Critical but stable: state of escalation in Israel-Hamas conflict
As the unfolding conflict between Israel and Hamas begins its second month, it is crucial to assess the current situation, combatant participation, and potential for escalation. While the ongoing multi-dimensional conflict between Hamas and allied fighters and the Israeli Defense Forces has kept tensions soaring in an unsettled Middle East, a significant expansion of the war, as expected in the first weeks, has thankfully not yet occurred. This assessment will detail some aspects of the current state of tensions, dubbed “critical but stable.”
Since the beginning of Israel’s retaliatory airstrikes within Gaza, Hezbollah, a Lebanese political party with a substantial militant component, has been carefully watched by many for signs of escalatory intent. The group, which has increased its alignment with Hamas following the October 7 attacks, was founded by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards force and remains a key member of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance.” Since the group’s last major conflict with Israel, a five-week war in 2006, Hezbollah has increased its striking power to include an estimated 100,000 rockets; it is considered by many observers to be (one of) the most heavily armed non-state groups in the world. This reality made credible the Iranian foreign minister’s October 14 threat that continued Israeli action in Gaza could lead to a “huge earthquake” unleashed by Hezbollah.
For weeks, Hezbollah has targeted Israeli tanks, security cameras, and border units along Israel’s northern border with Lebanon, though these attacks have had limited scope and impact. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW), a preeminent Washington-based think-tank that analyzes open-source intelligence on ongoing global conflicts, continues to assess that Hezbollah’s limited cross-border attacks are part of the Axis of Resistance’s attempts to “draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there.”
In his much-anticipated November 3 speech, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah addressed expectations of an escalatory announcement by arguing that Hezbollah had been involved in the fighting since October 8. He declared that US military assets in the Mediterranean “will not scare us,” and stated that the group could resort to any of its options at any time. Though concerning, Nasrallah’s speech was not the announcement of expanded attacks against Israel that many feared. There have thus far been few recent indicators of an impending Hezbollah escalation, and observable indicators suggest that the current pattern of harassing, force-fixing cross-border attacks will continue.
As Hezbollah mortars and anti-tank missiles strike Israeli positions along the northern border, IED attacks and shootouts in the West Bank also remain daily occurrences. In recent days, ISW has continued its trend of assessing these West Bank clashes as continuing at their “usual rate.” Though the frequency and intensity of these clashes between Palestinian militants and IDF forces in the West Bank are significantly higher than the pre-war norm, they have not consistently followed calls for uprisings in the territory issued by Hamas and other Axis of Resistance elements. Thus, unrest in the West Bank has not yet materialized into a broader escalation of the war or situation destabilizing enough to warrant a significant diversion of IDF resources from its ongoing campaign in Gaza.
Crucially, Iran, one of the critical actors in this conflict, does not appear to be pushing for a regional escalation despite its fiery rhetoric against Israeli and American responses to the October 7 Hamas attacks. Strong arguments have been advanced regarding Iran’s hesitancy to escalate further; any opening of a new front by Hezbollah along Israel’s northern border would likely trigger a substantial Israeli response, endangering the group’s military capabilities and political position in an unstable Lebanon. Iran’s sanctions-aggravated economic problems and desire for elements of its Axis of Resistance to retain their relatively strong capacities discourage the regime from pushing for further escalation. Were any of its various proxies to engage Israel meaningfully or especially draw the fire of American forces in the region, Iran would run the risk of losing a group that could be used to pressure Israel to curtail Gaza Bank activities.
For their part, the Houthi rebels in Yemen have attempted several cruise missile and drone attacks against Israel. An American guided missile destroyer shot down three cruise missiles and several drones comprising the first Houthi attack. The five subsequent attacks have utilized more drones but have largely been intercepted by Israeli air-defense systems. Houthi rebels notably succeeded in shooting down an American MQ-9 Reaper surveillance drone this week and will likely not face escalation as a result of the shoot-down’s limited significance. Though Houthi forces likely possess more Iranian-made land-attack cruise missiles, the group is unlikely to launch them in numbers large enough to strain or overcome extensive Israeli air defenses. Thus, the potential for Houthi-driven escalation remains quite low.
This recap of various relevant actors’ recent actions and the prevailing understanding of Iran’s interest in avoiding an escalation of the conflict into a regional war indicate that a continued state of “critical but stable” tension is likely to persist in the short term. Given the potential for new factors to be introduced at short notice, predicting the likelihood of a regional escalation beyond the near term remains unrealistic. Additionally, changes in the extent or tactics of Israel’s ground operation in Gaza hold the potential to drive further escalation. For now, the war has settled into a relative holding pattern, continuing to destroy countless lives daily and obliterating near-term hopes for a resolution.