India’s Policy in Afghanistan and the US Withdrawal

By Rohan Rajesh 

Ancient civilizational ties, a rivalry with Pakistan, and a love of cricket have made India and Afghanistan natural partners. India’s development and infrastructure aid and steadfast refusal to negotiate with the Taliban have earned praise among many Afghans. Afghanistan’s internationally competitive cricket team is grateful to India for letting it host Afghanistan’s home games in India. Today, however, the situation in Afghanistan is very different. The Taliban have made significant territorial gains, the Islamic State – Khorasan Province (IS-K) has launched deadly attacks throughout the country, and the Trump administration is engaged in unprecedented talks with the Taliban to extricate US troops from a hopeless stalemate. The Intra-Afghan Dialogue has kicked off in Doha, Qatar, and it could yield a vastly reconfigured political landscape and a recalibrated Afghanistan-India relationship. In this blog post, I will analyze the history of India’s policy in Afghanistan and how this should factor into America’s decision to withdraw from its longest war.

During the Cold War, India recognized the Soviet-backed government in Afghanistan. That government, led by pro-India President Najibullah, collapsed in the face of a US and Pakistan-backed mujahideen in 1992. Among the myriad insurgent groups, the Taliban emerged as the dominant group. They established the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in 1996, which was only recognized by Pakistan (India’s archenemy), Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. 

The Taliban’s philosophy is steeped in the traditions of the rural Pashtun regions and fundamentalist Deobandi Islam. The Taliban regime was condemned internationally for its harsh treatment of women. The Taliban were also responsible for the massacre of Shiite Hazaras after capturing the city of Mazar-i-Sharif. When the Taliban entered Kabul, they tortured and publicly executed Najibullah, setting the stage for hostile relations with India. India backed the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, which would later play a crucial role in overthrowing the Emirate. Meanwhile, India criticized the Taliban policy of forcing Afghan Hindus to wear identification markers. Relations with India reached a nadir when the Taliban destroyed the famous giant Buddha statues of Bamiyan in early 2001. 

The most well-known instance of India-Taliban diplomacy is particularly bitter. In 1999, gunmen hijacked an Indian flight that was en route from Kathmandu, Nepal to New Delhi. The hijackers redirected the flight to Kandahar, then under Taliban control. Although India suspected that the Taliban were helping the interests of Pakistan’s spy agency, the ISI, they opened talks with the Taliban. The Taliban negotiated the safe release of the passengers in exchange for the widely criticized release of terrorists held by India. Worse still, these terrorists were later implicated in several attacks, including the kidnapping and murder of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl in 2002 and the 2008 Mumbai attacks.

After 9/11 and the US invasion of Afghanistan, India backed the new, democratic government in Kabul diplomatically and economically and refused to engage with the Taliban. Meanwhile, the Taliban and the Haqqani network (its militant wing) repeatedly targeted Indian infrastructure. The most notable example was the bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul in 2008, which the US and India suspected was backed by Pakistan’s ISI. Currently, the Taliban control a significant portion of Afghanistan’s territory and contest even more.

Today, India’s main concern with Afghanistan is that it should not become a playground for anti-India terrorists. India also desires a stable, friendly government in Afghanistan to encircle Pakistan and deny it “strategic depth.” For the same reason, Pakistan backs the Taliban. Without US military support, the Afghan government would likely not be able to withstand a Taliban military campaign. Several analysts are justifiably skeptical about how committed the Taliban will be to the terms of a possible peace deal and whether Afghanistan would become another South Vietnam once the US withdraws. The Taliban and Haqqani Network’s historic and current ties to Pakistan also concern India.

Despite its difficult history with India, during the negotiations, the Taliban have sought to broaden its diplomatic outreach. To assuage India’s concerns, the Taliban criticized Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan’s attempt to link the Kashmir dispute with the Afghan peace process, even going so far as to say that what goes on in Kashmir is India’s internal affair. The Taliban have stated to Indian news channels that they would not be hostile to India and would not support anti-India terrorists. The Taliban also claimed they welcome India’s investments in the country.

As much as India is understandably concerned about the Taliban, it has shed its earlier reluctance to engage with the group. India’s point has always been that the Afghan peace process should be “Afghan-led and Afghan-controlled.” Now that the Afghan government is directly engaging with the Taliban, India is willing to support the process: Foreign Minister Jaishankar addressed the inaugural session of the intra-Afghan dialogue, and India sent a delegation to the talks. 

However, India’s ability to influence politics in Afghanistan is admittedly limited. It is geographically separated from Afghanistan by its archenemy Pakistan. Thus, should the US fully withdraw from the country, India will look to other regional powers to maintain stability. The most likely candidates are Russia and Iran, who also desire a stable Afghanistan and are friendly to India. Although US policymakers may be reluctant to cede ground to some of its fiercest rivals, I would argue the US should withdraw. The War in Afghanistan has drained American resources and resolve and distracted its attention from the rest of the Indo-Pacific, which is threatened by a revanchist China. In ending this chapter in American policy, the US can focus its attention on the rest of the region where its interests face far greater threats. India is invested in a democratic, inclusive Afghanistan and does not want to see a restored Emirate that breeds terrorism. Now that India has joined the dialogue, the US should place faith in the aspirations of Afghans for security and democracy, supported by the Afghanistan-India partnership, to see American objectives through.

Previous
Previous

Israel Recognized by Gulf States

Next
Next

LGBTQ Rights and Policy Globally