The Necessity of a Russian State: Fighting a Horse Sized Duck

Jay Ramesh

On September 26, 2022, Russia partially mobilized its population for war for just the third time in over 100 years. The last time that a Russian-led state mobilized for war was during World War II; Afghanistan, Chechnya, Georgia, none of these wars called for such drastic measures. 

And yet the Russian war machine appears to be in a drastic situation. Regardless of the necessity of mobilization, one thing remains certain: despite its recent warmongering, the existence of a strong Russian state is an absolute necessity for peace and is in the interest of both the Russian people and the Western world.

Let’s go over some basics.

Contrary to popular belief, Russia is not a centralized dictatorship. The country contains 11% of the entire world’s landmass, but only 1.87% of the world’s population. These vast distances make it extremely difficult for the central government in Moscow to maintain and administer all its territories. As such, Russia is organized as a federal system of six different types of subjects, all differing in levels of autonomy. 

Moscow, and thus Putin, maintains control over the country through regional governors, and throughout his terms he has consistently attempted to take power away from them in attempts to centralize the government. Additionally, Putin has a simple and unwritten social contract with his people: if citizens ignore the cronyism, oligarchy, and patronage of politics, and in return the Russian state will provide them with a peaceful, stable, and moderately comfortable life. 

The Russian state maintains coherence based on these delicate balances. Mobilization is a clear violation of the social contract, and as Russia is relying on the regional governors to enforce mobilization, it is also a direct threat to their power. It’s led to massive protests, violent resistance, and significant numbers of fighting-age men attempting to flee the country. And though it remains only an unlikely possibility, the implementation and effects of partial mobilization could bring down the Russian government and potentially lead to renewed regional separatism and calls for more autonomy and even independence.

Signs of discontent with the federal government have been sparse and relatively unimpactful on the conduct of the war, but they nevertheless are present and show us that the potential for nationalistic calls for autonomy and even independence exist. Though these scenarios are extremely unlikely, they pose huge risks to the Western world, including the US. Despite Russia’s aggression and antagonism in recent years, it is in our interests to have a united Russia, as the chaos of a Russian breakup similar to the events of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 could spell utter disaster for world peace.

Putin holds the differing factions, interest groups, and power-brokers of Russia together. Without him or a similar strongman, chaos could potentially ensue as billionaire oligarchs, regional governments, everyday people, and ideological factions all attempt to take control in the power vacuum of a government without a strongman. 

Putin has Russia’s nuclear launch codes, but the nuclear weapons themselves are stored all throughout Russia, often in remote areas. Who would maintain control of these weapons in the event of a collapse of the central governor? Nuclear weapons make an excellent bargaining chip when one is demanding independence or power, and a collapse of Moscow’s authority would bring about a power vacuum that would leave the fate of Russia’s nuclear arsenal completely uncertain.

In the case of nuclear diplomacy, it’s better to fight a single horse-sized duck than 100 duck-sized horses, any of which could explode at a moment’s notice. Though Putin has drifted towards brinkmanship and saber-rattling as the war in Ukraine drags on, the sheer scale of the Russian and American nuclear arsenal have served to deter any large-scale nuclear war between the two countries. 

But what if we remove both countries from the equation? Instead of 2 players possessing the collective power to destroy the world several times over, what if, instead, 10 players each possessed only the power to destroy strategic civilian and military targets?

In this scenario, nukes would serve a clear strategic purpose, rather than just a means of deterrence. If Russia breaks up into tens of small states, the global interests of a nuclear-armed Russia, on equal footing with a nuclear-armed United States, immediately become the regional interests of nuclear-armed states competing with other nuclear and non-nuclear armed states.

This situation is a powderkeg just waiting to be ignited. The potential for states to use nuclear weapons as threats against regional rivals would be a breeding ground for instability, extremism, violence, and the potential for nuclear, and subsequently global environmental, catastrophe. The fears of Russia potentially using nuclear weapons in its war in Ukraine would be multiplied as similar scenarios come into existence all throughout the former Russian Federation.

It’s better for one single state to possess this destructive capacity, as their opponents also have the destructive capacity to deter any use of said capacity- in this way, nuclear weapons become functionally useless. The biggest threat to world peace is a scenario in which nuclear weapons become functionally useful, and a collapse of the Russian state has the potential to create these scenarios. 

Thus, it is in the West's interest to keep a united Russian Federation in existence, even if it is one of their most formidable geopolitical antagonists. With great power comes great responsibility, and though it can be unreliable and unpredictable, the responsibility of Russia’s nuclear arsenal in Russia’s hands is much greater than the responsibility of the arsenal in the hands of local warlords, regional governors, and other unpredictable actors. If each opponent you face has the potential to explode at any moment, it’s better to face a single horse-sized duck than 100 duck-sized horses.