Burma on the Brink
Robert Cole
When I last discussed the violence following a military coup in Myanmar in April, the country was gripped by widespread civilian protests and strikes. About a week after that blog post was published, the National Unity Government (NUG) was formed out of old members of Aung Sang Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) and other anti-military leaders, and appeared to represent the potential for a unified pro-democracy anti-junta front. It discarded the 2008 constitution with its promises of a military role in civilian government and made the safe return of Rohingya refugees a core part of its platform, in stark contrast to the NLD during the genocidal campaign in Rakhine state starting in 2015. It sought to reach out to the various armed ethnic militias that are active across the country, as well as with the students and professionals that formed core parts of the urban resistance.
The dream of a unified front has failed to materialize as life in Myanmar becomes a nightmare. Security forces have killed well over 1,000 civilians according to some sources, with many more military and civilian deaths likely going uncounted in the rural periphery, where there have been reports of intense fighting. The violence has become increasingly random as the economy and governing bureaucracy are torn apart by violence and by striking civil servants including local officials, teachers, and police officers.
Rather than unifying behind a common cause, many of the ethnic militias the NUG needs to command any sort of military force are fighting each other or refusing to fully commit to joining the coalition. These organizations have their own politics and objectives, typically aiming for regional autonomy from the central government. As a result, they have little interest in replacing one party with another in Naypyidaw if they believe they have a plausible chance of extracting some sort of concessions from the military junta. There is also deep suspicion and resentment toward the NUG among some groups, particularly the Arakan Army, an insurgent group in Rakhine state that the previous NLD-led government fought against for several years. There is a sense that many of these groups, who spent years fighting a government led by many of the same people that now lead NUG, have little love for either side. Their very existence is a testament to their distrust of nationwide cooperation, so they would prefer to take advantage of a weak central government rather than expend blood and treasure reinstating politicians who would likely still be their enemies if they had not been kicked out of power.
Things are not necessarily rosy for the military either however. As noted above, its grip on power nationwide is tentative at best. The bitter election defeat that served as the trigger for this coup demonstrated definitively that the military does not enjoy broad public support either. The new government thus faces a bitter fight for control in the streets, a crashing economy, and has virtually no international legitimacy, notably being left out of a recent ASEAN conference. Its leaders are attempting the same tactic they have used for decades, attempting to silence any threat to their power through force of arms, ignoring the growing anger by the people over their tyranny. They face a population increasingly engaged with the digital world that has briefly tasted a measure of liberty under the previous NLD government, and is determined not to go back. Whether or not they will acquiesce to the clear wish of the Burmese people or continue to push their nation over the brink into another period of violence and oppression is yet to be seen.