A Policy of Table-Clearing

We who are so focused on the world of foreign affairs seem laser-focused on the interactions, all or most of them increasingly hostile and competitive, between the United States and China. We study them in school: one, according to foreign policy pundits, a power ever on the rise, destined to blow the world order into smithereens; the other, the former champion of the Cold War, now desperate to hang up its “world policeman” hat and retire into the sunset of protectionism and domestic disorder. It would seem that the United States-dominated world order that has thrived throughout the last 75 years is in its death throes, especially after the inflammatory statements made by Defense Secretary Peter Hegseth and Vice President J.D. Vance at this week’s Munich Security Conference. The only thing left for us Westerners to do is wait for the dawn of a new, multipolar world in which China is on top everywhere and in everything, from Saudi Arabia to Sudan, from semiconductors to silk scarves.  

But those who follow the dynamics of our changing world know that things are rarely so simple. For one thing, many China analysts have become more worried than ever about the continued growth of the Chinese economy, as slow economic reinvigoration policies and inadequate reform measures following Beijing’s disastrous response to the COVID-19 pandemic (and an increasingly aging population) have shown. And, as Yun Sun writes for Foreign Affairs, the CCP has been bracing itself for the Trump presidency by expressing eagerness for a revitalization of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which the United States abandoned in 2017, and by diversifying its trade agreements to make up for the lost US markets on which it so heavily relies. The United States, standing from its bully pulpit, has been trigger-happy with trade policies of its own, including President Trump’s well-covered flurry of tariffs against friends and foes alike. But some indicate not a complete unwillingness to continue its expansion towards heretofore ignored states, exemplified by Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s forays into South America and South Asia. But make no mistake: China is here, the United States relies on them, and as Washington shifts its foreign policy focus towards battling the Chinese government, the average person is going to be hearing a lot more about them.  

Dealing with our demanding—and occasionally belligerent—Pacific neighbor, however, has not been easy, to say the least. Xi Jinping has allegedly expressed his desire to have the People’s Liberation Army ready for an invasion of Taiwan by 2027, despite doubts both of his real timeline and his capability to do so. Publicly, the PLA has been infamous for its repeated invasions of Taiwanese airspace—a frequent scare tactic for the island China deems its own territory—as well as near-constant conflicts over territory in the South China Sea and other Pacific zones.  

In times like these, and with competitors like this, it is necessary to develop a comprehensive plan for approaching the Chinese government, managing individual and group interests, and creating a good deal for the parties involved, and it is the opinion of the author that the current negotiating strategy of the United States has been ineffective. As it stands, the United States needs Taiwan for its semiconductors (which go into anything from cars to computers to medical equipment to refrigerators) and, with Taiwan under threat, that vital aspect of the American technology industry is unacceptably vulnerable. But what it also needs, as the world continues to shift towards the Asian-Pacific and away from the mistakes of the Middle East, is a stable Pacific region, one without the threat of Chinese territorial aggression, which will inevitably drive a wedge between America and its allies if Washington’s commitments to their defense continue to go uninvoked. And it isn’t difficult to understand some of the trepidation expressed by policymakers: all of the above problems represent a massive load on the plate of US Diplomats at home and abroad. What is necessary, then, is a policy of table-clearing.  

Table-clearing is to be an approach to these multilateral problems between the United States and China in which one issue is approached at a time, with smaller issues coming before those pivotal, order-changing agreements that are likely to take months or years and leave no feather unruffled. Think of it like putting the plates and silverware away before ripping off the tablecloth in one fell swoop. Approaching such an important but competitive state like China with rapport-building agreements (say, reapproaching the CPTPP) will establish a working relationship with Beijing, allowing a good sense of familiarity, confidence, and one of the most under-rated tenets of relationship building, predictability. Maintaining strong, interpersonal ties between government officials such as these offer only gains for the parties involved, as the bonds of repeated contact dash away the clouds of suspicion and mutual adversity. We have yet only to see it happen, but the author is confident that America will grow stronger as a result.