No Easy Victory, No Simple Win: Moldova’s Election

Moldova has felt the weight of Russian influence, recalling its former role as a Soviet Republic.

This weight has been particularly prominent in determining the path of Moldova’s presidential elections. 

Since gaining independence in 1991, Moldova has struggled to gain its footing, straddling the line between an independent European country and one still under the shadow of Russia.

The country has seen a a rapidly shrinking population, a poor agricultural economy, and an ideological, linguistic divide between those who are pro-Russia and those who are pro-EU, meaning its identity as a nation is blurry.

On Sunday, November 3rd, the pro-European, pro-West President Maia Sandu won her re-election campaign in a run-off vote against Alexandr Stoianoglo, who is described as “Moscow’s Man.” The snap election saw Sandu’s center-right Action and Solidarity party with a narrow majority of about 55%.

As a former World Bank official, and as a candidate backed by the West, Sandu promised to be a “President for all Moldovans,” despite the fact that Sandu lost the vote in the territory of Moldova itself. This is largely due to the deeply polarized nature of Moldova’s population, where Moldova’s large diasporic community primarily voted for Sandu, while the rural and pro-Russian population, primarily residing in the regions of Transnistria and Gagauzia, chose Stoianoglo. 

Moldova has sought to draw closer to the West in recent years, beginning relations with NATO in 1992, and receiving support measures from the Alliance in 2022 and 2023 to strengthen its defense reform, modernization efforts, and overall long-term development. The country also began accession talks to the European Union under Sandu, setting an internal, not finalized deadline of 2030 to join. 

In response to the election result, many Western leaders, including Biden and those in the EU, congratulated Sandu, and Zelenskyy promised to begin strengthening Ukraine’s relationship with Moldova. 

Despite this celebration of a pro-Western win in a former Soviet Republic, Moldova can’t grow too comfortable. Sandu’s election cannot be a determinant of a shifting ideology in Eastern Europe, or as a sign of weakening Russian influence in the region. As seen with Georgia’s recent election, Russian interference in elections can be hard to prove, and even harder to combat. This election was no different, with accusations of Russian interference coming from all outlets. Cyberattacks and fake bomb threats targeted expat pro-Sandu voters. Authorities also accused Moscow of meddling with votes through its organized transportation effort of bussing and flying pro-Moscow voters to polling stations, and also warned about a fugitive oligarch spending millions on handouts to voters to “buy the election for Moscow.” 

Like Moldova, the US has had its share of Russian interference in presidential elections, including in the 2024 presidential election. A joint statement from the Intelligence Community agencies calls Russia the “most active threat” amongst US adversaries, with good reason. So far, this year has seen Russian AI videos, misinformation, and alarming threats circulating social media and the Internet. This election day, polling locations in the critical battleground states Georgia and Wisconsin faced hoax bomb threats, said to originate from Russian email accounts. These efforts prove the significant lengths Russia goes to expand its influence in the US. These trends should be watched closely by Moldova, since if the US is facing increasing Russian interference, Moldova certainly will too. However, Moldova has much fewer resources set aside to combat Russian influence than does the US. 

While Sandu’s win is a solid step forward when it comes to combating Russian influence, other former Soviet Republics need to demonstrate their commitment to halting the appeasement of the Kremlin.

Looking forward, Sandu must have a more successful presidency this year than in her previous term. Sandu should focus on targeting government corruption, largely linked to officials who have ties with Moscow. She then must turn to the economic woes facing Moldova, and win back some of the Moldovan expats to strengthen the country’s population. 

In order to enact these two major policy goals, Moldova may need to look towards a future without Constitutional neutrality, and instead turn towards the EU for assistance, and perhaps, eventual membership. Only then, will Russian efforts to guide the future of Moldova be curtailed.