The Fall of Avdiivka
As the sun set on the afternoon of February 17, Ukrainian forces withdrew from the embattled town of Avdiivka, located northwest of the major eastern city of Donetsk. Following months of attritional fighting that put Ukrainian and Russian artillery capabilities and resolve to the test, Ukrainian positions seem to have become untenable. Ukrainian units, possessing less manpower and hindered by a force regeneration structure that struggles to meet operational demands, chose to live to fight another day. This assessment, while far from exhaustive, integrates a discussion of core issues related to the defense of Avdiivka.
Avdiivka took center stage in October 2023 in assessments of the ongoing positional fighting in eastern Ukraine. Over the following months, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) has routinely noted marginal but persistent Russian gains in the meager heights and industrial areas along the outskirts of town. Until the past week, fighting around Avdiivka produced only marginal gains (one facility, the Avdiivka Coke Plant, was contested for months), at a high cost for Russian offensive units (Ukrainian, British, and American sources assess tens of thousands of Russian casualties).
In addition to high human costs, open source analysts have calculated Russian armor losses in the battle for Avdiivka as totaling north of 220 tanks and 350 armored fighting vehicles. This, Forbes notes, constitutes nearly an entire mechanized division (as conceptualized in Soviet design) worth of tanks. Ukrainian losses, according to the same analyst, total 20 tanks and 16 armored fighting vehicles. These highly attritional figures were partly the result of a series of disastrous mechanized attacks in October. Such attacks are emblematic of frequent Russian failures to utilize armored assets to achieve operational success without accepting high losses, as demonstrated throughout the war.
Though high Russian losses make the capture of Avdiivka a Pyrrhic victory at best, this development will likely mark an informational and morale victory for Putin’s forces. The capture of Avdiivka is reminiscent of the fall of Bakhmut, where each inch of Ukrainian soil was fought over for months, resulting in unfathomable Russian losses but eventual territorial capture. Though Russian milbloggers and pundits may rejoice for several weeks over this apparent success, there is little evidence to suggest that the Russian capture of Avdiivka will lead to significant shifts in the operational environment.
Avdiivka has been a point of contention since the conflict in eastern Ukraine began in 2014; its proximity to Russian-held Donetsk City placed it along the frontlines of the low-intensity conflict fought since the first invasion. As a result, the towns lying to the immediate west have long been fortified, and evidence strongly suggests that Ukrainian forces are now pulling back to prepared defensive positions. The very nature of the Russian capture of Avdiivka, characterized by slow advances and an inability to conduct more advanced encircling maneuvers, suggests that a newfound Russian ability to make significant battlefield advances in this sector of the frontline is likely nonexistent. For a variety of reasons that cannot be covered here due to space constraints, it is unlikely that either Russian or Ukrainian forces will manage significant rapid advances in this sector in the short term (as defined by the next two months). Former General Zaluzhny’s November essay on positional warfare is a solid starting point for understanding the lack of advances that now defines the conflict. Thus, while Putin may have a victory to tout to the Russian people ahead of the upcoming presidential election, the fall of Avdiivka is unlikely to be strategically decisive.
What will prove strategically decisive, however, is the outcome of the seemingly endless political wrangling over Ukraine aid currently taking place in the U.S. House of Representatives. Due to the determination of some elements of the Republican Party to obstruct vital aid shipments to Ukraine, allegedly in the name of border security, Ukraine is now contending with a “critical shortage” of air defense missiles. As the New York Times notes, American officials believe Ukraine will run out of interceptor missiles for critical air defense systems in March.
Ukraine has also confronted artillery shortages, especially in NATO-standard 155mm rounds, for weeks. Though this is partly due to Ukraine’s European partners falling behind in shell production and deliveries, both France and Germany this week signed defense agreements with Ukraine. The German package, notably, includes advanced howitzers, 122mm artillery ammunition, and additional air defense assets. Its French counterpart represents the largest annual sum provided by the nation to Ukraine since the 2022 invasion. Though Ukraine’s European allies continue to make significant contributions to the war effort, American financial and military aid is, as German Chancellor Olaf Scholz recently reiterated, “indispensable.”
The fall of Avdiivka, an eventuality expected for several weeks to become reality by some in defense circles, thus comes at a high cost to Russian forces. Due to the broader dynamics of the conflict, this Russian advancement is unlikely to mark the beginning of a period of Russian operational successes. The fall of Avdiivka is situated within a strategic environment marked by continued positional warfare, tactical stalemate, and shrinking Ukrainian munition levels. Over the next few months, Ukrainians will continue fighting to defend their families and independence, making do with dwindling stocks of ammunition and seeking to retain hope that their most critical allies will once again rise to the occasion to support their defense.
Author’s note: This assessment only scratches the surface of the complex operational environment Ukraine’s troops now find themselves in. As such, the author recommends further reading on related topics for those who wish to bolster their understanding of the issue, including but not limited to: the delay in provision of F-16 fighter jets, the bipartisan border legislation tied to Ukraine aid, the Ukrainian military command shakeup (1), (2), and potential Russian capability to establish short-term, local air superiority (rare in this conflict).