Could Jordan Fall Into Iran’s Grasp?

How The Most Recent Election Provides Insight

Preliminary results in Jordan’s most recent parliamentary elections came as a surprise to many, as the largest opposition party, the Islamic Action Front, took 32 out of 138 seats after boycotting previous elections in 2013 and 2010. What makes this interesting? Previous analysis suggested that domestic issues would play a far more important role, and with the IAF running on a platform of support for Hamas and discontent with Jordan’s cooperation with Israel, they would be unlikely to sway voters more concerned with unemployment, poverty, and corruption. 

To provide a little context on Jordan’s system of government: the parliament is composed mostly of tribal and pro-government factions, with 41 seats allocated for other political parties. Jordan’s king, however, controls foreign policy, with parliament mostly dealing with domestic issues. Surely a party running for parliament seats trying to sway voters with aggressive foreign policy stances wouldn’t have much success? 

Especially when you consider the IAF’s previous electoral performances, it makes sense why many analysts initially wrote them off. Despite this, the IAF seemed to capitalize on public sentiment – mostly on discontent with the current government. Jordanians are fed up with the war in Gaza, and despite Jordan’s denouncement of the Israeli military’s conduct, the country remains not only an important ally to the U.S. but also to Israel directly – even helping the U.S. and allied countries to intercept an Iranian missile attack. 

Continuing on this path of cooperation and partnership would keep Jordan away from Iran’s influence for the time being, as Israel (and the U.S.) would surely want to provide for Jordan’s protection in return for their helpful defensive efforts. But the resurgence of the IAF might complicate the partnership. Perhaps not yet, without a true majority in parliament. But results like this, especially when they follow the trends of public sentiment, often indicate the direction a country takes. Even if Jordan’s approach to Israel doesn’t yet change, Amman will still have to contend with increased expressions of opposition towards the conflict in Gaza – enabled by the IAF’s rhetoric. 

Short-term, Iran doesn’t have much chance of putting together the kind of resistance they’ve funded in Lebanon and Yemen. But if the goal is regional hegemony, Iran certainly won’t be disappointed with these election results. Jordan must strike a delicate balance if it hopes to maintain partnership with the U.S., bargain with Israel for a change in their conduct of the war in Gaza, and fix its worsening domestic issues; all while IAF-enabled tensions will only continue to rise.