US Relations in South and East Asia: A Game of Checks and Balances

Robert Cole

Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, a number of stories were released pointing out that the near-universal shock and outrage against Russia in the West is not necessarily present in other parts of the world. Indeed, from Africa to the Middle East to East Asia, public opinion has been far less critical of Russia and at times openly parroted Russian charges of American aggression and chemical weapons development in Ukraine, a charge that has not been substantiated. This attitude has appeared most frequently in countries that have historically suffered at the hands of western colonialism and were aligned against NATO during the Cold War. At the same time, both leaders and citizens of countries with close ties to Russia have been made uneasy by the conflict, which has delivered them nothing except economic turmoil and unfriendly western scrutiny. Two important examples of this scenario are India and Vietnam, key prospects in US diplomatic efforts to counter the rise of China. Both have been historical victims of both European and Chinese efforts at regional domination, and as a consequence are extremely wary of close alignment with NATO or Beijing, leading to close strategic partnerships with Russia. 

With Russia facing an unmitigated disaster in Ukraine, the US has a rare opportunity to increase its standing with key regional powers in its bid to stymie China’s expansion. However in order to do so, Washington must not expect the kind of close relationship it has enjoyed with more traditional allies such as Britain or Japan. Instead, it must be prepared to serve simply as a counterweight in countries long fearful of strong alignment and too weak and proximate to China to withstand retaliation for overly close relations with the US. Measures such as the CAATS Act which threatens sanctions against countries that buy arms from Russia should only conservatively applied as they run the risk of alienating states that would like to decrease their reliance on Russian arms but cannot realistically transition entirely away from them. India is a great example of this. India is faced with growing Chinese aggression along its northern border in addition to the increasing unreliability of Russia, and has participated in $20 billion in defense contracts with the US in the last decade and a half. It is also a key member of the Quad Group along with Australia, Japan, and the US, a coalition that has increasingly taken on military dimensions to oppose China’s territorial incursions. To place sanctions on such a critical regional player would be counterproductive to long-term US interests while likely having little effect on Indian arms acquisitions or the Russian ability to wage war. 

Vietnam-US relations are even more complicated, given the bitter shared history of the two nations and the complex relationship each has with China. No country on Earth better understands the worst that either power is capable of, nor better understands the need to avoid another armed conflict with a global power. Yet with China on the rise and Russia increasingly in lock-step with Beijing and a global pariah, the US increasingly looks like a good option for Vietnam. Chinese influence in the neighboring states of Laos and Cambodia has been on the rise in recent years, worrying many in Hanoi that China seeks to solidify its role as regional hegemon. Meanwhile, the volume of trade with the US has increased as has military cooperation, a sign that Vietnam is ready to pursue closer relations. However, difficulties still remain and will likely persist for years to come. The US withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) came as a blow to bilateral relations and a warning to Hanoi that American policy can shift unexpectedly. On the American side, the optics of working too closely with one of the few remaining Cold War era communist regimes are bad and will likely limit cooperation, particularly as many veterans of the Vietnam War and their families remain in the electorate. Vietnam also has a very weak human rights record, which should give American diplomats pause. It is a single-party state without freedom of speech or press that has increasingly cracked down on dissident journalists in recent years. Admittedly there are few better options in the region, with Freedom House giving almost every state in Southeast Asia a rating of “Not Free”. It is tempting to lean into a cynical doctrine of realpolitik on this issue, but America’s Cold War experience should demonstrate the “enemy of my enemy is my friend” doctrine creates far more problems than it solves. 

The US faces a difficult diplomatic course in South and East Asia, one in which compromise will be necessary and strong alliances will be few and far between. Neither India nor Vietnam is likely to end all ties to Russia or become ideal democracies any time soon, but long-term thinking will yield results. The increasing intolerability of Chinese and Russian power-grabs will leave no good alternatives to stronger ties to the United States. All that is necessary is for the US to remain committed to protecting national sovereignty in Asia and to understand that diplomatic progress will come by degrees.