Chaos, Change, and 2026: Colombia’s Election Outlook
On the morning of August 11th, Colombians woke up to the news that presidential candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay had died after nearly two months in critical condition following an attack in Bogotá’s Modelia neighborhood during a campaign event. His assassination leaves the country in a vulnerable and unstable position on the verge of crucial elections. At the same time, the nation is also reckoning with the legacy of its first leftist government under Gustavo Petro, making it important to look at the achievements and failures of his presidency, now entering its final stretch. The effects of his legacy, together with the shockwaves from a politically high-profile assassination, could shape the outcome of Colombia’s 2026 elections.
Gustavo Petro leads Colombia’s first leftist government, a historic move that has made governing a complicated task. His coalition brought together leftist parties, indigenous and social movements, and progressive groups, which has made implementing a coherent and unified agenda a real challenge. Expectations were enormous, and while not everything has been achieved, there have been measurable gains. The economy grew 2.7% in the first quarter of 2025, mostly driven by private consumption, which now represents more than three-quarters of the country’s GDP. Unemployment has steadily fallen, reaching 8.8% in July 2025, down from 9.9% the year before. Poverty has also improved, dropping slightly to 31.8% in 2024, even as inequalities continue to cut deep across regions and social groups.
These numbers, however, tell only part of the story.
On the economic front, Colombia’s fiscal deficit has reached 12.5 trillion pesos. Experts predict that public debt could reach up to 63% of the country's GDP, a level not seen in the last 20 years. While some of this comes from inherited pandemic-related obligations, Petro’s ambitious spending plans and subsidy programs have stretched the budget further. And although unemployment has fallen and more Colombians are working, the quality of jobs is worrying: as of late 2024, 86% of the new employment was self-generated in the informal sector, leaving over half of the workforce without social security coverage.
Political and security issues are also among the pressing considerations Colombian voters have to decide on next year. Petro’s reform agenda has further polarized the country, while corruption scandals and constant cabinet reshuffles have eroded trust in the government. In terms of security, the “total peace” plan, meant to bring simultaneous negotiations with guerrilla groups and criminal networks, has largely failed. Violence remains a daily reality, with 81 social, political, and environmental leaders killed this year alone. The assassination of presidential candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay, carried out by a 14-year-old allegedly linked to the Segunda Marquetalia, and recent terrorist attacks in Cali that left 18 dead and dozens injured both demonstrate not only how fragile Colombia’s security situation remains but also how deeply insecurity could shape the political agenda in 2026. In a country where citizens already distrust institutions, the persistence of violence risks pushing voters toward candidates who promise order above all else, even at the expense of broader reforms.
Internationally, Petro’s record has been uneven and at times contradictory. Relations with Washington have become strained: earlier this year, mass deportations of Colombians from the United States and threats of sanctions exposed the fragility of diplomatic channels between the two countries. The tension is especially striking given Colombia’s traditional role as Washington’s closest partner in the region, raising questions about whether Petro is willing to risk that alignment in pursuit of a more independent foreign policy. At the same time, his administration has drawn closer to Beijing, formally joining the Belt and Road Initiative and welcoming an influx of trade and infrastructure investment. This shift has also fueled domestic debate over whether dependence on China could be beneficial in diversifying international partnerships or detrimental, as it could create new vulnerabilities. Petro has likewise positioned Colombia more assertively in the Middle East: by severing ties with Israel and publicly calling for humanitarian support for Gaza, he aligned himself with progressive movements at home and abroad, but also deepened polarization within Colombia and added to the perception among critics that his foreign policy is driven more by ideology than by pragmatic calculation.
So what does this mean for 2026? Colombians are heading into an election clouded by uncertainty, where Petro’s mixed legacy collides with a wave of insecurity and political violence. The assassination of Miguel Uribe Turbay was not just a tragedy but a turning point, amplifying fear and reminding voters how fragile the country’s democracy could be. In many ways, the current political climate is a reminder of the volatility that has long defined Latin American politics: moments of crisis opening the door to both instability and uncertainty. As Colombia moves closer to 2026, voters may find themselves casting ballots less out of conviction and more out of fear, mistrust, or simply hope of clinging to some sense of order.