Burmese Unrest Revisited
Robert Cole
Before we begin, a quick note on terminology: The nation formerly known only as Burma in English-speaking circles is now according to the government to be known as Myanmar. However, the Burmese linguistic equivalents for both words are still used by native speakers depending on the context, and the military junta that made the decision to go with “Myanmar” was motivated by complex political interests that deserve a blog post of their own. Internationally, there remains division over the naming, with the UN, France, and Japan using Myanmar, and the US and the UK using Burma. Both terms are politically and culturally loaded among Burmese people, but in absence of a clear standard, I will be using both interchangeably. For another perspective, please read Internationalist contributor Joshua O’Brian’s February 14th blog post on the topic.
Less than two months ago, I wrote a post about the coup that ousted the government of Aung Sang Suu Kyi from power in Naypyidaw and returned the Burmese military to power. Even then it seemed likely that strong resistance would emerge from a people fed up with decades of military meddling, but to what degree and how the military would respond was yet to be seen. The answer was a mixture of good news and bad. People rose up, most dramatically in the former capital and most populous city of Yangon, to protest what was clearly an illegitimate seizure of power. At first, the military showed some restraint and no live rounds were fired into crowds. However, eight days after the coup and two days after my post, the first known instance of live round use occurred, leaving two protesters wounded. Since then, the military police have killed over 550 people, including almost 50 children, and detained thousands of others. By the time this post is published, those numbers will likely have risen even higher.
Yet the protests have only grown in scale, and at least three of Myanmar’s armed resistance groups have jointly pledged retaliation if the military does not back down. The entry of rebel groups into the fray is important because it signals a unity of cause unimaginable before the coup. One of the signatories of the retaliation pledge is the Arakan Army, a group best known for being the Suu Kyi government’s stated target and main opponent during the Rohingya Genocide that began in 2016. It now finds itself in alliance with Suu Kyi’s supporters, and the dismal support the military demonstrated in the last election means nearly the entire country is united against it. However, as Venezuela has demonstrated over the past few years, it is difficult for opposition groups without some measure of military support to topple a regime. While resistance groups like the Arakan Army have been able to survive military assault, they are limited to the far west and northeast of the country and do not represent a serious challenge to the military outside of the periphery. Given that almost all of them are ethnic separatist organizations, their opposition to the military crackdown is likely an attempt to generate sympathy for their efforts rather than directly challenge the authorities in Naypyidaw. The only other source of potential support, Myanmar’s neighbors, have shown little interest in fueling a civil war, and are principally interested in regional stability.
Armed only with their anger, the Burmese people are unlikely to be able to topple the generals through force of arms. In all likelihood, they will continue to be mowed down by a regime whose psyche is dominated by a fear of its own people. Ultimately, the power to stop the violence rests with the Burmese military and its tacit supporters in New Delhi, Beijing, Bangkok, and Dhaka. If the leaders of any or most preferably all of its neighbors leveled sanctions against the military, the Burmese people would likely have a much brighter road ahead of them.