Somaliland: If it Looks like a Duck?

What makes a state? Political scholars would typically give a list of qualifications around exercising authority, having control over territory and borders, ability to form interstate relations, monopoly of force, political autonomy, differentiation of rulers from the ruled, and so on.

I’d argue that what makes a state is that if it looks like a duck, acts like a duck, and someone calls it a duck, it must be a duck (or a state).

The political science definition fits well for most cases, but certainly not all of them. Consider the Holy See (which is distinct from the Vatican City). it certainly doesn’t look like a duck: It controls no territory. Despite this, the Holy See is a member of several intergovernmental organizations, has diplomatic relations with 180 countries, is subject to international law, and has United Nations observer status.

Alternatively, consider Haiti, which doesn’t act like a duck. Haiti has a defined area of sovereignty which is internationally accepted, but by any metric has little to no government managing the people and territory of Haiti. The island country is, at the time of writing, the closest thing the western hemisphere has to a failed state. Despite the near-utter lack of administration and governance, Haiti is still unanimously recognized as a state by the UN, though the government that is recognized is near-nonexistent.

Despite not looking like a duck or acting like a duck, the international community still calls it a duck.

The opposite is true for the unrecognized Republic of Somaliland, which looks like a duck, acts like a duck, but has never been called a duck.

That tide may be changing.

Somaliland is a sparsely inhabited breakaway region from Somalia, on the coast of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Since it declared independence in 1991, Somaliland has been reasonably democratic and had a central authority. Somalia, on the other hand, has fallen victim to civil war, terrorism, and borderline anarchy. While Somalia has not been a functioning state in decades, Somaliland has slowly developed, managing to build institutions, authority, and quell violence within its borders. Despite this, no state is willing to recognize Somaliland’s independence.

Now, it looks as though Somaliland may be set on the path to recognition from Ethiopia, one of the largest and most invested-in countries in Africa. On January 1, Ethiopia and Somaliland announced a Memorandum of Understanding in which Ethiopia would be granted a 50-year lease for the port of Berbera. In the announcement, Ethiopia agreed to undergo an “in-depth assessment” of Somaliland’s recognition, in addition to yearly payments and a stake in Ethiopian Airlines. The deal implies recognition, but exact terms are not disclosed, and Ethiopia has remained noncommittal on its stance.

Ethiopia has several reasons to recognize Somaliland: Somalia has been a problematic neighbor to say the least, Somaliland represents a more stable Horn of Africa. Ethiopia needs a friendly seaport in order to support growth and investment and has signaled intent to build a green-water navy; Somaliland’s port of Berbera could provide the means for both. Additionally, other regional states such as Kenya would support the dismemberment of Somalia due to their own struggles with militias located across the border, and even Dubai has interests in expanding business into the Gulf of Aden via Somaliland.

However, there is pushback from the international community. For many countries, recognizing a breakaway state opens a Pandora’s box that is hard to put away. If Morocco recognizes Somaliland, it signals independence is possible for Western Sahara. This same conundrum is found around the world, from cases as high profile as China-Taiwan to as minor as tiny separatist movements in Cameroon.

If Ethiopia calls Somaliland a duck, it could lead to other countries doing the same, but this might not create the consensus Somaliland needs. For many states, Somaliland is too minor a territory to risk igniting civil war and secession over, but for some, the need for regional security and economic prosperity could be too alluring to turn down.

Somaliland’s future in the gray area of a de facto state hangs in the balance of their port deal with Ethiopia. Somaliland continues to look like a duck, act like a duck, and now, they might just earn the right to be called a duck.