Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh: The post-Soviet Conflict You’ve Never Heard About

Most Americans have never heard of Armenia and Azerbaijan, two neighboring counties located in the Caucasus region with a complex shared history. Last month, when tensions flared between the neighbors, it was only a culmination of the more than 30 year dispute largely unknown in the United States. So, what is this conflict and what is it about? What happened in the past month, and what does it mean for global and regional dynamics?

Armenia and Azerbaijan were both Soviet republics under the USSR, and their relations remained largely unremarkable until 1991, when dissolution of the Soviet Union led to both nations declaring their independence and setting territorial boundaries based on the lines of the former Soviet ‘oblasts’—lines drawn by Stalin which ignored ethnic geographies. This led to conflict, as the region of Nagorno-Karabakh (interchangeably called Artsakh) was given to Azerbaijan despite being around 95% ethnically Armenian. The region declared its own independence from Azerbaijan in the Republic of Artsakh, but was never internationally recognised. Tension resulted in the First Nagorno-Karabakh War in the early 1990s, resulting in over 30,000 casualties, and Armenia occupied Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding Azerbaijani territory. Nagorno-Karabakh, with its capital and main city of Stepanakert, became heavily reliant on Armenia for economic, military, and humanitarian support delivered from Yerevan, and was governed as a ‘de facto’ part of Armenia.

This uneasy settlement did not last, however, with frequent border clashes and larger conflicts flaring up throughout the years, notably in 2016. In September 2020, the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War saw intense fighting in the region, and Azerbaijan regained some of its sovereign territory occupied by Armenia in the previous conflict. Thousands died, and the conflict came to an end after several weeks when Russia negotiated a peace settlement. Armenia retained a small portion of Nagorno-Karabakh, including Stepanakert, and the region’s safety was guaranteed by the presence of a Russian peacekeeping force. The Russian presence also guaranteed Armenia the use of the Lachin Corridor, a small road intended for the delivery of supplies and support to the Armenian exclave.

This uneasy peace lasted for only 2 years, however, since in December 2022, the use of the Lachin Corridor was disrupted. Azerbaijani ‘eco-activists’ supported by Baku occupied the corridor and completely cut off the Armenian support to Artsakh, including medical, food, and other humanitarian shipments. Armenians in and outside of the exclave feared that this blockade was an attempt at ethnic cleansing of the region by Azerbaijan. From that point until last month, the 150,000 ethnic Armenians living in the territory lived in the midst of this humanitarian crisis.

With all of this history in mind, we can look at what happened recently in Artsakh: at the end of September, Azerbaijan completed a military takeover of the breakaway region, which will officially cease to exist by the beginning of 2024. Over the course of several days, a heavy bombardment of the region began, leading over 100,000 ethnically Armenian residents to flee to Armenia. International concern has centered on the possibility for ethnic cleansing and a cultural genocide of the historically Armenian region. The takeover of the region has had several consequences for Armenia, the region, and the global order.

First, recent events have led to a major shift in Armenia’s relationship with Russia. As a previous Soviet republic, Armenia has had close relations with Moscow for many years, including the use of Russian peacekeepers in guaranteeing the stability of the region. However, new actions have signified a shift in Armenian-Russian relations, perhaps related to the perception that Russian peacekeepers failed to help Armenia and in doing so, failed to fulfill obligations of the earlier peace deal. Earlier this month, Armenian lawmakers ratified the Rome Statute, joining the International Criminal Court. Crucially, countries who are parties to the Rome Statute are asked to arrest Russian President Vladimir Putin if he travels to their territory, following an ICC arrest warrant related to the war in Ukraine. Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan also suggested that Armenia needed to “diversify [its] relationships” concerning its sovereignty and security. This is a major shift from previous, much friendlier, relations, which led to rebukes from Moscow and heightened tension. It heralds not only the decline of Russia’s soft power in the region, but also the growing influence of Western powers such as France and the United States.

France and the United States have been increasingly influential in the region recently, with France sending military weapons and defense systems to Armenia, and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken warning that Azerbaijan could soon plan to invade Armenia. An increase in Western concern, however, has not been followed by concrete action or allyship. France and the US are both members of the Minsk Group, which they co-chair with Russia. The Minsk Group, a subsidiary of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), is dedicated to conflict resolution and a peaceful end to the dispute regarding Nagorno-Karabakh. Despite this mandate, the group has achieved very little in concrete results.

As leading members, France and the US could be doing much more to step up in a crucial period for Armenia and human rights globally. When compared with other ethnic or territorial disputes in the Middle East or in Eastern Europe, it is clear that the same attention and concern has not been paid to the conflict in the Caucasus. Despite both EU and US threats and ultimatums, the Azerbaijani takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh occurred and has gone largely unopposed. As Armenia fears a complete invasion, and with Turkish and Azerbaijani military exercises occurring near their respective borders, this is a highly concerning time for regional security and stability, especially with the conflict in the Middle East rapidly growing.

With Russian influence in the region already declining, negotiating this conflict could be a crucial way for Western powers to ensure stability in a region where actors such as Russia, Turkey, and Iran compete for power. However, despite the benefits of Western intervention—increased regional stability, as well as the protection of human rights—it is unlikely that any concrete action will occur. Sanctions on Azerbaijan are unlikely due to the gas deals which the European Union has signed with Baku. Disregarding other concerns about Russian gas in Azerbaijan, the EU’s shift toward alternative energy sources following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have led to growing ties to Azerbaijan.

With the EU unlikely to take any action against a crucial energy partner, and the US so far unwilling to act, it is worth asking whether European and American promises of ensuring human rights and promoting peace globally bear enough weight when it comes to the Caucasus, and whether Western powers are missing a key opportunity to expand their influence in a previously Russian-dominated region.