On U.S. Intervention in Iran
Photo by HOSSEIN BERIS/Middle East Images/AFP via Getty Images.
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Since the founding of the Islamic Republic in 1979, the US has directly used military force against Iran on four occasions: Operation Eagle Claw (1980), Operation Praying Mantis (1988), the assassination of Qassem Soleimani (2020), and Operation Midnight Hammer (2025). On each of these occasions, the US deemed it within its vital national security interests to take military action against Iran. On the morning of February 28th, 2026, the United States and Israel launched the dual Operations Epic Fury and Roaring Lion. What distinguishes today’s situation from previous cases is the scale of US military action and the risk of a drawn-out conflict with an unclear path toward achieving American objectives. As the US takes military action against Iran, it must delineate clear political objectives to be achieved by the use of force and allocate adequate force to achieving those objectives. If it does not, it risks mission failure resembling that of previous US interventions.
In an 8 minute video posted to the White House’s X account, US President Donald Trump claimed the reasons for the US attack were Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs and that the US was left with little choice but to attack after several rounds of negotiations with Iran failed to produce a breakthrough. President Trump specified the primary goal of the operation is regime change. He encouraged the Iranian people to rise up against their government, echoing his previous statement that “Help is on its way” to the Iranian people during large protests in January. The US ultimately did not intervene on that occasion, and the resulting crackdown by the regime resulted in at least 7,000 killed, with the true number likely closer to over 30,000. Given US inaction during the protests, if the Trump administration seeks to assist the Iranian people in overthrowing the Islamic Republic, it must be willing to support the Iranian people long-term and be able to convince Iranians of the legitimacy of that support. Regime change will not occur in a day.
For the Islamic Republic and what remains of its proxies, this conflict is a war of survival. Groups such as Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraqi Shiite militias, including Kataib Hezbollah, would face existential crises without their primary patron. While Hezbollah sat out of the June 2025 12-day war, it had already stated that if the US targeted Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, it would be a “red line.” While they have yet to act in response to Khamenei’s death, the strike will likely trigger a wider confrontation across the region, as Iranian proxies seek to defend the regime and ensure their own survival. The US has already confirmed the death of three American servicemembers and Iran has struck or attempted to strike Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Bahrain. Kata’ib Hezbollah issued threats against US forces in Iraq and several missiles and drones were intercepted over the Kurdish city of Erbil. The risk of the US being drawn into another “forever war” looms large over the conflict, and it must commit adequate force from the outset to avoid such a possibility. If it does not, it risks being drawn into another Iraq or Afghanistan.
If the US is serious about regime change, it cannot rely solely on strikes to achieve its aims. It must seek to unite the divided Iranian opposition, provide incentives for Iranian military personnel to defect, and support protestors in the streets. The only widely known figurehead of the Iranian opposition is Reza Pahlavi, the son of the former Shah (king) of Iran. Other figures, such as Maryam Rajavi of the Mujahadeen-e-Khalq, are either little known or too unpopular to be able to effectively lead a united opposition. While Mr. Pahlavi is not the perfect candidate to lead a post-Islamic Republic Iran—his father committed atrocities similar to those of the Islamic Republic and he has not been to Iran since he was a teenager—he claims to support a free and democratic Iran and has seemingly widespread support among Iranians. The US can capitalize on the nostalgic view of his namesake and unite the Iranian opposition around the democratic future he may represent, rather than the return of an antiquated and repressive monarchy. Supporting him as a transitional figure would provide some cohesion to a continuously fragmented opposition movement.
If the US adheres only to the use of military strikes to achieve its goals and fails to think about what may come after the Islamic Republic, it risks repeating mistakes made in Iraq, Libya, and other places. The 2003 invasion of Iraq and the 2011 US-led bombing campaign of Libya resulted in brutal civil wars in both countries. While Iraq has become relatively stable, it still bears the consequences of the conflict, while Libya remains ruinously divided today. Among the many errors made in Iraq, the US did not commit enough troops to stabilize the country and had no comprehensive plan for a post-Saddam Hussein government. In Libya, the US, UK, and France relied almost entirely on air power to achieve its goals, leaving it unable to influence events on the ground.
In pursuing regime change, the US must have a strategy for what comes after and ensure that it is Iranians themselves who take the reins of power. It can use the leverage created by the ongoing military operation and diplomatic channels throughout the region to communicate with opposition groups, make contact with Iranian protesters, and assist the highly educated Iranian diaspora in forming a day-after plan, thus facilitating a transition of power rather than engineering it. Using American technology and influence to support Iranians, as the US did when it provided thousands of Starlink terminals to Iranian protestors in January, would allow the US to maximize the effectiveness of its strikes, while minimizing risk to US servicemembers. It would leave Iran’s fate in the hands of Iranians, bolstered by firm US support.
While the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is largely made up of fanatics who support the Islamist ideology of the Iranian regime, the regular army (or Artesh) is made up primarily of conscripts who may be persuaded to defect if they believe the regime will fall. As Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa did for Bashar al-Assad’s security forces, President Trump has already publicly promised regime forces amnesty if they lay down their arms. While it would be up to any succeeding Iranian government to make that decision, doing so would allow any new government a quicker route to stabilization.
It is improbable that the US will be able to conduct regime change in Iran with airpower alone. The Islamic Republic will not voluntarily give up power or change the nature of its oppressive theocracy. If the US is not willing to match the Islamic Republic’s political will upon taking military action, the current intervention could result in another Afghanistan, Iraq or Libya: long-term division, civil war, and humanitarian crisis. Such an outcome would be neither in US interests nor those of the Iranian people. Right or wrong, the US has already committed to regime change in Iran. It should now follow through on its commitment to the Iranian people for a free, democratic, and tolerant Iran.