Cuba, Venezuela, and the Politicization of Oil
The recent capture of Nicolás Maduro marked a dramatic turning point in U.S.-Venezuela relations, but the weeks that followed revealed something equally significant: the strategic value of Venezuelan oil in enforcing what has come to be known as the Donroe Doctrine. With Maduro replacement Delcy Rodríguez signaling openness to foreign investment, a new question has emerged—not just who controls Venezuela's government, but who controls its roughly 300 billion barrels of proven oil reserves. While it remains too early to determine the precise nature of U.S. influence over Venezuelan oil or how profits and access will be distributed, current developments suggest that energy dependence is becoming an important tool of hemispheric control.
Venezuela’s Uncertain Opening
In the aftermath of Maduro's removal, Rodríguez has taken steps to attract foreign investment, particularly in Venezuela's struggling oil sector. Venezuelan oil exports have shown signs of recovery, climbing from just under 500,000 barrels per day in December to 800,000 in January. Rodríguez has also signaled a willingness to release political prisoners and open the economy to outside capital, actions some observers interpret as a potential neoliberal opening under U.S. guidance.
Yet uncertainty remains. The exact details of U.S.-Venezuela cooperation are unclear. What does it mean for Washington to be "running the country" or working closely with Rodríguez's interim administration? Who will profit from renewed oil production, and who will control access to Venezuelan crude? These are open questions, and the answers will determine whether this moment represents a genuine shift in Venezuela's economic model or simply a reconfiguration of elite control.
Foreign investors and analysts, for their part, remain cautious. Venezuela's oil infrastructure has deteriorated significantly after years of underinvestment and mismanagement. Rule of law is weak, institutional frameworks are fragile, and the legacy of the 1976 nationalization of PDVSA, later reinforced by Chávez-era expropriations of ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips, looms large in the minds of potential stakeholders. While these dynamics are still taking shape, what is clear is that the U.S. now has unprecedented potential leverage over Venezuelan energy flows. And if recent developments in Cuba are any indication, that leverage could extend far beyond Venezuela's borders.
Cuba on the Brink
Cuba's energy crisis offers a stark illustration of what happens when oil becomes a geopolitical weapon. The island has long depended on fuel imports from Venezuela, its closest regional ally and primary supplier. But recent U.S. policies aimed at blocking oil shipments to Cuba have left the country facing intense shortages. On January 29, a White House Executive Order threatened tariff action against any country supplying oil to Cuba, worsening the decades-long blockade to a concerning degree. The results have been immediate and severe. Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel acknowledged in early February that the country had not received fuel since December, forcing the government to readjust domestic consumption and modify the distribution of basic food basket products. Not long after, Air Canada canceled flights as Cuba ran out of jet fuel, grounding planes and disrupting one of the island's largest sources of foreign exchange. At its peak, Cuba earned over $3 billion annually from tourism; a figure that is now believed to have dropped below $1 billion.
Beyond economic damage, the humanitarian toll is intensifying. The country experienced a partial collapse of its electrical grid on Wednesday, leaving broad areas of Eastern Cuba in the dark for more than 12 hours. This came during an unusually cold period that brought the island its first freeze in recorded history. United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres also warned of a potential humanitarian "collapse" if Cuba's energy needs go unmet. In response to the crisis, Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum announced that Mexico would send 814 tons of humanitarian aid in the form of provisions to Cuba and work to continue to fulfill Pemex’s contract with Cuba, despite President Trump telling reporters that Mexico would cut off supply. On February 4, Pemex's CEO confirmed the company's intent to honor its commitments, though the future of those shipments remains uncertain under U.S. pressure.
The Mechanics of Dependency
Understanding why oil has become such a powerful tool of leverage requires us to examine the technical details of energy production and refining. Venezuelan crude happens to be heavy and sulfurous, which makes it more expensive and difficult to refine than lighter grades. The specialized refineries capable of processing it are concentrated on the U.S. Gulf Coast, creating a structural dependency that limits Venezuela's ability to diversify its export markets. Even if Venezuela wanted to sell its oil elsewhere, the infrastructure, logistics, and refining capacity required would take years to develop, according to experts.
This dependency is not accidental: it reflects decades of economic integration between the U.S. and Latin American energy markets. But in the current geopolitical context, that integration has become a source of vulnerability. Countries that rely on Venezuelan oil, or on oil that must pass through U.S.-controlled refining networks, are exposed to political pressure in ways that extend beyond traditional sanctions or tariffs. Cuba's crisis exemplifies this dynamic. The island's energy needs are modest compared to larger economies, but its lack of alternatives has made it exceptionally vulnerable.
Beyond the Hemisphere: A New Leverage Tool
It is still too early to say definitively how U.S. influence over Venezuelan oil will manifest or what the long-term consequences will be. If the U.S. were to consolidate control over Venezuelan production and distribution, it could reshape global energy markets in several ways. Greater control over Western Hemisphere energy flows would reduce American exposure to Middle Eastern instability and reinforce the petrodollar system, ensuring that global energy transactions continue to flow through dollar-denominated markets. Most significantly, the politicization of oil access could reestablish how energy is used as leverage in international relations. Sanctions and tariffs have long been tools of economic statecraft, but the ability to control who receives oil, and under what conditions, represents a more direct and potentially more coercive form of influence. Cuba's crisis offers a preview of what this looks like in practice: isolation, humanitarian emergency, and threats facing any country that attempts to supply fuel, all pointing to a world in which access to essential resources is increasingly conditional on political compliance.
If this pattern holds, the use of energy access as a lever to enforce alignment, whether in Latin America or elsewhere, suggests a shift in how great powers exert influence. The Donroe Doctrine, in this sense, may be less a regional policy than a template for a broader strategy, one in which control over essential resources becomes the primary means of shaping global order. For Latin America, this is a familiar logic. For the rest of the world, it may be a preview of what's to come.