Polish Election
Hailed as a blow against the forces of far-right populism in Europe, the ruling party—Law and Justice (PiS)—has lost the 2023 Polish election. Despite this, the Civic Coalition headed by centrist Donald Tusk has a long way to go if he hopes to fully root out the illiberal cronyism now embedded in Polish democracy as a result of PiS rule.
Despite their victory in the polls, Tusk and his Civic Coalition will need to form a government with both the center-right Third Way and aptly named left-wing The Left. This coalition will require the three opposition parties to find common ground and, if they hope to enact legislation, find greater commonality aside from opposition to PiS and the party’s preference for democratic backsliding.
A further difficulty for the likely new coalition government lies in the PiS-aligned Polish President, Andrej Duda. Duda has already proven hard for Tusk to work with, with Duda preventing the formation of a new government under Tusk, preferring to allow PiS to finish their term despite their lack of a majority—delaying the appointment of a new government until December. The cooperation of Duda is imperative to the success of a Tusk government as if it wants to reverse the democratic backsliding initiated by PiS, it needs to gain Duda’s support or risk having its legislation regularly vetoed by the President.
But it is not just the PiS-adjacent President that Tusk needs to worry about, but also the remnants of PiS that have been embedded into the Polish state apparatus. The Polish Constitutional Tribunal and media have also been heavily stacked with PiS loyalists. If the Tusk government hopes to reverse Poland’s backsliding into illiberalism, they have the daunting task before them of reversing these appointments while not getting their legislation shot down by the President and ruled unconstitutional by the Tribunal. And this process will take time, something the PiS is apt not to give a Tusk government.
Similarly to the contemporary American political culture of divisive politics and vast chasms of political division, a Civic Coalition victory does not eliminate the large political divide in Poland. Despite seemingly losing the election, PiS still won the plurality vote, taking 35.4% of the vote, more than any other party. While one could argue that this is a result of division amongst the opposition, it is undeniable that there is still a broad base of support for PiS in Poland. Winning overwhelmingly in rural districts, PiS will hold onto its strongholds and continue to do what it can to sew division in Polish society—exploiting its vast networks in media and equally vast funding.
While it is easy to cast Tusk’s victory as a victory for liberal democracy and a blow to far-right populism, the caveats are glaring. If the Tusk coalition hopes to keep power and reverse PiS’s authoritarian reforms, it needs to ensure that the coalition is able to govern; both through working to pass policy as a cohesive government, effectively dealing with Duda, the stacked courts, and attempt to heal the social and political divide in Poland or risk a PiS return.