The Possibility of Renewed US Presence in Afghanistan
Graphic by Miles Kershner.
When the US withdrew from Afghanistan in July of 2021, it left behind Bagram Airfield, a strategic stronghold 30 miles outside of Kabul that once hosted US and NATO forces, a prison complex, and a fully functioning hospital. It served as the logistics and operations hub for the 20 year war in Afghanistan. Now it sits deserted, with the majority of its supplies and equipment having been either destroyed in the wake of the US evacuation or looted by the Taliban.
In recent weeks, however, US president Donald Trump has expressed desire to regain control of the base. In a September Truth Social post, Trump warned that “bad things are going to happen” if the Taliban does not “give Bagram Airbase back to those that built it.” The statement is highly ironic for multiple reasons. For one, Bagram was built by the Soviet Union in the 1950s, not the US. For another, during his first term, Trump himself signed the very agreement with the Taliban that set the stage for the eventual withdrawal. “The US pledged that ‘it will not use or threaten force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Afghanistan, nor interfere in its internal affairs,” said a Taliban spokesperson. Retaking the base would certainly be in violation.
So why does Trump want it back? While the base is a strategic location for running counterterrorism operations, Trump seems more concerned about competition with China. The Chinese have been accelerating their engagement in Afghanistan since the US withdrawal by pursuing the country’s deposits of rare earth minerals and embedding itself in Afghanistan’s critical infrastructure. Trump also claimed that the base sits “an hour away from where China makes its nuclear weapons.” This is only partially true—China tests nuclear weapons at a site a little over 1,200 miles away, reachable in an hour via F-16 fighter jet. It would also simply be a projection of US power in the region, aligning with Trump’s supposed “peace through strength” model.
To be fair to the President, retaking Bagram is not a pipe dream. While the Taliban have publicly rejected the idea of US military presence in Afghanistan, internal divisions within the group may leave the door open for that conversation. There are backdoor diplomatic channels at Trump’s disposal, such as using Qatar or the UAE as intermediaries, should the Taliban be willing to negotiate.
The question is not one of feasibility, but rather cost-benefit. Powers such as China, Russia, and Iran, who also seek to assert power in the region, would see the move as a threat, heightening tensions amidst an already fraught geopolitical situation. The open-ended threat from Trump that “bad things are going to happen” suggests that the US may be willing to take Bagram by force should negotiations with the Taliban fail (or fail to occur at all). This puts the US at a high risk for mission creep—history shows that “limited” engagements often do not stay limited. Practically, getting the base back to operational standards would be a costly logistical nightmare given the security situation on the ground in Afghanistan.
The US withdrawal from Afghanistan was a chaotic, messy disaster, but the motivations for doing so should not be ignored: two decades, trillions spent, and thousands of lives lost with no stable democracy achieved. The US should not ignore its regional history and risk another potentially lengthy, deadly, and costly entanglement.