a small band of guerrillas could generate the required support. Most perplexing, however, is that he writes about the need to win the support of the population, but in practice, he ignored this requirement in the Congo and Bolivia. He ignored this because he learned the wrong lessons from his experience in Cuba. Successful guerrilla campaigns include more than a small group of mountain guerrillas; they require a strong political base and support.

Guevara disregarded basic tenets of successful revolutionaries based on faulty assumptions of Cuban success. The human element, as Clausewitz writes, is critical to any theory of war, as the art of war "deals with living and with moral forces." In an insurgency or revolution, the people are the center of gravity. Guerrilla warfare is a people's war. Therefore, developing widespread peasant support is

essential to any successful revolution. In analyzing Guevara's theory of guerrilla warfare and his actions in Cuba, the Congo, and Bolivia, this paper will demonstrate how Guevara failed to understand the use of politics to galvanize popular support in creating a revolution.

Historiography

Most scholarship attributes Guevara's failure in Bolivia to one of three factors: the role of counterinsurgency forces such as the Bolivian Rangers and the United States; flaws in his military strategy and execution; and political failings such as his inability to create popular support. Two books place his failures squarely on the shoulders of the Bolivian forces: Henry Butterfield Ryan's "The Fall of Che Guevara" and "How the CIA Killed Che: The Murder of a Revolutionary" written by attorneys Michael Ratner and Michael Steven Smith. Ryan, a former U.S. State Department Foreign Service officer, asserts that between 1962 and 1967 U.S. counterinsurgency strategy improved remarkably, and also that U.S. officials involved in Guevara's capture executed great restraint in not 'Americanizing' the effort in Bolivia. Smith and Ratner are adamant that the United States is ultimately responsible for the death of Guevara while Ryan believes that his eventual undoing was a combination of factors, specifically "bad luck, difficult terrain, government spies, Green Berets, and 1,500 Bolivian soldiers." Smith and Ratner, on the other hand, attempt to weave a narrative that the United States explicitly ordered the killing of Guevara, a thesis that evidence does not support. In fact, in "Hunting Che: How a U.S. Special Forces Team Helped Capture the World's Most Famous Revolutionary", Mitch Weiss and Kevin Maurer describe the U.S. contribution to the operation in detail and demonstrate that while the United States Special Forces did provide invaluable training, the ultimate decision to kill Guevara came directly from Bolivian President Rene Barrientos. In regards to Guevara in Bolivia, Ryan also asserts that neither the United States ambassador in Bolivia nor the CIA field officials there participated in the order given by the Bolivian military general staff.

Ryan essentially leaves Guevara blameless, but does speculate that if he had better prepared the local population and generated popular support he may have been more successful. While it is clear that the United States was heavily involved in the hunt for and capture of Guevara, the CIA agents did not murder Guevara, nor did they give the order to do so - Barrientos did. Those involved understood the value of Guevara as a prisoner and likely wanted him extradited to a U.S. military base in Panama for further questioning. Nevertheless, Ratner and Smith provide a host of source documents that allow the reader to draw their own conclusions.

Other scholars look at Guevara's military strategies and abilities to determine that his shortcomings were of a military nature. Paul Dosal and Leo Savage agree that Guevara's failure is due to his inability to function as an effective military commander. In "Comandante Che", Dosal concludes that Guevara's guerrilla warfare strategy was flawed in that it did not take into account the myriad of other tasks required for successful revolution. He also asserts that Guevara was actually a much better conventional military commander than guerrilla leader, which led to many frustrations in the field. Savage is one of the most critical of Guevara's tactics and performance in Bolivia. In his work "Che Guevara: The Failure of a Revolutionary", Savage contends that the Bolivian affair was an ill-conceived plan and Guevara was unable to incite revolution through his foco because he did not properly prepare. On the other hand, Dosal believes that Guevara's failings are a result of his inability to control a sizeable revolutionary movement as well as a faulty understanding of Bolivian culture.

Conversely, according to Jon Lee Anderson in "Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life", Che failed in Bolivia because he repeated the same mistake he made in the Congo of secretly entering another country, attempting to incite rebellion without alerting or gaining the approval of his alleged political allies. Thus his failure stems from an unwillingness to follow fundamental principles of revolution and prepare the environment in which his revolution would take place. Gordon H. McCormick furthers this idea in his article "Che Guevara: The Legacy of a Revolutionary Man," published in World Policy Journal. McCor-

mick asserts that Guevara's inability to let those who had not experienced the struggle lead the effort alienated other factions in Bolivia and prevented him from finding the support necessary to provide new recruits, equipment, and other essential items for a guerrilla force in the mountains.

Still, other scholars analyze Guevara's political shortcomings to demonstrate his failure to find success in the Congo or Bolivia. In "Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life", John Lee Anderson presents a sweeping, definitive text on the life of Guevara, shows how Guevara found few converts to his revolution, and reasons that his failings were political in nature. Winning over a population is crucial to revolutionary success and McCormick also acknowledges this in his journal article. Jorge Castaneda, a Mexican political scientist, further details Guevara's betrayal in Bolivia and postulates that his failures primarily stem from a lack of support by the Bolivian peasantry.

Castaneda also hints at Guevara's personality and how it relates to his leadership methods while McCormick agrees and proposes that Guevara's inability to compromise was another factor in his downfall. McCormick believes that Guevara's stubbornness limited his effectiveness as a leader, and that this also manifested itself in Guevara's problem with allowing politics into the sphere of revolution, which contributed heavily to the failure in Bolivia. Ryan also describes Cuba's inability to reinforce or resupply Guevara and his guerrillas as another indicator of Guevara's disdain for politics. If true, Ryan contends, a lack of support from Cuba is likely due to Guevara's alienation of the Soviet Union, which Castro abhorred, and demonstrates Guevara's political ineptitude.

This study will build upon the research from the scholars above with primary source documents to merge their schools of thought and show that Guevara was unable to use the power of politics to develop popular support for his revolutionary ideals. While it is clear that Guevara did not enjoy popular support for his actions in Bolivia, which eventually led to his death, this paper seeks to answer why he failed to get their support. The theory of foquismo was destined to fail from its inception. Guevara ignored many lessons of Cuba when he wrote it, and he even ignored portions of his own theory. Essentially, Guevara demonstrates an inability to harness the political situation through preparation, and therefore an inability to rouse support. In short, he did not understand the power that politics and popular support had in developing a revolution both in his writing and in practice. This paper will demonstrate that Guevara's ultimate undoing was his failure to merge politics with guerrilla action, a necessary component to building popular support.

Foquismo

Guevara's brand of guerrilla war, known as foquismo, relies on the foco, or focus group, to carry the revolution. The theory is based on the idea that the foco will grow after others hear of its success in battle and join forces, thus becoming the primary political leadership afterward. Guevara's theory rejected the idea of political preparation and instead required the foco to generate popular support through action. Ignoring the years of preparation and hard work done by Cubans that did not land in Oriente from the Granma, Guevara eschewed politics for action. Guevara's three major lessons learned from the Cuban Revolution were as follows:

1. Popular forces can win a war against the army.
2. It is not necessary to wait until all conditions for making revolution exist; the insurrection can create them.
3. In underdeveloped America, the countryside is the basic area for armed fighting.

These three lessons comprised the essence of foquismo: a small vanguard relying on peasant protection in rough terrain provoking the government into responses that would undermine its legitimacy. Guevara's book on the subject titled "Guerrilla Warfare" blends other revolutionary theories with

Guevara's interpretation, juxtaposed with his own success in Cuba. Guevara had learned from his mentor Alberto Bayo that a people's army of guerrilla columns could fight alone so long as they fought for legitimate objectives and had the support of the peasants. Debray, a contemporary disciple of Guevara who joined him in Bolivia, advocated 'propaganda patrols' in which the foco splits and moves among the people, spreading their revolutionary message in an effort to create support. Propaganda patrols represent an interesting idea, though never put into practice by Guevara. Guevara understands, at least in his writings, the power of the people in seeing a revolution through to fruition. He recognizes the need for popular support but does not understand how to develop the support required. He writes, "work must be undertaken to explain the motives of the revolution," but gives no explanation in how to do so.

Reflecting his unrealistic vision of the Cuban Revolution's success, Guevara ignores the requirement of setting political conditions that would galvanize popular support before launching a revolutionary struggle. Most scholars focus on popular support, politics, or military failings; however, these three ideas interplay with each other. Predicated on popular support developed through politics, successful military revolutions require adept leaders that can bridge tactical and political efforts. Guevara's disdain for anyone not actively participating in the guerrilla fight leaves him completely ignorant to the requirements of supporting elements. This is exceptionally intriguing, as Guevara mentions both Mao and Ho Chi Minh in his text on the subject, acknowledging their success in defeating colonists by creating support amongst the people. To Guevara, the guerrilla band is the entire fighting force and guerrilla warfare the only tactic. He did, however, recognize that the guerrilla foco would not win a 'complete victory' outright and that the final phase before victory would become a conventional war. The difficulty, of course, is arriving at this final phase, as it requires a large number of people joining the movement.

Nevertheless, as his actions show, Guevara was unable to complement his foco with the requisite political base to generate support. Robert Dix explains that a sound political base is precisely what successful Latin American revolutions achieve, while unsuccessful revolutions, such as Guevara in Bolivia, are unable to do so. The same is true of guerrillas. A focused combat-only group cannot overcome the lack of a political base. The fight between guerrilla and counter-guerrilla forces is a fight for the people. Each element attempting to delegitimize the other in order to win the support of the population and a political base is required in order to communicate the revolutionary message. Popular support through politics is the most important condition for a successful revolution and Guevara rejects this principle in favor of the foco.

Cuba

In Cuba, the July 26 Movement (M-26-7) had success because it was able to engender popular support and capitalize on a government, led by Fulgencio Batista, that lost its legitimacy. Castro had successfully prepared the political climate, helped by the corruption of Batista's regime, to develop support throughout the island. Guevara's unwillingness to understand the depth of the revolution is crucial in understanding his inability to digest the lessons of the revolution properly. Guevara could not comprehend the clandestine work of urban cells in creating the type of popular support required for success.

On the promise of a restored democracy following Batista's coup, Castro managed to mobilize 100 recruits before his fateful failure at Moncada Barracks on July 26, 1953, the date that would lend its name to his rebel army. Castro's speech after his capture, stating that history would absolve him, did much to rally popular support throughout Cuba. Castro's supporters published the speech in pamphlet form and distributed it throughout the island. This document served as early propaganda for his movement. Despite his failure at Moncada Barracks, the spirit of revolution now permeated the island, and once Castro returned to fan its flame, it would only take 26 months to complete the transformation of Cuba.

While exiled in Mexico, Castro's supporters were active on the island setting the conditions for

success upon his return. The initial plan for invasion included coordinated attacks in nearby cities of the Oriente province of eastern Cuba. Castro's main body would land on November 30. Militants led by Frank Pais, the general coordinator of the movement, were to attack government institutions in Santiago including the Moncada Barracks. Castro would move his men to Niquero (north of the proposed landing site) and link up with Celia Sanchez who would reinforce Castro with necessary supplies, including trucks and more weapons. Castro would then move on to Manzanillo. The strategy involved M-26-7 gaining arms and ammunition as they went, along with more personnel, before finally linking up with Pais' forces and moving to take population centers. Unfortunately, even the best-laid plans often do not survive the first contact with the enemy, and Castro was two days behind schedule by the time he landed. The failure to coordinate precisely between Castro and his underground network threatened to compromise the entire mission, so Castro immediately launched into his contingency plan: guerrilla warfare. Nevertheless, the plan itself demonstrates that a robust underground rebel infrastructure was in place and played a crucial role in the overall success in the revolution in spite of its initial setbacks. Despite his central role in the revolution, Guevara's lack of focus on it demonstrates that he was either unaware of, or unwilling to acknowledge, the underground network's effect on the operation.

Unsurprisingly, the Castro rebels did not initially view themselves as a guerrilla *foco a la Guevara's* theory, but rather a conventional force. Castro's plans included revolutionaries all over the island. Known as the *llanos*, an estimated ten thousand supporters made up the urban and plains revolutionaries. These supporters were influential in spreading the message of M-26-7, keeping lines of communication open, supporting Castro logistically, disseminating propaganda, and funneling recruits to the mountains. Urban revolutionaries were extremely helpful in the eventual overthrow of the regime. They incited riots, strikes, and mutinies in the cities and "carried out numerous acts of sabotage and terrorism," which diverted Batista's forces away from the Sierra Maestra and Castro's vanguard. Under the noses of the Cuban army, Frank Pais managed to send Castro vital supplies: clothes, food, arms, ammunition, and, most importantly, recruits. Without his support, Castro would have found himself an, "easy target of the Cuban army, unable to establish bases, full of ideals but lacking arms and the logistics to fight for them."

Guevara was never able to appreciate the work of anyone not in the guerrilla vanguard. He believed a guerrilla army should sustain itself in the field and he looked down on those not in the mountains with him because he did not believe they had the same political ideology. Castro, with his adept political maneuvering, managed to bring his communist rivals and other revolutionary factions on the island who did not see eye to eye with Guevara into the fold. The success of M-26-7 rests on Castro's immense political expertise and the manner in which he controlled messaging, something Guevara was never able to emulate. Key to understanding Castro's deft political maneuvering is the article written for *The New York Times* by Herbert L. Matthews, who arrived in the Sierra Maestra on February 17, 1957. Detailing the movements objectives and strength, this one article was crucial in broadcasting Castro's intentions and prospects for victory throughout the island. This same day was the first meeting between Castro and members of the urban guerrilla movements, which allowed the two groups to synchronize their strategies. Nonetheless, Matthews' article allowed Castro to create a coherent message and use it to propagandize his movement. He even used the opportunity to insert false messages about a second column and the size of his operating groups in order to give his movement more legitimacy. Batista lifting censorship and allowing the Cuban press to print the article was perhaps more important than the next battle in engendering support amongst the greater Cuban population. Matthews' claims were overblown and outrageous, but demonstrated the validity and importance of propaganda and information operations.

The peasantry of the Sierra Maestra were also crucial to the success of M-26-7, and agrarian reform became the catalyst for their inclusion into the guerrilla movement. Land reforms began in earnest as soon as the guerrilla column arrived in Las Villas. There, Guevara and others went to work preparing

the framework for Sierra Maestra Law No. 3 on agrarian reform, dated October 10, 1957. Furthermore, Castro encouraged his men to treat the locals with respect, and the campesinos of the Maestra returned the respect, always tending to and taking care of the rebels. In addition, unlike Batista's army, Castro's men always paid for their food and lodging and punished those who disrespected peasants. In contrast to Batista's army, the M-26-7 treated wounded Batista regime soldiers with esteem. As Guevara himself points out, "over time this difference had an effect on the enemy and it was a factor in our victory." Bringing peasants into the army had a purifying effect for Guevara, and the merging of the peasantry with guerrilla is why Guevara consistently refers to the rebel army as a 'peasant army.' Furthermore, by mid-March 1958, a series of civic institutions representing some 200,000 Cubans called on the flailing Batista regime to resign. The people had spoken and clearly shown their support for change.

As the Batista regime crumbled, popular support of the revolutionary movement increased because peasants could see that supporting M-26-7 was a much better choice than the corrupt Batista government. Broad popular support from the Cuban population was essential to the success of Castro and M-26-7. In the summer, M-26-7 repelled a 10,000-man strong army assault into the mountains with only 300 fighters. The tide had finally turned, and Castro chose to go on the offensive, gaining more and more recruits as he went. Guevara's final clash included a column over 300 men strong, with civilians from Santa Clara supporting his forces. After three days of fighting, Guevara defeated the 3,500-man army garrison and paved the road to Havana. The fighting at Santa Clara cemented Guevara as a solid conventional commander and taught him that a guerrilla movement must culminate in conventional operations and positional battle against the enemy army.

By the end of his Cuban experience, Guevara would only recognize and understand small portions of the complete recipe for success. In his final battle, where he distinguished himself as possibly a better conventional commander than a guerrilla commander, Guevara's opponent was a dejected military no longer loyal to Batista, hardly a formidable opponent. Enamored by *foco*, Guevara paid little respect to the thousands of men and women who were busy setting conditions for Castro's return and helping funnel recruits, weapons, and equipment to the Rebel Army when they arrived in the Sierra Maestra. Guevara's ignorance of the complexities of revolution-making would cost him in his subsequent adventures as he looked for other places to bring his narrow brand of guerrilla warfare.

Congo

Ever combative and impatient, Guevara certainly did not have Castro's political talents. Guevara chose to support Laurent Kabila's Marxist rebels in the Congo because he believed a victory would help win support from the Soviet Union. In the Congo, Guevara hoped to replicate the success he enjoyed in the Sierra Maestra to demonstrate the validity of his theory. This was not possible because the political situation in the Congo was dire before Guevara arrived and his presence only exacerbated the situation. As he reminisced at the opening of his Congo diary, his trip to Africa is "the story of a failure." Guevara conceptualized that the people of the Congo would unite within their border, despite that border having no basis in local politics since it had been drawn by former colonial rulers. He could not fathom why the Congolese preferred tribalism to socialism, but he did recognize this tribalism as a contributing factor in their defeat. Unfortunately, Guevara was not able to reproduce the success of M-26-7 because he misunderstood the immense political work outside of guerrilla warfare required to unite, incite, and sustain rebellion. Miscommunication, tribal rivalries, and undisciplined guerrillas left Guevara extremely frustrated by the time he left.

The Congolese Marxists never approved of Guevara's presence, nor that of a Cuban combat unit. Guevara was not happy being merely an advisor and training the Congolese. He viewed fighting as the ultimate form of training. Because of this view, he demanded to lead his Cubans into combat alongside the Congolese. Guevara only commanded his Cubans, not locals, and could not enter combat with-

out Congolese approval. By August, however, he predictably no longer cared about Kabila's approval and left for the front to lead his men in battle. Of course, by doing so, Guevara created new problems for himself and his cause. His inability to walk the tight rope that was the political situation in the Congo meant that he would have no impact on the fight there. After seven months of frustration, Guevara and his Cuban contingent left, unable to affect the fight in the Congo because they could not change the political climate within the rebel factions.

Fighting in the middle of Africa with but a few Cuban compatriots, Guevara grew frustrated waiting on Kabila and other leaders to take charge and lead their troops into combat. Guevara himself reflects on their inability to affect the peasantry in the Congo. He specifically mentions how they were unable to provide the peasants with protection, education, or medical supplies - all vital services that could have profoundly affected the revolutionary movement. Near the end, his personality, arrogance, and quick temper got the better of him. His men lost respect for him and nearly called for his removal. Guevara was an unwelcome presence in the Congo who never received approval from the Congolese to lead men in battle, and was therefore unable to turn the tide of revolution.

A final contributing factor to Guevara's failure in the Congo was his inability to shake the perception amongst Congolese that he did not belong there; the Congolese viewed Guevara and his Cuban soldiers more akin to former colonial masters than liberators. Guevara foresaw this problem, and specifically chose Afro-Cubans to negate the issue, but they proved unable to create unity within the ranks, as "the Congolese felt it in the core of their being when a Cuban displayed any disdain toward them." Tensions between the Congolese and the Cubans manifested themselves in terminology. Guevara strove to have his men use the term 'Congolese,' the Afro-Cubans preferring the less sophisticated 'Congos,' a term that, "carried a hefty dose of venom." These issues contributed to the failings of Guevara and his Cubans to find any sort of success in the Congo. The Cubans and Congolese had significant issues rectifying their differences, never able to create a singular strategy. Guevara left in disgust, determined to avoid the same problems in the future.

Bolivia

Emboldened still by success in Cuba, on the heels of failures in the Congo that he attributed more to the Congolese than himself, Guevara arrived in Bolivia ready to spark a continental revolution. As was the case in the Congo, the political situation in Bolivia was not ripe for revolution and as such, the population was not willing to join his cause. He had not adequately prepared for successful guerrilla operations prior to arrival, gave scant attention to the urban network, and explicitly ignored the Bolivian Communist Party. Because of this, in Bolivia his guerrillas did not enjoy popular approval, had no steady stream of recruits, no urban support network, and could not cooperate with the Bolivian Communist Party (PCB). All of this was in contrast to the very reasons M-26-7 succeeded in Cuba, and all would lead to his failure in Bolivia. He ignored the real lessons of Cuba, the power of politics to develop popular support, in favor of his flawed foquismo.

Guevara's foremost political mistake in Bolivia was denying Mario Monje Molina, the First Secretary of the PCB, a key part in the revolution. In their meeting on New Year's Eve of 1966, Monje made three reasonable demands of Guevara:

1. Monje would resign from leadership of the party, but would recruit cadres for the struggle.
2. Monje would head the political-military struggle for as long as the revolution is in Bolivia.
3. Monje would handle relations with other South American parties to win their support.

Guevara preferred Monje maintain leadership of the party and had no objections to Monje handling relations with other South American parties, but would not accept the idea of Monje leading the guerrillas. "I had to be military chief and would not accept any ambiguity on this," Guevara writes. His inability to cooperate demonstrates his disdain for politics, which alienated the existing political base, and precluded him from developing the type of underground support network that the Cuban revolution enjoyed.

Guevara's inability to merge his movement with local politics was clear to his supporters. Fellow Argentine *Ciro Bustos*, whom many view as Guevara's betrayer, wrote in his memoirs, "... it was nonetheless still wishful thinking to embark on armed struggle...to us, insisting on a guerrilla foco was unrealistic." Bustos clearly understood that a motivated working class inspired by political action was crucial to, "raise awareness among the masses," and that, "the political conditions would have to be right objectively, practically and contextually, to justify embarking on revolutionary armed struggle now." The Bolivian army hindered Guevara's plans by capturing Bustos and French philosopher *Regis Debray* in April of 1967. Information learned from their subsequent interrogation directly led to the defeat, capture, and execution of Guevara.

Despite sending his East German communist operative *Tania* to La Paz a year ahead of himself, Bolivia was not ready for rebellion by the time Guevara and the Cubans arrived. *Tania* was ineffective, unable to build the necessary networks, but the entire support effort lacked emphasis by Guevara once he arrived. Instead, by April, she was also in the mountains, recalled by Guevara, rather than fulfilling her role as the strategic link between urban areas, "deep in enemy territory," and the guerrillas. This oversight, along with broken radios, directly contributed to the guerrilla's lack of communication with the outside. Before his arrival, in October 1966, the PCB had already decided not to support his foco and without this, Guevara embarked on his mission minus an urban support system as he had unwittingly enjoyed in Cuba. Guevara's mission in Bolivia without prepared political support networks was unable to achieve success.

In Bolivia, Guevara was more akin to an invader than a revolutionary and, because of this, he had a difficult time recruiting locals to a cause they were not motivated to join. One extremely important condition for revolutionary success was missing in Bolivia: a sympathetic population. Bolivian peasants did not flock to the rebels as in *Sierra Maestra*. In fact, the United States government knew this immediately after Guevara's death. A note from State Department official *W.G. Bowdler* to the President's Special Assistant for National Security *Walt Rostow* states, "what broke the back of the guerrilla movement was lack of campesino support." Almost worse, as the movement failed to gain traction, his Bolivian recruits resented taking orders from Cuban fighters. Guevara's lack of popular support in Bolivia was a result of his inability to understand and maneuver the political situation in the country.

Bolivian peasants were satisfied with their way of life and had no reason to support Guevara over their own government. Guevara did not understand the peasants' situation before embarking on this adventure. *Nancahuazu*, the location where the foco began operations, was perhaps the worst possible place to start a revolution, as Guevara found no landless peasants eager for reform. In fact, they had already had their agrarian revolution in 1952. Guevara himself witnessed the happenings of this revolution and should have understood that the poor peasantry, while not rich, owned their land. Whatever dilapidated crops they grew were theirs and despite Guevara's promises of economic and agrarian reform, Bolivian peasants were content with their status quo and easily supported the government over Guevara's rebels.

Because the Bolivian peasants supported their government, they were difficult to persuade that communist revolution was in their best interest. Bolivian President General *Rene Barrientos Ortuno* enjoyed basic constitutional legitimacy through a series of elections, pacts, and reforms. Because of *Barrientos'* validity, government efforts to undermine Guevara's guerrillas were successful. *Barrientos* and

the Bolivian military effectively demonstrated to the peasantry that Guevara and his guerrillas were a threat to their security and that assisting the government in finding the rebels was in their best interest. Guevara, disappointed by the lack of popular support, blamed “the Bolivian Government propaganda which claimed that the guerrillas represented a foreign invasion of Bolivian soil.” Without a Batista-style, universally despised regime to oppose, Guevara’s ability to mobilize public support suffered.

Guevara may have found a modicum of success if he had paid attention to the plight of the miners in northern Bolivia. It was a missed opportunity that Guevara may not have realized, as he makes scant mention of them in his Bolivian diaries. Nevertheless, on June 24, 1967, the Bolivian government massacred 87 men, women, and children at mining towns of Catavi and Siglo Veinte after a siege and uprising. Guevara hardly pays this event any attention until his end of June summary when he writes that the events at the mines, “considerably light up the panorama for us,” but does nothing to capitalize on what happened nor turn it into positive propaganda for his movement except one ‘communique’ to the Bolivian Miners.

Unfortunately, the secretary-general of the miners’ union died during the attack. Because of the secretary-general’s death and the government’s record of intercepting Guevara’s communique’s, it is unlikely the message was properly disseminated.

Regardless, by the end of June, Guevara had been in Bolivia for seven months and had seen no growth in his movement and especially no new recruits. His diary reflects this as he acknowledges that the lack of recruitment is troublesome, writing, “it is a vicious cycle: to recruit we need to maintain constant activity and to do so we need more people.” A lack of peasant support created a vacuum that the military was able to fill. Guevara himself began to notice this in his end of June report, writing that “the army...is doing work among the peasants that we cannot ignore, transforming all members of the community into informers.” In fact, every month from April to September, Guevara painfully reports, “we have not succeeded in developing peasant support.” By September, Guevara again realizes that the locals were becoming informants for the Army. Furthermore, there is zero documentation of Guevara’s movement recruiting a single peasant to its cause while in Bolivia. Without recruitment, even after his plea to the miners to join his guerrilla force, Guevara’s revolution was destined to fail. Decisive to his lack of gain of peasant support was Guevara’s inability to explain his reasons for guerrilla operations to the locals. According to the Bolivian military officer who oversaw his capture, authorities intercepted Guevara’s communiques, which constituted a much different propaganda result than Castro enjoyed in Cuba. The first time Guevara directly addressed Bolivian peasants occurred in the village of Alto Seco on September 22, 1967- a mere two weeks prior to his death. He spoke anonymously, and allegedly unimpressively, inviting the villagers to join his revolution. Instead of receiving new recruits, the villagers informed the Bolivian army of his location. Guevara’s only attempt to address Bolivian peasants himself directly contributed to his death.

Guevara was an outsider in Bolivia, and in Bolivia’s homogenous indigenous countryside, this did him no favors. In Cuba, the M-26-7 was majority Cuban and had done much to sow the seeds of revolution prior to execution, whereas in Bolivia he ignored this and found an unwelcoming peasantry. A lack of meaningful peasant support for his revolution was Guevara’s ultimate undoing. One of the primary tenants of guerilla warfare is the support of the people. Popular support is why M-26-7 was successful in Cuba, as a prepared support network motivated locals to join in the revolution. Guevara ignored his own treatise on popular support: “Guerrilla warfare is a people’s warfare; an attempt to carry out this type of war without the population’s support is the prelude to inevitable disaster.” Guevara’s lack of political maneuvering contributed to his inability to galvanize the peasants in Bolivia, which, as he foretold, was his inevitable prelude to disaster.

Conclusion

A sound guerrilla strategy involves harnessing the political base to provide a network for the guerrilla and generate popular support. Peter Paret and John Shy, studying guerrilla movements in the early 1960s, found that in conducting counter-guerrilla operations, “good troops employing sound tactics cannot make up for an unsound governmental and political base.” While Paret and Shy were referring to governmental forces, the inverse is true of guerrillas. As this paper demonstrates, Guevara was never able to make up for an unsound political base in either the Congo or Bolivia because he did not understand the role of the political base in Cuba and its effects in garnering support.

In the end, a much larger force of Bolivian Rangers trained by U.S. Special Forces and aided by the U.S. intelligence community soundly defeated Guevara’s seventeen remaining militants. The Bolivian government maintained legitimacy throughout, which in turn kept the peasants from joining Guevara’s movement. The Bolivian Army succeeded in winning support of the peasantry in Guevara’s area of operations, locating the armed band, tracking its movements, and keeping him on the run until finally delivering the finishing blow. Guevara was not a good guerrilla commander, certainly was not a good guerrilla theorist, and never sufficiently revised his tactics on guerrilla warfare. His Tricontinental strategy was grandiose, assumed the residents of those countries desired liberation and would welcome Marxist revolution, and never included a detailed implementation strategy. In fact, Guevara’s writings on guerrilla warfare never bridged the gap between grand strategy and small-scale tactical operations.

Guevara’s ignorance of the intricacies of revolutionary action plagued his movement and were the impetus for his downfall. In the Cuban revolution, Castro had managed the macro-level affairs, politics and propaganda, leaving Guevara to focus on tactical, micro-level minutia of guerrilla operations. Without Castro’s ability to control political and propaganda matters, Guevara was lost, as he lacked the “political sophistication and charms” of the Cuban leader. With Castro navigating the politics, Guevara operated as an excellent aggressive conventional military commander but could not replicate the same success elsewhere. Guevara’s theory, doomed from the start, contributed to many other failed revolutions in Latin America, and led to his death.

Perhaps Guevara’s greatest flaw was his ignorance of what was required to prepare and run an urban underground capable of harnessing a political base, which directly led to his inability to create popular support for his movement. Guevara eschewed mundane political action in favor of the much more exciting life of a dirty mountain guerrilla. In the Congo, he lost the support of Laurent Kabila while in Bolivia he ostracized Mario Monje. Inversely, in Cuba, Guevara excelled because the revolution was organized and generally well prepared for the arrival of Castro and their fighters so that he did not have to concern himself with such tasks as resupply, urban operations, politics, and recruiting. Finally, Guevara envisioned guerrilla warfare as the primary means of fighting the enemy, whereas his contemporaries, such as Mao and Giap, advocated guerrilla warfare as a component, albeit an integral one, but nonetheless only a component of a larger revolutionary strategy. He failed, not because he was inept tactically, but rather because he did not understand the power of politics and popular support in developing and supporting a revolution.

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Questioning Authority:

The MyLai Massacre and Obedience

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Hayden Hemphill was born and raised in Raleigh, North Carolina. She is a graduating Senior majoring in Peace, War, and Defense with a concentration in Evolution of Warfare and a minor in History. She has always had a strong interest in American military history, and after taking a research seminar on war crimes, she began exploring America's role in Vietnam to gain more of a global perspective of the intricacies of war. In her research, she aimed to answer how and why the MyLai massacre unfolded and the central psychological phenomena that occur during atrocities in warfare.

Introduction

On March 16, 1968, during the height of the Vietnam War, a group of soldiers from Charlie Company of the 11th infantry division advanced into the small village of MyLai in the Quang Ngai Province, which was believed to be a stronghold of communist Viet Cong and their sympathizers. Because American intelligence reported that the men would be outnumbered two to one in a "fierce battle," the soldiers were told this operation would be a search-and-destroy mission.¹ At this point in Charlie Company's deployment, four of the soldiers had been killed and 38 wounded due to mines, booby traps, or snipers.² The frustration of the soldiers was reaching its limit, as the enemy avoided open battle and denied the men a chance to retaliate due to the guerilla-style warfare typical of the Vietnam War. Captain Ernest Medina, Charlie Company's commander, impassioned his troops for the attack, claiming that this operation would be an opportunity to avenge their lost comrades. The entire village and its inhabitants were to be annihilated.³ Combined with the factors of the crime of obedience, the concept of dehumanization applied to the victims, and the injustice of the trials that followed, the MyLai massacre and Nazi treatment of Jews in World War II correlate with one another on the grounds of method and technique.

Background

Upon their arrival at the village, no one in MyLai fired a single shot at Charlie Company, yet the American soldiers killed hundreds of unarmed elderly men, women, and children. Following the massacre, there were many attempts of cover-up and denial from members of Charlie Company and higher-ranking U.S. Army officials. Ultimately, only one officer was ever fully sentenced for the events that took place, despite over a hundred men being involved in the mission.

In a guerrilla warfare setting such as Vietnam, it was difficult for U.S. soldiers to identify enemy from non-combatant, which made progress disputable and thus lowered soldier morale. This form

of asymmetric war relied on the ability of the actor with less money, power, resources, and personnel, which was, in this case, the Viet Cong, to undermine the overwhelming force of the United States. The Viet Cong used covert action strategies, meaning that they did not partake in orthodox, open-battle combat. Instead, they used small-scale actions such as laying landmines that are both inexpensive and effective to take out large numbers of enemy combatants without directly facing them. The methods and techniques of the Viet Cong were brutal, often times they ambushed, raided, mutilated, and, on occasion, burned American prisoners alive.⁵ In addition to the unorthodox methods of combat, every member of the Viet Cong guerilla group would wear the same “black pajamas” as any regular rice farmer in South Vietnam, so it made the adversary difficult to detect.⁶ The area where the MyLai massacre occurred, also known as “Pinkville,” had a reputation for majority of residents to be communist sympathizers, which further lead Charlie Company to believe the Viet Cong would possess a strong presence during the attack on MyLai.⁷

Now infamous as a motley crew of misfits and ruthless killers after MyLai, Charlie Company had demonstrated adequate skills for combat and cohesion during training. The unit received high marks for preparedness and training before deployment in Hawaii, but because many of its experienced officers had already served in-country, most soldiers had to be transferred out due to Army regulations that prevented them from returning to combat so quickly.⁸ As a result, many of the lower-ranking enlistees were thrust into leadership roles, which created many setbacks for the soldiers. Although Charlie Company had only been in Vietnam for three months, they had already experienced great loss. In the first two months of deployment, the company lost half of its strength. Two days before the attack, a popular sergeant was killed after stepping on a booby trap.⁹ A memorial service was held for the dead sergeant, setting the stage for the planning of MyLai, which would take place the following day. After the service, Captain Medina urged the members of Charlie Company to avenge the sergeant’s death at whatever cost.¹⁰ Medina was known to possess harsh attitudes toward the Vietnamese. He often allowed his troops to use prisoners as human mine detectors and would personally beat captives during interrogations.¹¹ Immense loss resulted in a collapse of mental outlook, resentment for the war as a whole and the severe treatment Medina enforced resulted in an exceedingly grim mindset. Paul Hines of the Marine Corps Gazette wrote that, after the loss of four men and the injury of 28 due to a minefield three weeks prior to the massacre, the company “died” at that point and existed solely for revenge.¹²

Charlie Company received word that Viet Cong guerrillas had taken over MyLai. Since the soldiers were told all individuals in MyLai were active Viet Cong sympathizers, Charlie Company was ordered to kill all people in the area.¹³ This order resulted in the killing of hundreds of unarmed civilians, and the raping of many women and young girls.¹⁴ It remains one of the most well-known atrocities committed by American forces to this day. Michael Walzer describes the incident when discussing Just War Theory, “A company of American soldiers entered a Vietnamese village where they expected to encounter enemy combatants, found only civilians, old men, women, and children, and began to kill them... not stopping until they had murdered between four and five hundred people.”¹⁵ The actions were unrelenting and inhumane, but the question remained as to how the atrocities occurred and were not only allowed by superior officers, but encouraged. Following the landing of the first wave of helicopters and the securing of the landing zone, Charlie Company did not receive any enemy fire, but the constant stream of machine gun and rocket fire that helicopter gunships sprayed at the nearest huts gave the impression that they were about to partake in a firefight.¹⁶ To encounter what Charlie Company thought was going to be a firefight, the platoons broke up into smaller groups of soldiers, which caused their inexperienced officers to no longer be able to observe them adequately, contributing to the mass confusion and violence that followed.¹⁷ In the midst of the carnage, a helicopter pilot, Warrant Officer Hugh Thompson, saw the massive number of women and children being killed, landed his helicopter in MyLai, and threatened to open fire on American soldiers if they continued to kill the women and children. The efforts of

Thompson led to the end of the massacre and the sparing of fifteen lives.¹⁸ Following the release of the incident to the public, President Nixon noted in a public statement that, “the event was blatantly a massacre, under no circumstances justified, and atrocities against civilians should never be condoned.”¹⁹

The Cover Up

The events that took place at MyLai were covered up and downplayed in an effort to prevent the U.S. Army from being painted in more of a negative light in Vietnam. Commanders of Charlie Company wanted to avoid a scandal. News of the massacre did not break until the following year, and one result of the delay and cover up was discrepancies in numbers of victims.²⁰ In a New York Times opinion piece published during the trial in 1971, Ward Just writes that, “...109 or 205 or 500 or however many dead there were at MyLai. We know that war is hell...but there were a lot of dead at My Lai, and some of them were infants.”²¹ For more than a year, no official report was submitted about what happened at MyLai and it was kept quiet by officers in Vietnam at the time. However, Ron Ridenhour, a former soldier of the 11th infantry division, sent a letter to the president, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff, the secretary of the Army, and about a dozen congressmen and senators, finally exposing the massacre.²² This forced President Nixon to take on maintaining an acceptable reputation of the U.S. Army for an atrocity that did not take place under his administration.

Comparative Methods

There are a number of parallels between the treatment and method of the killing of non-combatants by the Germans in World War II, which resulted in the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal, and the soldiers of Charlie Company at MyLai. Both involved the crime of obedience. Telford Taylor made a comparison of the two events and methods in his book, *Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy*. Taylor was the chief prosecutor during the Nuremberg war crime tribunals following World War II.²³ He became a trailblazer in holding leaders accountable for their actions during war time and sought the right for the international community to seek justice for crimes against humanity.²⁴ During the Vietnam War and the years that followed, Taylor became an outspoken critic of both American conduct in Vietnam and the war itself. In his book, Taylor begins by explaining an overview of war crimes and describes broad questions concerning the conduct of war, followed by specific examples of the problematic events that unfold during war time.

One of Taylor’s most important inquiries of both Nuremberg and Vietnam is that of the crime of obedience, which is when a soldier claims a defense that they did not commit any wrongful act due to the fact that they were simply following the orders given to them by a superior officer. The issue of obedience and superior orders during war has endured since the beginning of warfare, changing as based on the circumstances of the conflict. Certain conduct, such as killing an enemy combatant, is not regarded as criminal during the course of war, but this allowance is not unlimited, and does have boundaries. Taylor explains, “[the laws of war] are also as we will now see, unstable in the sense that their enforcement is and has always been spasmodic and uneven, and changeable in that the extent to which they are observed may be rapidly altered by the circumstances and techniques of warfare.”²⁵ Although the circumstances, techniques, and weaponry have changed since the beginning of warfare, the defense argument of the crime of obedience has been continually rejected when brought to trial. The first documented instance of the crime of obedience used in a defense argument was after the Stuart Restoration of the English Monarchy in 1660.²⁶ The commander of the guards at the trial and execution of Charles I was put on trial for treason and murder, and the officer defended himself on the ground that, as a soldier, he was to obey the commands of his superior officer or die. The court ruled that, “when the command is traitorous, then the obedience to that command is also traitorous,” meaning that when the command is unlawful, the soldier is expected to disobey.²⁷ The importance of precedence under common law re-

garding the crime of obedience is discussed as well. Taylor notes that the argument continued to be used hundreds of years later and, in 1804, Chief Justice John Marshall declared that superior orders justify a subordinate's conduct only if not to perform an unlawful act, and other early decisions produced the same outcome.²⁸

Proximity and Decision-making

The argument of obedience or superiority is an ineffective argument in the case of MyLai due to the fact that there was no actual battle, so soldiers were not making hasty or in-the-moment decisions. Although, in guerrilla warfare, it is hard to determine enemy from innocent civilian, there remains a rigid difference between guerrilla warfare and massacre. The most brutal guerrilla conflicts are distinctive from flagrant slaughter. There is credible evidence from accounts of members in Charlie Company that soldiers were well aware of the difference. Some men had to be ordered two or more times to fire their weapon before they could bring themselves to do so.²⁹ This argument of the crime being justified by following orders from a higher command blindly as was introduced as a defense in Nuremberg cannot apply to situations of such close and direct proximity.

When war is fought from a distance, such as artillery men with their weapons aimed at what they believe to be their target, or pilots who do not have an accurate view of their target, it is easier to be assured by a commander that the target is a combatant.³⁰ There is a greater threshold for ignorance when the distance from the target is greater. These men of Charlie Company were in close, face-to-face contact with the villagers of MyLai. Therefore, it was clear that they knew the targets were not close to meeting the standards of "legitimate military objectives," and were instead a majority women and children.³¹ That is why for the soldiers to continue to fire and follow orders was shocking for so many. Walzer confronts the question of responsibility regarding superior orders; "It is in such a situation that we want them to disobey: when they receive orders which, as the Army judge said at the Calley trial, 'A man of ordinary sense and understanding would, under the circumstances, know to be unlawful.'"³² This disobedience did not occur in MyLai, and the villagers suffered the consequences.

Although many of the soldiers that took part in the My Lai massacre complied to superior orders, there are instances of resistance. Private Meadlo of Charlie Company reported to Lieutenant Calley, one of the commanders, that all of the villagers were following his orders after Charlie Company occupied MyLai.³³ Lieutenant Calley responded that he wanted the villagers killed, and ordered that they all be killed while he instructed soldiers into a firing line. Private Meadlo broke down in tears; "If they are going to be killed, I'm not doing it. Let him do it."³⁴ This encounter and break down demonstrates that the soldiers knew that they were given wrongful orders, and Private Meadlo demonstrated the disobedience that is meant to be shown to continue conducting a just war.

In the military, there is an emphasis on efficiency, which operates through a chain of command. Taylor describes that, "military service is based on obedience to orders passed down through the chain of command, and the success of military operations often depends on the speed and precision with which orders are executed,"³⁵ and thus psychologically engrains in the mind of military service members to follow orders, which puts them at a disadvantage in assessing whether an order is just. Additionally, soldiers at war are risking their lives against an enemy, and face severe or possibly capital penalties on the basis of their own assumption that their superior's orders are unjust or arbitrary.³⁶ Although, in the case of Private Meadlo disobeying the orders to fire at civilians lined up in front of a ditch, the soldier was not harmed or penalized for his choice. This demonstrates that any given soldier at My Lai could have rejected the orders to kill in the same way and not face immediate or life-threatening consequences.

The argument of obedience and the question of responsibility continues to be used in justifying warfare conduct because, as warfare develops, the rules of engagement change as well. Vietnam forced military commanders to question whether all of the rules of conventional warfare could be applied to

irregular warfare as well. The rules of engagement regarding civilians were clearer in World War II, and that was how it was so obvious that the Germans were committing atrocities with Jewish civilians and therefore should be held accountable. The same core principles could be applied to serving justice to a war crime in Vietnam such as My Lai, but the enforcement is much more complicated due to the fact that the lines were blurred between civilian and combatant in guerrilla warfare. Due to this drastic change in the technique of warfare, the argument emerged again, and will continue to be used as warfare changes in the future and different actors are held accountable.

Tokenistic Outrage

An additional parallel between the My Lai massacre and Nuremberg was outrage from the American public and the lack of action taken to fully address both atrocities. Regarding the Nazi treatment of Jews, the Nuremberg trials were created, and although the trials possess a reputation as justice for the Holocaust, the word “Jew” or “Holocaust” was rarely mentioned in the trial, which mainly focused on persecution of the Germans based on a crime of aggression.³⁷ Regarding the My Lai trial, the American public was shocked and dismayed when the atrocity was exposed, and it demonstrated to Americans that the U.S. was not only fighting a war with no purpose, but also blatantly harming innocent civilians in the process. Yet there was no pressure or promotion for justice for the victims. For the severity and number of casualties from the atrocity at MyLai, there was not an adequate number of servicemen charged. Of the over 100 men who participated in or planned the operation at MyLai, only 28 officers and enlisted men were charged.³⁸ Out of those 28 charged, only six were then officially court-martialed, and ultimately only one single individual was convicted. Lieutenant William Calley was originally sentenced to life with hard labor, which was soon reduced to 20 years, and then 10 years. Ultimately, Calley ended up serving less than four years in prison.³⁹ For both the MyLai trial and Nuremberg trials, and for many war crime tribunals to follow, existed a theme of tokenism, meaning that the war trials were used to placate public outrage more than deliver justice to war crime participants.

Ingrained Killing

There were many cases of men being urged by their superiors to kill in the Vietnam War, so much so that the members of Charlie Company argued that the act of killing Vietnamese had been ingrained in their mind. The Viet Cong refused to take part in conventional war, which resulted in uncertainty of enemy combatants. In the context of a war where the enemy is obscure, the war was being waged not only against the communist guerrilla Viet Cong, but also against the entire Vietnamese population as a whole due to the inability to differentiate. To encourage American soldiers in Vietnam to destroy all possible guerrilla fighters, degradation of the enemy was a common tactic used. This was an effort to, “be safe rather than sorry,” and resulted in the dehumanization of the target enemy and inhumane treatment of civilians who were unknown to be civilian or combatant. An eyewitness account noted a separate example of this immediately following the MyLai massacre. Two soldiers eating near My Lai noticed that some of the victims of the massacre were still breathing and some were moaning. The two soldiers noted that there was no way they could seek medical help anytime soon in an effort to save their lives, so no effort was made to transport the victims to a hospital or provide treatment. Instead, the two soldiers decided to shoot them dead. This method of killing, the same way one would “put down” an animal, demonstrates that the villagers of My Lai were not viewed as human beings, and were dehumanized in an effort to combat guerrillas with no concern given to the issue of collateral damage. An additional showing of dehumanization which resembles the same sort of methods of the Nazi style of killing in World War II was the concept of a mass grave. One German construction engineer noted in an affidavit during the Nuremberg trial that he was an eyewitness to Jews herded into lines to stand on the edge of a mass grave in Ukraine where they were killed by firing squad and their bodies then thrown on top of one another. A

soldier at My Lai noted an analogy in the two methods, and explicitly refers to the Vietnamese, “in a group, standing over a ditch—just like a Nazi-type thing.”⁴⁰ An additional similarity in both of the atrocities was the scarcity of men in the graves. There were little to no boys or men of combat age present at My Lai, and one of the soldier’s eyewitness accounts at My Lai stated that he did not remember seeing any men in the ditch, only women and children.⁴¹

An important aspect to point out when discussing non-combatant victims of war is that in the guerilla warfare setting of Vietnam, the prevalence of only women and children did not necessarily always mean peace and innocence. Taylor states that, “it is not necessary to be a male, or particularly strong, to make a booby-trap, plant a mine, or toss a hand grenade a few yards. American soldiers are often the losers in these lethal little games played by those who appear helpless and inoffensive.”⁴² It was common in Vietnam for the inhabitants to play the dual role of victim and participant, especially in an area such as My Lai, regarded as a Viet Cong stronghold where the hamlets also occasionally served as Viet Cong military bases.⁴³ This information about the entire population participating in the armed struggle puts the incident into perspective, and explains why the men were distrusting of the village’s innocence even though there were only elderly men, women, and children present. Although, it does not justify the conduct of the soldiers at My Lai due to the fact that they never encountered a booby trap upon entrance of the village and no harm was inflicted upon any member of Charlie Company. Not one villager was armed with a weapon.

Repercussions

Another factor that contributed to the dehumanization of the victims even after their deaths was how the congressional inquiry to the incident, meant to serve as justice for the atrocity committed, was conducted. The inquiry was done by Edward Hebert, described as, “a Southern conservative who was also defensive of Southern racism, fierce anti-communism, and super patriotism and support for the American military.”⁴⁴ Hebert had also been advocating the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Vietnam, which is an additional example of an inhumane use of force against the civilian population. As a staunch supporter of patriotism, Hebert was pressured to render a favorable report. Hebert may not have held a high regard for the value of the lives of the villagers of MyLai, but he did expect more from the United States military in terms of conduct.⁴⁵ His investigation produced a fifty-three-page document that concluded My Lai was a tragedy of major proportions, one that, “was so wrong and so foreign to the normal character and actions of our military forces as to immediately raise a question as to the legal sanity of the men involved.”⁴⁶

There had been a divide between the American public regarding the opinion on the war effort before the incident occurred, but MyLai assured the majority of the U.S. that Vietnam was an ill-advised war. “Disputes between supporters and opponents of the war had previously focused upon America’s policy of intervention in Vietnam. Yet, by 1971, when a military court convicted Lieutenant William Calley of the murders at MyLai, 65 percent of Americans believed the war was morally wrong.”⁴⁷ My Lai not only propelled the anti-war movement, it resulted in criticism of the United States’ military establishment. The Americans were supposed to be a part of the side that was admirable and virtuous, not the side committing unthinkable horrors. A former commander of U.S. Special Forces in Vietnam claimed that most people think that the Japanese, Germans, or Russians are the only ones who commit atrocities, but American troops have proven equally as capable.⁴⁸

Psychological Phenomenon Conclusion

The events that unfolded at MyLai highlighted two central psychological phenomenons in warfare; the crime of obedience and the dehumanization of the target. Soldiers were trained to act promptly and to not question authority, and this issue came to a head in the cruel and complex environment that

was Vietnam. Although the crime of obedience was immediately dismissed while accessing the atrocities of the Germans at Nuremberg, matters were more complicated in Vietnam, and when more realistic assessments were applied, it could be seen that the very nature of the military requires prompt obedience, leaving little time to determine justness of the order.⁴⁹ However, this does not justify the atrocity. The intersection of obedience and guerrilla warfare resulted in the MyLai massacre, with dehumanization as a contributing factor as well. The dehumanization encouraged killing without making careful discriminations and the issue of obedience emerged, which depended completely on if the soldier regarded the order as unlawful or not. From the evidence presented of multiple men refusing to shoot, the soldiers knew the orders were unlawful and did not want to participate. The My Lai trial was groundbreaking because it forced United States officials to not only reassess the structure of the U.S. military, the efficiency of leadership, and chain of command, but also the reevaluation of how higher responsibility is defined. Thus, the My Lai massacre reconsidered the conduct of just war and acknowledged the fact that the anomaly regarding obedience of orders evolves with the technique of warfare.

Endnotes

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8. Christopher Levesque, *The Truth Behind My Lai*, (The New York Times, 2018).
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26. *Ibid.*, 43.
27. *Ibid.*, 43.
28. *Ibid.*, 43.
29. Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, 310.
30. *Ibid.*, 310.
31. *Ibid.*, 312.
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33. Levesque, *The Truth Behind My Lai*.
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35. Taylor, *Nuremberg and Vietnam*, 50.
36. *Ibid.*, 50.
37. Gary Bass, *Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals*, (Princeton University Press, 2000), 148.
38. Taylor, *Nuremberg and Vietnam*, 43.
39. *Ibid.*, 43.
40. *Ibid.*, 136.
41. *Ibid.*, 136.
42. *Ibid.*, 135.
43. *Ibid.*, 134.
44. Mark Carson., *Edward Herbert and the Congressional Investigation of the My Lai Massacre*, 69.
45. *Ibid.*, 70.
46. *Ibid.*
47. *Ibid.*, 69.
48. William Greider, *The My Lai Massacre*, (The Washington Post, 1999).
49. Taylor, *Nuremberg and Vietnam*, 44.