Arab-Israeli ties are normalizing, but there remains one important hurdle

Suhas Nannapaneni

With the decline of pan-Arabism, normalization of Arab-Israeli relations, rise of a dangerous Iran, and exit of the United States from the Middle East, the next decade will likely see a monumental shift in the geopolitics of the Middle East – specifically regarding Israel and Saudi Arabia’s not-so-secret backdoor alliance. However, even if the two nations’ governments can formalize an alliance, it does not solve the issue of the extremely embittered population of Arab countries who still refuse to recognize Israel.

In August 2020, the U.A.E announced a deal to allow regular air travel and diplomatic communications with Israel. This was followed by similar announcements from Bahrain, Oman, Sudan, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia. Although each nation has specific reasons for easing relations, there are overlapping factors relevant to Arab-Israeli relations at large. Namely, pan-Arabism has declined in legitimacy and influence at the Palestinian’s expense resulting in the priority of bilateral diplomacy over multinational coalitions.

Oman began accommodating Israeli lawmakers, Bahrain hosted Israeli business delegations, Qatar worked with Israel to supply aid to the Gaza Strip, and Saudi Arabia acquired Israeli weapons. 

Another factor that has fostered better relations is the rise of Iran following the Arab Spring. No single nation could contain Iran which has vested interests in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen. This motivated a backdoor-alliance between Israel and Saudi Arabia, and by extension, the other Persian Gulf States. 

However, as is often the case with modern geopolitics, the potential for unprecedented levels of transregional commercial activity is just as important as national security concerns. The prime example would, of course, be the Belt and Road Initiative, but a similar vein of geopolitics is being practiced within the Middle East as well. Here, two unprecedented economic projects reveal further pressure on Arab-Israeli relations. 

The first is the Tracks for Regional Peace Initiative which was announced in 2019 by the Israeli foreign office and endorsed by then-President Donald Trump. This Initiative plans to create a transregional railway to further connect the trade of Europe and the Persian Gulf, bypassing the more tumultuous maritime routes of the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Bab al-Mandab. Specifically, the rail would link the Israeli port city of Haifa to Jordan and onwards into Saudi Arabia. Here, the new supply chains would connect to the ports of Bahrain, Oman, and the U.A.E. Only in Jordan and Oman does additional rail need to be constructed to link the hubs of the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf – which means the initiative could be completed in a relatively short period. Israeli analysts believe that by 2030, $250bn would travel on the tracks each way, contributing much to the non-oil economic sectors of the Persian Gulf. 

The second major economic initiative is the Saudi-planned megacity of Neom situated at the entrance of the Gulf of Aqaba which comes with a cost of $500bn. It seeks to not only tap into the trade which passes through the Red Sea, but to expand into high-tech industries following the blueprint of Israel. The purpose of the mega-city is to propel the Saudis into the post-oil era, earning it the highest priority from Mohammed bin Salman.

However, Neom also seeks to create connections with Egypt and Jordan across the Straits of Tiran. Part of Neom’s city plan is the construction of a 10-km bridge across this trait. However, the 1979 peace treaty between Israel and Egypt recognized the waters of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran as international waters. Any infrastructure that crosses and blocks the straits would require a rewriting of the treaty. So, this means that the completion of the megacity of Neom would require Saudi Arabia to formally recognize Israel in order to negotiate – a major step towards normalizing Arab-Israeli relations. 

Despite the national security concerns and common ground created by economic initiatives, there exists a major hurdle – public opinion in Arabian countries. In a poll conducted by the Arab Opinion Index (2019-2020) which asked how citizens would react to their country diplomatically recognizing Israel, there was an overwhelming majority who opposed the consideration. In Lebanon, 94% opposed. In Jordan, 93%. Egypt, 85%. Qatar and Kuwait, 88%. And Saudi Arabia, 65%.

With heightened sensitivity towards popular discontent and the outbreak of multiple civil wars since the Arab Spring, Arab countries realize that a normalization of Arab-Israeli relations cannot simply happen between government officials behind closed doors. Whether they like it or not, Arab governments require some commitment from their people which will shape to be one of the largest domestic issues in Arab countries in the new decade.