If Kennedy Had Lived: The Consequences for India-US Relations

Rohan Rajesh

President Kennedy was undoubtedly one of the most iconic presidents in modern American history. He is most famous for the vitality and glamor he and Jackie Kennedy brought to the White House, launching the Peace Corps, laying the foundations for comprehensive civil rights legislation, expanding the space program that put a man on the moon, and solving the Cuban Missile Crisis, which threatened to deliver nuclear armageddon. One accomplishment he is less famous for is his determination to improve relations with India and his efforts to prevent India from collapsing during the 1962 Sino-Indian War while solving the Cuban Missile Crisis at the same time.

Throughout the Cold War, the United States adopted a mentality of ‘you are either with us or you are with the enemy.’ So when India declared itself a non-aligned country that desired cordial relations with the capitalist West, the communist bloc, and newly independent colonies in Afro-Eurasia, Washington was suspicious, to say the least. Thus, India was one of the first non-communist countries to recognize the People’s Republic of China but also supported the UN-action to stop communist North Korea’s invasion of the South. Nonetheless, Washington looked at New Delhi’s pro-communist actions with suspicion. The Eisenhower administration thus tilted towards India’s rival Pakistan, whose government also looked favorably on an alliance with the United States to counterbalance India’s military, demographic, and economic superiority. Thus, Pakistan joined two anti-communist alliances - CENTO and SEATO - and also provided bases from which the United States could spy on the Soviet Union - Pakistan was separated from the Soviet Union by just 13 km of Afghan territory in the Wakhan Corridor. Many know of the U-2 incident in the latter years of the Eisenhower administration, where an American U-2 spy plane was shot down by the Soviet Air Defence Forces while performing photographic aerial reconnaissance deep inside Soviet territory. Few, however, know that the U-2 plane was launched from the northwest Pakistani city of Peshawar. Further, the CIA backed Tibetan rebels fighting to free their country from the PRC by parachuting them into Chinese-controlled Tibet from bases in East Pakistan (today Bangladesh) over Indian airspace (without Indian permission). Ironically, Chairman Mao thought that it was India that was backing the rebels, souring the China-India relationship that had already deteriorated over border disputes and India’s giving asylum to the Dalai Lama.

The hawkish mentality toward relations with India shifted significantly with the Kennedy administration. On the campaign trail, Kennedy held up India as a standard-bearer for Asian democracy and a useful ideological ally. Kennedy believed in supporting India’s pressing development needs to show the Third World that the democratic model is superior to the communist model for economic development. In this effort, Kennedy was aided by his ambassador to India Kenneth Galbraith, a post-Keynesian, liberal economist who taught at Harvard and was one of Kennedy’s most important confidants. Galbraith also opposed the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion that humiliated Kennedy and the CIA’s Tibet operation. Kennedy approved more than a billion dollars in economic aid to India, raising concerns in Islamabad that the money would be used for military purposes. Pakistan’s military dictator Ayub Khan threatened to close the East Pakistani base. Kennedy ended the crisis by charming Khan at Mount Vernon and promising that in the event of war with China, the United States would preclear any weapons sales to India with Pakistan.

Despite this promise and the souring of India-US relations over India’s annexation of Portuguese India, in the Sino-Indian War of 1962 (which took place at the same time as Kennedy was desperately preventing nuclear annihilation in Cuba), Kennedy worked with the United Kingdom and Australia to provide the beleaguered Indian troops significant military aid and weaponry without Pakistan’s approval. Further, Galbraith played an instrumental role in ensuring that Pakistan did not take advantage of India’s situation by invading Indian-administered Kashmir. It is possible that this strong support led to Mao’s decision to unilaterally declare a ceasefire that led to China’s annexing the remote Aksai Chin territory (which it already held de facto) but not the territory conquered by China in the Northeast (much of which comprises the modern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh that is still claimed by China as “South Tibet” to this day). India was bruised by its loss, but without Kennedy’s support, it stood to lose the entire Northeast to the Chinese and the eastern state of West Bengal could have been next.

After the war with China, the Indian government looked very favorably on stronger ties with the United States. It was already considering a significant weapons purchase from Washington. India also provided bases to the United States to spy on China’s nuclear weapons program. Kennedy’s assassination closed the door on the deal and on strong India-US ties for the remainder of the Cold War. When Kennedy’s successor Lyndon Johnson expanded the Vietnam War, India bitterly opposed it on anti-colonial grounds. In the 1965 India-Pakistan War, Washington refused to provide weapons to either side. However, Pakistan had already amassed significant firepower from Washington that was only supposed to be used against communist aggression. But, the Pakistanis directed them towards Indian troops, increasing Indian resentment.

Kennedy would have almost certainly aided India since, unlike the more hawkish State Department, he had little sympathy for Pakistan’s military dictatorship and would not have looked favorably on Pakistan’s starting the war. Instead, both New Delhi and Islamabad felt slighted by Washington, leading to the former moving towards Moscow and the latter towards Beijing. To this day, India’s weapons are largely Russian (though this is changing), and India’s relations with Moscow continue to be a sticking point in Indo-American cooperation. If the US-India weapons deal had been closed, this may not have been the case. It is also possible that India and Pakistan may not have developed nuclear weapons had Kennedy lived. A strong US guarantee against Chinese aggression would have eliminated the need for India to develop nukes to defend itself. 

While we can only speculate on this alternate history, we should do more to recognize Kennedy’s leadership during the 1962 Sino-Indian War. It is often overshadowed by his actions in the Cuban Missile Crisis to the point of public unawareness. With the end of the Cold War, India-US relations have improved dramatically. The Kennedy-Nehru partnership against China in 1962 may provide guidance to the current partnership’s goal of limiting Beijing’s expansionism today.